According to the orthodox treatment of risk preferences in decision theory, they are to be explained in terms of the agent's desires about concrete outcomes. The orthodoxy has been criticised both for conflating two types of attitudes and for committing agents to attitudes that do not seem rationally required. To avoid these problems, it has been suggested that an agent's attitudes to risk should be captured by a risk function that is independent of her utility and probability functions. The main (...) problem with that approach is that it suggests that attitudes to risk are wholly distinct from people's (non-instrumental) desires. To overcome this problem, we develop a framework where an agent's utility function is defined over chance propositions (i.e., propositions describing objective probability distributions) as well as ordinary (non-chance) ones, and argue that one should explain different risk attitudes in terms of different forms of the utility function over such propositions. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Offsetting is a very ineffective way to do good. Offsetting your lifetime emissions may increase aggregated life expectancy by at most seven years, while giving the amount it costs to offset your lifetime emissions to a malaria charity saves in expectation the life of at least one child. Is there any moral reason to offset rather than giving to some charity that does good so much more effectively? There might be such a reason if your offsetting compensated or somehow (...) benefitted the victims of your emission, since that could mean that you would satisfy the duty not to harm others by emitting and offsetting. But that is typically not true. If your emission harms some person and your offsetting benefits some person, then these are most likely different people. Hence, I conclude, we have a stronger reason to give to effective charities than we have to offset our emissions. (shrink)

Many philosophers think that we should use a lottery to decide who gets a good to which two persons have an equal claim but which only one person can get. Some philosophers think that we should save identified persons from harm even at the expense of saving a somewhat greater number of statistical persons from the same harm. I defend a principled way of justifying both judgements, namely, by appealing to the decreasing marginal moral value of survival chances. I identify (...) four desiderata that, I contend, any such justification should satisfy, and explain how my account meets these desiderata, unlike some previous accounts. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that indeterminacy and indeterminism make most ordinary counterfactuals false. I argue that a plausible way to avoid such counterfactual skepticism is to postulate the existence of primitive modal facts that serve as truth-makers for counterfactual claims. Moreover, I defend a new theory of ‘might’ counterfactuals, and develop assertability and knowledge criteria to suit such unobservable ‘counterfacts’.

1. Barry and Cullity (2022b) argue that when morally assessing a person’s climate actions,1 we should ask how these actions affect other people’s prospects.2 For the present purposes, we can unders...

Long‐term potentiation (LTP) of excitatory synapses is a leading model to explain the concept of information storage in the brain. Multiple mechanisms contribute to LTP, but central amongst them is an increased sensitivity of the postsynaptic membrane to neurotransmitter release. This sensitivity is predominantly determined by the abundance and localization of AMPA‐type glutamate receptors (AMPARs). A combination of AMPAR structural data, super‐resolution imaging of excitatory synapses, and an abundance of electrophysiological studies are providing an ever‐clearer picture of how AMPARs are (...) recruited and organized at synaptic junctions. Here, we review the latest insights into this process, and discuss how both cytoplasmic and extracellular receptor elements cooperate to tune the AMPAR response at the hippocampal CA1 synapse. (shrink)

At a meeting of the Physical Society of London in 1925 participants expressed their concerns regarding a recent suggestion by the Australian physicist T. H. Laby for replicating the established value of the mechanical equivalent of heat. This rather controversial discussion about the value of redetermining this numerical fact brings to light different understandings of the moral economy of accuracy in scientific work; it signals a distinctive new stage in the historical understanding of accuracy and precision and the moral integrity (...) in conducting research. (shrink)

Peircean scholars in particular and historians of philosophy in general will welcome this initial volume of a new critical edition of the most important writings of this scientist/philosopher, not inaptly referred to as the "Socrates of America" because of the richness of seminal ideas to be found in his philosophical speculations. Until now, students of his basic philosophy have had to rely mainly on the topological Hartshorne-Weiss edition of his "collected works," which introduced the philosophical world to the goldmine of (...) original conceptions to be found in this hitherto unknown thinker. Like virtually all systematic philosophers, however, Peirce's seminal notions underwent development during almost six decades of literary activity. Those reading his collected works soon discovered that to reach any adequate idea of his system, they needed to know not only the time the item was written but also its context, and this meant going back to the manuscripts in the Houghton Library of Harvard, available in microfilm. It was here the enterprising researcher was confronted with substantial problems, for the material contained therein, would run to approximately a hundred thousand printed pages. Many of the manuscripts were repetitious, representing subsequent working drafts, but each with some new and exciting idea or important digression. The serious and intrigued scholar was both prompted on the one hand to pursue a particular topic further and at the same time repelled by the time and effort required to do so. It was to remedy this unhappy situation, particularly in view of the widespread growing interest in America's most original thinker both here and abroad, that resulted in the creation of the "Pierce Edition Project" at Indiana University/purdue University of Indianapolis under the general editorship of that internationally famous Peirce scholar, Max H. Fisch, aided by a staff directed by Professor Edward C. Moore. Almost a decade has passed since they began the gargantuan task of sifting through the mass of unpublished manuscripts, arranging dated items in chronological order, and determining as far as possible from paper watermarkings, similarity of thought and expression, etc. the approximate time of composition of the numerous bits and pieces of undated material spanning a period of some sixty years. More than three years time was devoted to this dating process alone, and the job of determining the final ordering and renumbering of the known manuscripts assigned to the project's principal associate editor, Christian J. W. Kloessel. In the Preface to the present volume, Moore sets out the general plan of this elaborate edition. "Each volume will contain a brief historical introduction giving an account of the activities of Peirce within its time span, including the work he was doing in the sciences, in mathematics, and in the history of science. Each volume will also include a single chronological list of all the papers Peirce wrote within the period covered by that volume. Thus readers who wish to make a thorough study of Peirce's work will find within each volume a guide to the complete Peirce corpus for the years of the particular volume. The historical introduction near the beginning and the chronological list near the end of each volume will serve as a frame for the papers that appear between them. It is hoped that reference to these additional materials will provide a comprehensive sense of Peirce's work in mathematics, the sciences, and philosophy". Because most of the texts in this initial volume exist only in a manuscript form of a working copy, never intended for publication as they exist, with their haphazard punctuation, phonetic spellings, abbreviations, etc., the editors felt it necessary to append over a hundred pages of editorial notes to satisfy the most meticulous historiophile who might like to reconstruct the original form of the writings in question, but which to the general user will probably seem to be an unnecessary expenditure of time and effort that might have been used to better purpose. Be that as it may, those interested in the history of ideas will be more than gratified that the many years of careful and patient labor by the editorial staff of the Peirce Edition Project at the Indiana University/ Purdue University of Indianapolis has begun to bear fruit. (shrink)

Neoclassical economists use expected utility theory to explain, predict, and prescribe choices under risk, that is, choices where the decision-maker knows---or at least deems suitable to act as if she knew---the relevant probabilities. Expected utility theory has been subject to both empirical and conceptual criticism. This chapter reviews expected utility theory and the main criticism it has faced. It ends with a brief discussion of subjective expected utility theory, which is the theory neoclassical economists use to explain, predict, and prescribe (...) choices under uncertainty, that is, choices where the decision-maker cannot act on the basis of objective probabilities but must instead consult her own subjective probabilities. (shrink)

Bartha and DesRoches (2021) and Steel and Bartha (2023) argue that we should understand the precautionary principle as the injunction to maximise lexical utilities. They show that the lexical utility model has important pragmatic advantages. Moreover, the model has the theoretical advantage of satisfying all axioms of expected utility theory except continuity. In this paper I raise a trilemma for any attempt at modelling the precautionary principle with lexical utilities: it permits choice cycles or leads to paralysis or implies that (...) the smallest value difference that is possible in a context has extreme axiological implications. (shrink)

We present an epistemological schema of natural sciences inspired by Peirce's pragmaticist view, stressing the role of the \emph{phenomenological map}, that connects reality and our ideas about it. The schema has a recognisable mathematical/logical structure which allows to explore some of its consequences. We show that seemingly independent principles as the requirement of reproducibility of experiments and the Principle of Sufficient Reason are both implied by the schema, as well as Popper's concept of falsifiability. We show that the schema has (...) some power in demarcating science by first comparing with an alternative schema advanced during the first part of the 20th century which has its roots in Hertz and has been developed by Einstein and Popper. Further, the identified differences allow us to focus in the construction of Special Relativity, showing that it uses an intuited concept of velocity that does not satisfy the requirements of reality in Peirce. While the main mathematical observation connected with this issue has been known for more than a century, it has not been investigated from an epistemological point of view. A probable reason could be that the socially dominating epistemology in physics does not encourage such line of work. We briefly discuss the relation of the abduction process presented in this work with discussions regarding ``abduction'' in the literature and its relation with ``analogy''. (shrink)

Peircean scholars in particular and historians of philosophy in general will welcome this initial volume of a new critical edition of the most important writings of this scientist/philosopher, not inaptly referred to as the "Socrates of America" because of the richness of seminal ideas to be found in his philosophical speculations. Until now, students of his basic philosophy have had to rely mainly on the topological Hartshorne-Weiss edition of his "collected works," which introduced the philosophical world to the goldmine of (...) original conceptions to be found in this hitherto unknown thinker. Like virtually all systematic philosophers, however, Peirce's seminal notions underwent development during almost six decades of literary activity. Those reading his collected works soon discovered that to reach any adequate idea of his system, they needed to know not only the time the item was written but also its context, and this meant going back to the manuscripts in the Houghton Library of Harvard, available in microfilm. It was here the enterprising researcher was confronted with substantial problems, for the material contained therein, would run to approximately a hundred thousand printed pages. Many of the manuscripts were repetitious, representing subsequent working drafts, but each with some new and exciting idea or important digression. The serious and intrigued scholar was both prompted on the one hand to pursue a particular topic further and at the same time repelled by the time and effort required to do so. It was to remedy this unhappy situation, particularly in view of the widespread growing interest in America's most original thinker both here and abroad, that resulted in the creation of the "Pierce Edition Project" at Indiana University/purdue University of Indianapolis under the general editorship of that internationally famous Peirce scholar, Max H. Fisch, aided by a staff directed by Professor Edward C. Moore. Almost a decade has passed since they began the gargantuan task of sifting through the mass of unpublished manuscripts, arranging dated items in chronological order, and determining as far as possible from paper watermarkings, similarity of thought and expression, etc. the approximate time of composition of the numerous bits and pieces of undated material spanning a period of some sixty years. More than three years time was devoted to this dating process alone, and the job of determining the final ordering and renumbering of the known manuscripts assigned to the project's principal associate editor, Christian J. W. Kloessel. In the Preface to the present volume, Moore sets out the general plan of this elaborate edition. "Each volume will contain a brief historical introduction giving an account of the activities of Peirce within its time span, including the work he was doing in the sciences, in mathematics, and in the history of science. Each volume will also include a single chronological list of all the papers Peirce wrote within the period covered by that volume. Thus readers who wish to make a thorough study of Peirce's work will find within each volume a guide to the complete Peirce corpus for the years of the particular volume. The historical introduction near the beginning and the chronological list near the end of each volume will serve as a frame for the papers that appear between them. It is hoped that reference to these additional materials will provide a comprehensive sense of Peirce's work in mathematics, the sciences, and philosophy". Because most of the texts in this initial volume exist only in a manuscript form of a working copy, never intended for publication as they exist, with their haphazard punctuation, phonetic spellings, abbreviations, etc., the editors felt it necessary to append over a hundred pages of editorial notes to satisfy the most meticulous historiophile who might like to reconstruct the original form of the writings in question, but which to the general user will probably seem to be an unnecessary expenditure of time and effort that might have been used to better purpose. Be that as it may, those interested in the history of ideas will be more than gratified that the many years of careful and patient labor by the editorial staff of the Peirce Edition Project at the Indiana University/ Purdue University of Indianapolis has begun to bear fruit. (shrink)

Rowe has recently argued that pure risk of harm cannot itself be a harm. I respond to Rowe and argue that given an appropriate understanding of objective probabilities, pure objective risk of harm can itself be a harm.

The de minimis principle states that some risks are so trivial that they can be ignored or treated categorically differently from non-trivial risks. Lundgren and Stefánsson criticize the de minimis principle, arguing that it either has to be applied locally or globally and that problems arise whichever application is chosen. Aven and Seif respond to Lundgren and Stefánsson’s argument and defend the de minimis principle as a “meaningful and useful perspective for handling risk in practice.” The response highlights some aspects (...) of the argument in Lundgren and Stefánsson that needs clarification, which is what we do in this note. (shrink)

Catastrophic risk raises questions that are not only of practical importance, but also of great philosophical interest, such as how to define catastrophe and what distinguishes catastrophic outcomes from non-catastrophic ones. Catastrophic risk also raises questions about how to rationally respond to such risks. How to rationally respond arguably partly depends on the severity of the uncertainty, for instance, whether quantitative probabilistic information is available, or whether only comparative likelihood information is available, or neither type of information. Finally, catastrophic risk (...) raises important ethical questions about what to do when catastrophe avoidance conflicts with equity promotion. (shrink)

Those who are risk averse with respect to money, and thus turn down some gambles with positive monetary expectations, are nevertheless often willing to accept bundles involving multiple such gambles. Therefore, it might seem that such people should become more willing to accept a risky but favourable gamble if they put it in context with the collection of gambles that they predict they will be faced with in the future. However, it turns out that when a risk averse person adopts (...) the long-term perspective, she faces a decision-problem that can be analysed as a noncooperative game between different “time-slices” of herself, where it is in the interest of each time-slice (given its prediction about other slices) to turn down the gamble with which it is faced. Hence, even if a risk averse but rational person manages to take the long-term perspective, she will, in the absence of what Hardin called “mutual coercion”, end up in a situation analogous to the “tragedy of the commons”. (shrink)

In the present essay we attempt to reconstruct Newtonian mechanics under the guidance of logical principles and of a constructive approach related to the genetic epistemology of Piaget and García (Psychogenesis and the history of science, Columbia University Press, New York, 1989). Instead of addressing Newton’s equations as a set of axioms, ultimately given by the revelation of a prodigious mind, we search for the fundamental knowledge, beliefs and provisional assumptions that can produce classical mechanics. We start by developing our (...) main tool: the no arbitrariness principle, that we present in a form that is apt for a mathematical theory as classical mechanics. Subsequently, we introduce the presence of the observer, analysing then the relation objective–subjective and seeking objectivity going across subjectivity. We take special care of establishing the precedence among all contributions to mechanics, something that can be better appreciated by considering the consequences of removing them: (a) the consequence of renouncing logic and the laws of understanding is not being able to understand the world, (b) renouncing the early elaborations of primary concepts such as time and space leads to a dissociation between everyday life and physics, the latter becoming entirely pragmatic and justified a-posteriori (because it is convenient), (c) changing our temporary beliefs has no real cost other than effort. Finally, we exemplify the present approach by reconsidering the constancy of the velocity of light. It is shown that it is a result of Newtonian mechanics, rather than being in contradiction with it. We also indicate the hidden assumption that leads to the (apparent) contradiction. (shrink)

A social planner who evaluates risky public policies in light of the other risks with which their society will be faced should judge favourably some such policies even though they would deem them too risky when considered in isolation. I suggest that a longtermist would—or at least should—evaluate risky polices in light of their prediction about future risks; hence, longtermism supports social risk-taking. I consider two formal versions of this argument, discuss the conditions needed for the argument to be valid, (...) and briefly compare these conditions to some risky policy options with which actual public decision-makers are faced. (shrink)

On the basis of the archival materials, first identified by the authors, and the published historical sources that have not yet come to the attention of historians of science, this article reconstructs the biography of Johann Christian Weltzien (1767–1829), doctor of medicine and surgery. In 1785, Weltzien became a court physician. In 1799, in the retinue of Grand Duke Konstantin Pavlovich, he participated in Italian and Swiss military campaigns. After that, Weltzien was assigned to the Сourt of Grand Duke Konstantin (...) Pavlovich of Russia and stayed at his court until 1810. He started his charitable activities in the Medico-Philanthropic Committee. From May 1810 to the middle of 1825, Weltzien was a physician at the Imperial Page Corps. It turned out that around the same time, in 1804–1825, he was a member of the Medical Council. Furthermore, as there were two medical councils under two ministries at the time, in 1811–1822, he was a member of both. Since 1825, Weltzien lived on his estate in Somel, now Vaiatu Manor in Estonia, and died in St. Petersburg. Weltzien’s work as a provincial physician prompted him to write a book on medical police, which was published in 1785. It has been established that this remained his only book on the topic. The article shows that Weltzien became one of the first ideologists of state care for public health in the Russian Empire. Weltzien’s ideas, expressed over 200 years ago, regarding the state having mechanisms to impact public health and the importance of not excluding it from solving health problems have not lost their significance even today. (shrink)

Is 'n transendentale kritiek religieus bepaald? deur V. Brümmer. -- Constitution and creativity in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, by A. L. Conradie. -- Studium Generale, deur H. J. De Vleeschauwer. -- Sociology of law and its philosophical foundtions, by H. Dooyeweerd. -- Beginvrae en antwoorde in der Wysbegeerte, deur P. G. W. Du Plesis. -- Max Scheler's concern with the highest perfection, by S. I. M. Du Plessis. -- Christelike wetenskap, highest perfection, by S. I. M. Deu Plessis. -- (...) Christelike wetenskap, deur B. Duvenage. -- Malan's critical study, by H. Hart. -- Raakpunte vir 'n dialoog met 'n Christelike Wysbegeerte, deur A. M. T. Meyer. -- Nuwe gedagtes oor die begrip Natuurwet, deur A. H. Murray. -- Die voorwaardes vir die uitbou van 'n wysgerige antropologie, deur C. K. Oberholzer. -- De structuur van feit-en-betekenis, deur K. J. Popma. -- The relation of the arts to the presentation of the truth, by C. G. Seerveld. -- Gezag en vrijheid in het licht van Gods Woord, deur J. Stellingwerff. -- Voorveronderstellings vir 'n filosogie van die opvoeding, deur J. A. L. Taljaard. -- Objektiwiteit, sekularisasie en geskiedenis, deur N. T. Van der Merwe. -- Etiek: wetenskap van relasies, deur S. P. Van der Walt. -- Wetten en feiten, deur C. A. Van Peursen. -- Enige opmerkingen over entiteiten, deur H. Van Riessen. -- Richard Kroner on Herman Dooyeweerd, by C. Van Til. -- De mens in de taalkunde, deur P. A. Verburg, -- Enkele motieven van het anti-militair pacifisme, deur S, U. Zuidema. -- Publications of prof. dr. H. G. Stoker. Publikasies van prof. dr. H. G. Stoker (p. 303-311). (shrink)

Suppose that a decision-maker's aim, under certainty, is to maximise some continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare. Can such a decision-maker rationally satisfy what has been called "continuity for easy cases" while at the same time satisfying what seems to be a widespread intuition against the full-blown continuity axiom of expected utility theory? In this note I argue that the answer is "no": given transitivity and a weak trade-off principle, continuity for easy cases violates the anti-continuity (...) intuition. I end the note by exploring an even weaker continuity condition that is consistent with the aforementioned intuition. (shrink)

Taguergoust (Morocco), history; Cities and towns; Morocco; history.

The purpose of the work was to produce a framework to guide the development of meritorious clinical trial proposals. The framework consists of essential features of rigourous methodology, ethical acceptability, and a component referred to as "community context". These three domains were woven together in a checklist format under the headings of general, scientific and ethical considerations. Since texts concerning clinical trial methodology do not integrate ethics criteria and ethics guidelines do not provide detailed scientific criteria in obvious and practical (...) ways, we outline a more contemporary and comprehensive set of guidelines. (shrink)

This paper explores the different ways in which conditionals can be carriers of good and bad news. I suggest a general measure of the desirability of conditionals, and use it to explore the different ways in which conditionals can have news value. I conclude by arguing that the desirability of a counterfactual conditional cannot be reduced to the desirability of factual propositions.

Hans Skjervheim har hatt stor betydning for norsk åndsliv og offentlig ordskifte. Han hadde en unik evne til å vise hvordan tidløse filosofiske problemstillinger ikke bare angår fagfilosofer, men også er til stede i den politiske debatt og i hverdagens små og store utfordringer. Mange forbinder nok Skjervheim særlig med ±positivismestriden? på 1960- og 1970-tallet. Denne antologien viser bredden i virksomheten hans, og at mange av Skjervheims tekster har noe betydelig å si om også vår egen tids utfordringer - blant (...) annet om tiltroen til vitenskapen, filosofiens rolle, forvitringen av den liberale orden, økologisk krise, algoritmestyrte sosiale medier, ±fake news? og identitetspolitikk. Forfatterne er en blanding av en eldre garde, som skrev og virket samtidig med Skjervheim, og en yngre garde bestående av toneangivende fagpersoner fra ulike fagområder i dag. De tar alle for seg en eller flere sentrale tekster av Skjervheim og leser dem inn i samtidige problemstillinger. Disse nylesningene aktualiserer og bruker av Skjervheims filosofiske og litterære arv, men peker også på blindflekker og svakheter i hans tenkning - helt i tråd med slik Skjervheim ønsket å bli lest. (shrink)

This book demonstrates the rich diversity and depth of political philosophy in the twentieth century. Catherine H. Zuckert has compiled a collection of essays recounting the lives of political theorists, connecting each biography with the theorist's life work and explaining the significance of the contribution to modern political thought. The essays are organized to highlight the major political alternatives and approaches. Beginning with essays on John Dewey, Carl Schmitt and Antonio Gramsci, representing the three main political alternatives - liberal, fascist (...) and communist - at mid-century, the book proceeds to consider the lives and works of émigrés such as Hannah Arendt, Eric Voegelin, and Leo Strauss, who brought a continental perspective to the United States after World War II. The second half of the collection contains essays on recent defenders of liberalism, such as Friedrich Hayek, Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls and liberalism's many critics, including Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Alasdair MacIntyre. (shrink)

_Explores questions concerning animals from a continental perspective._.

On the teachings of Prophet Muḥammad, d. 632 with reference to humanity.

jild-i 1. Falsafah -- jild-i 2. Andīshahʹhā-yi kalāmī va ijtimāʻī.