In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:160 BOOK REVIEWS ary. The latter dispose toward {mediate) and help in the expression of (pertain to the use of) the grace of the Spirit. In professing the priority of the Spirit, The Reshaping of Catholicism could hardly be in greater agreement with the Summa theologiae. This theme in Dulles suggests how Aquinas can be linked to ecclesial renewal: Aquinas's thought on the New Law can assist the Church (...) in continually re-acquiring its own divinely given internal order. FR. THOMAS HUGHSON, S.J. Pontificial Biblical Institute,!erusalem; Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action. By ALAN DoNAGAN. Studies in Philosophical Psychology, R. F. Holland, ed. London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987. Pp. x + 197. $29.95 (cloth). Readers of Donagan expecting a book in the style of The Theory of Morality will be surprised; Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action is far more compact and demanding. In setting out to support his thesis that the "propositional attitudes" (the term is taken from Russell) of beliefs and wishes explain choices which, in turn, explain human actions, the author considers a plethora of views and objections of both contemporary and traditional philosophers: Gilbert Ryle-whose Concept of Mind Donagan considers a classic of analytic Aristotelianism -Roderick Chisholm, Donald Davidson, Anthony Kenny, John Searle, Alvin Goldman, Elizabeth Anscombe, Bertrand Russell, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Wittgenstein, Quine, and Frege. At times the reader may wish that fewer theorists were appealed to, or perhaps that his or her familiarity with the views referred to were more extensive, or at least that (although not in the case of Frege) they were explicated in more detail. Further explication, however, could obscure hopelessly the line of reasoning of the author. While he appears to wish to give credit every place it is due, he also wishes to clarify the genesis of significant objections to be met by a defensible action theory. Happily, Donagan himself provides an overview of his project, which he calls a " Plan for an Investigation of Human Action on Socratic Lines." This is proffered in chapter one after the author has discussed the " Socratic tradition in the theory of human action " and the question "Should the Socratic tmdition be jettisoned as folk psychology?" BOOK REVIEWS 161 As these sections provide the foundation for Donagan's thesis, they are briefly summarized here. Considering both Aristotle and the " mediaeval Aristotelian " Aquinas to be in the Socratic tradition, Donagan emphasizes Aristotle's role in distinguishing human from animal action. Possibilities for acting are represented in the human intellect in propositions, toward which one can take various attitudes. Those philosophers who hold that such propositional attitudes cannot explain human action are challenged. Donagan then takes on those cognitive scientists who reject as " stagnant " and rooted in folk beliefs the Socratic theory of action. He rather impressively presents the problems involved in admitting, as do the " scientific psychologists," the practicality of employing the notion of propositional attitudes in history and natural sciences (which seem to exist in a context of history), while at the same time actually :rejecting the existence of such attitudes and hence their theoretical validity. Indeed, Donagan brings home the point that it is simply incon· sistent to hold both that there are no beliefs and that the belief that there are beliefs underlies a stagnant research program. Having thus sustained his position :regarding propositional attitudes in general, Donagan summarizes, chapter by chapter, his "contem· po:rary Socratic " plan for examining the actions of rational animals. It will be helpful to sketch this program, filling in crucial portions. In chapter two the author contends that bodily or mental actions are events that are individuals insofar as they are " changes or persistences in states of continuing individual objects" (p. 38). Propositional attitudes are states, but their arising and persistence in being as energeiai are events that explain,actions. Building on Aristotle's teaching and that of his mediaeval successors, in chapter three Donagan argues that beliefs and wishes, or the cognitive and appetitive propositional at· titudes, explain choices which in turn explain actions. In chapter four Donagan elucidates Durnmett's :revision of the Fregeau semantical theory, which he opts... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THOMISTIC METAETIDCS AND A PRESENT CONTROVERSY XOOD STARTING point for understanding the recent controversy regarding the Grisez-Finnis interpretaition oi St. Thomas Aquinas's ethical theory is Finnis's claim that "by a 'Simple act of non-inferential understanding one grasps that the objeot of the [natural] inclination which one experiences is an instance of a general form of good, for oneself (and others like one)." 1 For here Finnis is denying an (...) inferential process by which one moves from a theoretical understanding (" understanding this nature from the outside, as it were" 2) of what inclinations humans,as humans have to the conclusion that the object oi the particular inclination in question is ·a human good. Instead, he is asserting that it is in a practical context that one understands an object of an inclination to be a human good, and thus generates, via the practical reason, ·a practical, prescriptive principle. An example of such a principle is " Knowledge is something good to have " which, for Finnis, is the same logically as " Knowledge is a good to be pursued " 3 which, in turn, is equivalent to "Knowledge ought to be pursued ",4 which is a prescriptive ("normative") rather than descriptive (factual) utterance.5 1Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980; hereafter NLNR), p. 34. Cf. Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983; hereafter FE), pp. 20-22. 2NLNR p. 34. s Ibid., p. 63. 4lbid., p. 42, note 56; "The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph Mclnerny," John Finnis and Germain Grisez, American Journal of Jurisprudence 26 (1981), pp. 21-31 (hereafter Reply to Mcinerny), pp. 23-24. See also Germain Grisez's well-known article "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," Natural Law Forum 10 (1965), pp. 168-201 (hereafter FPPR), p. 194. 5 See, e.g., NLNR, pp. 44-45; Reply to Mcinerny, p. 23. Grisez and Finnis attempt to distinguish imperatives and prescriptions, which I argue against in 40 THOMISTIC METAETHICS AND A PRESENT CONTROVERSY 41 Finnis and Grisez, then, argue that practical principles, which encompass value-judgments about human goods, are arrived at through the practical reason and thus are prescriptive ("normative ") utterances, as opposed to descriptive or theoretical truths "of metaphysical anthropology ".6 Hence these principles cannot be derived from metaphysical claims.7 To argue for such,a derivation would he to hold that prescriptivity or normativity can emerge from pure descriptivity. Such a derivation, of course, would not account for the appearance of the prescriptive or action-guiding element. An alternative position, to be returned to below, is that value-judgments about human goods are descriptive in themselves. At the same time, owing to the natural inclination to do what we understand to be morally or humanly good, human beings could prescribe to themselves the pursuit of such human goods, once they are understood to be human goods. It should be noted that for Grisez and Finnis the basic practical principles are not moral but pre-moraL8 Still, Grisez and Finnis consider that they direct to ends completive of human nature. Hence, although these authors reserve the characterization of "' moraily right choices " to those that are not simply harmonious with one or another basic human good but rather to those that also do not run counter to any other human good,9 my paper "Is-Ought: Prescribing and a P1·esent Controversy," The Thomist 49, l (January, 1985), pp. 1-23 (hereafter Schultz), esp. pp. 10-Hl. s Reply to Mcinerny, pp. 23-24. 7 Ibid.; see note 13 below. In the paper mentioned in note 5 above I point out that Finnis seems to allow for the possibility of arriving at value-judgments through theoretical reasoning, since he says "I assert that judgments [about man's natural goods, about what man should be] are primarily (though perhaps not exclitsively) judgments of practical reason...." ("Natural Law and 'Is'-'Ought' Question: An Invitation to Professor Veatch," Catholic Lawyer 26, 4, 1981, p. 272, my emphasis. This article is subsequently referred to as Response to Veatch.) But he doesn't explain this, and in Reply to... (shrink)

This paper shows how, according to st. thomas aquinas, basic descriptive moral principles can be both substantive and necessarily true. aquinas's position on reference (the function of the subject term) is similar to that of the contemporary logician, saul kripke, who argues for necessary informative propositions. such propositions in aquinas (which are analyzed in detail in the paper) include definitions-e.g., "human beings, or men, are rational animals"-and property statements. the latter encompass those concerned with natural inclinations. from this foundation the (...) necessity of fundamental moral principles is explained. still, moral principles can be refined as we discover more about human nature; "if" true, such statements will be necessarily true. the paper ends with an explanation of how basic moral principles can be considered to be not simply "per se", but also "per se nota". (shrink)

This article defends as correct and as faithful to Aquinas’s thought the tenets of “descriptivism” (sometimes called “naturalism”) in the context of criticisms that Patrick Lee has made in “Is Thomas’s Natural Law Theory Naturalist?” (American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71:4 [1997]: 567–87). “Revisiting Aquinas” argues that evaluative utterances are descriptive; so even if human goods were immediately known by practical reason (a position nonetheless rejected), their understanding would be a descriptive one, which moral objectivity requires. The arising of the prescriptivity (...) of precepts in relation to practical reason is then treated. The descriptivism articulated in this paper supports Lee’s emphasis on the primacy of love and choice; it further stresses that submission to an understood order of objective goods is essential to willing well. (shrink)

This volume contains essays on an array of topics originally presented orally by a master teacher and scholar. With characteristic rhetorical elegance, Msgr. Synan, late professor at the Pontifical Institute in Toronto, delivered these papers in a variety of settings on issues relating to his specialty of mediaeval Christian philosophy and to his interest in Jewish-Christian dialogue, on the theology of sanctity and of death, and on morally significant historical events. Medieval figures represented here include Aquinas, Augustine, Abelard, and Godfrey (...) of St. Victor; some topics treated are war and peace, philosophical innovations, ecclesiology, evil, goliardic verse, law and abortion, Church councils and Jews in the Middle Ages, and convictions uniting Jews and Christians. This book also contains representative sermons–including a Month’s Mind for Etienne Gilson, an introduction detailing Synan’s background and professional contributions, an updated bibliography of his published works, and an extensive index. Especially appealing to those who knew Synan are three posthumous tributes and thirteen photographs from throughout his life. The selections in this volume are scholarly but non-technical, intended for anyone moved to seek elucidation of the topics discussed. (shrink)

The study's purpose was to estimate the variety of foods consumed within standard and ethnic food categories by three groups of women between 18 and 35 years of age. Foreign-born Chinese women [N = 21], Chinese-American women [N = 20] and white American women [N = 23] kept 4-day food records, after instruction. Analysis of variance showed that the mean number of different foods consumed by the foreign-born Chinese was significantly [p < 0.05] lower than those eaten by the other (...) two groups for breads/cereals, dairy products, ethnic foods, fats, meats, sweets/sugars, and vegetable categories. White American women consumed significantly more dairy products and legumes/nuts than either of the groups of Chinese women. Diets of the Chinese-American women were more nutrient dense than those of the women in the other groups, containing significantly more energy, riboflavin, iron, folacin, and calcium than those of the foreign-born Chinese women. The percentage of kilocalories derived from fat [33–34%] did not differ among groups. 95% of foreign-born and 85% of Chinese-American women affirmed their ethnic identification by consuming foods belonging to Chinese cuisine; whereas, the percentage [30%] of white American women selecting Chinese food was significantly lower. Mexican and Italian foods were selected by significantly more white and Chinese-American women than by foreign-born Chinese women. Approximately 20% of both groups of Chinese women, but 49% of white American subjects, ate Japanese food. Chinese-American women retained a preference for Chinese food, similar to that of the foreign-born Chinese women. However, the Chinese-American women consumed cheeses, legumes, raw vegetables in salads, and foods from Italian and Mexican cuisines, indicating their acceptance of foods commonly consumed by white American women. Dietary acculturation among the Chinese-American women improved their diets over those of the foreign-born Chinese women and these results support the theory that consumption of a greater variety of foods increases nutrient density of diets. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY Introduction HE PROBLEM OF THE naturalistic fallacy, or the laim that value and ought-judgments are not factual r 'is' judgments, has been a lively one this century, ever since Moore coined the term ' naturalistic fallacy '.1 This debate has died down rather, especially in analytic philosophy, but it has flared up again among students of St. Thomas. This is largely because of (...) the controversial interpretations of Grisez and Finnis.2 In a recent and commendable article Janice Schultz has gone over these interpretations and developed some serious criticisms.3 She rightly points out that for St. Thomas judgments about human goods can be theoretical and not just practical, and that they are practical and have prescriptive or imperative force only on the presupposition of some act of will underlying them. Grisez and Finnis want to say that reason is practical and makes prescriptions of its own nature and not on the presupposition of some prior act of will, and that the grasp by reason of human goods is always practical and never just theoretical. I will not repeat Ms. Schultz's arguments here, though I will use them later on. What I want to do in this article is to locate her arguments and contentions in a different context-not the context of the interpretations of 1 Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1903, p. 10. 2 The main works are Finnis's Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980; and Grisez's article, 'The Frst Principle of Practical Reason: a Commentary on Summa Theologica Ia Hae, q.94 a.2.' Natural Law Forum, 10, 1965, pp. 162-201. Other references are handily collected in an article by Janice Schultz, 'Is-Ought: Prescribing and a Present Controversy ', The Thomist, vol. 49, Jan. 85, no. 1, pp. 1-2. a As cited in the previous note. 51 PETER SIMPSON Grisez and Finnis, but that of the naturalistic fallacy debate as this developed from Moore to Hare. My reason for wanting to do this is that this debate uncovered a series of important features of good and Ought that must be incorporated into any moral theory, naturalist or non-naturalist, if that theory is to be at all adequate. While modern proponents of naturalistic ethics have tended to play down or ignore these features (largely because they point in a non-naturalistic direction ), St. Thomas did not. His moral theory is superior as a result, and can indeed be said to constitute a model for all defensible naturalistic ethics. This can best be seen if his theory is expounded as a response to the points about good and Ought made by non-naturalists. The first part of this paper is therefore an attempt to state the key theses of non-naturalism; and the succeeding parts attempt to expound St. Thomas's position in response to them. The NaturaUstic Fallacy As Moore first coined the name ' Naturalistic Fallacy ' and initiated the debate about it, one should begin with him. According to Moore, the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy concerning the idea of goodness. Goodness, he said, is a simple, unanalysable notion, like yellow or red and the fallacy is committed when people try to define or analyse it.4 This is because when they do try to define it they always identify it with some natural or observable property (as pleasure), and good is not such an object. It is a non-natural property that is unique and peculiar to itself. There are two parts to this claim. The first is that good is indefinable, the second is that it is something non-natural. Moore endeavored to establish the first point by means of the so-called open-question argument. Whatever definition one proposes for good it is always possible to ask of the definition whether it is itself good. For instance, if one defines good as pleasure or what promotes the greatest happiness, it is always 4 Op. cit., p. 6ff., and chapter 1 passim. ST. THOMAS ON THE NATURALISTIC FALLACY 58 possible to ask, with significance, whether pleasure or what promotes the greatest happiness is after all good. But this would be impossible if this... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 165 arguments. He meets them head on, on their ground; whether or not he is deemed successful, he presents a challenge not only to the philosophers he adduces but also to anyone in the Thomistic tradition who has judged confrontation with contemporary critics to he fruitless. JANICE L. SCHULTZ Canisius College Buffalo, New York Authority and Leadership in the Church: Past Directions and Future Possibilities. (...) By THOMAS P. RAUSCH, S.J. Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1989. Pp. 158. $15.95. Rather than offering a sustained study of the question of authority and leadership in the Church, Rausch presents a collection of essays related to the topic. The format reflects the book's genesis: much of the material was developed for the 23rd Faith and Order Conference of the Texas Conference of Churches on the subject "Authority in the Body of Christ." Although the title does not reflect the hook's ecumenical focus, readers who want a general introduction to the present status of agreement in ecumenical discussion of authority and ministry may find Rausch's hook helpful. In " Authority in the Ecumenical Dialogue " Rausch reviews and summarizes the ARCIC Final Report, the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Dialogue, the WCC Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry text, and the Consultation on Church Union. The emerging consensus on the value of ordained ministry in these documents indicates that this ministry is permanent, although the threefold ministry of bishop, presbyter, and deacon stands in need of reform. Rausch notes that the documents do not limit " valid " ministry to ordained ministry in communion with the historic episcopate. As for the shape of ministry in the church of tomorrow, not surprisingly, he identifies shared responsibility and collegiality as the marks of the future exercise of authority. Among the important issues still unresolved by the churches are Petrine ministry and primacy and the problem of the " reception " of ecumenical documents. The chapter on authority and reception, originally published in Theological Studies, may well be the most original contribution of the book. It broadens the discussion of reception from its historical " classical " understanding as " the acceptance by local churches of particular ecclesiastical or conciliar decisions " to an ecumenical understanding of the concept as " the acceptance by one church of a theo- 166 BOOK REVIEWS logical consensus arrived at with another church, and ultimately, the recognition of the other church's faith and ecclesial life as authentically Christian (p. 103)." He concludes that (1) reception is more properly understood as a process rather than as a juridical determination, (2) it also involves formal decisions on the part of church authorities, (3) it cannot be reduced to the acceptance of doctrinal formulations, and (4) the norm for recognizing a common faith is not agreement with a particular ecclesial position but agreement with the apostolic tradition. Ultimately, reception involves the whole church and is not the sole product of theologians or church authorities. Ecumenical dialogues will only be effective when they enter into the practical life of the churches. In "Imaging Tomorrow's Church: Models of Christian Unity" Rausch summarizes four models of church unity: organic union, conciliar fellowship, reconciled diversity, and communion of Churches. He opts for the fourth model. The chapter does not offer any new information to someone familiar with ecumenical discussions, but it does serve as an introduction for the neophyte. Rausch's image of authority in the future lies somewhere between a strictly hierarchical or institutional model and a more egalitarian model. His final chapter, " Authority in Tomorrow's Church," predicts that the church of the future will be " ordered " in the sense that it will combine an authoritative ordained ministry (based on the church's apostolic office) with a recognition of multiple and diverse charismatic gifts. He retrieves Karl Rahner's suggestion that recognition of charism for leadership in an individual may result in that person's " relative" ordination for a particular local community. Authority of the future will be collegial with a more participatory style of decision-making. The renewed papacy will encourage not only a more participatory style of decision-making but also a broader participation in the formulation of church teaching. He suggests that representatives of particular churches could elect the Bishop... (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 77-80.

Our goal here is to help identify the contextualist’s most worthy competitor to relativism. Recently, some philosophers of language and linguists have argued that, while there are contextualist-friendly semantic theories of deontic modals that fit with the relativist’s challenge data, the best such theories are not Lewis-Kratzer-style semantic theories. If correct, this would be important: It would show that the theory that has for many years enjoyed the status of the default view of modals in English and other languages is (...) in need of revision. Here we defend the default view by showing how a Kratzer-style semantics is able to make available readings of the relevant utterances that fit with the pretheoretical judgments opponents purport it cannot fully capture. Having established this, we turn to considering the more theoretical grounds proponents have offered for preferring their rival contextualist views. Here the question is to what extent such grounds favor semantic over what Korta and Perry call “near-side pragmatic” explanations of our judgments. In particular, we argue that our favored readings figure in near-side pragmatic explanations of those judgments that possess the methodological and theoretical advantages of systematicity and unity at least as well as, if not to a greater extent than, those of opponents who argue for their revised semantic theories on the basis of these advantages. (shrink)

Feeding difficulties in older patients who are suffering from dementia present problems with balancing conflicting ethical principles. They have been considered by several writers in recent years, and the views of nursing and care staff have been studied in different contexts. The present study used focus groups to explore the way in which nursing and care staff in a National Health Service trust deal with conflict between ethical principles in this area. Three focus groups were convened, one each from the (...) staff of three wards caring for patients with dementia. Case histories were discussed and transcripts analysed. It emerged that staff were aware of making fine judgements of utility concerning the spectrum of feeding methods available. Informants gave some weight to the principle of autonomy, but sought to balance that against their commitment to care. In explaining their perspectives, informants gave more weight to personal attitudes and trust culture than to professional ethics. (shrink)

The objective of this study is to test the embeddedness of codes of ethics (ECE) in organizations on aggregated data from three countries, namely Australia, Canada and the United States. The properties of four constructs of ECE are described and tested, including surveillance/training, internal communication, external communication and guidance. The data analysis shows that the model has satisfactory fit, validity and reliability. Furthermore, the results are fairly consistent when tested on each of the three samples (i.e. cross-national validation). This cross-national (...) study makes a contribution beyond previous descriptive or exploratory studies by using confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling. Nevertheless, a number of limitations are raised, all of which provide opportunities for further research in refining, extending and testing the proposed ECE model in other cultural and corporate settings. (shrink)

What considerations place genuine constraints on an adequate semantics for normative and evaluative expressions? Linguists recognize facts about ordinary uses of such expressions and competent speakers’ judgments about which uses are appropriate. The contemporary literature reflects the widespread assumption that linguists don’t rely upon an additional source of data—competent speakers’ judgments about possible disagreement with hypothetical speech communities. We have several good reasons to think that such judgments are not probative for semantic theorizing. Therefore, we should accord these judgments no (...) probative value for the development of a semantics for our moral terms. Such judgments can no longer be presumed to put pressure on theories according to which our moral expressions share a semantics with ordinary, descriptive terms. Many rivals to pure, Descriptivist theories count among their advantages the ability to accommodate these judgments. If these judgments have no probative value, such theories lose an important source of support. (shrink)

Skeletal muscle formation is studied in vitro with myogenic cell lines and primary muscle cell cultures, and in vivo with embryos of several species. We review several of the notable advances obtained from studies of cultured cells, including the recognition of myoblast diversity, isolation of the MyoD family of muscle regulatory factors, and identification of promoter elements required for muscle‐specific gene expression. These studies have led to the ideas that myoblast diversity underlies the formation of the multiple types of fast (...) and slow muscle fibers, and that myogenesis is controlled by a combination of ubiquitous and muscle‐specific transcriptional regulators that may be different for each gene. We further review some unexpected results that have been obtained when ideas from work in culture have been tested in developing animals. The studies in vivo point to additional molecular and cellular mechanisms that regulate muscle formation in the animal. (shrink)

In this article, the authors operationalize the intersection of gender and race in survey research. Using quantitative data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, they investigate how gender/racial stereotypes about African Americans affect Whites’ attitudes about two types of affirmative action programs: job training and education and hiring and promotion. The authors find that gender/racial prejudice towards Black women and Black men influences Whites’ opposition to affirmative action at different levels than negative attitudes towards Blacks as a group. Prejudice (...) toward Black women has a larger effect on Whites’ policy preferences than does prejudice toward Black men or Blacks in general. In future research, survey methodologists should develop better intersectional measures to further document these gender/racial attitudes. (shrink)

Canadian and American population-based research concerning sexual and/or gender minority populations provides evidence of persistent breast and gynecologic cancer-related health disparities and knowledge divides. The Cancer's Margins research investigates the complex intersections of sexual and/or gender marginality and incommensurabilities and improvisation in engagements with biographical and biomedical cancer knowledge. The study examines how sexuality and gender are intersectionally constitutive of complex biopolitical mappings of cancer health knowledge that shape knowledge access and its mobilization in health and treatment decision-making. Interviews were (...) conducted with a diverse group of sexual and/or gender minority breast or gynecologic cancer patients. The LGBQ//T2 cancer patient narratives we have analyzed document in fine grain detail how it is that sexual and/or gender minority cancer patients punctuate the otherwise lockstep assemblage of their cancer treatment decision-making with a persistent engagement in creative attempts to resist, thwart and otherwise manage the possibility of discrimination and likewise, the probability of institutional erasure in care settings. Our findings illustrate the demands that cancer places on LGBQ//T2 patients to choreograph access to, and mobilization of knowledge and care, across significantly distinct and sometimes incommensurable systems of knowledge. (shrink)

Recent research suggests that some human-like social skills evolved in dogs during domestication as an incidental by-product of selection for “tame” forms of behavior. It is still possible, however, that the social skills of certain dog breeds came under direct selection that led to further increases in social problem solving ability. To test this hypothesis, different breeds of domestic dogs were compared for their ability to use various human communicative behaviors to find hidden food. We found that even primitive breeds (...) with little human contact were able to use communicative cues. Further, “working” dogs were more skilled at using gestural cues than were non-working breeds. This difference in performance existed regardless of whether the working breeds were more or less genetically wolf-like. These results suggest that subsequent to initial domesticating selection giving rise to cue-following skills, additional selection on communicative abilities in certain breeds has produced substantive differences in those breeds’ abilities to follow cues. (shrink)

The temporal pattern of the terminal response on periodic schedules depends on when responding begins. Pigeons pecking on fixed-interval and fixed-time schedules of food reinforcement responded, or accelerated, faster the later in an interval they began responding.

This chapter discusses three puzzles about practical conditionals and inferences and shows how the flexible, contextualist semantic framework for “ought”. The chapter develops elsewhere resolves all three puzzles more satisfactorily than any of its three most prominent rivals, the relativist account of Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane, the wide-scoping account of John Broome, and the “trying on” account of James Dreier. The chapter first introduces the puzzle cases and six desiderata for their solutions, and then shows how only flexible contextualism (...) about “ought” is able to resolve each while satisfying all six desiderata. (shrink)

Quelle est la signification du « corps anonyme » ou, plus simplement, de l’anonymat dans l’usage qu’en fait Merleau-Ponty? Peut-elle offrir des ressources pour une critique féministe radicale et une politique émancipatrice? Certaines philosophes féministes en ont traité comme un idéal universel abstrait du corps qui est à la fois exempt de toute particularité et qui présume tacitement que le corps blanc masculin servirait de norme et aurait une puissance normative. D’autres ont voulu montrer que l’anonymat éclaire les manières dont (...) la domination et la normativité sont intrinsèques à la constitution corporelle. Je soutiens que le « corps anonyme » peut être lu d’une manière productive pour la compréhension des manières dont le corps vécu est fondamentalement constitué par des relations concrètes de pouvoir. Plus particulièrement, je reprends deux lectures de l’anonymat, l’une comme temporalité vécue – un passé sédimenté – et l’autre comme intériorité corporelle. Prises ensemble, ces lectures montrent que l’anonymat soutient le champ intersubjectif, qui joue un rôle clé dans la description de la constitution corporelle de Merleau-Ponty. Je reprends ensuite cette description pour lire la théorie du schéma corporel de Frantz Fanon et les histoires autobiographiques de l’écrivaine et activiste yankton Zitkála-Šá, le tout afin de montrer que le déni de l’anonymat, qui dérange le champ intersubjectif, a pour résultat une violence et des maux considérables. Le tout servira à montrer que la description du corps anonyme par Merleau-Ponty fournit d’importantes ressources pour une politique émancipatrice et une critique philosophique radicale. (shrink)

Schools are interesting as complex organizations in and of themselves but even more so for how they refract the societal dynamics by which inequality is reproduced, an enduringly vexing question (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012:3). Educational attainment is core to socioeconomic status and connected to outcomes in housing, health, and employment. Unequal schools in fields characterized by stratification are often the subject of reform attempts (Tyack, 1974). We examine how a wealthier and a poorer school responded to a state-level regulatory mandate (...) for change, in the U.S. context of schools as putative engines of opportunity. Bourdieu’s “master concepts” of field, habitus, and cultural capital (Swartz, 2008) are often applied, and we used them to answer frequent but still relatively unanswered calls in the literature: first, to use the master concepts together rather than singularly, and second, to attend specifically to the organization level and what it refracts (Dobbin, 2008; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Hallett & Gougherty, 2018; Lounsbury & Ventresca, 2003; Mohr, 2013). For this integrative and organizational level approach, we derived the concept of “class signature,” which enabled us to focus on practices in organizations. This lens revealed “resistant compliance” in the wealthier school and “compliant resistance” in the poorer school, both of which reshaped the stratified field, even if stratification was not rectified. These responses appeared to reproduce inequality, not simplistically, we argue, but along a winding path fraught with practical experiments, protection against penalties, redefinition of the reform’s terms, and some small gains to remedy intra-organizational inequalities. (shrink)

This article examines birthday party decorations as a way of understanding the materiality and religious place-making of an expanding Baptist congregation in central Sweden in the early twentieth century. The fiftieth birthday party for Magnus Johanson, held at Salem Chapel in Falun, Dalarna county, in 1906, was decorated with birch branches, large Swedish flags and bunting and an elaborately laid table featuring coffee cups and refreshments. From an analysis of these material elements and a deeper investigation into the lives of (...) Johanson and his wife Kristina, it can be seen that evangelicals had a flexible approach to their ‘sacred’ spaces. Social activities and the act of decorating them created not only a sense of congregational fellowship and belonging but also the opportunity for congregations to display their connection to external cultural and political identities. Through the construction of chapel buildings and their subsequent decoration, male and female members were able to demonstrate a complementary creativity. Together they contributed to the cre-ation of Salem as a multi-purpose, comfortable and accepted place within Falun’s evolving religious landscape. (shrink)

2. The Contingency and A posteriority Constraint: A formulation of the thesis must make physicalism come out contingent and a posteriori. First, physicalism is a contingent truth, if it is a truth. This means that physicalism could have been false, i.e. there are counterfactual worlds in which physicalism is false, for example, counterfactual worlds in which there are miracle -performing angels.[9] Moreover, if physicalism is true, our knowledge of its truth is a posteriori. This is to say that there are (...) ways the world could turn out to be such that physicalism is false. For example, if there are miracle -performing angels, then physicalism is false. So there are worlds considered as actual in which physicalism is false.[10] For short, call this ‘the a posteriority constraint’.[11]. (shrink)

Are there are normative reasons to have – or refrain from having – certain emotions? The dominant view is that there are. I disagree. In this paper, I argue for Strong Eliminativism – the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim has two premises. The first premise is that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons: a reason for an agent to have an attitude must be able to feature in that agent’s deliberation to (...) that attitude. My argument for this premise is that in order to have reasons for an attitude, we need to be able to exhibit some relevant form of control over this attitude, and this relevant form of control is deliberative control. The second premise is that no one can deliberate to any emotion. My argument for this premise turns on the claim that there is no deliberative question that is settled by forming (or giving up) an emotion. I contend that this is so due to the well-known phenomenon of recalcitrant emotions: for any deliberative question that can be settled, there is no guarantee that the relevant emotional state will follow (or be revised). Strong Eliminativism follows from these two premises. (shrink)

No presente artigo expomos alguns aspectos das concepções gödelianas acerca da percepção. Procuramos mostrar aqui que a comparação realizada por Gödel entre percepção sensível e racional, bem como suas concepções sobre esta última, correspondem a uma análise do conceito de percepção. Em uma primeira seção, expomos a analogia gödeliana entre percepção sensível e racional, salientando que ambas são comparadas tendo em vista seu status de relação de acesso a entes. A partir disto, argumentamos, na segunda seção, que subjazendo à analogia (...) há uma análise do conceito de percepção como o conceito geral ou formal de uma relação de acesso, do qual a percepção sensível e a racional são casos particulares. Tal análise, como defendemos, acaba por ser mais adequada ao uso comum que fazemos deste conceito do que pareceria à primeira vista. (shrink)

The aim of this workshop was to ask potential end-users of the citizens’ information pack on legal and ethical issues around ICTs the following questions: What is your knowledge of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, and what actions have you taken in response to these regulations? What challenges are you experiencing in ensuring the protection and security of your project data, and compliance with the GDPR, within existing data management processes/systems? What information/tools/resources do you need to overcome these challenges? (...) What are the best formats/channels for receiving, sharing and acting upon this information? What is the most appropriate structure/format for the citizens’ information pack? (shrink)

Whenever the name Edmund Husserl appears in the context of nursing research, what correctly comes to mind is the phenomenological approach to qualitative methodology. Husserl is not only considered the founder of phenomenology, but his broad concept development also contributed to the demise of positivism and inspired fruitful approaches to the social sciences. In this spirit of inspiration, it must be expressed that Husserl's theory of wholes and parts, and particularly his differentiation of parts into ‘pieces’ and ‘moments’, is very (...) helpful in guiding the selection of research methods across the board in nursing science. The purpose of this paper is to highlight a frame of reference for nursing researchers to use in examining the essential nature of that which is being studied. This frame of reference is the Husserlian philosophy of ‘pieces’ and ‘moments’ in relation to the whole. ‘Pieces’ are independent parts of the whole that are subject to isolability in study, whereas ‘moments’ are nonindependent parts, which cannot be detached, presented, or studied apart from the whole. The intent is to propose this frame of reference as a philosophical base from which nursing researchers may better select among paradigms and methodological approaches in regard to the essential nature (‘pieces’ or ‘moments’) of that which they are researching. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Narrative Symposium:Living Organ DonationLaura Altobelli, Sherri Bauman, Janice Flynn, Andy Heath, Joseph Jacobs, Tim Joos, Amy K. Lewensten, Donna L. Luebke, Sarah A. McDaniel, Donald Olenick, Laurie E Post, Vicky Young, Blake Adams, Anonymous One, Michael Sauls, Christine Wright, Shannon D. Wyatt, and Cara Yesawich• An Altruistic Living Donor’s Story• Surgery for the Soul• Kidney Donation Story• The Essence of Giving—A Transplant Story• Love—the Risk Worth Taking• My (...) Donation Journey• A Life For A Life: My Gift To My Dad• Lessons Learned: The Realities of Living Organ Donation• Sarah’s List Exchange Experience• Accelerated Living Donation• Liver Donor Nightmare• Adrift After Donation• Getting Our Child Off Dialysis• A Living Donor’s Journey• The Spare Kidney• Living Donors are People Too• The Gift of Life—Walking by Faith• Journey of an Altruistic, Non–designated Living DonorCopyright © 2012 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)