Romans 7: 14 if. has traditionally been one of the most frequently discussed passages in the whole of the Pauline Corpus. Nevertheless, this pericope has attracted attention more because it is consistently regarded as a crucial part of Paul's theology, than because of its intrinsic exegetical problems. The main issue is whether the ‘split personality’ and the weakness of will should be regarded as essential to the life of the believing Christian; or, rather, as characteristic for those who are not (...) ‘in Christ’ and therefore beyond the power of his Spirit. For the systematic theologian, the question of whether the first person singular in these verses should be understood in an autobiographical sense is a subordinate one. However this particular question is answered, we are still confronted by the main issue. (shrink)

There has been a time in my teaching career that I used to cite in my introductory classes ‘Moral Philosophy’ from Erica Jong's Fear of Flying . The situation leading up to the quote is that the main character, Isadora, is asked a sexual favour by her brother in law, Pierre. Her answer and the subsequent dialogue read then as follows: ‘I can't’ , I said. ‘Come on,’ Pierre said, ‘I'll teach you.’ ‘I didn't mean that … I meant that (...) I can't; morally , I can…’. (shrink)

According to the traditional conception of morality one's feeling of guilt is appropriate if and only if one has culpably done wrong. The feeling must involve this propositional content. In recent literature, however, two opposite developments can be discerned. First there is a tendency to expand the range of things one can appropriately feel guilty about. So, for example, it is argued that there is nothing wrong in feeling guilt about actions done involuntarily, or done by others, or about thoughts (...) which just happen to the subject of the feeling . This position is criticized on the ground that guilt is a painful emotion and should therefore be suffered only if it is deserved. On the other hand, there are also arguments in the literature to the effect that agent regret should be substituted for guilt , and that the range of appropriate guilt feelings should be limited . The main objection to Williams's proposal is that it would mean an impoverishment of the moral world: guilt feeling implies, as agent regret does not, the recognition that one could and should have acted otherwise. As to Gibbard's position, it is demonstrated that it is based on a disputable metaethics. In addition to that, it is argued that Gibbard's view of guilt feeling as an adaptive syndrome is untenable. (shrink)

The article deals with the classical idea that God's will is the foundation of moral obligation. The particular theory should be understood as a theory of a certain moral practice. Therefore, its 'Sitz im Leben' is first invoked by means of an episode of Walter Scott's The Heart of Midlothian. Then a strong version of the theory is stated and defended against a couple of current and classical objections. A successful defense would give rational support to the theory, but it (...) would not qualify the theory as the best in the field. That depends on the quality of its rivals. One of those, Christine Korsgaard's recent impressive Kantian reflective endorsement view is discussed. The conclusion is that it does not provide stronger grounds for the reality and inescapability of moral obligations than the divine command theory. (shrink)

This is the first book that pays systematic attention to ontological issues impinging on this question.

In the first part of the paper an argument is developed to the effect that (1) there is no moral ground for individual persons to feel responsible for or guilty about crimes of their group to which they have in no way contributed; and (2) since there is no irreducibly collective responsibility nor guilt at any time, there is no question of them persisting over time. In the second part it is argued that there is nevertheless sufficient reason for innocent (...) individual members of a group (that persists over time) to take on responsibility and guilt for the evil other (earlier) members have committed. The reason depends on the acceptability of a particular psychological theory of personal identity. (shrink)

What I set out to do is to cast some doubt on the thesis that, in Bernard Williams's words, any appeal to God in morality “either adds nothing at all, or it adds the wrong sort of thing”. A first conclusion is that a morality of real, inescapable and (sometimes) for the agent costly obligations, while being at home in a theistic metaphysic, does not sit easily with metaphysical, atheistic naturalism. The second conclusion is that Christine Korsgaard's impressive ethical project (...) which is neutral towards theism and atheism fails in giving a satisfying account of such obligations. My final claim is that a theistic account in terms of a strong divine command theory might succeed where non- and atheistic accounts seem to founder. (shrink)

[Masaryk and Korsgaard on God and Moral Obligation: Toward a Moral Argument for the Existence of God].

In a Dutch weekly it was recently stated that man's moral powers are overestimated in the christian faith. The proponent of this belief, the Dutch–American philologist and philosopher Staal seems to me to be closer to the truth of this matter than his distinguished German colleague Nietzsche. The latter used to fascinate me as a young student with his devastating criticisms of christian culture and the christian view of life. According to Nietzsche, the christian religion has not too high, but (...) rather too low a view of mankind: it wanted man to be ugly and evil; in this way it has succeeded in making man so. The insignificance, ugliness and sinfulness of man is the outcome of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Someone who is being told again and again how insignificant, bad and sinful he is, will end up believing it and behave accordingly. A not implausible theory, I thought at that time. However, as I see the matter now, I would support Staal rather than Nietzsche . The christian faith has an optimistic view of man. Does it overestimate him? Does it attribute imaginary moral powers to him? Does it demand the morally impossible? A positive answer to these questions is not unreasonable if one does not want to go beyond a secular, evolutionist or sociobiological under-standing of man and does not take into consideration the affirmations of the Church. (shrink)

There has been a time in my teaching career that I used to cite in my introductory classes ‘Moral Philosophy’ from Erica Jong's Fear of Flying . The situation leading up to the quote is that the main character, Isadora, is asked a sexual favour by her brother in law, Pierre. Her answer and the subsequent dialogue read then as follows: ‘I can't’ , I said. ‘Come on,’ Pierre said, ‘I'll teach you.’ ‘I didn't mean that … I meant that (...) I can't; morally , I can…’. (shrink)

Background and aim With the increasing interest in lifestyle, health and consequences of unhealthy lifestyles for the healthcare system, a new kind of solidarity is gaining importance: lifestyle solidarity. While it might not seem fair to let other people pay for the costs arising from an unhealthy lifestyle, it does not seem fair either to punish people for their lifestyle. However, it is not clear how solidarity is assessed by people, when considering disease risks or lifestyle risks. The aim of (...) this study was to investigate the degree of solidarity with lifestyle as well as with other factors that are related to health outcomes—for example, old age—and the relation between this degree of solidarity and various characteristics. Methods This cross-sectional study is part of the Dutch longitudinal SMILE study. Data on the degree of solidarity with different lifestyles and old age, and the relation between the degree of solidarity and various demographic and other variables were obtained in a questionnaire survey. Results Solidarity with smokers and overweight people was moderate, as was solidarity with older people. Respondents were ambivalent about athletes. Respondents who were younger, male and highly educated, and those with a healthy lifestyle, a small social network, high quality of life and an internal locus of control, showed low solidarity. Conclusions Solidarity with an unhealthy lifestyle and old age is moderate and the degree of solidarity varies among the different subgroups. (shrink)

This comprehensive book covers the research, theory, policy and practice context of unusual reproduction using third parties. Olga Van den Akker details the psychological adaptation required to continuing changes in public opinion, advances in technologies and new legislations in surrogate motherhood and discusses their impact at an individual, societal and global level. She describes the competing interests and interactions between legal, organisational, personal, social, psychological and cultural issues in relation to biological and genetic surrogate and commissioning parenthood. This book is (...) intended for professionals, practitioners, academics and students interested in the complexities of unusual reproduction using multidisciplinary perspectives. (shrink)

This paper investigates conceptions of explanation, teleology, and analogy in the works of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Georges Cuvier (1769-1832). Richards (2000, 2002) and Zammito (2006, 2012, 2018) have argued that Kant’s philosophy provided an obstacle for the project of establishing biology as a proper science around 1800. By contrast, Russell (1916), Outram (1986), and Huneman (2006, 2008) have argued, similar to suggestions from Lenoir (1989), that Kant’s philosophy influenced the influential naturalist Georges Cuvier. In this article, I wish to (...) expand on and further the work of Russell, Outram, and Huneman by adopting a novel perspective on Cuvier and considering (a) the similar conceptions of proper science and explanation of Kant and Cuvier, and (b) the similar conceptions of the role of teleology and analogy in the works of Kant and Cuvier. The similarities between Kant and Cuvier show, contrary to the interpretation of Richards and Zammito, that some of Kant’s philosophical ideas, whether they derived from him or not, were fruitfully applied by some life scientists who wished to transform life sciences into proper sciences around 1800. However, I also show that Cuvier, in contrast to Kant, had a workable strategy for transforming the life sciences into proper sciences, and that he departed from Kant’s philosophy of science in crucial respects. (shrink)

Suppose “chicken” eggs could be produced by quasi‐chickens—genetically engineered humps of living chicken‐flesh that do nothing but lay eggs. Would there be anything amiss with that? Animal ethicists invoke the notion of animal integrity in order to give intellectual content to the intuition that there would be. On inspection, ‘integrity’ isn't everything its proponents want it to be. Yet there's enough in it to make reasoned argument possible.

Much has been said about the need for improving the current definitions of scientific authorship, but an aspect that is often overlooked is how to formulate and communicate these definitions to ensure that they are comprehensible and useful for researchers, notably researchers active in international research consortia. In light of a rapid increase in international collaborations within natural sciences, this article uses authorship of this branch of sciences as an example and provides suggestions to improve the comprehensibility of the definitions (...) of authorship in natural sciences. It assesses whether the definition of authorship provided by the European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity can deal with current issues and problems of scientific authorship. Notably, problems that are experienced in project groups with researchers coming from multiple countries. Using theories developed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Merton, a normative framework is developed to articulate ethical authorship in natural sciences. Accordingly, enriching the current definition of authorship with normative elements and using discipline-specific metaphors to communicate them are introduced as possible ways of improving the comprehensibility of the definition of authorship in international environments. Finally, this article provides a proposal to be considered in the future revisions of the European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity. (shrink)

Much has been said about the need for improving the current definitions of scientific authorship, but an aspect that is often overlooked is how to formulate and communicate these definitions to ensure that they are comprehensible and useful for researchers, notably researchers active in international research consortia. In light of a rapid increase in international collaborations within natural sciences, this article uses authorship of this branch of sciences as an example and provides suggestions to improve the comprehensibility of the definitions (...) of authorship in natural sciences. It assesses whether the definition of authorship provided by the European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity can deal with current issues and problems of scientific authorship. Notably, problems that are experienced in project groups with researchers coming from multiple countries. Using theories developed by Jürgen Habermas and Robert Merton, a normative framework is developed to articulate ethical authorship in natural sciences. Accordingly, enriching the current definition of authorship with normative elements and using discipline-specific metaphors to communicate them are introduced as possible ways of improving the comprehensibility of the definition of authorship in international environments. Finally, this article provides a proposal to be considered in the future revisions of the European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity. (shrink)

Liberal political philosophy emphasizes the benefits of membership in a cultural group and, in the opinion of this challenging book, neglects its harmful, oppressive aspects. Andrew Kernohan argues that an oppressive culture perpetuates inegalitarian social meanings and false assumptions about who is entitled to what. Cultural pollution harms fundamental interests in self-respect and knowledge of the good and is diffuse, insidious, and unnoticed. This cultural pollution is analogous to environmental pollution, and though difficult to detect, is nonetheless just as real. (...) The book's conclusion is that a liberal state committed to the moral equality of persons must accept a strong role in reforming our cultural environment. (shrink)

Background Genuine uncertainty on superiority of one intervention over the other is called equipoise. Physician-investigators in randomized controlled trials need equipoise at least in studies with more than minimal risks. Ideally, this equipoise is also present in patient-participants. In pediatrics, data on equipoise are lacking. We hypothesize that 1) lack of equipoise at enrolment among parents may reduce recruitment; 2) lack of equipoise during participation may reduce retention in patients assigned to a less favoured treatment-strategy. Methods We compared preferences of (...) parents/patients at enrolment, documented by a questionnaire, with preferences developed during follow-up by an interview-study to investigate equipoise of child-participants and parents in the BeSt-for-Kids-study. This trial in new-onset Juvenile Idiopathic Arthritis-patients consists of three strategies. One strategy comprises initial treatment with a biological disease-modifying-antirheumatic-drug, currently not standard-of-care. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 23 parents and 7 patients, median 11 months after enrolment. Results Initially most parents and children were not in equipoise. Parents/patients who refused participation, regularly declined due to specific preferences. Many participating families preferred the biological-first-strategy. They participated to have a chance for this initial treatment, and would even consider stopping trial-participation when not randomized for it. Their conviction of superiority of the biological-first strategy was based on knowledge from internet and close relations. According to four parents, the physician-investigator preferred the biological-first-strategy, but the majority stated that she had no preferred strategy. In phase 2, preferences tended to change to the treatment actually received. Conclusions Lack of equipoise during enrolment did not reduce study recruitment, mainly due to the fact that preferred treatment was only available within the study. Still, when developing a trial it is important to evaluate whether the physicians’ research question is in line with preferences of the patient-group. By exploring so-called ‘informed patient-group’-equipoise, successful recruitment may be enhanced and bias avoided. In our study, lack of equipoise during trial-participation did not reduce retention in those assigned to a less favoured option. We observed a change for preference towards treatment actually received, possibly explained by comparable outcomes in all three arms. (shrink)

BackgroundReducing the number of animals used in experiments has become a priority for the governments of many countries. For these reductions to occur, animal-free alternatives must be made more available and, crucially, must be embraced by researchers.MethodsWe conducted an international online survey for academics in the field of animal science (N = 367) to explore researchers’ attitudes towards the implementation of animal-free innovations. Through this survey, we address three key questions. The first question is whether scientists who use animals in (...) their research consider governmental goals for animal-free innovations achievable and whether they would support such goals. Secondly, responders were asked to rank the importance of ten roadblocks that could hamper the implementation of animal-free innovations. Finally, responders were asked whether they would migrate (either themselves or their research) if increased animal research regulations in their country of residence restricted their research.ResultsWhile nearly half (40%) of the responders support governmental goals, the majority (71%) of researchers did not consider such goals achievable in their field within the near future. In terms of roadblocks for implementation of animal-free methods, ~ 80% of the responders considered ‘reliability’ as important, making it the most highly ranked roadblock. However, all other roadblocks were reported by most responders as somewhat important, suggesting that they must also be considered when addressing animal-free innovations. Importantly, a majority reported that they would consider migration to another country in response to a restrictive animal research policy. Thus, governments must consider the risk of researchers migrating to other institutes, states or countries, leading to a ‘brain-drain’ if policies are too strict or suitable animal-free alternatives are not available.ConclusionOur findings suggest that development and implementation of animal-free innovations are hampered by multiple factors. We outline three pillars concerning education, governmental influence and data sharing, the implementation of which may help to overcome these roadblocks to animal-free innovations. (shrink)

ABSTRACTBoth auditory and visual emotional memories can be made less emotional by loading working memory during memory recall. Taxing WM during recall can be modality specific (giving an audit...

In this position paper, we describe a number of methodological and philosophical challenges that arose within our interdisciplinary Digital Humanities project CatVis, which is a collaboration between applied geometric algorithms and visualization researchers, data scientists working at OCLC, and philosophers who have a strong interest in the methodological foundations of visualization research. The challenges we describe concern aspects of one single epistemic need: that of methodologically securing (an increase in) trust in visualizations. We discuss the lack of ground truths in (...) the (digital) humanities and argue that trust in visualizations requires that we evaluate visualizations on the basis of ground truths that humanities scholars themselves create. We further argue that trust in visualizations requires that a visualization provides provable guarantees on the faithfulness of the visual representation and that we must clearly communicate to the users which part of the visualization can be trusted and how much. Finally, we discuss transparency and accessibility in visualization research and provide measures for securing transparency and accessibility. (shrink)

What is the relevance of an analytical philosophy of history to the practice of history? There are four fundamental criticisms of the existing analytical philosophy: analytical philosophers have concentrated on old, dualistic traditions of history; they have not provided sufficient empirical validation for their explanatory theories; they have paid little attention to the preliminary operations necessary to the writing of historical explanation; and they have ignored important stages of growth within the study of history. These are criticisms of the existing (...) apragmatic philosophies of history, which lack a necessary empirical basis and become static, tied to one research tradition within historical scholarship. A pragmatic philosophy of history would focus on the growth of historical scholarship. The "History of Society," a name for the global approach to history, operates under the rules of comparative history. In the framework of a typology of the comparative method, types of difference and contrast refer back to the dominating types of macrocausality, generality, and inclusion. The logic of historical explanations is greatly determined by the choice of a particular type of comparative history. A pragmatic analysis demonstrates that a plurality of shades of meaning are possible in historical explanation, and that the traditional apragmatic dualist theory of a tension between the global and particular provides insufficient description. (shrink)