The author shows that Aquinas’s treatise on the Trinity can be viewed in two ways. According to the first, now prevailing opinion, the thoughts of the Angelic Doctor are too speculative and in essence they harm our personal relationship with God. He aims to show that the main source of inspiration for this approach are those currents in modern and contemporary philosophy according to which any metaphysics is impossible. Adherents of the other view do not reject metaphysics, and so they (...) are also sympathetic towards Aquinas’s connecting speculation with the Trinity doctrine. They see a great advantage in this connexion, as it allows us to understand more deeply the mysteries of faith and so to demonstrate the uniqueness of the Christian message. The author aims to show that both approaches are justified and one should not be sacrificed for the other. He believes that a philosophical framework allowing the old and the new Trinitarian theologies to coexist is provided by Wittgenstein’s conception of speech games. (shrink)

Mathematics in the 19th century underwent explosive development. The discussion among philosophers was motivated by new results which conflicted with Kant’s very influential conception. One of the most important areas which lead to the meeting of philosophy and mathematics was a rigorous account of the infinitesimal calculus. In his article the author shows that considerations of this type found in Bolzano and Frege are important not only for the overcoming of the Kantian conception, but as for what we today call (...) the linguistic turn. (shrink)

Responsione nostra disputationem cum L. Novák prosequimur, qui tractationem nostram, cui titulus “Různá pojetí matematiky u vybraných autorů od antiky po raný novověk”, impugnavit. Impugnatio a L. Novák sub titulo “Tomáš Akvinský instrumentalistou v matematice?” conscripta ansam praebuit nobis ad nonnulla, quae dixeramus, non solum clarius, sed etiam latius ac profundius explananda. Qua in re inprimis ad hoc attendimus, quomodo S. Thomas mathematicam, scientiasque medias necnon philosophiam intellexerit. Adhuc in nostra sententia sistimus, duplicem scil. ac valde diversam interpretationem harum disciplinarum (...) proponi posse. Quamquam multi textus testantur, S. Thomam mathematicam scientiasque medias realistice intellexisse, inveniuntur tamen apud eum dicta nonnulla, quae interpretationi favent instrumentalisticae. Hanc duplicem interpretationem prae oculis ponere multum iuvat, nostro iudicio, ad subsequentem intellectualem historiam, praecipue modernae aetatis, adaequate intelligendam.In our contribution we continue our discussion with L. Novák, who criticised our paper “Různá pojetí matematiky u vybraných autorů od antiky po raný novověk.” Novák’s critique titled “Tomáš Akvinský instrumentalistou v matematice?” served as an incentive for us not only to clarify certain points, but also to deepen our original exposition. We focused on Aquinas’s understanding of mathematics, the middle sciences and philosophy. We still insist that two substantially different interpretations of these disciplines are possible. On the one hand, there is much evidence for Aquinas’s realistic approach to mathematics and the middle sciences. On the other hand, ideas can also be found in Aquinas’s texts supporting an instrumentalist reading. In our opinion, it is important to point out these two approaches to the mathematical sciences in order to adequately understand the subsequent evolution of the history of ideas, especially in the modern period. (shrink)

We deal with the concept of man and woman, as well as with the problem of their equality, in the two great ancient thinkers Plato and Aristotle. The discussion of Plato leads to the conclusion that there is no substantial difference between man and woman. We find Plato’s view close or similar to today’s widely held doctrine of “unisexism”. Aristotle on the other hand believes that there are important differences between man and woman and we find in his texts two (...) approaches to the problem. In his first view the sex difference is due to the lesser perfection of woman, according to the second view both sexes are equally perfect, nevertheless each in its own way. Both conceptions have their supporters in contemporary thought (so-called theories of „polarism“ and „compatibilism“). From a systematic point of view we suggest that Aristotle´s second approach should be further developed as it is most in accord with our Christian worldview. (shrink)

[Tichy's Criticism of the Causal Theory of the Proper Name].

Discussion on Two Remarks on Ondřej Švec’s Note regarding Philosophy of History.

The author attempts to give an analysis of negative existential statements, in which the subject is a proper name. In contrast to many contemporary philosophers he thinks that this analysis is possible also in the case that we understand a proper name in the same way as Mill or Kripke. The purpose of this paper is not only to provide an analysis of existential statements, but also to support Mill´s and Kripke´s theory of proper names. It was just the failure (...) to analyse negative existential statements that caused many theoreticians to incline towards the descriptive theory of proper names. Existential negative statements do not have, in author´s opinion, a subject-predicate structure. So, paradoxically, we do not speak about Homer in the statement Homer did not exist. This statement expresses that the name Homer does not have any bearer; and so we can say that the name is in some sense spurious. For this reason non-existential sentences that contain the name Homer do not have a truth-value, because their presupposition Homer did not exist is true. (shrink)

The author shows that, after some considerations about the nature of speech, we can take two substantially different paths. Wittgenstein’s early philosophy is the paradigm of the first path, his later the paradigm of the second. According the author, the difference between these two conceptions is that in the late Wittgenstein, as opposed to his early conception, rejects the search for, and the clarification of, the essence of our language.

This paper is a Czech translation and critical interpretation of 'Dialog s Pünjerem' by G. Frege.

The author divides his reflections on the nature of philosophy or science into three parts. In the first part, he strives to determine the issues in question systematically. By dividing the concept of human activity he uncovers the features common to philosophy and science as well as the features by which these two disciplines are distinguished. The inspiration is found especially in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In the second part, the same problem is dealt from the historical perspective. By way of a (...) reconstruction of the origins of philosophy and science, the author shows the features by which these disciplines got mutually separated and secluded from the previous trends. In the third part, the author contrasts the presented approaches and highlights why it is reasonable to investigate the nature of philosophy and science from both, systematical and historical point of view. (shrink)

[Considerations on the interpretation of Frege's. logico-philosophical legacy].

Petr Dvořák hájí ve své knize Kauzalita činitele libertariánské pojetí svobody lidské vůle. Vůli považuje za duševní schopnost člověka a její svobodu spatřuje v možnosti její sebedeterminace. Tuto tezi autor tohoto příspěvku kritizuje. Dokazuje, že sebedeterminující schopnost je contradictio in terminis. Libertariánsky pojatá svobodná vůle je možná jen, pokud není schopností. Takovou vůlí je pouze vůle Boží (za předpokladu, že Bůh existuje). Autor připojuje historické upozornění, že autorem omylu zaměňujícího lidskou vůli s Boží je renezanční teolog Ludvík Molina, že k (...) jeho stoupencům náležel i René Descartes. (shrink)

In this article I consider two aspects of Moore’s philosophical method which lead to the turn to natural language. These are his interest in the meaning (not the truth) of problematic philosophical theses and his interest in common sense philosophy. However, Moore himself did not completely achieve the linguistic turn: he merely prepared the way for it. In the conclusions I show that Moore’s themes were developed by N. Malcom. The deeper sense of my paper is to show that the (...) linguistic turn as begun by Moore does not conflict with the spirit of the Aristotelian tradition. (shrink)

The authors explicate Aquinas's conception of mathematics. They show that in his work the Aristotelian conception is prevalent, according to which this discipline is—together with physics and metaphysics—a theoretical science, whose subject is the study of real quantity and its necessary properties. But, alongside this dominant and prevalent conception, Aquinas's work contains a number of indications that cast doubt. These sparse and rather marginal reflections lead the authors to conclude that Aquinas's texts contain a "constructivist" conception of mathematics in rudimentary (...) form. According to this approach, mathematics is not a theoretical science examining real quantity but, rather, a special kind of "art" by means of which mathematical objects are "created." From a constructivist point of view the authors then attempt to formulate a conception of mathematics that would accord with the basic Aristotelian assumptions of Aquinas's thought. (shrink)

A Riposte to Stanislav Sousedík’s View of Historical Facts.

P. Sousedík and D. Svoboda, in their paper “Různá pojetí matematiky u vybraných autorů od antiky po raný novověk: Je matematika teoretická věda nebo pouhá technika?”, proposed an interpretation of Aquinas’s understanding of the nature of mathematics which the author regards as unsatisfactory. The purpose of this review article is to point out its problems and to suggest in its stead an adequate interpretation of Aquinas’s mind, on the basis of a detailed analysis of his texts. The author shows (...) that Aquinas was by no means an instrumentalist in mathematics but considered mathematical truths to be directly applicable to “physical matter”. Such an application takes place in sciences like astronomy, harmonics or optics, which, although sometimes subsumed under mathematics broadly conceived, nevertheless form a special category qua the so-called “middle sciences” (viz. situated between mathematics and physics) and are thus no true species of mathematics. The fact that these sciences are also regarded as “arts” does not preclude their scientific character at all, since the two categories are not mutually exclusive, according to St. Thomas. (shrink)

Philosophy in the historical Kingdom of Bohemia has never received much attention in the Anglophone world. Yet in the early modern period, Bohemia and especially Prague were an extraordinarily fertile ground for philosophical thought. Stanislav Sousedík of Charles University in Prague is now the foremost expert on this region and period. His Philosophy in the Bohemian Lands between the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment appeared in Czech in 1997 and is now available in a nearly identical German translation.Within the (...) Holy Roman Empire, the Bohemian Lands formed a cultural unity that was also under independent rule until it came under the Habsburg crown in 1526. This study reveals the contribution of philosophy to the creation of this unity from the late Middle Ages until the end of Joseph II’s rule in 1790.The book starts with the Thomism , the Scotism , and the Lullism taught at the University of Prague after Jan Hus had imposed a strict ontological realism. Under independent Bohemian kings, political philosophy became relevant, and Renaissance Platonism was eventually received and flourished in coexistence with the inherited. (shrink)

The paper deals with the metaphysics of Valerian Magni, a seventeenth-century Capuchin thinker and Church politician. It follows Stanislav Sousedik’s and Paul Richard Blum’s interpretations of Magni’s thought and aims to systematize Magni’s metaphysical notions and present their gradual development. The paper first focuses on Magni’s critique of Aristotelianism, which the Capuchin regards as an atheistic philosophy due to incorrect conceptions of God and the world. Then, Magni’s attempt to create a metaphysical system in his late work Opus philosophicum in (...) particular is presented. The influence of the Augustinian-Bonaventurian tradition and the subjectivist tendencies in Magni’s thought are taken into account. (shrink)

Sally Sedgwick presents a fresh account of Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy. She argues that Hegel offers a compelling critique of and alternative to the conception of cognition that Kant defended in his 'Critical' period, and explores Hegel's claim to derive from Kantian doctrines clues to a superior form of idealism.

According to Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.3, 995a7–8, there are people who will take seriously the arguments of a speaker only if a poet can be cited as a ‘witness’ in support of them. Aristotle's passing observation sharply reminds us that Greek philosophy had developed within, and was surrounded by, a culture which extensively valued the authority of the poetic word and the poet's ‘voice’ from which it emanated. The currency of ideas, values, and images disseminated through familiarity with poetry had always (...) been a force with which philosophy, in its various manifestations, needed to reckon. As a mode of thought and discourse which proclaimed its aspiration to wisdom, philosophy could not easily eschew some degree of dialogue with an art whose practitioners had traditionally been ranked prominently among the sophoi. Even Aristotle, who keeps aloof from the assumption that philosophical contentions stand in need of poetic support, cites and quotes poetry regularly in his own writings in ways which indicate the influence on him of a prevailing mentality that regarded poets and philosophers as pursuers, up to a point at least, of a common wisdom. (shrink)