Coauthored with Merrilee Salmon, addresses archaeologists and other anthropologists interested in the nature of scientific explanation. A group called the new archaeologists, concerned to assure the scientific status of archaeology, had become convinced that a sine qua non of science is the construction of explanations conforming to Hempel's D‐N model. The authors aim was to show that a much wider class of covering law models of explanation is available, and that others in this set are more suitable than (...) the D‐N model for archaeology and anthropology. At the same time, they show that the so‐called systems approach, advocated by other archaeologists, has all of the shortcomings of the D‐N model without offering improvements in exchange. (shrink)

This collection of essays reexamines the origins of logical empiricism and offers fresh insights into its relationship to contemporary philosophy of science.

The author replaces his earlier explication of causal processes in terms of capacity for mark transmission with an analysis of the capacity for transmission of conserved quantities. This new theory was formulated in response to criticisms of Phil Dowe and Philip Kitcher. It relies heavily on modified versions of the seminal ideas of Phil Dowe, and overcomes a number of difficulties faced by the author's previous view. It eliminates a philosophically undesirable dependence on counterfactual conditions; it provides analyses of Y (...) and λ types of causal interactions; and it suggests an avenue for avoiding problems about laws of nature. (shrink)

With its seventeen papers roughly evenly divided between European and American scholars, Logical Empiricism is a welcome addition to the rapidly growing literature on that movement. It both broadens and deepens our understanding of the logical empiricists themselves. It shows their work often to have been continuous with that of more modern figures. And it explores from a variety of perspectives the connections both between science and philosophy and between the study of historical figures and problems and the ongoing systematic (...) work in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

Not since Ernest Nagel’s 1939 monograph on the theory of probability has there been a comprehensive elementary survey of the philosophical problems of probablity and induction. This is an authoritative and up-to-date treatment of the subject, and yet it is relatively brief and nontechnical. Hume’s skeptical arguments regarding the justification of induction are taken as a point of departure, and a variety of traditional and contemporary ways of dealing with this problem are considered. The author then sets forth his own (...) criteria of adequacy for interpretations of probability. Utilizing these criteria he analyzes contemporary theories of probability, as well as the older classical and subjective interpretations. (shrink)

The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view (a version of the epistemic conception) is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the (...) ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a robust argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the "reviewed view" of scientific explanation (that explanations are arguments) to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts. (shrink)

The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory (...) furnishes a robust argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the "reviewed view" of scientific explanation to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts. (shrink)

This is a short, cohesive collection of published articles by one of the top philosophers of science in the 20th century, Wesley C. Salmon.

The contributions to this special collection concern issues and problems discussed in or related to the work of Wesley C. Salmon. Salmon has long been noted for his important work in the philosophy of science, which has included research on the interpretation of probability, the nature of explanation, the character of reasoning, the justification of induction, the structure of space/time and the paradoxes of Zeno, to mention only some of the most prominent. During a time of increasing (...) preoccupation with historical and sociological approaches to under standing science (which characterize scientific developments as though they could be adequately analysed from the perspective of political movements, even mistaking the phenomena of conversion for the rational appraisal of scientific theories), Salmon has remained stead fastly devoted to isolating and justifying those normative standards distinguishing science from non-science - especially through the vindi cation of general principles of scientific procedure and the validation of specific examples of scientific theories - without which science itself cannot be (even remotely) adequately understood. In this respect, Salmon exemplifies and strengthens a splendid tradi tion whose most remarkable representatives include Hans Reichenbach, Rudolf Carnap and Carl G. Hempel, all of whom exerted a profound influence upon his own development. (shrink)

As Aristotle stated, scientific explanation is based on deductive argument--yet, Wesley C. Salmon points out, not all deductive arguments are qualified explanations. The validity of the explanation must itself be examined. _Four Decades of Scientific Explanation_ provides a comprehensive account of the developments in scientific explanation that transpired in the last four decades of the twentieth century. It continues to stand as the most comprehensive treatment of the writings on the subject during these years. Building on the historic (...) 1948 essay by Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” which introduced the deductive-nomological model on which most work on scientific explanation was based for the following four decades, Salmon goes beyond this model's inherent basis of describing empirical knowledge to tells us “not only _what,_ but also _why_.” Salmon examines the predominant models in chronological order and describes their development, refinement, and criticism or rejection. _Four Decades of Scientific Explanation_ underscores the need for a consensus of approach and ongoing evaluations of methodology in scientific explanation, with the goal of providing a better understanding of natural phenomena. (shrink)

Wesley Salmon is renowned for his seminal contributions to the philosophy of science. He has powerfully and permanently shaped discussion of such issues as lawlike and probabilistic explanation and the interrelation of explanatory notions to causal notions. This unique volume brings together twenty-six of his essays on subjects related to causality and explanation, written over the period 1971-1995. Six of the essays have never been published before and many others have only appeared in obscure venues. The volume includes (...) a section of accessible introductory pieces, as well as more advanced and technical pieces, and will make essential work in the philosophy of science readily available to both scholars and students. (shrink)

Through his S–R model of statistical relevance, Wesley Salmon offers a solution to the scientific explanation of objectively improbable events.

Outlines many different types of human understanding, and shows how scientific explanations enable us to understand the universe in which we live. It reflects on the great increases in scientific understanding during the past century, and exhibits the value of such understanding as we move into the twenty‐first century. The author recognizes the serious issues concerning values that face humanity at this time, and does not believe that science alone can solve these problems. He argues nevertheless that increased scientific understanding (...) can furnish the information we all need to formulate a responsible social policy. (shrink)

Can statistical inference shed any worthwhile light on theory change? For many years I have believed that the answer is “Yes.” Let me try to explain why I think so. On my first reading of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) I was so deeply shocked at his repudiation of the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification that I put the book down without finishing it. By 1969, when a conference was held (...) at the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science on the relations between the history of science and the philosophy of science, I had returned to Structure and formed the view that Kuhn’s rejection of this fundamental distinction resulted from his adoption of an inadequate conception of scientific justification. It appeared that he saw scientific confirmation in terms of the traditional hypothetico-deductive (H-D) schema, according to which a scientific hypothesis (or theory) is confirmed by observing the truth of its logical consequences. (shrink)

Challenges the widely held thesis that scientific explanations are arguments by posing three questions that seem to raise difficulties for it: Why are irrelevancies harmless to arguments but fatal to explanations? Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? Or, to reformulate essentially the same question, is genuine scientific explanation possible if indeterminism is true? Why should requirements of temporal asymmetry be imposed upon explanations but not upon arguments? In addition to showing the untenability of the “third dogma,” this chapter (...) signals the development of a causal theory of explanation that will supplement the simple statistical‐relevance model of explanation advocated in earlier works by the author. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Hume's Problem Classic Responses to Hume Causation in the Objects – Causal Processes Causation in the Objects – Causal Interactions Causation in the Objects – Causal Transmission Complete Causal Structures Causes and Effects Causal Explanation Further Topics.

This paper presents a drastically revised version of the theory of causality, based on analyses of causal processes and causal interactions, advocated in Salmon (1984). Relying heavily on modified versions of proposals by P. Dowe, this article answers penetrating objections by Dowe and P. Kitcher to the earlier theory. It shows how the new theory circumvents a host of difficulties that have been raised in the literature. The result is, I hope, a more satisfactory analysis of physical causality.

This paper discusses several distinct process theories of causality offered in recent years by Phil Dowe and me. It addresses problems concerning the explication of causal process, causal interaction, and causal transmission, whether given in terms of transmission of marks, transmission of invariant or conserved quantities, or mere possession of conserved quantities. Renouncing the mark-transmission and invariant quantity criteria, I accept a conserved quantity theory similar to Dowe's--differing basically with respect to causal transmission. This paper also responds to several fundamental (...) constructive criticisms contained in Christopher Hitchcock's discussion of both the mark-transmission and the conserved quantity theories. (shrink)

Offers a novel approach, in terms of causal processes and causal interactions, to the fundamental philosophical problems raised by David Hume in the eighteenth century. His classic critique initiated a lively philosophical controversy that continues today. The author shows how twentieth‐century science, especially quantum mechanics with its challenges to determinism, has opened a new way to attack Hume's problems.

The unification tradition embraces the idea that scientific explanation consists in showing that apparently disparate phenomena can be seen to be fundamentally similar. Michael Friedman and Philip Kitcher, who accept different versions of this tradition, are contemporary proponents of the view. The causal tradition, advanced by Michael Scriven, and embraced in a modified version by the author, says – roughly and briefly – that to explain an event is to identify its cause. This chapter explores the possibility of rapprochement between (...) these two dominant traditions regarding scientific explanation that have generally been seen as mutually incompatible. It shows how progress in the development of both approaches has eradicated many – perhaps all – of the grounds for conflict between them. (shrink)

The ontic conception sees a scientific explanation as an exhibition of the ways in which what is to be explained fits into natural patterns or regularities in the world. The classic form of the epistemic conception takes scientific explanations to be arguments; and the modal conception says that a good explanation shows that what did happen had to happen. This chapter originally appeared just prior to the publication of Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. It contains a (...) highly condensed summary of some of the main discussions, including that of criteria of adequacy, in that book. Whereas Ch. 18 focuses on causal considerations, this chapter focuses on the concept of explanation. (shrink)

Studdert-Kennedy, Gerald, Evidence and Explanation in Social Science. ... Kauffman, Stuart, "Articulation of Parts Explanation in Biology and the Rational ...

This volume honors and examines the founders of the philosophy of logical empiricism. Historical and interpretive essays clarify the scientific philosophies of Carnap, Reichenbach, Hempel, Kant, and others, while exploring the main topics of logical empiricist philosophy of science.

The propagation of causal influences through space‐time plays a fundamental role in scientific explanation. Taking as point of departure, a basic distinction between causal interactions and causal processes, this chapter attempts an analysis of the concept of causal propagation on the basis of the ability of causal processes to transmit “marks.” The analysis rests upon the “at–at” theory of motion that has figured prominently in the resolution of Zeno's arrow paradox. It is argued that this explication does justice to the (...) idea that causal processes can transmit causal influence without invoking anti‐Humean “powers” or “necessary connections.” Although at the time this essay was first written, the author treated causal processes in terms of capacity to transmit marks, the basic concept of transmission works equally well in the conserved quantities theory introduced in Ch. 16. (shrink)

The original version of this chapter was published long before the author's conversion to a conserved or invariant theory of causality as presented in “Causality and Counterfactuals” ; nevertheless, its fundamental approach is still sound. The basic facts about causal processes and causal forks, about their interrelationships, and about the various types of forks are presented here in some detail. The only difference is that a new criterion for causal processes and interactive forks has subsequently been adopted. The same processes (...) and intersections will be classified as causal under either criterion. This chapter presents a concise but comprehensive picture of the causal structure of the world along the same lines as the author's account in his Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. (shrink)

Supplements the statistical‐relevance model of scientific explanation with causal components. Some S‐R relationships can be explained by reference to spatiotemporally continuous causal connections. In this context, it is crucial to distinguish genuine causal processes – those with the ability to transmit marks – from pseudoprocesses. Other S‐R relationships are explained terms of common causes. It introduces causal processes and the common cause principle, and it presents the strategy for incorporating causal considerations into the theory of scientific explanation, while making it (...) seem natural to appeal to unobserved or unobservable entities. (shrink)

This chapter extends the discussion of the preceding chapter, and emphasizes the causal dimensions of explanation in archaeology. The author considers the sorts of situations that archaeologists want to explain, and notes that many of these are events that result from a complex set of factors, some of which are positively relevant to the occurrence of the event and others that are negatively relevant. In addition, many events that archaeologists want to explain are events that had a very low probability (...) of occurrence. The author argues that formal philosophical models of explanation, such as the D‐N and the I‐S models, are ill suited to the task of archaeological explanation. What is needed, he says, is the development of a probabilistic account of causality that can supplement notions of statistical relevance in explanations of archaeological phenomena. (shrink)

Argues that indeterministic causality cannot be explicated adequately by means of statistical‐relevance relations alone. Physical considerations are also required. The same point applies to deterministic causality. This essay sets the author's view of causality apart from standard treatments in terms of abstract relations such as necessary condition, sufficient condition, and statistical relevance. These relationships, in and of themselves, do not provide physical – or causal – connections.