Pada 11 Oktober 2012 Gereja Katolik merayakan 50 tahun dibukanya Konsili Vatikan II. Namun demikian, 16 dokumen yang dihasilkan selama Konsili itu berlangsung (11 Oktober 1962-7 Desember 1965) belum dikenal oleh semua umat Katolik. Bahkan ada tidak sedikit umat Katolik yang belum pernah melihat dokumen-dokumen tersebut. Ada pula yang mengatakan bahwa kendati sudah membacanya, namun merasakan sangat sulit untuk memahaminya. Ada pula yang ketika melihat buku tebal yang memuat dokumen-dokumen tersebut langsung merasa terintimidasi dan ketakutan (intimadated), lalu tidak berani membukanya. (...) Sudah ada berbagai macam upaya untuk menyampaikan isi dan semangat dari Konsili Vatikan II kepada seluruh anggota Gereja Katolik. Salah satu cara adalah menerbitkan buku untuk mengulas isi dokumen-dokumen tersebut. Salah satu dari sekian banyak buku yang pantas dibaca adalah karya Maureen Sulivan, seorang assistant professor ilmu Teologi di Saint Anselm College, Manchester, New Hapshire, Amerika Serikat. Buku yang ditulis dalam bentuk tanya jawab ini dibagi menjadi 9 bab. Bab 1 berbicara mengenai “Pengumuman” diadakannya Konsili yang menggemparkan para pemimpin Gereja, khususnya anggota Dewan Kardinal dan Kuria di Vatikan, yang merasa bahwa Konsili tidak diperlukan. Dalam bab ini dibicarakan tentang arti dari Konsili yang disebut sebagai ekumenis dan pastoral, alasan perlu diadakannya Konsili, persiapan yang dibutuhkan, serta tujuan yang ingin dicapai dengan diadakannya Konsili Vatikan II. Secara khusus disebutkan peran almarhum Paus Johanes XXIII, yang ketika mengumumkan untuk mengadakan Konsili, beliau baru tiga bulan diangkat menjadi Paus. Lewat Konsili ini beliau menginginkan agar Gereja mampu menemukan cara agar iman Kristiani dapat disampaikan kepada dunia dan dimengerti oleh dunia. Demi tujuan itu Gereja perlu “membuka jendela” agar “angin segar memasuki dirinya (hlm. 29).” Gereja perlu melakukan aggiornemento, pembaruan diri. Bab 2 mengulas mengenai orang-orang yang berperan dalam KonsiliVatikan II, ketegangan-ketegangan yang muncul antara mereka yang ingin mengadakan pembaruan dengan mereka yang ingin mempertahankan status quo Gereja, serta peran media massa. Selain sekitar 2200 peserta (Kardinal, Uskup, dan Abas), juga terdapat ratusan teolog yang berperan sebagai penasihat bagi para peserta Konsili (periti), antara lain dengan memberikan seminar-seminar mengenai topik-topik teologis kepada para peserta Konsili (hlm. 35-36). Selain itu juga terdapat para pengamat dari Gereja Ortodoks, Gereja-gereja Protestan main streams (Lutheran, Episkopalian, Anglikan, Metodis, Presbyteran, dan Quakers), dan Yudaisme. Hadirnya para pengamat dari kalangan khusus ini merupakan sesuatu yang baru dan revolusioner dalam Konsili. Secara khusus ditampilkan seorang tokoh pembaru: Kardinal Bea, ketua Sekretariat untuk Kesatuan Umat Kristiani. Ia begitu dikenal dengan ucapannya yang sangat menggemparkan di depan para wartawan: “Members of the other Christian Churches who are living today never ’left’ the Church. So they cannot ‘return,’ can they? We are talking about going together, hand in hand, toward a new future” (hlm. 33). Tokoh pembaru lain adalah Kardinal Achile Liénart, seorang Kardinal senior dari Prancis, yang pada hari ketiga Konsili menolak untuk memilih dari daftar nama yang sudah disiapkan (kebanyakan adalah anggota Kuria) untuk menjadi ketua dari 10 komisi yang akan mengendalikan agenda Konsili. Ia mengusulkan supaya para peserta Konsili memilih orang-orangnya sendiri. Usulan ini didukung oleh Kardinal Josef Fring dari Jerman, dan kemudian diterima oleh semua perserta Konsili. Tokoh pembaru lain adalah Kardinal Jan Alfrink dari Belanda, dan Kardinal Leo Josef Suenens dari Belgia (hlm. 38-38). Di pihak lain, ada tokoh sangat konservatif yang mencoba menghambat jalannya Konsili: Kardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, seorang anggota Kuria dan ketua The Holy Office (sekarang dikenal sebagi Kogregasi untuk Ajaran Iman), yang terkenal dengan ucapannya “Semper idem” (Selalu sama). Ia antara lain melawan hadirnya para pengamat dalam Konsili (hlm. 33), mencoba melarang kuliah-kuliah yang diberikan kepada para peserta Konsili oleh para Yesuit dari Institut Biblis di Roma, bahkan meminta Paus Yohanes XXIII untuk mengusir teolog Yesuit, Karl Rahner dari Roma, yang tentu saja ditolak oleh Paus (hlm. 35). Ia menolak penggunaan bahasa-bahasa lokal untuk Misa, yang intinya adalah pemindahan kekuasaan dari hierarki kepada Umat (hlm. 43), menghambat disahkannya kolegialitas para Uskup dan menandaskan bahwa Komisi Teologi yang ia pimpin memiliki otoritas di atas Konsili (hlm. 55). Dalam bab ini juga disebutkan hal yang baru dalam Konsili ini adalah hadirnya para wartawan dari pelbagai media massa dari seluruh dunia........................................... Sebagai penutup, dalam bab 9, Sullivan menegaskan bahwa ada dua hal yang benar-benar perlu diperhatikan untuk zaman ini sebagai agenda yang belum selesai dari Konsili Vatikan II: kolegialitas (relasi atara Paus dan Uskup) dan peran kaum perempuan dalam Gereja. Akhirnya, pada awal abad ke-21 ini Sullivan mengajak kita semua untuk bertanya: Apakah Gereja kita sungguh-sungguh dapat menjawab tantangan-tantangan pada zaman ini?; Apakah Gereja kita dapat membuat pesan Injil relevan untuk zaman ini?; Apakah Gereja kita dapat membangkitkan entusisme baru yang dapat membangun sebuah generasi baru?; Apakah Gereja dapat meredakan berbagai macam ketegangan yang akhir-akhir ini menggoncang “bahtera Petrus?” Dengan bijak Sullivan mengatakan bahwa kita perlu terus berharap, dan harapan itu akan menjadi semakin produktif kalau kita selalu berpegang pada nasihat almarhum Yohanes XXIII: “Untuk hal-hal yang mendasar, kesatuan; untuk hal-hal yang meragukan, kebebasan; dan untuk segala sesuatu, cinta kasih” (hlm. 124). Buku ini sangat komprehensif mengulas Konsili Vatikan II dan disampaikan dengan bahasa yang sederhana. Buku ini sangat membantu para pembaca karena dilengkapi dengan daftar isi yang mendetil, daftar semua dokumen yang dihasilkan oleh Konsili Vatikan II beserta dengan waktu promulgasinya, daftar istilah-istilah yang penting berkaitan dengan Konsili Vatikan II, serta indeks subjek. Semoga dengan membaca buku ini para pembaca terdorong untuk membuka dan menemukan pesan-pesan penting dari dokumen-dokumen Konsili Vatikan II. (Ignatius Madya Utama, Program Studi Ilmu Teologi, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)

De 1958 à 1968, le cardinal L.-J. Suenens a mené un long combat pour obtenir un changement d’attitude de l’Église catholique au sujet de la contraception. L’ouverture de ses archives conciliaires permet actuellement de découvrir les moyens qu’il a utilisés et les manoeuvres qu’il a entreprises pour arriver à ses fins. Il a fait appel à des médecins , à des théologiens et à des philosophes provenant surtout de l’Université catholique de Louvain, ainsi qu’à des évêques amis . Comme (...) membre de la commission de coordination du concile, chargé du texte de Gaudium et Spes, il a veillé à ce que le chapitre sur le mariage reste ouvert à un développement de la doctrine. Courageusement, à de multiples reprises, il a tenté – mais sans résultat – de convaincre le pape Paul VI. Après la publication en 1968 de l’encyclique Humanae Vitae, il a réussi à faire publier une Déclaration de l’épiscopat belge, afin de libérer les consciences et de canaliser la contestation. (shrink)

I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.

The best-interests standard is a widely used ethical, legal, and social basis for policy and decision-making involving children and other incompetent persons. It is under attack, however, as self-defeating, individualistic, unknowable, vague, dangerous, and open to abuse. The author defends this standard by identifying its employment, first, as a threshold for intervention and judgment (as in child abuse and neglect rulings), second, as an ideal to establish policies or prima facie duties, and, third, as a standard of reasonableness. Criticisms of (...) the best-interests standard are reconsidered after clarifying these different meanings. (shrink)

Fabi and Goldberg investigate how funding availability influences the landscape of bioethics as a field, and perpetuates forms of social and epistemic injustice while limitin...

The genetic modification of pigs as a source of transplantable organs is one of several possible solutions to the chronic organ shortage. This paper describes existing ethical tensions in xenotransplantation (XTx) that argue against pursuing it. Recommendations for lifelong infectious disease surveillance and notification of close contacts of recipients are in tension with the rights of human research subjects. Parental/guardian consent for pediatric xenograft recipients is in tension with a child’s right to an open future. Individual consent to transplant is (...) in tension with public health threats that include zoonotic diseases. XTx amplifies concerns about justice in organ transplantation and could exacerbate existing inequities. The prevention of infectious disease in source animals is in tension with the best practices of animal care and animal welfare, requiring isolation, ethologically inappropriate housing, and invasive reproductive procedures that would severely impact the well-being of intelligent social creatures like pigs. (shrink)

Several types of inferences are employed in the diagnosis and prognosis of patients with brain injuries and disorders of consciousness. These inferences introduce unavoidable uncertainty, and can be evaluated in light of inductive risk: the epistemic and nonepistemic risks of being wrong. This article considers several ethically significant inductive risks generated by and interacting with inferences about patients with disorders of consciousness, and argues for prescriptive measures to manage and mitigate inductive risk in the context of disorders of consciousness.

This paper argues that forgiveness is not best understood in terms of waiving a requirement of justice, and, specifically, that forgiveness is distinct from mercy. I question some reasons philosophers have given for distinguishing forgiveness and mercy, but argue that the difference between the two notions can be clearly shown by considering the standard grounds for which they are granted. I argue that while mercy involves leniency in the infliction of punishment that is due in accordance with justice, forgiveness primarily (...) concerns the victim's feelings and attitudes towards the wrongdoer as a person. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 27 (1) 2008 pp. 1-9. (shrink)

Suppose that the ultimate point of ethics is to make the world a better place. If it is, we must face the question: better in what respect? If the good is prior to the right — that is, if the rationale for all requirements of the right is that they serve to further the good in one way or another — then what is this good? Is there a single fundamental value capable of underlying and unifying all of our moral (...) categories? If so, how might it defeat the claims of rival candidates for this role? If not, is there instead a plurality of basic goods, each irreducible to any of the others? In that case, how do they fit together into a unified picture of the moral life? These are the questions I wish to address, in a necessarily limited way. To many the questions will seem hopelessly old-fashioned or misguided. Some deontologists will wish to reverse my ordering of the good and the right, holding that the right constrains acceptable conceptions of the good. For many contractarians, neither the good nor the right will seem normatively basic, since both are to be derived from a prior conception of rationality. Finally, some theorists will reject the classification of moral theories in terms of their basic normative categories, arguing that the whole foundationalist enterprise in ethics should be abandoned. In the face of these challenges to the priority of the good, and in light of the many current varieties of moral skepticism and relativism, I cannot provide a very convincing justification for raising the questions I intend to discuss. (shrink)

Disorders of Consciousness (DoCs) raise difficult and complex questions about the value of life for persons with impaired consciousness, the rights of persons unable to make medical decisions, and our social, medical, and ethical obligations to patients whose personhood has frequently been challenged and neglected. Recent neuroscientific discoveries have led to enhanced understanding of the heterogeneity of these disorders, and focused renewed attention on the medical and ethical problem of misdiagnosis. -/- This book examines the entanglement of epistemic and ethical (...) uncertainty in DoCs and other medical contexts, and how they interact to create both epistemic and ethical risks. Philosopher and bioethicist L. Syd M Johnson pulls together multiple threads in this work: the ontological mysteries of consciousness, medical uncertainty about unconsciousness, ableist bias, withdrawal of treatment in neurointensive care, and the rarely questioned view that consciousness is essential to personhood and moral status. Johnson challenges longstanding bioethical dogmas about DoC patients, and argues for an ethics of uncertainty for contexts where there is a need for decisive action in the presence of unavoidable uncertainty. The ethics of uncertainty refocuses ethical inquiry concerning persons with DoCs, placing less emphasis on their contested personhood, and more on inductive risk and uncertainty, on respect for autonomy, and especially on epistemic justice. With applications to various decisional contexts where uncertainty and ethical risk interact, this ethical approach enables surrogate decision makers facing fraught and risky choices to fulfill their obligations as moral and epistemic agents. (shrink)

This edited volume represents a unique addition to the available literature on animal ethics, animal studies, and neuroethics. Its goal is to expand discussions on animal ethics and neuroethics by weaving together different threads: philosophy of mind and animal minds, neuroscientific study of animal minds, and animal ethics. Neuroethical questions concerning animals’ moral status, animal minds and consciousness, animal pain, and the adequacy of animal models for neuropsychiatric disease have long been topics of debate in philosophy and ethics, and more (...) recently also in neuroscientific research. The book presents a transdisciplinary blend of voices, underscoring different perspectives on the broad questions of how neuroscience can contribute to our understanding of nonhuman minds, and on debates over the moral status of nonhuman animals. All chapters were written by outstanding scholars in philosophy, neuroscience, animal behavior, biology, neuroethics, and bioethics, and cover a range of issues and species/taxa. Given its scope, the book will appeal to scientists and students interested in the debate on animal ethics, while also offering an important resource for future researchers. Chapter 13 of this book is available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com. (shrink)

Recognition that the Principle of Respect for Autonomy fails to work in family-centric societies such as Singapore has recently led to the promotion of relational autonomy as a suitable framework within which to place healthcare decision making. However, empirical data, relating to patient and family opinions and the practices of healthcare professionals in Confucian-inspired Singapore, demonstrate clear limitations on the ability of a relational autonomy framework to provide the anticipated compromise between prevailing family decision-making norms and adopted Western led atomistic (...) concepts of autonomy. Evidence suggests that despite a growing infusion of Western influence, there is still little to indicate any major shift to individual decision making, particularly in light of the way society and healthcare are structured. Similarly, the lack of employing a shared decision-making model and data that discredit the notion that the complex psychosocial and cultural factors that affect the decision making may be considered “content neutral” not only prevents the application of relational autonomy but questions the viability of the values behind the Principle of Respect for Autonomy. Taking into account local data and drawing upon a wider concept of personhood that extends beyond prevailing family-centric ideals along with the complex interests that are focused upon the preservation of the unique nature of personhood that arises from the Ring Theory of Personhood, we propose and “operationalize” the employing of an authoritative welfare-based approach, within the confines of best interest decision making, to better meet the current care needs within Singapore. (shrink)

Progress in automatic control, particularly in optimizing and self‐adaptive controls, is used to establish models in order to connect three horizons: knowledge, human activities and automatic controls. The guiding operation in all these horizons is recognished as the evolution. In the horizon of automatic controls, the evolutions can be said closed, since they are completely defined. In the horizon of human activities, they can be said open, because their over all direction depends both on the constituents and on the partial (...) accomplishment. In the horizon of the acquisition of the knowledge, there appear to be both evolutions in closed and open form; the problem is therefore to know whether these evolutions are teleological or homeostatic. There does not seem to be a ready answer; it could however probably be accelerated by better knowing the concept of matching the analogy. (shrink)

The right to die has for decades been recognised for persons in a vegetative state, but there remains controversy about ending life-sustaining medical treatment for persons in the minimally conscious state. The controversy is rooted in assumptions about the moral significance of consciousness, and the value of life for patients who are conscious and not terminally ill. This paper evaluates these assumptions in light of evidence that generates concerns about quality of life in the MCS. It is argued that surrogates (...) should be permitted to make decisions to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment from patients in the MCS. (shrink)

Clinical decision making is a challenging task that requires practical wisdom—the practised ability to help patients choose wisely among available diagnostic and treatment options. But practical wisdom is not a concept one typically hears mentioned in medical training and practice. Instead, emphasis is placed on clinical judgement. The author draws from Aristotle and Aquinas to describe the virtue of practical wisdom and compare it with clinical judgement. From this comparison, the author suggests that a more complete understanding of clinical judgement (...) requires its explicit integration with goals of care and ethical values. Although clinicians may be justified in assuming that goals of care and ethical values are implicit in routine decision making, it remains important for training purposes to encourage habits of clinical judgement that are consciously goal-directed and ethically informed. By connecting clinical judgement to patients' goals and values, clinical decisions are more likely to stay focused on the particular interests of individual patients. To cultivate wise clinical judgement among trainees, educational efforts should aim at the integration of clinical judgement, communication with patients about goals of care, and ethical reasoning. But ultimately, training in wise clinical judgement will take years of practice in the company of experienced clinicians who are able to demonstrate practical wisdom by example. By helping trainees develop clinical judgement that incorporates patients' goals of care and ethical reasoning, we may help lessen the risk that ‘clinical judgement’ will merely express ‘the clinician's judgement.’. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 33-35.

We have arrived at an inflection point, a moment in history when the sentience, conscious- ness, intelligence, agency, and even the moral agency of many nonhuman animals can no longer be questioned without ignoring centuries of accumulated scientific knowledge. Nowhere is this more true than in our understanding of nonhuman primates (NHPs). A neu- roethics committed to probing the ethical implications of brain research must be able to respond to and anticipate the challenges ahead as brain projects globally prepare to (...) increase the use of NHPs in research. This requires adopting a less anthropocentric focus that includes nonhuman animals within its scope. But the Neuroethics Roadmap represents a missed opportunity to critically examine the future direction of research with NHPs in an ethically-responsive neuroscience. (shrink)

1. Falsafat al-rūḥ -- 2. Falsafat al-ʻaqūl -- 3. Raḥīq al-nafs -- 4. al-Qadāʼ wa-al-qadar.

It has been more than sixty years since R. D. Collison Black published his Economic Thought and the Irish Question, a book which ever since has been widely regarded as a classic in the history of e...

If I lead a life of virtue, that may well be good for you. But will it also be good for me? The idea that it will—or even must—is an ancient one, and its appeal runs deep. For if this idea is correct then we can provide everyone with a good reason—arguably the best reason—for being virtuous. However, for all the effort which has been invested in defending the idea, by some of the best minds in the history of philosophy, (...) it remains unproven. Worse, in this skeptical age hardly anyone really believes it. I don't really believe it either, at least not in its strongest forms, but I think that the question is nonetheless worth examining. Even if we cannot show that virtue and self-interest coincide, we can at least measure the breadth of the gap between them. (shrink)