(for Adam Morton's half) I argue that if we take the values of persons to be ordered in a way that allows incomparability, then the problems Broome raises have easy solutions. In particular we can maintain that creating people is morally neutral while killing them has a negative value.

You have the camera, or intend to. You have the desire. Now, you have personalized instruction from PC Magazine "The play of light and color on the human imagination." That's how Daniel and Sally Wiener Grotta define photography. They'll lead you through choosing a digital camera and using all its amazing features, but photography is more than technology. These renowned experts liberally share their knowledge of lighting, settings, focus, file formats, communicating with pictures, and more. Read a little, then (...) go shoot some pictures, study them, and read some more. See what you and that camera can do -- together. Go one-on-one with the pros Choose a camera that fits your needs Understand resolution, compression, pixels, and file formats Use shutter speed, lighting, and depth of field Learn about white balance and color adjustment Organize your shots on the camera Shoot photos for company publications or online auctions Pick up tips for getting great photos Get your pictures out of the camera, easily Edit, print, and e-mail photos. (shrink)

To the age-old debate over what it means to be human, the relatively new fields of sociobiology and artificial intelligence bring new, if not necessarily compatible, insights. What have these two fields in common? Have they affected the way we define humanity? These and other timely questions are addressed with colorful individuality by the authors of _The Boundaries of Humanity_. Leading researchers in both sociobiology and artificial intelligence combine their reflections with those of philosophers, historians, and social scientists, while the (...) editors explore the historical and contemporary contexts of the debate in their introductions. The implications of their individual arguments, and the often heated controversies generated by biological determinism or by mechanical models of mind, go to the heart of contemporary scientific, philosophical, and humanistic studies. (shrink)

ADMINISTRANDO VIDAS SECAS: ENSAIO SOBRE OS RELATOS DE GRACILIANO RAMOS EM SUA EXPERIÊNCIA COMO PREFEITO DE PALMEIRA DOS ÍNDIOS/AL.

The young Canadian philosopher, George John Blewett, stood at the matrices of idealism at the turn of the century, and was so highly regarded that in 1910 he was invited by Boston University to succeed the eminent personalist, Borden Parker Bowne. Yet his name is virtually unknown. He studied in the classrooms of four idealists in the tradition of Wilhelm Wundt. Josiah Royce was one of his dissertation readers when he received his doctoral degree from Harvard University. He spent two (...) terms at Oxford under Edward Caird, and his two books were regarded at the time as first-rate contributions to the literature of idealism. My purpose in this paper is to introduce George Blewett as an important figure in the history of North American idealism, to set out briefly the range and major insights of his work, and to make public for the first time several pieces of private correspondence related to the Boston offer. (shrink)

The young Canadian philosopher, George John Blewett, stood at the matrices of idealism at the turn of the century, and was so highly regarded that in 1910 he was invited by Boston University to succeed the eminent personalist, Borden Parker Bowne. Yet his name is virtually unknown. He studied in the classrooms of four idealists in the tradition of Wilhelm Wundt. Josiah Royce was one of his dissertation readers when he received his doctoral degree from Harvard University. He spent two (...) terms at Oxford under Edward Caird, and his two books were regarded at the time as first-rate contributions to the literature of idealism. My purpose in this paper is to introduce George Blewett as an important figure in the history of North American idealism, to set out briefly the range and major insights of his work, and to make public for the first time several pieces of private correspondence related to the Boston offer. (shrink)

review of Mark Crimmins' *Talk about Beliefs*.

I give reasons stemming from the nature of narrative thinking why two-antecedent conditionals, most naturally expressed as "Suppose A. Suppose moreover B. Then C" the two antecedents play different roles. I formalise this idea with a two-dimensional similarity relation between possible worlds.

This chapter presents a model of risk‐taking behaviour. That is, it describes some simpler patterns of preference than real people ever have, and then discusses some strategies that would make sense for people with these simple preferences when faced with choices between risky options. These strategies can also make sense for people, with the more complicated preferences. The chapter also discusses some more detailed assumptions about snobs' preferences. There are several ways in which the Snobs can find their way through (...) risky situations. The chapter considers two. The first is, in effect, to refuse to reason probabilistically. Given every risky prospect they can decide what the most likely outcome is, equate it to a certainty of that outcome, and choose accordingly. In more complex situations something closer to real probabilistic reasoning will be needed. And this is the second way in which preferences such as those of the snobs can come to terms with risk. (shrink)

During the last twenty-five years or so there has been a remarkable growth in the interdisciplinary field bordering on cognitive psychology, linguistics, neurobiology, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of mind. The book under review makes a belated but significant contribution to the literature of cognitive science, since it provides the first detailed comparison of the views of two of the field's most influential figures, Noam Chomsky and Jean Piaget. The text is based on a conference which was held in October (...) of 1975 at the Abbaye de Royaumont near Paris. Besides Chomsky and Piaget, the participants at the conference included such notables as Jacques Monod and Gregory Bateson, the philosophers Jerry Fodor and Stephen Toulmin, psychologists Norbert Bischof, David Premack and Bärbel Inhelder, as well as distinguished representatives from the fields of biology, anthropology, and artificial intelligence. The major focus of the discussion concerned the differences between Chomsky's and Piaget's views on the nature/nurture question in psychology. (shrink)

The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 63, Issue 253, Page 843-846, October 2013.

This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.

This is a reply to de Sousa's 'Emotional Truth', in which he argues that emotions can be objective, as propositional truths are. I say that it is better to distinguish between truth and accuracy, and agree with de Sousa to the extent of arguing that emotions can be more or less accurate, that is, based on the facts as they are.

As this book reveals, his vision was much more complex and interesting. He hoped that machines would release people from relentless and repetitive drudgery in order to achieve more creative pursuits.

I discuss a large number of emotions that are relevant to performance at epistemic tasks. My central concern is the possibility that it is not the emotions that are most relevant to success of these tasks but associated virtues. I present cases in which it does seem to be the emotions rather than the virtues that are doing the work. I end of the paper by mentioning the connections between desirable and undesirable epistemic emotions.

Machine generated contents note: ARISTOTELIAN AND CARTESIAN LOGIC AT HARVARD -- by Rick Kennedy -- I. Introduction --II. Religiously-Oriented, Dogmatically-Inclined Humanistic Logics from the Renaissance to the Seventeenth Century -- A. Melanchthon and Aristotelianism 01 -- B. Richardson and Ramism 16 -- C. Aristotelianism, Ramism, and Schematic Thinking 25 -- D. Puritan Favoritism From Ramus to Descartes 32 -- E. Cartesian Logic and Christian Skepticism 37 -- F. The Religious and Dogmatic Orientation of The Port-'Royalfogic 42 -- G. Cartesian Logic (...) in British Textbooks 52 -- III. Charles Morton and c A; logick System -- A. Charles Morton 62 -- B. Morton's cAfogick System 78 -- IV. William Brattle and the Compendium of logick -- A. Intellectual Reform in the Puritans' Collapsing World 91 -- B. The Compendium ofJogick 93 -- c. Brattle: Tutor and Unofficial Professor of Divinity 108 -- V. Epilogue: Later Constituencies of Religious Logics and 133 -- The Separation of Logic and Divinity at Harvard. (shrink)

This paper begins with a discussion the role of less-than-admirable epistemic emotions in our respectable, indeed admirable inquiries: nosiness, obsessiveness, wishful thinking, denial, partisanship. The explanation for their desirable effect is Mandevillian: because of the division of epistemic labour individual epistemic vices can lead to shared knowledge. In fact it is sometimes essential to it.

The claim of this paper is that the everyday functions of knowledge make most sense if we see knowledge as contrastive. That is, we can best understand how the concept does what it does by thinking in terms of a relation “a knows that p rather than q.” There is always a contrast with an alternative. Contrastive interpretations of knowledge, and objections to them, have become fairly common in recent philosophy. The version defended here is fairly mild in that there (...) is no suggestion that we cannot think in terms of a simpler not explicitly contrastive relation “a knows that p.” Some, for instance Schaffer (2005) and Karjalainen and Morton (2003), have hinted that this stronger possibility may be right. But all that I am arguing now is that facts that are easily expressed in contrastive terms are vital to understanding why we need the concept of knowledge. In a piece that is in some ways a companion to this one ("Contrastivism" in Duncan Pritchard and Sven Bernecker, eds. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge 2010, 513-522), I give a general survey of theories of contrastive knowledge and the differences between them. (shrink)

I argue that general constraints on how humans think about humans produce universal features of the concept of mind. Some of these constraints determine how we imagine other people's thinking and action through our own. I formulate this in opposition to what I call the "theory theory". I believe this was the first use of this terminology, and this work was an early version of what has come to be called the simulation theory.