Witnessing to the strong present-day interest in the formation of the great scholastic syntheses of the thirteenth century are the large number of studies devoted to the lesser thinkers of the preceding century. The English-born Robert of Melun is one of these so far largely neglected authors. Despite the edition of his major works in Louvain by R. M. Martin, little has been written on this gifted pupil of Abelard. Horst cuts a large and central piece out of Robert's "system": (...) the doctrines of the Trinity and of God. After a detailed analysis of the sources of his thinking, the Trinity is dealt with and then God. Under the pen of Robert, the sharp dialectical method of Abelard serves to elaborate Augustine's speculation on the Trinity. Yet the author—in line with the contemporary interest in trinitology—is not satisfied to expound the subtle distinctions Robert made but strives to show also how they can have a bearing on the "economy of salvation." There is a rather liberal dose of lengthy Latin quotes, footnotes mushroom, and secondary literature is quoted by the yard. To sum up: this is a serious and articulate treatment of two central questions of scholastic theology and we are glad to read the promise of a continuation treating Robert's anthropology, angelology, and his views on the First Man.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Friedrich Schlegel is known above all as a man of letters and political interests, while his philosophical opus has received as yet a very limited interest and attention. Perhaps this new critical edition will enable him to carve a small niche for himself in forthcoming histories of philosophy. He was certainly not the most significant thinker; but his imagination, many-sidedness, sharpness, and his unmistakable speculative gift qualify him to be in the second rank of Romantic philosophers immediately after Schelling and (...) Baader. The young Friedrich Schlegel was thoroughly under the spell of Fichte, but his later development—notwithstanding personal antipathy—carried him close to Schelling. The ethical pathos of Fichte's doctrine could not make Schlegel overlook the injustice done to nature, art, and religion. Though his celebrated conversion to Catholicism in the Dom of Cologne did not take place until 1838, Schlegel read Jacob Boehme and was a close friend of Schleiermacher, and thus was absorbed by religious problems years before. Already in his Cologne lectures he goes beyond the vague idealistic concept of the "divinity" in favor of a personal and transcendent God. These two volumes of the critical edition contain the following texts: Transzendentalphilosophie, lectures in Jena from 1800-1801. The text is the one published by J. Körner in 1935. The Development of Philosophy in Twelve Books and Propedeutic and Logic. The texts in Propedeutic and Logic are of a general introductory character. But in The Development of Philosophy a tremendous effort is made to give, if not an entirely systematic, at least a quasi-all-embracing, encyclopedic sketch of philosophy and its history. Here again we read nothing substantially new. The editor follows the text published by Windischmann in 1836 but does complete it with variants from other manuscripts. Métaphysique. These lectures were delivered in French to Madame de Staël. In addition to an already known text published by J. Körner the editor makes use of a manuscript in the hand of Schlegel which was found only after the last war. The preface of J.-J. Anstett is ascetically short and even the commentary consists only of sober and learned notes at the end of the second volume.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Friedrich Schlegel is known above all as a man of letters and political interests, while his philosophical opus has received as yet a very limited interest and attention. Perhaps this new critical edition will enable him to carve a small niche for himself in forthcoming histories of philosophy. He was certainly not the most significant thinker; but his imagination, many-sidedness, sharpness, and his unmistakable speculative gift qualify him to be in the second rank of Romantic philosophers immediately after Schelling and (...) Baader. The young Friedrich Schlegel was thoroughly under the spell of Fichte, but his later development—notwithstanding personal antipathy—carried him close to Schelling. The ethical pathos of Fichte's doctrine could not make Schlegel overlook the injustice done to nature, art, and religion. Though his celebrated conversion to Catholicism in the Dom of Cologne did not take place until 1838, Schlegel read Jacob Boehme and was a close friend of Schleiermacher, and thus was absorbed by religious problems years before. Already in his Cologne lectures he goes beyond the vague idealistic concept of the "divinity" in favor of a personal and transcendent God. These two volumes of the critical edition contain the following texts: Transzendentalphilosophie, lectures in Jena from 1800-1801. The text is the one published by J. Körner in 1935. The Development of Philosophy in Twelve Books and Propedeutic and Logic. The texts in Propedeutic and Logic are of a general introductory character. But in The Development of Philosophy a tremendous effort is made to give, if not an entirely systematic, at least a quasi-all-embracing, encyclopedic sketch of philosophy and its history. Here again we read nothing substantially new. The editor follows the text published by Windischmann in 1836 but does complete it with variants from other manuscripts. Métaphysique. These lectures were delivered in French to Madame de Staël. In addition to an already known text published by J. Körner the editor makes use of a manuscript in the hand of Schlegel which was found only after the last war. The preface of J.-J. Anstett is ascetically short and even the commentary consists only of sober and learned notes at the end of the second volume.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Studies in philosophy: I. Tufts, J.H. On moral evolution. II. Willcos, W.F. The expansion of Europe in its influence upon population. III. Woods, R.A. Democracy a new unfolding of human power. IV. Sharp, F.C. An analysis of the moral judgment. V. Woodbridge, F.J.E. The problem of consciousness. VI. Norton, E.L. The intellectual element in music. VII. Raub, W.L. Pragmatism and Kantianism. VIII. Lyman, E.W. The influence of pragmatism upon the status of theology.--Studies in psychology: IX. Delabarre, E.B. Influence of (...) surrounding objects on the apparent direction of a line. X. Swift, E.J. Beginning a language; a contribution to the psychology of learning. XI. Pierce, A.H. An appeal from the prevailing doctrine of a detached subconsciousness. XII. Woodworth, R.S. The cause of a voluntary movement. XIII. Burnett, C.T. An experimental test of the classical theory of volition. (shrink)

Many years after the translation by Richard Robinson of books 3 and 4 of Aristotle’s Politics, Professor David Keyt now presents a translation with an extensive commentary of books 5 and 6, the main topics of which are equality, democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, and revolution. The text attempts to describe these different political regimes and the causes of their disintegration. According to Keyt books 4, 5, and 6 form a unit and discuss less ideal constitutions and political instability. Keyt defends the (...) traditional order of the books instead of switching around 5 and 6 as some editors have done. He acknowledges nevertheless that the logical order is to place 7 and 8 before 4, 5, and 6. For his translation he used the Greek edition by A. Dreizehnter. Reading the text in a clear and pleasant translation makes us admire the sharpness of Aristotle’s insight and the actuality of what he says. Besides indicating the lines of the Bekker edition, Keyt divided the text into mostly short paragraphs, which make consultation easy. The commentary on Book V runs from page 55 to 190, on VI from 191 to 239, followed by a concise bibliography, a glossary, an index locorum, and a general index. Keyt is very consistent in his translation of Greek terms. He anticipates the difficulty some readers might experience with his translation of στάσις by “faction” and στασιᾳζειν by “to split into factions.” In 1308b20 it is better to translate “who bring about a new order because of their private lives” than “who seek a new order.” Likewise, one should perhaps translate ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς by “in leading positions.” In a few places, for instance at 1308b40, Keyt adds a clarifying phrase such as “if one could insure that offices are not a source of profit.”. (shrink)

The author argues that there is a sharp contrast between Plato's earlier teleological explanation of nature and his later conception. In the Phaedo Anaxagoras' νοṽς as a teleological principle is rejected, the forms taking its place, in the Philebus the existence of a νοṽς explaining order and finality in nature, is strictly demonstrated. After that nature and consequences of this new doctrine are briefly discussed : the ineffable character of the transcendent cause of the world ; the reduction of (...) the number of the Forms to those of substances in nature ; the causality of νοṽς as an immanent and intermediate one ; the foundation of a mathematical science of nature. Thirdly the author makes an effort to reconstruct the philosophical grounds of this development, starting from the three theses, on which the argumentation of the Philebus is based. 1) νοṽς can only exist in a soul. It is argued that the dynamic conception of soul in the Phaedrus logically leads to the conclusion, that νοṽς also is movement . 2) To explain cosmic order and finality a νοṽς has to be accepted. This new idea occurs for the first time in the Sophistes and in the myth of the Politicus. 3) Cosmic order has a mathematical and astronomical character. This aspect is absent before the Philebus and seems to have been a consequence of Plato's discovery of the regularity in the planitary motions . Finally the author thinks he can indicate in the Sophistes the turning-point in the theory of Forms, as a result of the extension of the notion of being. (shrink)

Many recent evolutionary psychology and human behavioral ecology studies have tested hypotheses by examining correlations between variables measured at a group level (e.g., state, country, continent). In such analyses, variables collected for each aggregation are often taken to be representative of the individuals present within them, and relationships between such variables are presumed to reflect individual-level processes. There are multiple reasons to exercise caution when doing so, including: (1) the ecological fallacy, whereby relationships observed at the aggregate level do not (...) accurately represent individual-level processes; (2) non-independence of data points, which violates assumptions of the inferential techniques used in null hypothesis testing; and (3) cross-cultural non-equivalence of measurement (differences in construct validity between groups). We provide examples of how each of these gives rise to problems in the context of testing evolutionary hypotheses about human behavior, and we offer some suggestions for future research. (shrink)

The current rise in malpractice litigation has led to concern in the research community as to the prospect of litigation against researchers. Clearly as the responsibility for the day-to-day conduct of the research falls upon the researchers they will be potentially liable should there be negligence in the conduct of the research project itself. But to what extent can the research ethics committee and its members be held liable should harm result to the research subject? How far does the prospect (...) of the threat of litigation equate with the reality of the prospect of liability? Although the NHS research governance framework suggests that primary responsibility for the conduct of the trial is with the researcher this does not mean that REC members will be immune from actions in tort where research subjects suffer harm in the conduct of a research project approved by their NHS REC. This paper focuses upon the prospect for liability in the law of tort of NHS RECs and their members. While in practice the vast majority of such claims are unlikely to be successful members of RECs may incur resultant legal costs as a consequence of involvement in proposed litigation. It is submitted that the scope of indemnity provision provided to RECs and their members should be precisely determined, otherwise there is a real prospect that the risk of malpractice litigation may deter individuals from serving on such committees. (shrink)

This completes what I think one may state and defend on physical grounds concerning the foundations of Astrology and the coming year 1602. If those learned in matters of Physics think them worthy of consideration, and communicate to me their objections to them, for the sake of eliciting the truth, I shall, if God grants me the skill, reply to them in my prognostication for the following year. I urge all who make a serious study of philosophy to engage in (...) this contest. For it concerns our worship of God and the welfare of the human race. Meanwhile, I pray from the depths of my soul, through Christ our mediator, that for all and for each the coming year may be a very happy one. (shrink)

The aim of this investigation is to discuss the merits of the three radically divergent views as to the nature and function of the categories held by Kant, Ward and Alexander.

In Cratylus 385 b-c Plato argues that if statements () can be true or false, names (),2 as parts () of statements, are also capable of being true or false. From Aristotle onwards this view has often been challenged,3 and R. Robinson put the case against it trenchantly when he wrote:4 This argument is bad; for names have no truth-value, and the reason given for saying that they do is a fallacy of division. No one in the dialogue points out (...) that it is bad. … Nevertheless it is fairly probable that Plato saw or at least felt that it is a bad argument, quite different in quality from those he later produces against the nature-theory. (shrink)

In Cratylus 385 b-c Plato argues that if statements () can be true or false, names (),2 as parts () of statements, are also capable of being true or false. From Aristotle onwards this view has often been challenged,3 and R. Robinson put the case against it trenchantly when he wrote:4This argument is bad; for names have no truth-value, and the reason given for saying that they do is a fallacy of division. No one in the dialogue points out that (...) it is bad. … Nevertheless it is fairly probable that Plato saw or at least felt that it is a bad argument, quite different in quality from those he later produces against the nature-theory. (shrink)

This dissertation seeks to contribute to research in the philosophy of social science. The study focuses upon select epistemological and ontological aspects of Hannah Arendt’s work from which methodological implications are drawn pertaining to sociology. Arendt, although critical of the sociology of her time, has become increasingly cited and influential for emerging sociological research and this study seeks to contribute to this by focusing upon the problem of novelty. The aim is to explore the philosophical and methodological implications of novelty (...) for social science by working through three case studies that are theoretically pivotal for social science—action, the ‘social’, and the self—in terms of novelty as expressed in Arendt’s writing. Arendt is critical of methodology and epistemology, aiming to draw her readers to ontological concerns outlined from her preoccupation with the 'world' and social reality. In this aim, Arendt seeks to distance herself from social sciences that she claims ignore human novelty in favour of reading social regularities, tendencies and similarities. Despite her disdain for method, Arendt suggests a anti-methodological 'method' (outlined in an overlooked footnote) for keeping trained upon and for dealing with novel, anomalous events. In the seed of this method lies a unique opportunity for social science to reassess and extend its methods, addressing this oversight and in so doing bring to light the novel social object as a legitimate subject of social research. (shrink)