Socializing Epistemology: An Introduction through Two Sample Issues Frederick F. Schmitt Social epistemology is the conceptual and normative study of the ...

A new approach to understanding the nature of ethics and ethical decision making, not only in the context of business, but also in other life contexts.

The concept of truth lies at the heart of philosophy; whether one approaches it from epistemology or metaphysics, from the philosophy of language or the philosophy of science or religion, one must come to terms with the nature of truth.In this brisk introduction, Frederick Schmitt covers all the most important historical and contemporary theories of truth. Along the way he also sheds considerable light on such closely related issues as realism and idealism, absolutism and relativism, and the nature of (...) contemporary pragmatism.At a time when it is fashionable for scholars outside of philosophy to deny the possibility of truth, Schmitt’s lucid, technically accurate survey offers the easiest way to understand what is really at stake in such denials. Truth: A Primer is a quick but accurate and philosophically sophisticated overview that will prove invaluable to philosophers and their students in a wide range of courses, in particular epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language. (shrink)

In this article, we argue that John Henry Newman was right to think that our passional nature can play a legitimate epistemic role. First, we unpack the standard objection to Newman’s understanding of the relationship between our passional nature and the evidential basis of faith. Second, we argue that the standard objection to Newman operates with a narrow definition of evidence. After challenging this notion, we then offer a broader and more humane understanding of evidence. Third, we survey recent scholarship (...) arguing that emotions, a key aspect of our passional nature, are cognitive. In this light, they plausibly have a proper epistemic role. Fourth, we defend Newman’s reliance on the passional nature in epistemic matters by showing how reasonable it is in light of this recent work on evidence and the nature of emotions. Newman’s insistence that the formation of a right state of heart and mind is crucial for epistemic success is far from untenable. (shrink)

n his Lectures on the Histmy 0f Philosophy Hegel credits Rousseau with an cpoch-making innovation in the realm 0f practical philosophy, an innovation said to consist in thc fact that Rousseau is thc first thinker t0 recognize "the free will" as thc fundamental principle 0f political philosophy} Since Hcgcl’s 0wn practical philosophy is explicitly grounded in an account 0f thc will and its freedom, Hcgcl’s assertion is clearly intended as an acknowledgment 0f his deep indebtedness t0 R0usscau’s social and political (...) thought. What is not s0 clear, however, is how this indebtedness is t0 bc understood: What precisely docs it mean t0 say that the political theories 0f Hegel and Rousseau share the same first principlc? In this paper I intend t0 follow up 0n this interpretive suggestion 0f Hcgcl’s by claborating, much more explicitly than he himself docs, thc sense in which R0usscau’s political thought is founded 011 thc principle 0f the "frcc wiil." While accomplishing this task will put us in a better position t0 clarify thc obscurc philosophical strategy behind Hcgcl’s 0wn social theory, my primary interest here is t0 illuminate thc foundations 0f R0usscau’s political thought, especially its account 0f the connection between freedom and the general will. I argue that it is necessary t0 distinguish two ways in which Rousseau takes the general will t0 secure, or realize, thc freedom of individual citizens, namely, by functioning as an embodiment as well as a precondition of such freedom. Understanding both 0f these points will lead us t0 scc: that R0usscau’s thought rests 0n two distinct, though not incompatible, accounts 0f how citizens whose actions are constrained by thc general will are in fact subject 0nly to their 0wn wills and therefore free in their 0bcdience to thc general will. As we shall scc, these two accounts arc implicitly based upon distinct conceptions 0f political freedom. (shrink)

Descriptions of how managers think about the moral questions that come up in their work lives are analyzed to draw out the moral assumptions to which they commonly refer. The moral standards thus derived are identified as (1) honesty in communication, (2) fair treatment, (3) special consideration, (4) fair competition, (5) organizational responsibility, (6) corporate social responsibility, and, (7) respect for law. It is observed that these normative standards assume the cultural form of social conventions but because managers invoke them (...) as largely private intuitions, their cultural status remains precarious and unclear. This is the second in a research series of three papers. (shrink)

Science traditionally is taught as a linear process based on logic and carried out by objective researchers following the scientific method. Practice of science is a far more nuanced enterprise, one in which intuition and passion become just as important as objectivity and logic. Whether the activity is committing to study a particular research problem, drawing conclusions about a hypothesis under investigation, choosing whether to count results as data or experimental noise, or deciding what information to present in a research (...) paper, ethical challenges inevitably will arise because of the ambiguities inherent in practice. Unless these ambiguities are acknowledged and their sources understood explicitly, responsible conduct of science education will not adequately prepare the individuals receiving the training for the kinds of decisions essential to research integrity that they will have to make as scientists. (shrink)

Abstract Modern reflection on the ideal of personal autonomy has its Western origin in the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, where autonomy, or self-legislation, involves citizens joining together to make laws for themselves that reflect their collective understanding of the common good. Four features of this conception of autonomy continue to be relevant today. First, autonomy, a type of freedom, is introduced into modern philosophy in order to make up for a perceived deficiency, or incompleteness, in merely ?negative? freedom (the right (...) to do as one pleases, unimpeded by others). Second, autonomy is taken to be not merely a complement of negative freedom but a higher, more valuable species of freedom. Third, at its origin personal autonomy is not conceived individualistically; rather, on Rousseau's account, autonomy is achievable only if citizens surrender part of their status as individuals and think of their social membership as essential, not merely accidental, to who they are. Finally, Rousseau's conception of autonomy is distinct from the contemporary ideal of autonomy defined as judging or deciding for oneself (according to one's own reason). Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which autonomy as Rousseau conceives it also requires the developed capacity for independent, self-determined judgment. (shrink)

I argue that the increase in identification of human subjects as potentially vulnerable provides evidence for a transition in human research practice analogous to changes that have occurred in implementation of environmental policy. More specifically, the increasing identification of subjects as vulnerable corresponds to de facto acceptance of what has been called “the precautionary principle” in environmental policy.

Alfred Schutz in his phenomenological studies on the social world, has systematically analyzed the nature of social relationships between individuals, and has arrived at an originating point involving intersubjectivity. This point is described by what he calls the Pure We-relationship. Comparison of Schutz's analysis of the Pure We relationship with Buber's description of his personal experience of intersubjectivity, i.e., the l-Thou relationship, reveals a remarkable convergence. For instance, fundamental to both Schutz and Buber are the notions that intersubjectivity is tied (...) to the lived presence of the self with the other (i.e., sharing of time in the stream of duration), and that the 'content' of this 'experience' is related to the being of the other. These interesting features in the works of Schutz and Buber are described by showing the similarity between the Pure We and I-Thou relationships. (shrink)

Investigates the Neo-idealists or Neo-Hegelians who became important in British thought around 1870 and were influential for about a half century. Focuses on how their social philosophy exhibited a fundamental continuity with British liberal thought from the time of Locke.

The reasons-causes debate concerns whether explanations of human behavior in terms of an agent's reasons presuppose causal laws. This paper considers three approaches to this debate: the covering law model which holds that there are causal laws covering both reasons and behavior, the intentionalist approach which denies any role to causal laws, and Donald Davidson’s point of view which denies that causal laws connect reasons and behavior, but holds that reasons and behavior must be covered by physical laws if reasons (...) explanations are to be valid. I defend the intentionalist approach against the two causalist approaches and conclude with reflections on the significance of the debate for the social sciences. (shrink)

He demonstrates that a broad parallelism exists between developments in ethical theory among Continental philosophers of the phenomenological persuasion and the more analytically inclined philosophers of the English-speaking world.

This paper examines the contents and institutional context of August Weismann's long essay on Amphimixis (1891). Therein he presented detailed discussions of his on-going studies of reduction division and parthenogenesis, but more to the point, he included an elaborate examination of Émile Maupas's two major publications in protozoology. To understand the relevance of this part to the other two, the author briefly reviews highpoints in earlier nineteenth century protozoology and concludes that only in the mid-1870s and 1880s did protozoa add (...) an important dimension to heredity theory. Otto Bütschli and then Maupas provided Weismann with a deeper understanding of how conjugation and fertilization were related but not identical processes. This allowed him to integrate the two into a fuller understanding of evolution by natural selection. (shrink)

Typically people make ethical judgments with reference to unchanging principles, standards, rights, and values. This essay argues that such an ahistorical approach to ethics should be supplemented by a due regard for history. Invoking precedents by authors such as Jonsen and Toulmin, McIntyre, Niebuhr, Weber, De Tocqueville, Machiavelli and others, this essay explores several important ways in which a due regard for history can and should shape the practice of business ethics. Thus a due regard for history helps us both (...) to cultivate fitting appreciation of cultural mores and to understand how current problems and issues have developed as they have; it helps us to gauge current responsibilities with respect legacies of problems inherited from the past; it helps us to develop a lively sense of what is possible in the present, given current contingencies and past experiences; and it moves us to rethink the practice of ethical auditing: not just as a backward-looking effort to gauge compliance but as a forward-looking way of learning from actual experiences and developing fitting responses. (shrink)

The Scientific Attitude presents a systematic account of the cognitive and social features of science. The work is unique in its attempt to understand science in terms of day-to-day practice. The book goes beyond the traditional description of science, which focuses on method and logic, to characterize the scientific attitude as a way of looking at the world.

Some present-day disagreements in moral philosophy, by E. F. Flower.--Values in the history of ideas, by P. P. Wiener.--Social interests and value, by T. A. Cowan.--Value conflicts and the education of our young, by J. L. Childs.

The mystery of embodiment is ubiquitous in medical settings. Even so, health care professionals may find themselves driven by daily clinical tasks that prevent this mystery from coming to focal awareness. The author explores embodiment from five approaches, (1) offering a simple account of developing a skill that proceeds in several stages from novice to expert, (2) examining critically the “capabilities approach” of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum and what it says and does not say about embodiment, (3) developing a (...) brief description of the human body as vulnerable, (4) exploring the long-term trend in clinical contexts sometimes described as the “commodification of the body,” and (5) highlighting connections between Christian faith and embodiment. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.2 (Summer 2011): 239–248. (shrink)

The theological task in North America is not the correlation of faith and world or the appropriation of creedal concepts, but the effort to show how the gospel story itself functions as the model of theology. Opening this dimension for the imagination of faith is our primary challenge.

The way of shaping present “riffraff” into community in our wilderness is not identical to that of Moses at Sinai, but the need to establish law and to offer it as gospel is very much the same.