Can we speak and think about God? -- What is the question? -- Warranted belief in God -- The extended A/C model -- Faith -- Sealed upon our hearts -- Objections -- Defeaters? historical biblical criticism -- Defeaters? pluralism -- Defeaters? evil.

This book, one of the first full-length studies of the modalities to emerge from the debate to which Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Ruth Marcus, and others are contributing, is an exploration and defense of the notion of modality de re, the idea that objects have both essential and accidental properties. Plantinga develops his argument by means of the notion of possible worlds and ranges over such key problems as the nature of essence, transworld identity, negative existential propositions, and the existence (...) of unactual objects in other possible worlds. He also applies his logical theories to the elucidation of two problems in the philosophy of religion: the problem of evil and the ontological argument. (shrink)

In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment.

Examines both sides of this major dilemma, arguing that the conflict between science and theistic religion is actually superficial, and that at a deeper level they are in concord with each other.

This is the third volume in Alvin Plantinga's trilogy on the notion of warrant, which he defines as that which distinguishes knowledge from true belief. In this volume, Plantinga examines warrant's role in theistic belief, tackling the questions of whether it is rational, reasonable, justifiable, and warranted to accept Christian belief and whether there is something epistemically unacceptable in doing so. He contends that Christian beliefs are warranted to the extent that they are formed by properly functioning cognitive faculties, (...) thus, insofar as they are warranted, Christian beliefs are knowledge if they are true. (shrink)

Chapter 6 is an attempt to show that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals —i.e. the theory that any object exists in exactly one possible world—is false, and that there's no good reason to deny that objects exist in more than one world. First, arguments that attempt to show that a denial of TWI entails a contradiction fail, and the so‐called Problem of Transworld Identity is no problem at all. Second, TWI should be rejected because it entails that all of an (...) object's properties are essential to it. The defender of TWI may attempt to defend his view by adopting Counterpart Theory. I conclude by arguing that the Counterpart Theory is both semantically and metaphysically inadequate. (shrink)

Chapter 7 explores the question: Are there or could there be, possible but non‐existent objects? In the first half of the chapter, I critically assess the claim that an applied semantics for modal logic commits us to the claim that there are non‐existent possible objects. I conclude that it does commit us to there being some possible world distinct from the actual world that contains some object distinct from anything that exists in the actual world; but it does not, however, (...) commit us to the claim that there really are some things that do not exist. In the second half of the chapter, I develop a historically based argument for the conclusion that there are non‐existent possible objects, which I call the Classical Argument. Importantly, the Classical Argument presupposes that singular negative existentials are possible. I end the chapter by showing that certain objections to the possibility of singular negative existentials fail, and that such existentials are indeed possible. (shrink)

Chapter 7 concluded with the claim that the Classical Argument for possible non‐existent objects depends on both the possibility of singular negative existentials and the Ontological Principle. The Ontological Principle is the principle that any world in which a singular proposition is true is one in which there is such a thing as its subject, or in which its subject has being if not existence. In this chapter, I show that the Ontological Principle is false and that whatever plausibility it (...) enjoys is explained by the truth of a similar principle, namely, the Restricted Ontological Principle. Thus, the Classical Argument fails. Moreover, I give an account of how fictional names function in order to show that statements about fictional subjects, for example, ‘Othello is a Moor’, do not express predicative singular propositions. (shrink)

I clarify the notion of necessity that I will be examining in the book. In the first section, I claim that the relevant notion of necessity is ‘broad logical necessity’, which I distinguish from causal necessity, unrevisability and a proposition being self‐evident or a priori. In the second section, I distinguish between modality de dicto and modality de re. An assertion of modality de dicto predicates a modal property of another dictum or proposition, while a claim of modality de re (...) asserts of an object that it possess a property either essentially or contingently. I conclude by examining the use of the de dicto/de re distinction in the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, G.E. Moore, and Norman Malcolm. (shrink)

I begin by introducing the ideas of possible worlds, books on worlds, and essential properties. A possible world is a broadly logically possible state of affairs that is maximal. Furthermore, for any possible world W and proposition p, let the book on W be the set S of propositions such that p is a member of S if W entails p. Finally, an object x has property P essentially if and only if x has P and has it in every (...) world in which x exists. I use the above three concepts to give a sound argument for the conclusion that human persons are essentially immaterial. (shrink)

Plantinga examines the nature of epistemic warrant; whatever it is that when added to true belief yields knowledge. This volume surveys current contributions to the debate and paves the way for his owm positive proposal in Warrant and Proper Function.

This collection of essays and excerpts gives a comprehensive overview of Alvin Plantinga 's seminal work as a Christian philosopher of religion.

Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the objection to theism that holds that the conjunction of the propositions, God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and There is evil in the world, is necessarily false. The Free Will Defense is an effort to show the two propositions are compatible, and in the process (...) of the defence, I use the concept of transworld depravity. I then prove that the possibility that every essence suffers from such depravity entails that it is possible both that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and that there is evil in the world. I conclude by addressing special problems caused by natural evil and by arguing that the Probabilistic Problem of Evil is unsuccessful. (shrink)

I discuss three objections to essentialism. The first objection is from Gilbert Harman, who claims that because numbers can be identified or reduced to sets it follows that numbers cannot have essential properties. In the second objection, William Kneale argues for the conclusion that objects have essential properties only relative to a certain way of specifying or selecting the object. Kneale's argument suffers from a de re/de dicto confusion and the disambiguated reading of his argument is unsound. The third objection, (...) Quine's mathematical cyclist, contains a similar confusion. (shrink)

I explain modality de re in terms of modality de dicto because there are those who feel that modality de dicto is easier to understand. I argue that the de dicto properties of what I call the kernel proposition can indicate whether x has P essentially. I then provide directions on how to determine the kernel proposition for an object x and a property P. I conclude by addressing some objections. In particular, I argue that my account is not circular (...) despite its reliance on proper names. (shrink)

This book discusses and exemplifies the philosophy of religion, or philosophical reflection on central themes of religion.

The problem of evil has challenged religious minds and hearts throughout the ages. Just how can the presence of suffering, tragedy, and wrongdoing be squared with the all-powerful, all-loving God of faith? This book gathers some of the best, most meaningful recent reflections on the problem of evil, with contributions by shrewd thinkers in the areas of philosophy, theology, literature, linguistics, and sociology. In addition to bringing new insights to the old problem of evil, Christian Faith and the Problem of (...) Evil is set apart from similar volumes by the often-novel approaches its authors take to the subject. Many of the essays pursue classic lines in speculative philosophy, but others address the problem of evil through biblical criticism, the thought of Simone Weil, and the faith of battered women and African American slaves. As a result, this book will interest a wide range of readers. Contributors: Paul Draper Eduardo J. Echeverria Laura Waddell Ekstrom Stephen Griffith Del Kiernan-Lewis Richard T. McClelland Barbara Omolade Richard Otte Alvin Plantinga John R. Schneider Robert Stanley Peter van Inwagen Carol Winkelmann Keith D. Wyma. (shrink)

In Part I, I present two traditional arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge with human freedom; the first of these is clearly fallacious; but the second, the argument from the necessity of the past, is much stronger. In the second section I explain and partly endorse Ockham’s response to the second argument: that only propositions strictly about the past are accidentally necessary, and past propositions about God’s knowledge of the future are not strictly about the past. In the third (...) part I point out some startling implications of Ockham’s way out; and finally in part IV I offer an account of accidental necessity according to which propositions about the past are accidentally necessary if and only if they are strictly about the past. (shrink)

Can belief in God be rationally justified? Reviewing in detail traditional and modern arguments for and against the existence of God, Professor Plantinga concludes that they must all be judged unsuccessful. He then turns to the related philosophical problem of the existence of other minds, and defends the so-called analogical argument against current criticisms. He goes on to show, however, that although this argument affords us the best reasons we have for belief in other minds, it finally succumbs to the (...) same malady that afflicts the teleological argument of God. (shrink)

Sets of contingent objects, perhaps, are as contingent as their members; but properties, propositions, numbers and states of affairs, it seems, are objects whose non-existence is quite impossible. If so, however, how are they related to God? Suppose God has a nature: a property he has essentially that includes each property essential to him. Does God have a nature? And if he does, is there a conflict between God's sovereignty and his having a nature? How is God related to such (...) abstract objects as properties and propositions? These are the questions I want to explore. - Introduction. (shrink)

Is belief in God epistemically justified? That's the question at the heart of this volume in the Great Debates in Philosophy series, with Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley each addressing this fundamental question with distinctive arguments from opposing perspectives. The first half of the book contains each philosopher's explanation of his particular view; the second half allows them to directly respond to each other's arguments, in a lively and engaging conversation Offers the reader a one of a kind, interactive (...) discussion Forms part of the acclaimed Great Debates in Philosophy series. (shrink)

A collection of essays by contemporary Calvinist philosophers of religion that examine the epistemology of religious belief between Reformed and Roman Catholic philosophers.

“1950’li yıllarda dönemin büyük felsefecileri arasında dinsel inancı savunan bir kişi bile yoktu. 1990’lı yıllarda Yale’den UCLA’ya, Oxford’dan Heidelberg’e kadar birçok yerde insanın manevi yanını savunan ve geliştiren yüzlerce kitap yazılacak, sel olup akacaktı. Aradaki 40 yıllık süre zarfındaysa sadece ve sadece Alvin Plantinga vardı.” Kelly James Clark Tanrı’nın veya tanrıların varlığı sorusu felsefenin ezeli sorularından biri olagelmişse de Nietzsche’nin Tanrı’nın ölümünü ilan ettiği günden bu yana onu doğrularcasına yaşanan acılar, savaşlar, kötülükler bu konudaki tartışmaların sesini uzun süre bastırdı. (...) Ama özellikle yüzyılın ikinci yarısından sonra palazlanan analitik felsefede meydana gelen “metafiziğe dönüş”, dine yakınlık duyan, en azından dinle ilgilenen filozofların tekrar Yahudi-Hıristiyan ve İslam geleneklerinde anlaşıldığı şekliyle Tanrı’nın varlığına duyulan inancın gerekçelerini yeniden değerlendirmelerine, konuya yeni bir bakış ve araçlarla bakmalarına vesile oldu. Alvin Plantinga’nın bu kitabı, yayımlandığı tarihten itibaren “analitik din felsefesi” alanının da en önemli ve sarsıcı eserlerinden biri hâline geldi ve Tanrı’nın ölmediğini ilan etti. Anselmus’tan Hume’a, Kant ve pozitivistlerden John Mackie gibi modern ateologlara kadar felsefe geleneğiyle hesaplaşan Plantinga, bu abidevi çalışmasında ontolojik, kozmolojik ve teleolojik tanrı kanıtlamalarının eski ve yeni biçimlerinin çıkmazlarını, meziyetlerini ve sunduğu imkânları değerlendiriyor. Tanrı’nın varlığına duyulan inanç ile diğer insanların varlığına ve zihinlerine duyulan inanç arasındaki şaşırtıcı ve sarsıcı bağlantıyı ortaya koyuyor. (shrink)

Perhaps no one has done more in the last 30 years to advance thinking in the metaphysics of modality than has Alvin Plantinga. Collected here are some of his most important essays on this influential subject. Dating back from the late 1960's to the present, they chronicle the development of Plantinga's thoughts about some of the most fundamental issues in metaphysics: what is the nature of abstract objects like possible worlds, properties, propositions, and such phenomena? Are there possible but (...) non-actual objects? Can objects that do not exist exemplify properties? Plantinga gives thorough and penetrating to all of these questions and many others. This volume contains some of the best work in metaphysics from the past 30 years, and will remain a source of critical contention and keen interest among philosophers of metaphysics and philosophical logic for years to come. (shrink)

An exchange between Patrick Grim and Alvin Plantinga regarding Cantorian arguments against the possibility of an omniscient being.

This collection of essays and excerpts gives a comprehensive overview of Alvin Plantinga's seminal work as a Christian philosopher of religion.

Ateistler, kötülük probleminin Tanrı’nın varlığı aleyhine en güçlü argüman olduğu konusunda hâlâ ısrarcılar. Felsefe tarihine baktığımızda da Epikuros’tan Hume’a ve yakın dönemde Mackie’ye kadar uzanan bir yelpazede çeşitli düşünürler tarafından bu konuda birçok eleştirinin dile getirildiğini görmek mümkün. Plantinga bu çalışmasında felsefe tarihinin en köklü sorunlarından biri olan ‘Tanrı’nın varlığı sorusu’nu cevaplamaya çalışmakla kalmayıp felsefi bir yöntem ve soruşturmanın nasıl olması gerektiği konusunda muhteşem bir örnek de sunmaktadır. Plantinga, bu kitabıyla bizi, felsefe tarihinin en temel ilkelerinden birini hatırlamaya çağırıyor: var (...) olanın ardındakini anlamaya çalışmak. (shrink)