It is conventional to think of modernity as being characterised by the irremediable separation of philosophy and theology, of reason and faith. Failing to reconsider the idea of such a divorce, post-modernity has pushed this postulate to its very limits by attempting to abolish all types of normativity whether on the grounds of reason or any other basis. Against these prevailing conceptions, we argue that there exist, within philosophy and theology, processes of differentiation as well as original combinations. To illustrate (...) the possibility of mutually enriching exchanges between the philosophical and the theological ethical traditions we will call upon the historical example of solidarism. This will enable us to show that the two traditions are not so heterogeneous as may be first thought by those who underestimate the importance of identifying the conditions, both pragmatic and ideological, that govern practical in situation ethical judgements. (shrink)

This article examines Charles Villers's Essay on the Spirit and Influence of Luther's Reformation (1804) in its intellectual and historical context. Exiled from France after 1792, Villers intervened in important French and German debates about the relationship of religion, history, and philosophy. The article shows how he took up a German Protestant discussion on the meaning of the Reformation that had been underway from the 1770s through the end of the century, including efforts by Kantians to seize the mantle (...) of Protestantism for themselves. Villers's essay capitalized on a broad interest in the question of Protestantism and its meaning for modern freedom around 1800. Revisiting the formation of the narrative of Protestantism and progress reveals that it was not a logical progression from Protestant theology or religion but rather part of a specific ideological and social struggle in the wake of the French Revolution and the collapse of the Old Regime. (shrink)

Urban studies understandably dominate the historiography and our comprehension of the French Wars of Religion. Social, religious and, more recently, political issues have all been in vogue in studies of the wars and, therefore, in the histories of towns. Confessional conflict and coexistence, relations between royal and municipal authorities, affiliation to Protestantism or the Catholic League, have all exercised urban histories. Key moments during the wars highlight the importance of the towns and the trauma they experienced. Yet, despite (...) tension and division, urban communities had a shared concern in the maintenance of civic order and the defence of local integrity. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag widmet sich der Entstehung des Faches Religionsgeschichte in Frankreich. Die Vorgeschichte zu diesem Prozess beginnt mit Benjamin Constants Religionsphilosophie der 1810–1820er Jahre, in der die lokalen und diachronen Veränderungen des allgemein menschlichen religiösen Gefühls als ein Schlüssel zur Religionsgeschichte verstanden wurden. Nach einer langen Pause wird das Thema des religiösen Gefühls in Albert Révilles liberaltheologischem Projekt wieder aktuell. Ausgehend von Schleiermachers Voraussetzungen hoffte Réville dadurch die Apologetik zu modernisieren wie auch den Weg zum theologischen Inklusivismus zu bahnen. (...) Sein Sohn Jean, ebenfalls Theologe, neutestamentlicher Forscher und Sentimentalist, arbeitete mit dem Vater zusammen an der Institutionalisierung des Faches Religionsgeschichte in Frankreich. Albert Réville leitete von 1886 bis zu seinem Tod 1906 die fünfte (religionswissenschaftliche) Sektion der École Pratique des Hautes Études, gleichzeitig war Jean Réville seit 1884 Herausgeber der Fachzeitschrift Revue de l’histoire des religions. Révilles theoretischer Standpunkt wurde von É. Durkheim und seinen Gleichgesinnten H. Hubert und M. Mauss, die die weitere weltanschauliche Säkularisierung förderten, nach 1898 stark kritisiert. Diese Serie von Erwiderungen zeigt die Kluft zwischen der Methodologie der (dem Ursprung nach) evangelischen Religionsgeschichte und der durkheimischen Religionssoziologie. (shrink)

Contrairement à sa réception anglo-saxonne, la réception en France de l’idéal-réalisme d’Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) n’a encore jamais fait l’objet d’une étude spécifique. Cet article entreprend de combler cette lacune en se centrant sur un aspect particulier de cette réception, soit le rapport entretenu en France à la philosophie de Lotze comme un spiritualisme dont l’enjeu n’est pas uniquement métaphysique, et dont les implications s’étendent à la question religieuse. Il s’attache en même temps à reconstruire les possibles raisons d’un constat paradoxal (...) : comment la philosophie de Lotze a-t-elle pu à la fois se voir reconnue en France dans toute son importance, et n’avoir pas reçu dans la philosophie française elle-même de prolongement vraiment décisif? (shrink)

Before World War II French intellectuals had paid little attention to Hegel. Only offbeat intellectuals like André Breton's surrealists and a circle of young Marxists in the 1920s paid tribute to the German dialectician. Among the reasons suggested by Alexandra Koyré for the lack of interest were the obscurity of Hegel's writing, the strength of Cartesian and Kantian traditions, Hegel's Protestantism, but, above all, the incredulity of the French toward Hegel's “strict identity of logical synthesis and historical (...) becoming.” If this was the situation, how can we account for the precipitous turn to Hegel in the 1940s? In the eyes of many converts to Hegel, the catastrophic defeat of France in 1940 had discredited liberal-bourgeois intellectual and political traditions, leaving France in a conceptual vacuum. (shrink)

This article investigates the question why even the existence of “moral conscience” became regarded with serious doubts among radical eighteenth-century French philosophes La Mettrie, d’Holbach, Diderot, and Voltaire, from the vantage point of conceptual history. The philosophes’ stance of regarding moral conscience only as a name for certain acquired prejudices both fails to engage with the conception of moral conscience upheld by their theistic opponents and stands in a sharp contrast to the moral thought of Protestant reformation, which – (...) less than two centuries earlier – had elevated moral conscience to a position of an infallible moral authority. The article argues, however, that, in spite of the opposition between these two conceptions of conscience, they might be connected, and that the former might have even been a consequence of the latter. It will be shown that the pre-Reformation conception of moral conscience, crystallized in Aquinas, presents it being based on our natural attraction to “the human good”. However, as this conception was not created by medieval theologians, but was inherited from non-theistic ancient philosophy, in principle it would have been as compatible with the deistic and atheistic worldviews of the philosophes as the other ancient philosophical concepts, such as “the human good” and “human nature”, that the philosophes continued using in their original, teleological senses. Having presented a brief overview of the history of moral conscience, the article proceeds to show how the Protestant reformers removed the attraction to the human good from moral conscience while making its normative guidance infallible. The article will suggest that, due to the prevalence of this, exclusively theological, conception of moral conscience in the intellectual environment shaped by Protestantism, several British thinkers of the seventeenth century, including Hobbes, Locke, and Hume, who could not endorse the theological aspects of moral conscience, gradually reduced it into a mere acquired “sentiment”. As their philosophy was a major influence on the philosophes, the article concludes that the loss of a rational justification for moral conscience in the works of the British philosophers could have also been what motivated the philosophes to question moral conscience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BreathrenKatherine Ibbett (bio)The French Reformation and its aftermath was a battle over breath: literally so, as a matter of life and death, but also because it represented a battle over the Holy Spirit, Saint Esprit, from the Latin spiritus, breath. Over decades of conflict both Catholics and Protestants claimed divine inspiration, arguing that they and only they were breathed on in the way Christ breathes on the apostles (...) when he asks them to receive the spirit (John 20: 22).On the Protestant (Huguenot) side of these early modern disputes, the term esprit is often displaced by a more vernacular and more bodily breath, souffle, so that God blows on his chosen people a little in the way his chosen people might blow on their soup. Souffle renders spirit as something humanly familiar, if still exemplary. In his account of the life and death of Jean Calvin (1564), the Protestant historian and polemicist Théodore de Bèze writes of breath as the last remaining sign of Calvin's presence: the day before his death Calvin is so weak "qu'il ne luy restoit plus que le souffle," ["only breath remained"] but he tells his followers nonetheless that he is still "uni d'esprit" ["joined in spirit"] with them. Like Christ's, Calvin's souffle and spirit inspired many, and the Protestant minority, under increasing and violent pressure from the Catholic state, met his example with a last gasp of their own. The term "souffle" is everywhere in the martyrologies of the many Calvinists executed by Catholics over the following century and more, which insist repetitively on the victim's praise of God "to the last breath."French Protestants also imagined breath as a political metaphor, frequently presenting the minority's right to live on French soil as a right to breathe, some sort of jus spiri: the late seventeenth-century Protestant historian Élie Benoist writes that Catholic violence turned "le Plaisir naturel de respirer l'air du païs natal en une espece de joug servile" ["the natural pleasure of breathing the air of one's own country into a kind of servile yoke"]. This frequent rhetoric of bad air gets re-ventilated in Benoist's account of the Refuge, the period after 1685 when Protestantism became illegal in France, at which point Huguenots fled in hope of what Benoist hopefully calls the "abundance" of air found on welcoming shores elsewhere. [End Page 163] The more upbeat refugee writing somewhat breathlessly celebrated the "change of air" that transnational solidarity brought about. Bref: breath is central to the Huguenot imaginary.A more painful formulation comes in one of the pamphlets that circulated from the 1660s on, throughout Protestant Europe, asking for new air to breathe. Many of these calls for international aid insisted on the sheer miracle of continued Protestant bodily existence, sketching a sort of Protestant vita nuda. A 1667 text published in parallel French and German recounts the misery of the Protestants banned from professional positions and living only "la vie, c'est à dire, un triste soufle qu'ils tirent de leurs tristes coeurs affligez" ["life, that is to say, a sad breath/sigh that they pull from their sad and afflicted hearts"]. But where Agamben's notion of bare life marks the extreme form of a particular model of Western sovereignty, imagining bare life as helpless and voiceless against sovereign power, the Protestant lifebreath is highly strategic, performing its bareness so as to imagine a new political role. The Protestant life retains and performs a "soufle" for its international audience, taking a breath before it speaks, eventually allowing for a new articulation of a Protestant voice that speaks multiple languages and can make itself heard internationally. In response to that voice, in the organizing of English and Dutch and German responses to Huguenot suffering, came a new organization of transnational political community. During the years of the Refuge, at a moment when European neighbors were prepared to take in refugees, the "poor breath" of the Protestant eventually makes room for a new kind of breath-ren. May their history breathe on us again today. [End Page 164]Katherine IbbettUniversity of OxfordKatherine Ibbett Katherine Ibbett... (shrink)

Martin Heidegger is the 20th century theology philosopher with the greatest importance to theology. A cradle Catholic originally intended for the priesthood, Heidegger's studies in philosophy led him to turn first to Protestantism and then to an atheistic philosophical method. Nevertheless, his writings remained deeply indebted to theological themes and sources, and the question of the nature of his relationship with theology has been a subject of discussion ever since. -/- This book offers theologians and philosophers alike a clear (...) account of the directions and the potential of this debate. It explains Heidegger's key ideas, describes their development and analyses the role of theology in his major writings, including his lectures during the National Socialist era. It reviews the reception of Heidegger's thought both by theologians in his own day (particularly in Barth and his school as well as neo-Scholasticism) and more recently (particularly in French phenomenology), and concludes by offering directions for theology's possible future engagement with Heidegger's work. - See more at:. (shrink)

Dans la Lettre, Blondel entend étudier le problème religieux en respectant intégralement « les exigences de la pensée contemporaine ». L’auteur s’interroge sur les raisons d’une « restriction méthodique » qui tient à ce que l’étude blondélienne de la religion est rationnelle parce qu’utilisant une méthode d’immanence dont la portée est strictement phénoméniste. Après avoir étudié les deux formes de phénoménisme soutenues à la fin du XIXe siècle, l’une venant du Positivisme, l’autre du Criticisme, celle-ci nourrissant l’objection de Brunschvicg au (...) projet de L’Action, cette contribution analyse les « explications de Blondel » dans sa vive réaction à ses accusateurs, réaction adressée au directeur de la Revue de métaphysique et de morale. S’il s’étonne du silence français en matière d’analyse critique de la religion, à la différence de ce qui se passe dans le monde anglo-saxon parce que sans doute marqué par le Protestantisme, c’est précisément pour y remédier de façon philosophiquement rigoureuse. Sa recension de l’ouvrage de Delbos, sous le titre « L’évolution du Spinozisme », lui permet d’établir la logique interne de la philosophie moderne dans laquelle s’inscrit le caractère rationnel des réflexions développées dans la Lettre.In the Lettre, Blondel intended to study the religious problem by respecting integrally « the demands of contemporaneous thought ». The author asks himself about the reasons of a « methodological restriction » that depends on the fact that Blondel's study of religion is rational because it uses a method of immanence of which the scope is strictly phenomenist. After studying the two forms of phenomenism held at the end of the 19th century, one coming from Positivism, the other from Criticism – the latter nourishing the objection of Brunschvicg to the project of Action – this contribution analyses the « explanations of Blondel » in his strong reaction to his accusers, a reaction addressed to the director of Revue de métaphysique et de morale. If he is surprised at the French silence as regards a critical analysis of religion, different from that which was happening in the Anglo-Saxon world because it was undoubtedly marked by Protestantism, it is precisely to put it on the same level in a rigorous philosophical way. His review of Delbos'work, entitled « The Evolution of Spinozanism », permitted him to establish the internal logic of modern philosophy, upon which the rational character of the reflections developed in the Lettre is based. (shrink)

Historians have convincingly shown the extent to which Protestantism played a role in the founding of the Third Republic, undermining the once canonical claim that republicanism and religion were implacably hostile opponents in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Catholics, however, continue to be viewed as nearly universally antirepublican. Analyzing the writings of philosopher Emile Boutroux and his students, this article shows how the specifically Catholic concern with the relationship between free will and scientific concepts of determinism both (...) influenced the direction of French philosophy of science into the twentieth century and provided a framework for defending the Republic at the height of the Dreyfus affair. (shrink)

This presentation of the main phases and features of political thought in the sixteenth century is based on an exhaustive study of contemporary writings in Latin, English, French, German and Italian. The book is divided into four parts. The first part deals with the new thought of Protestantism. The rest describes special ideas that emerged in England, France and Italy.

The historical situation in which the essays of Montaigne appeared is not unlike the situation in which the skepticism of antiquity developed. In both cases an old town civilization was declining, to be replaced by large, centrally administered states. Skepticism was developed by cultivated individuals of the town bourgeoisie who sought a base in their philosophical self-consciousness for the great transformations taking place in the external world. The essential difference between Montaigne and the skeptics of antiquity lies in his more (...) positive position with regard to the external world. Because of his social origin, he was able to identify himself with the rising French absolutism.This essay deals with the changing role of skepticism in modern history. First of all, it was confronted with the revival of religion both within Catholicism and in the Reformation. This religious temper had certain traits in common with skepticism in that it also replaced the medieval conception of the external world as a meaningful order by the notion of the world as a dark reality, and turned the individual back upon himself. The inner world of the individual, however, took different forms in Montaigne and in the Reformation. The development of a cultivated, worldly wise, and harmonious personality was appropriate to his skepticism, whereas the man of early Protestantism found in himself the conscience which compelled him to tireless labor and fulfillment of duty. Montaigne’s urbane humanism placed him above Protestantism ; the fanatic religious temper seems limited by comparison. The latter, however, includes the distinction between God and the world, and with it another principle besides mere surrender to the existing order. The Reformers had to concede to the masses that the inequitable earthly regime was not an absolute. For all its inadequacy, therefore, the new religion had an element which pointed beyond the prevailing relationships in society.In liberalism, religion became reconciled with the social reality, and skepticism lost its humanistic traits. The differences were obliterated. The predominant type was skeptical because he accepted religion without taking it seriously, and he was religious because his conscience drove him to more and more activity, not, however, in order to change the world into a better one, but merely for the well-being of himself and his family.Towards the new absolutism, particularly as it has developed in the authoritarian states, skepticism becomes universal. The high idealistic faith which is announced by the authoritarian ideology takes hold of man only superficially, and in reality he continues to pursue his individual ends. The period of transition, with its analogies to the decline of antiquity and to the Renaissance, appears to be the time once again for a more noble skepticism. But history does not consist of mere repetitions. The powers of mankind have grown in the meantime, and higher forms of social organization have become possible. The flight into oneself, therefore, takes on a retrogressive and nihilistic character, unlike earlier periods.Religion, like skepticism, can no longer be revived in its earlier form. Under the pressure of reality, it seeks to return to itself. It appears, however, that freedom of conscience cannot be maintained if it limits its demands to the sphere of religion. Separated from all other historical activity, religion has become impotent and self-contradictory. Conscience, originally set against the worldly regime as something vague, has become concrete. It can exist only insofar as it becomes part of the historical effort actually to eliminate prevailing injustice. Isolated religion is no longer religious.La situation historique dans laquelle apparurent les Essais de Montaigne n’est pas sans ressemblance avec les conditions dans lesquelles se formait le scepticisme antique. Ici et là, une vieille culture urbaine s’effondre et de grands États naissent avec un gouvernement centralisé. Le scepticisme est le fait d’individus cultivés qui sortent de la bourgeoisie urbaine, et, face aux bouleversements, cherchent dans la conscience philosophique un point fixe. La différence entre Montaigne et les sceptiques antiques se marque surtout dans l’attitude positive de Montaigne à l’égard du monde extérieur. Grâce à son origine sociale, il parvient à s’identifier avec l’absolutisme français qui commence.L’article examine les transformations du scepticisme dans l’histoire moderne. Tout d'abord, on le confronte avec le renouvellement de la religion, à l'intérieur du catholicisme ou dans la Réforme. La nouvelle religiosité a des traits communs avec le scepticisme dans la mesure où elle conçoit le monde extérieur non plus à la manière du moyen-âge comme un ordre harmonieux, mais comme une obscure réalité, et renvoie l'individu à l'intimité de sa conscience. Mais cette intériorité prend un aspect différent selon qu'il s'agit de Montaigne ou des Protestants. Au scepticisme de Montaigne correspond le développement d'une personnalité harmonieuse, riche d'expérience du monde et de la culture. L'homme du protestantisme naissant découvre en soi la conscience morale impérieuse qui le pousse à un travail sans trêve, à l'accomplissement d'un devoir indéfini. Il se révèle que Montaigne est supérieur au Protestantisme grâce à son humanisme compréhensif. Comparée à lui, la religion fanatique apparaît limitée, et cependant, dans sa brutalité, elle contient la distinction de Dieu et du Monde et partant un autre principe que la simple acceptation de ce qui est. Les réformateurs durent concéder aux masses que l'ordre terrestre injuste ne représente pas une règle absolue. Encore que sous un masque, la nouvelle religiosité contient en elle-même un élément qui va au delà des conditions existantes. Dans le libéralisme, la religion s'est réconciliée avec la conscience sociale, et le scepticisme perd son caractère humaniste. Les différences s'estompent. Le type dominant est sceptique dans la mesure où il reconnaît ja religion sans la prendre au sérieux ; et religieux dans la mesure où il déploie une activité qui, à vrai dire, n'a pas pour but d'améliorer le monde, mais uniquement d'assurer son bien et celui de sa famille.Avec l'absolutisme qui se montre particulièrement dans les États totalitaires, le scepticisme devient général. La haute croyance idéaliste qui y est prêchée ne s'empare des hommes que très superficiellement — en vérité ils ne poursuivent que leurs intérêts individuels. Dans la situation de transition, qui n'est pas sans similitude avec le déclin de la liberté dans le monde antique et avec la Renaissance, le temps semble revenu pour un scepticisme plus noble que celüi des masses. Mais l'histoire ne consiste pas en simples répétitions. Entre temps, les forces de l'humanité ont grandi, des formes plus élevées d'organisation sociale sont devenues possibles. La fuite dans le moi prend par suite — au rebours de ce qui se passait dans les époques anciennes — un caractère rétrograde, voire nihiliste.Pas plus que le scepticisme, la religion ne peut revivre dans sa forme originelle. Sous la pression des circonstances, elle tçnte, il est vrai, de revenir à elle-même. Mais il apparaît que la liberté de conscience ne peut se maintenir si elle ne limite sa prétention au domaine religieux. La religion en tant que mode de vie, séparée du reste de l'activité historique, est devenue impuissante et contradictoire. La conscience qui primitivement était opposée à l'ordre terrestre seulement de manière vague, s'est concrétisée. Elle ne peut exister qu'en se transformant en volonté historique de dépasser réellement l'injustice régnante. La religion isolée n'est plus religieuse.De même que la bonté et l'humanité, par suite de l’évolution historique, ont disparu du scepticisme, ainsi la conscience et le devoir de la religion isolée. La théorie critique de la société, dans laquelle ces deux éléments sont contenus, représente une forme plus élevée de l'activité philosophique. (shrink)

An examination of the studies of the French historian of religion Jean Delumeau on the subject of ‘angst’ and awareness of guilt as a collective mode of being, characteristic of Europeans from the 13th to the 18th century, will not only provide the reader with a nuanced picture of the influence of the so-called Renaissance and Reform Movement on the liberation of the human person, but he or she will also find it difficult to resist the temptation to draw (...) parallels with current explanations for the present day increase in feelings of insecurity and ‘angst’.Both then and now the collective ‘angst’ resulting from epidemic, war, famine and natural disaster vented themselves against ‘outsiders’, those who were different; foreigners witches, gypsies, heretics, vagabonds, the insane and the crippled all became targets. Just as people today try to discern devilish plans afoot in a world stricken by AIDS, environmental and health dangers, by growing unemployment, fundamentalism and migration, and by plans intent on undermining Western civilisation as we know it, so also then people found it easy to identify demons in the ‘other’, disguised Antichrists and Satans whose sole purpose was to undermine Christian culture. In those days people tried to avert the danger by attempting to force Muslims by government decree and Cathars by the Inquisition to embrace the true faith of Christians. Today we try to do the same by submitting foreigners to an ever narrowing concept of integration.In pre-modern culture, just as today, subjective feelings of insecurity were disproportional to objective insecurity, and although the chances of falling victim to epidemic, war or criminal acts were much greater among the lower social classes, protests of insecurity from among the better situated classes, tended to set the tone, as they continue to do today.Two aspects of Delumeau’s evocation of the culture of ‘angst’ are particularly striking. Firstly, one becomes aware of the quasi evident moralising with which people tackled the most diverse social phenomena. Signs of God’s wrath were to be found everywhere as moral warnings. Difference and alterity was immediately understood in terms of godlessness, decline, guilt, sin, unworthiness, vice, wickedness or cunning. The Christian culture was in its very core a culture of meaning in which everything, as a matter of course, acquired a moral significance. In this regard, the advent of Protestantism did not essentially change matters: morality shifted towards individual responsibility, but its worldview did not become less moralising as a result. Actually, it became even more moralising. Secondly, one becomes aware of the sustained efforts of the Church to spread and intensify the culture of ‘angst’ and to view everything from the perspective of the contemptus mundi, vitae et homini. Every form of human joy, delight or pleasure was condemned as a manifestation of insufficiency in one’s fear of God. Although the world was never to become the ‘vale of tears’ of which the clerical authorities dreamed, ‘angst’ and fear were nevertheless an essential feature of the condition humaine of the time and the dominant religious cultural expressions of the day were solely directed towards the maintenance of such a culture of ‘angst’. (shrink)

The Initiation Biblique of Robert-Tricot was first published in 1939, with an enlarged edition in 1948, and was made available to a wider public in 1951 when it appeared in English translation as Guide to the Bible. The third French edition was a thorough-going revision—some chapters were entirely re-written. The most important change was, beyond all question, the chapter on Inspiration by Father P. Benoit. As an exegete and a theologian, keenly aware both of the doctrinal principles involved and (...) of the real difficulties in the Bible, his approach to the question of inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture is truly illuminating; it disposes beforehand of a host of false problems which inevitably bedevil a notion of inspiration that is too rigid and, in fact, ‘unscriptural’. A thorough understanding of Benoit’s theory of Inspiration will rid one of a certain vague uneasiness and will leave one free to savour to the full the beauty and the riches, human as well as divine, of the Bible. The second edition of Guide to the Bible, Vol. I gives us the first nine chapters of the new Initiation Biblique. True to the spirit of the original it is not a mere translation. The bibliography has been consistently brought up to date and the translators have added very many footnotes. Besides, there are appendices which cover the idea of inspiration in Protestantism and Islam, and which give a detailed analysis of the books of the Pentateuch and an extended treatment of the Dead Sea Scrolls. It would be superfluous to emphasise the excellent qualities of the work. The appearance of this new edition should be a reminder to Catholics of our incalculable debt to French biblical scholarship. (shrink)

The religious controversies of the 17th century are of central importance to any attempt to appraise the role of Christianity in the genesis of "modern secular society." In the 18th century there was a clear understanding that modern philosophy was hostile to religion, as the French Revolution proclaimed. The reappraisal of this relation began in Hegel's Phänomenologie, and became explicit with Max Weber: secularism is the consequence of Christianity. The adjudication of this issue demands an evaluation of the interpretations (...) of the Bible and of Christian morality made by such men as Hobbes, Spinoza, and Bayle. According to the Enlightenment, they speak as believers only in order to interpret Christianity in such a way as to make it tolerate the new philosophy. Rex would correct this view of Bayle's intention; he would show that Protestantism, and in Bayle's case, Calvinism, is the source or a source of the belief in the sovereignty of reason. One may doubt whether Rex has proved that the Enlightenment misunderstood Bayle's intentions. Nevertheless, this study, the first part of which is devoted to the Pensées diverses sur la comète, the second to the Commentaire philosophique, is a very helpful guide to an extensive literature. And in his very attempt to prove his thesis Rex frequently brings to light aspects of Bayle's rhetoric that must be noticed in order to understand his writings.—H. C. (shrink)

The Philosophy of Right is an enormously complex work, and any short treatment of it has to set limits for itself. Harry Brod, in this highly readable and useful new book, chooses to focus only on the last third of the Philosophy of Right, in which Hegel discusses civil society and the state, and also limits his scope by avoiding engagement with much of the relevant secondary literature. This is not to say Brod avoids larger interpretive questions; on the contrary, (...) he focusses on the concrete political institutions in the last third of the Philosophy of Right in order to advance his general thesis that Hegel’s analysis of history, as the development of human beings’ consciousness of their freedom, shapes the philosophic enterprise and structure of the Philosophy of Right. In Brod’s view, Hegel intends to show how the practices and institutions discussed in the Philosophy of Right “engender in the citizens of the Hegelian state an ever-more-conscious awareness of their roles as political agents”. In Hegel’s view, “people and institutions in succeeding historical periods display increasingly greater consciousness of their freedom”. This is due to appropriate political institutions that have developed in history - “for Hegel, subjective freedom follows the institutionalization of objective freedom, not the reverse”. Brod suggests that for Hegel we can judge and criticize our political institutions according to whether they fulfill the principles toward the realization of which history is aiming. These principles - “subjective freedom,” “universality,” and “rationality” - are reflected in the modern consciousness of Hegel’s day, as a result largely of the French Revolution but also of Protestantism. Part of Brod’s thesis is that Hegel insists on drawing on these principles precisely because they contribute to the modern consciousness of Hegel’s own time. There is one other “primary principle of the modern world,” though, one shunned by the Revolutionaries and their liberal theorists of abstract individualism, namely, “being part of the world in which one feels at home”, and Brod repeatedly shows how Hegel invokes this additional “principle” to criticize modern liberal thought. I shall have more to say about these principles later. (shrink)

This article analyses the logic of (de)territorialisation at work in Protestant churches and movements in Oceania, through two examples : the indigenous militants of the “ historic” mâ’ohi Protestant church of French Polynesia, and the relationships between the Evangelical and Pentecostal churches and the local context. Over and above the obvious opposition between cultural roots and Evangelical globalisation, relationships with the local context and memory appear to have become a major arena for confrontation between Pentecostalism and traditional Christianity in (...) Oceania. (shrink)

Ontic structural realism argues that structure is all there is. In (French, 2014) I argued for an ‘eliminativist’ version of this view, according to which the world should be conceived, metaphysically, as structure, and objects, at both the fundamental and ‘everyday’ levels, should be eliminated. This paper is a response to a number of profound concerns that have been raised, such as how we might distinguish between the kind of structure invoked by this view and mathematical structure in general, (...) how we should choose between eliminativist ontic structural realism and alternative metaphysical accounts such as dispositionalism, and how we should capture, in metaphysical terms, the relationship between structures and particles. In developing my response I shall touch on a number of broad issues, including the applicability of mathematics, the nature of representation and the relationship between metaphysics and science in general. (shrink)

Steven French articulates and defends the bold claim that there are no objects in the world. He draws on metaphysics and philosophy of science to argue for structural realism--the position that we live in a world of structures--and defends a form of eliminativism about objects that sets laws and symmetry principles at the heart of ontology.

Scientific results are often presented as ‘surprising’ as if that is a good thing. Is it? And if so, why? What is the value of surprise in science? Discussions of surprise in science have been limited, but surprise has been used as a way of defending the epistemic privilege of experiments over simulations. The argument is that while experiments can ‘confound’, simulations can merely surprise (Morgan, 2005). Our aim in this paper is to show that the discussion of surprise can (...) be usefully extended to thought experiments and theoretical derivations. We argue that in focusing on these features of scientific practice, we can see that the surprise-confoundment distinction does not fully capture surprise in science. We set out how thought experiments and theoretical derivations can bring about surprises that can be disruptive in a productive way, and we end by exploring how this links with their future fertility. (shrink)

Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that there is a (...) robust form of naive realism which is unfazed by the blurriness of some of our experiences, even when that blurriness is understood as a subjective modification of consciousness. (shrink)

Steven French and Decio Krause examine the metaphysical foundations of quantum physics. They draw together historical, logical, and philosophical perspectives on the fundamental nature of quantum particles and offer new insights on a range of important issues. Focusing on the concepts of identity and individuality, the authors explore two alternative metaphysical views; according to one, quantum particles are no different from books, tables, and people in this respect; according to the other, they most certainly are. Each view comes with (...) certain costs attached and after describing their origins in the history of quantum theory, the authors carefully consider whether these costs are worth bearing. Recent contributions to these discussions are analyzed in detail and the authors present their own original perspective on the issues. The final chapter suggests how this perspective can be taken forward in the context of quantum field theory. (shrink)

Many contemporary theorists charge that naïve realists are incapable of accounting for illusions. Various sophisticated proposals have been ventured to meet this charge. Here, we take a different approach and dispute whether the naïve realist owes any distinctive account of illusion. To this end, we begin with a simple, naïve account of veridical perception. We then examine the case that this account cannot be extended to illusions. By reconstructing an explicit version of this argument, we show that it depends critically (...) on the contention that perceptual experience is diaphanous, or more minimally and precisely, that there can be no difference in phenomenal properties between two experiences without a difference in the scenes presented in those experiences. Finding no good reason to accept this claim, we develop and defend a simple, naïve account of both veridical perception and illusion, here dubbed Simple, Austere Naïve Realism. (shrink)

Many important explanations in physics are based on ideas and assumptions about symmetries, but little has been said about the nature of such explanations. This chapter aims to fill this lacuna, arguing that various symmetry explanations can be naturally captured in the spirit of the counterfactual-dependence account of Woodward, liberalized from its causal trappings. From the perspective of this account symmetries explain by providing modal information about an explanatory dependence, by showing how the explanandum would have been different, had the (...) facts about an explanatory symmetry been different. Furthermore, the authors argue that such explanatory dependencies need not be causal. (shrink)

What is a scientific theory? This book considers this fundamental question by presenting a range of options and the issues they raise. It draws comparisons between theories and artworks and proposes that we should stop thinking of theories as things altogether.

We present four classical theories of counterpossibles that combine modalities and counterfactuals. Two theories are anti-vacuist and forbid vacuously true counterfactuals, two are quasi-vacuist and allow counterfactuals to be vacuously true when their antecedent is not only impossible, but also inconceivable. The theories vary on how they restrict the interaction of modalities and counterfactuals. We provide a logical cartography with precise acceptable boundaries, illustrating to what extent nonvacuism about counterpossibles can be reconciled with classical logic.

This paper considers some issues to do with valuational presentations of consequence relations, and the Galois connections between spaces of valuations and spaces of consequence relations. Some of what we present is known, and some even well-known; but much is new. The aim is a systematic overview of a range of results applicable to nonreflexive and nontransitive logics, as well as more familiar logics. We conclude by considering some connectives suggested by this approach.

Thomas Szasz famously argued that mental illness is a myth. Less famously, Szasz argued that since mental illness is a myth, so too is psychotherapy. Szasz’ claim that mental illness is a myth has been much discussed, but much less attention has been paid to his claim that psychotherapy is a myth. In the first part of this essay, I critically examine Szasz’ discussion of psychotherapy in order to uncover the strongest version of his case for thinking that it is (...) a myth. As we’ll see, this involves an understanding of psychotherapeutic interventions as treatments of psychopathological problems. In the rest of this essay, I turn to this directly and argue that psychotherapy has an important non-pathocentric dimension. I argue that we fail to appreciate the nature and variety of psychotherapy if we concentrate only on its pathocentric dimensions. Though I use Szasz as a stalking horse, the substantive topic is the nature of psychotherapy. This enquiry falls into the philosophy of psychotherapy as distinct from the philosophy of psychiatry and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. (shrink)

This paper considers some issues to do with valuational presentations of consequence relations, and the Galois connections between spaces of valuations and spaces of consequence relations. Some of what we present is known, and some even well-known; but much is new. The aim is a systematic overview of a range of results applicable to nonreflexive and nontransitive logics, as well as more familiar logics. We conclude by considering some connectives suggested by this approach.

The view that quantum particles cannot be regarded as individuals was articulated in the early days of the 'quantum revolution' and became so well-entrenched that French and Krause called it 'the Received View'. However it was subsequently shown that quantum statistics is in fact compatible with a metaphysics of particle individuality, subject to certain caveats. As a consequent it has been claim that there exists a kind of underdetermination of the metaphysics by the physics which in turn has been (...) used to motivate a form of 'notice' structural realism. In this essay I will review this purported underdetermination and the motivation for structural realism that it purportedly provides in the context of recent developments in both the philosophy of physics and metaphysics. I aim to conclude that such developments reinforce the underdetermination and allow one to respond to certain critical concerns regarding its motivational power. (shrink)

Quantum theory explains a hugely diverse array of phenomena in the history of science. But how can the world be the way quantum theory says it is? Fifteen expert scholars consider what the world is like according to quantum physics in this volume and offer illuminating new perspectives on fundamental debates that span physics and philosophy.

In this paper we treat metasequents—objects which stand to sequents as sequents stand to formulas—as first class logical citizens. To this end we provide a metasequent calculus, a sequent calculus which allows us to directly manipulate metasequents. We show that the various metasequent calculi we consider are sound and complete w.r.t. appropriate classes of tetravaluations where validity is understood locally. Finally we use our metasequent calculus to give direct syntactic proofs of various collapse results, closing a problem left open in (...) French (Ergo, 3(5), 113–131 2016). (shrink)

In this paper we treat metasequents—objects which stand to sequents as sequents stand to formulas—as first class logical citizens. To this end we provide a metasequent calculus, a sequent calculus which allows us to directly manipulate metasequents. We show that the various metasequent calculi we consider are sound and complete w.r.t. appropriate classes of tetravaluations where validity is understood locally. Finally we use our metasequent calculus to give direct syntactic proofs of various collapse results, closing a problem left open in (...) French (Ergo, 3(5), 113–131 2016). (shrink)

What is the role of the imagination in scientific practice? Here I focus on the nature and role of invitations to imagine in certain scientific texts as represented by the example of Einstein’s Special Relativity paper from 1905. Drawing on related discussions in aesthetics, I argue, on the one hand, that this role cannot be simply subsumed under ‘supposition’ but that, on the other, concerns about the impact of genre and symbolism can be dealt with, and hence present no obstacle (...) to regarding imagination as appropriately belief-like. By applying the framework of ‘semi- propositional representations’ and ‘quasi-truth’ to this case I thereby offer a new unitary framework for understanding the epistemology of scientific imagination. (shrink)

It has been claimed that Massimi’s recent perspectival approach to science sits in tension with a realist stance. I shall argue that this tension can be defused in the quantum context by recasting Massimi’s perspectivalism within a phenomenological framework. I shall begin by indicating how the different but complementary forms of the former are manifested in the distinction between certain so-called ‘-epistemic’ and ‘-ontic’ understandings of quantum mechanics, namely QBism and Relational Quantum Mechanics, respectively. A brief consideration of Dieks’ perspectivism (...) will then lead to a consideration of the much-maligned and typically dismissed role of the observer in the measurement process. This opens the door to London and Bauer’s presentation of a form of ‘phenomenological quantum perspectivalism’ that brings together Massimi’s two forms and explicitly eschews the ‘naïve’ realism that creates the above tension. I shall conclude with some reflections on how intersubjectivity can still be established within this framework, focusing in particular on how Massimi’s idea of ‘interlacing’ scientific perspectives can be accommodated, using the example of a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ that gave rise to Bose-Einstein statistics. (shrink)

Philosophical Issues, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 102-119, October 2020.

According to the substantialist, substances should be regarded as the fundamental ontological category. It is substances that are the bearer of properties, that are causally efficacious and that compose the things we see and touch around us. Cumpa has argued that this metaphysics fits poorly with classical physics and Buonomo has extended this argument into the quantum realm. After reviewing their claims, I shall argue that simple reflection on the form of the Standard Model also undermines substantialism. I will then (...) explore Dasgupta’s qualitative factualism in this context before suggesting that modern physics does not compel us to adopt such a stance. The alternative is to adopt a form of structuralism which, although it may be rendered compatible with factualism, can also stand as a ‘third way’ between these stances. (shrink)

Naive realists hold that experience is to be understood in terms of an intimate perceptual relation between a subject and aspects of the world, relative to a certain standpoint. Those aspects of the world themselves shape the contours of consciousness. But blurriness is an aspect of some of our experiences that does not seem to come from the world. I argue that this constitutes a significant challenge to some forms of naive realism. But I also argue that there is a (...) robust form of naive realism which is unfazed by the blurriness of some of our experiences, even when that blurriness is understood as a subjective modification of consciousness. (shrink)