Following W.V. Quine’s lead, many metaphysicians consider ontology to be concerned primarily with existential questions of the form, “What is there?”. Moreover, if the position advanced by Rudolf Carnap, in his seminal essay, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology ”, is correct, then many of these existential ontological questions ought to be classified as either trivially answerable or as “pseudo-questions”. One may justifiably wonder, however, whether the Quinean and Carnapian perspective on ontology really does justice to many of the (...) most central concerns of this discipline. This chapter argues, by considering a particular ontological dispute between two different kinds of trope theorists, that some of the most interesting and important debates which properly belong to the study of being, whether we call it “metaphysics” or “ ontology ”, do not concern existential questions at all; rather, such disputes in some cases focus on non-existential disagreements over questions of fundamentality. (shrink)

The views of Quine and Strawson on the significance of 'mass terms' are rehearsed, and the metaphysical status of substances, in the chemist's sense, is considered. It is urged that the ontological dichotomy of particulars and universals is not adequate to accommodate such substances, which are in a sense to be explicated concrete but non-particular.

What is the so-called “question of ontology?” Is the question of ontology genuinely a question about “categories” (Lowe 2006), “structure” (Sider 2011), “existence” (Thomasson 2015), or rather “reality” (Fine 2009)? In this article, I defend the neo-Sellarsian approach to the question of ontology, a novel, naturalistic approach according to which the foundational question of ontology is about “understanding the manifest and the scientific images of the world, and their multiple relationships.” First, (...) I argue for the thesis of Impure Eliminativism, a form of constructive pluralism about the question of ontology by which the substantivity of questions of ontology which are not the neo-Sellarsian one is to be built upon certain relations with the neo-Sellarsian question of ontology. Second, I argue for the categorial plasticity of the two images and their relations in connection with the hypothesis of Weak Epistemic Factualism. Third, and lastly, I argue for a person-based ontology framed in terms of the crucial notions of “fact” and “understanding” in response to the eliminativist categorizations of the two images and their relationships proposed by substantialism and structuralism. (shrink)

We articulate a distinction between ontology, understood as involving existence questions, and metaphysics, understood as either providing for metaphysical profiles of entities or else as dealing with fundamentality and/or grounding and dependence questions. The distinction, we argue, allows a better understanding of the roles of metaontology and metametaphysics when it comes to discussing the relations between ontology and science on the one hand, and metaphysics and science on the other. We argue that while ontology, as understood in (...) this paper, may have reasonable perspectives for naturalization, given its relation to science, the same cannot be said for metaphysics, given that it is typically understood as an additional theoretical layer over science, not participating in the scientific investigation. That may result either in skepticism over metaphysics, or else on accepting that metaphysics is an autonomous branch of investigation, depending on one’s concern for metaphysics. (shrink)

In his early work, Heidegger seems to be committed to a perplexing combination of ontological idealism and ontic realism (i.e. entities do not depend on human b...

Within the heterodox economic literature on pluralism, attention has predominately focussed on epistemic and methodological levels. The response to the question of what ontological pluralism could mean, and its contribution to the debate, remains limited. This paper argues for greater attention to be given to ontological pluralism, not only because it enriches the existing discussions around pluralism in the heterodox literature but it also provides support for a plurality of epistemological standards and methodological approaches. The paper proposes an alternative (...) definition of ontological pluralism based on the work of McDaniel and Turner. Both argue that ontological pluralism should be understood as saying that there are different ways to exist and that acceptance of the semantic characteristics of ontological questions and statements within different ontological discourses are essential in a proper definition. This paper details their definition and explores its consequences with an analysis of the Searle–Lawson dispute on social objects. (shrink)

"Phenomenology or Deconstruction? challenges traditional understandings of the relationship between phenomenology and deconstruction through new readings of the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Luc Nancy. A constant dialogue with Jacques Derrida's engagement with phenomenological themes provides the impetus to establishing a new understanding of 'being' and 'presence' that exposes significant blindspots inherent in traditional readings of both phenomenology and deconstruction." "This new reading of being and presence fundamentally re-draws our understanding of the relation of deconstruction and phenomenology, and (...) provides the first sustained discussion of the possibilities and problems for any future 'deconstructive phenomenology.'" --Book Jacket. (shrink)

THE FIRST EXHAUSTIVELY SCIENTIFIC, speculative inquiry into the notion and nature of essence in the Western philosophical tradition is found in Aristotle's Metaphysics. In contrast to the earlier Greek philosophers and Plato, after considering the problem of being and change Aristotle reached the conclusion that the essential identity of material phenomena, or ousia, is an immanent and inseparable quality that forms the identity of each particular phenomenon. In Aristotle's concept, however, which constitutes the original form of phenomenal realism, ousia is (...) not "it"-self some-thing or some it. For though its presence may certainly be speculatively implied, "it" is not. Following Aristotle, though, and for reasons extraneous to the theme of this present article, the speculative inquiry into the nature of essence and phenomenality deviated from the orientation that Aristotle initially imputed to that study, evolving in a philosophical milieu whose theoretical propensity was predominantly transcendental. This article, then, focuses on the problematic of essential identity in the Western transcendental tradition, and, more particularly, seeks to contrast and compare the essence of the transcendental philosophers against the ousia of Aristotle's metaphysic. (shrink)

Our ordinary moral practices not only suppose that some people ought to perform some actions, and that some outcomes are morally better or worse than others, but also that there are rights, duties, goodness, and other apparently abstract moral entities. What should we make of these entities, and the talk of these entities? It is not straighforward to account for these entities in other terms. On the other hand, this paper will argue that talk of such entities is not easily (...) eliminated from good moral theorising. Nor are the prospects for paraphrasing apparent talk about these entities into less committal terms very promising. We should either find a place in our ontology for these creatures of ethics, or explain how they can be employed as a convenient fiction. (shrink)

In Seminar XI, Lacan begins by saying that the seminar will be a response to the question of ontology posed at the close of Seminar X. What emerges from this question is a new priority given to thinking the Real, as well as his famous myth of the lamella and his clearest writings on the death drive. This paper proposes that the metaphysical works of both Žižek and Badiou aim to answer the same question posed by (...) Jacques-Alain Miller, “What is Lacan’s ontology?” While both are indebted to Lacan, their responses to this question of ontology show clear differences in their interpretations of the Real. The Real is perhaps one of the most difficult concepts to grasp since it is by definition that which cannot be symbolized, that which voids all symbolization thrust upon it. It will be argued that Badiou’s work clearly emphasizes the negative aspect of the Real, that which is really “nothing;” central here are Badiou’s writings on the Void and the Event, those punctuated instances where nothingness punches through Being and forces its way into the world. Žižek instead maintains that the Real shows itself both in lack as well as in excess/surplus . By working through Žižek’s work on German Idealism and subjectivity, as well as Badiou’s metaphysics of mathematics and the Void, we will better understand both their respective readings of Lacan, as well as understand more clearly the import of Lacan’s work for contemporary metaphysics. (shrink)

A significant increase in scientific discoveries, made possible, among other things, thanks to the computing power provided by modern information technologies, occurs against the background of the lack of theoretical and methodological resources necessary for their scientific conceptualization. The situation is similar to the one that took place at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and became the object of reflection on the part of philosophers called emergentists. This explains the revival in our time of interest in some (...) of their ideas, including the idea of ontological novelty, which emergent phenomena possess. Modern emergentism is positioned as a realistic teaching that aims to find access to reality in itself, before any knowledge about it, which implies overcoming the correlationism that has dominated philosophy since the time of Kant. One of the representatives of modern emergentism, Manuel DeLanda, tries to combine the position on the ontological novelty of emergent objects with the concept of individuation by Georges Kangilem, which reveals the mechanism of their occurrence and concretization in the form of individual singularities. This requires abandoning the ontology inherited from the ancient Greeks, based on the dialectic of the general and the singular, in favor of an ontology based on individual and universal singularities. The article analyzes the arguments of the supporters of the "new ontology" and concludes that, as in the case of classical emergence, modern discussions are caused by a crisis in physics, which is faced with the fact that the facts recorded during the study of the microcosm are inexplicable from the point of view of the existing theory, and therefore are really ontologically new. But it is possible that with the creation of the" new physics", these facts will cease to be emergent and will pass into the category of "others". (shrink)

Objective – is to formulate a methodological discourse regarding the place and role of the language interconnected with the process of socialization of a person and develop a systemic idea of the corresponding functional features. -/- Materials & Methods – this discourse is formulated on the basis of a systemic idea of the personality socialization, which, in turn, is realized using the structural-ontological method of studying the subject matter field in interdisciplinary researches. This method involves the construction of special visual-graphic (...) matrices that reflect the interaction of the primary process and the material of the studied system. -/- Results. The work with the structural-ontological matrix made it possible to analyze the functions of the language in the context of such significant factors of socialization as complex psychodynamics, civilization space and the function of reflection. At the same time, reflection is considered at the level of two plans – primary (reflection-bond) and secondary (reflection-splitting). This made it possible to deduce the idea of the role of language beyond the traditional framework of working with text and analyze the place of the language in the context of activities to establish a connection between individuals, which is realized in a specific cooperative situation (Shchedrovitsky). In particular, the look at language as a specific tool of civilizational rationing, the mechanism of which is provided through reflection-communication. Thus, the language is examined through the prism of its systemic influence on the morphology of the psyche. -/- Conclusions – a structural-ontological analysis of the place and role of language in the process of personality socialization has led us to construction of a hypothesis about the phenomenon of language discontentment, as a tendency to distance away ego-consciousness in the process of individuation from linguistic ontology. The arguments were also advanced in favor of the assumption regarding the peculiarities of the influence of language discontentment on cultural activities and the psychodynamic contribution of this phenomenon in the midlife crisis (Jung). (shrink)

In their paper “Sixteen Days” Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard try to answer the question: when does a human being begin to exist? In this paper we will address some methodological issues connected with this exercise in ontology. We shall begin by sketching the argument of “Sixteen Days”. We shall then attempt to characterize what is special about the ontological realism of “Sixteen Days” as contrasted to the linguistic constructivism which represents the more dominant current in contemporary analytic (...) philosophy. This will allow us to infer guidelines for assessing the quality of ontological theories of various types. We shall argue that ontological parsimony, groundedness, faithfulness to ordinary language, consistency with science, coherence, and fruitfulness are at least part of the adequacy criteria for such theories. These criteria will then be applied to the theory presented in “Sixteen Days”, and they will lead us to some revisions of this theory as well as to some reflections on its ethical implications. (shrink)

A significant reorientation is currently under way in analytic metaphysics, away from an almost exclusive focus on questions of existence and towards a greater concentration on questions concerning the dependence of one type of phenomenon on another. Surprisingly, despite the central role dependence has played in philosophy since its inception, interest in a systematic study of this concept has only recently surged among contemporary metaphysicians. In this paper, I focus on a promising account of ontological dependence in terms of a (...) non-modal and sufficiently constrained conception of essence developed by Kit Fine. I argue that even this essentialist account is, as it stands, not fine-grained enough to recognize different varieties of dependence which ought to be distinguished even within the realm of ontology. In some cases, an entity may be ontologically dependent on its essential constituents out of which it is constructed; but in other cases, an entity may be ontologically dependent on another for a different reason. A framework which glosses over these differences does not offer a proper diagnosis of why one entity ontologically depends on another. (shrink)

The aim of what follows is to explore how to raise the question of Being by way of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. Phenomenological ontology is a way of approaching and conducting philosophy exemplified in the work of German philosopher Martin Heidegger’s, and specifically in his magnum opus Being and Time. In preparation to raise the question of Being a more nuanced understanding of Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses on truth and language are summarized. Following, the manner in which Being (...) is referenced is analyzed before considering the way of Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology. In conclusion, existing attempts and continuing efforts into the question of Being in education through phenomenological ontology are shared. At a time when decontextualized and reductive ways of knowing and being are becoming the norm within education, phenomenological ontology offers new possibilities for scholarship and practice. The present inquiry does not offer solutions in the traditional sense but rather traces a path that opens and keeps in tension the question of Being in education in order to support further study. (shrink)

According to certain models of the musical work-performance relationship, musical works persist through time. Dodd and Thomasson argue that perdurantist accounts of musical persistence—according to which musical works persist by having temporal parts at every time they exist—are untenable, and Tillman argues that musical endurantism—according to which persisting works are wholly present at each time they exist—avoids Dodd’s worries. In this paper, I argue that both Dodd’s and Thomasson’s arguments—and Tillman’s response—rely on assumptions linking theories of persistence to common-sense views (...) about musical works and, moreover, that these assumptions are unwarranted. As a result, only an attitude of neutrality towards questions about the nature of musical persistence is warranted. (shrink)

L’originalité de l’ontologie leibnizienne réside dans le fait que sa philosophie du droit constitue une grande synthèse philosophique des juristes humanistes. Quant à la question de la place de la « science juridique » chez Leibniz, elle se trouve en réalité à tous les niveaux de son édifice métaphysique : l’omniprésence non seulement de références au droit et à la justice, mais aussi d’arguments d’ordre normatif est évidente. Chez Leibniz, la science juridique ne constitue pas un domaine autonome par (...) rapport aux autres disciplines des sciences humaines, et il serait par conséquent vain d’essayer de dégager des lignes de démarcation strictes. Par son objet – l’ordre des règles « vérités » –, la science juridique s’inscrit parfaitement dans l’idée selon laquelle l’objet de la démonstration scientifique est la vérité. En vertu de cette doctrine, Leibniz identifie les éléments du système juridique existant comme droit positif et droit naturel, comme vérités contingentes (ou historiques) et vérités éternelles. Nous pensons que cette théorie de la norme juridique présente les caractéristiques d’une ontologie « hylétique ». Le droit naturel se veut un ensemble de vérités jugées « nécessaires », mais dépourvues de force obligatoire, contrairement à l’ontologie volontariste où les règles de droit équivalent aux commandements d’un souverain hiérarchiquement supérieur. Le critère de la normativité réside dans la rationalité ; les règles juridiques ne sont ni « valides » ni « obligatoires », mais plutôt « nécessaires » et « vraies ». Un des défis les plus intéressants pour les études juridiques leibniziennes consiste à démontrer l’harmonie entre le système juridique rationnel et le cas perplexe irrationnel. (shrink)

Scientific literature on particular themes in ontology is extremely abundant, but it is often very hard for freshmen or sophomores to find a red thread between the various proposals. This text is an opinionated introduction, a preliminary text to research in ontology from the so called standard approach to ontological commitment, that is from the particular point of view that connects ontological questions to quantificational questions. It offers a survey of this viewpoint in ontology together with their (...) possible applications through a broad array of examples and open problems and, at the same time, essential references to the classics of philosophy, so as to allow non-specialists to understand the terms and analysis procedures characterizing the discipline. Its result is a wide-ranging overview of the issued tackled by ontology, with a particular focus on the most relevant problems of contemporary debate. (shrink)

St Anselm is one of the major thinkers of the medieval epoch of the history of philosophy. Interest in Anselm usually focuses on his discussion of the problem of the existence of God especially as contained in the Proslogion. Indeed Anselm is mostly known for his attempt to proof the existence of God in the Proslogion. The argument he advances here which goes by the name ontological argument has been a point of reference all through the history of Western philosophy (...) and is usually viewed as his most substantive contributions to philosophy of religion, with Hume and Kant criticizing it in the eighteenth century and thinkers such as Hartshorne, Malcom and Plantinga endorsing it in the Twentieth century. Like Augustine before him and Aquinas after him, Anselm did not see any opposition between faith and reason, or again, between philosophy and theology, as he was concerned with providing rational ground for the doctrines of Christianity which he already accepted as a matter of faith. Indeed as commentators rightly note, Anselm’s thought can be summed up in the Augustinian dictum, “faith seeks understanding”, so that he is arguably one of the early pioneers of Christian theology, so far as he sees certain solidarity between faith and reason, with reason providing the excellent service of rational clarification of what we accept by faith. The inter-play Anselm sees as subsisting between faith and reason is one we must take into account if we must appreciate his contributions to theology and metaphysics, for this consideration permeates the whole of his thought. For him clearly, that there is no divorce between faith and reason means concretely that “I do not seek to understand in other that I may believe, but rather I believe in order that I may understand”. (shrink)

The question of energy is among the most vital for the future of humanity and the flourishing of life on this planet. Yet, only very rarely (if at all) do we ask what energy is, what it means, what ends it serves, and how it is related to actuality, meaning-making, and instrumentality. Energy Dreams interrogates the ontology of energy from the first coinage of the word energeia by Aristotle to the current practice of fracking and the popularity of (...) "energy drinks." Its sustained, multi-disciplinary investigation builds a theoretical infrastructure for an alternative energy paradigm. This study unhinges stubbornly held assumptions about energy, conceived in terms of a resource to be violently extracted from the depths of the earth and from certain living beings (such as plants, converted into biofuels), a thing that, teetering on the verge of depletion, sparks off movement and is incompatible with the inertia of rest. Consulting the insights of philosophers, theologians, psychologists and psychoanalysts, economic and political theorists, and physicists, Michael Marder argues that energy is not only a coveted object of appropriation but also the subject who dreams of amassing it; that it not only resides in the dimension of depth but also circulates on the surface; that it activates rest as much as movement, potentiality as much as actuality; and that it is both the means and the end of our pursuits. Ultimately, Marder shows that, instead of being grounded in utopian naïveté, the dreams of another energy—to be procured without devastating everything in existence—derive from the suppressed concept of energy itself. (shrink)

이 논문은 인공지능의 존재론적 지위를 평가하기 위한 두 개의 물음을 던진다. 하나는 인공지능이 개념을 가질 수 있는가 하는 물음이고, 다른 하나는 인공지능이 행위의 능력을 가졌는가 하는 물음이다. 개념 능력은 인공지능이 통상적인 언어의 형태로 주어지는 명령이나 정보를 능동적으로 이해하고 그것의 작동에 반영할 수 있기 위한 필요조건이다. 최근 인공지능 기술은 영상자료에서 비지도 학습의 방식으로 특정 범주의 사물을 식별해내는 성과를 거뒀지만, 이런 식별의 능력은 개념 능력의 필요조건도 충분조건도 아니다. 인공지능이 우리와 같은 개념을 가지도록 하는 것은 인간 사회의 언어 관행을 고스란히 학습시키는 방식으로 가능할 (...) 것인데, 이것은 불가능하지는 않지만 사실상 완결되기 어려운 목표다. 한편, 행위 능력에 대한 평가는 인공지능 프로그램이나 지능형 로봇 같은 인공물을 모종의 책임과 권리를 지닌 행위 주체로 간주할 수 있는가 하는 물음을 다루기 위한 열쇠다. 행위는 행위 주체와 환경 간의 상호작용으로, 행위의 실현에는 환경 속 대상에 대한 지각과 그것에 관한 동작의 협응, 달리 말하자면 감수자 체계와 행위자 체계의 통합이 필수적이다. 그리고 이러한 협응이나 통합의 배후에는 행위를 낳는 의도를 가지고 협응을 조율하는 존재, 즉 자아가 있다. 행위는 감수자 체계와 행위자 체계의 협응을 통해 자아의 의도를 실현하는 과정이다. 인공물의 작동이 이런 조건을 충족한다고 볼 이유는 아직 없다. 결국, 두 물음에 대한 이 논문의 대답은 부정적이거나 기껏해야 유보적이다. (shrink)

Introduction: the figure of this world -- 1. The question of political ontology -- 2. The poetic experience of the world -- 3. The myth of the earth -- 4. The unbearable -- 5. The creature before the law -- 6. The animal for which animality is an issue -- 7. Understanding the happy -- 8. The picture and its captives -- 9. The passing of the figure of this world.

Axel Honneth is internationally renowned for being one of the leading political and social philosophers of our time, and is highly regarded for his work on recognition and the struggles for recognition. In this interview, he discusses his work over the past four decades, starting from the rise of his intellectual vocation to his most recent book on the sovereignty of work. The text is a transcript, revised by the author, of the dialogue Honneth had with his interviewers and the (...) audience at the masterclass held on 24 May 2023 at the University of Trento, as part of the first series of lectures “Voices from Contemporary Philosophy”. (shrink)

The relations between ontology and information are many and fundamental, and they help us to understand the present gulf between (formal) ontology and (philosophical) Ontology: We can speak of respectively ontology-driven information and information-driven ontology as the focus on being informed vs. informed being. The question of whether these two (can) coincide is relevant to both fields, and in this article I elaborate on what needs to be addressed first of all to provide us (...) with an answer: The form. This core ontological concept rooting in Aristotelian metaphysics was central to philosophical ontology, in particular in Latin Scholasticism, when it was clearly put into relation with information as that which defines an entity. In this context, Dietrich of Freiberg synthesized this long debate in a way that matters not only to the philosophical effort of producing information-driven ontologies but also to the engineering constructs of ontology-driven information systems. (shrink)

When an entity ontologically depends on another entity, the former ‘presupposes’ or ‘requires’ the latter in some metaphysical sense. This paper defends a novel view, Dependence Deflationism, according to which ontological dependence is what I call an aggregative cluster concept: a concept which can be understood, but not fully analysed, as a ‘weighted total’ of constructive and modal relations. The view has several benefits: it accounts for clear cases of ontological dependence as well as the source of disagreement in controversial (...) ones; it gives a nice story about the evidential relevance of modal, mereological and set-theoretic facts to ontological dependence; and it makes sense of debates over the relation's formal properties. One important upshot of the deflationary account is that questions of ontological dependence are generally less deep and less interesting than usually thought. (shrink)

Despite their recent development, geo-ontologies represent a complicated conundrum for the different experts involved in their design. Computer scientists use ontologies for describing the meaning of data and their semantics in order to make information resources built for humans understandable also for artificial agents. Geographers pursue conceptualizations that describe the domain of interest in a way that should be accessible, informative, and complete for their final recipients. In this context, philosophers are not required to sketch the historical background of (...) class='Hi'>ontology. Rather, they should offer conceptual solutions for carving nature at the joints and choosing how best to categorize and classify the different entities belonging to the geographical domain in question. Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to combine assumptions and requirements coming from these different areas of research in order to show what different categories might potentially complete the current domain of geo-ontologies. (shrink)

Okolo maintains that the African is identified by his personality which is the attitudinal disposition he designates as ‘beingwith’. He adopts the term ‘being-with’ to represent the African ‘communality’ which is all there is to be truly African. Though maintaining a radical communalistic viewpoint suspending in socio-ontological considerations, Okolo posits that this attitude characteristically defines and symbolically stands for that by which ‘an African’ is identified. However, Okolo’s position inheres some problems that border on one, the question and place (...) of right and freedom of the individual as a community-member in the face of the community-consciousness, two, imposition of the title ‘African’ on even non-Africans as he opines that even an American, for instance, who imbibes by the principle of ‘being-with’ is ‘an African’, among other problems. Nonetheless, this paper defends that there are serious series of challenges/disruptions to this personality of ‘being-with’ which today hinder a satisfactory realization of its practicability/liveability even among Africans. The expectations from the paper include one, an analysis of Okolo’s thoughts, pointing out the loopholes for further academic exercise on African philosophical discourse, two, to reiterate the fact that what is African has substantial potency to sustain Africa, and address African problems hence ‘African solutions to African problems’, and third and finally, to propose an alternative view to ameliorating the radical communalistic positions in Okolo. The paper shall here also adopt philosophical conceptualization, content and contextual analysis and clarifications to critically review Okolo. (shrink)

Are the categorical laws of ontology metaphysically contingent? I do not intend to give a full answer to this question in this paper. But I shall give a partial answer to it. In particular, Gideon Rosen, in his article “The Limits of Contingency”, has distinguished a certain conception of metaphysical necessity, which he calls the Non-Standard conception, which, together with the assumption that all natures or essences are Kantian, is supposed to entail that many laws of ontology (...) are metaphysically contingent. Now, the argument Rosen gives supports the conclusion that all categorical laws of ontology are contingent. I shall argue that the Non-Standard conception and the thesis that all natures are Kantian are incompatible with each other and that, if the Non-Standard conception is true, there must be at least one metaphysically necessary categorical law of ontology, and I shall identify such a law. Thus my contribution to the question of the title of the paper will be that not all categorical ontological laws can be contingent if the Non-Standard conception is true. (shrink)

The question of how to interpret spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics is an open one. One issue involves what link one should use to go from wave function talk to talk of ordinary macroscopic objects. Another issue involves whether that link should be taken ontologically seriously. In this paper, I ague that the link should be taken ontologically seriously; I argue against an ontology consisting solely of the wave function. I then consider three possible links: the fuzzy (...) link, the accessible mass density link, and the mass density simpliciter link. I show that the first two links have serious anomalies which render them unacceptable. I show that the mass density simpliciter link, in contrast, is viable. (shrink)

In recent years, a new dispute has risen to prominence: the dispute between realists and anti-realists about causal powers. Albeit sometimes overlooked, the meta-ontological features of this “question of realism for powers” are quite peculiar. For friends and foes of causal powers have characterized their contrasting views in a variety of different ways; as existence claims, as semantic or truth-making claims, as fundamentality claims, as claims about the nature of certain properties. Not only does this multiplicity of interpretations make (...) it unclear what the genuine bone of contention is, if there is one; some of them appear to be mutually exclusive. Some light can be shed on this apparent yet widespread confusion by distinguishing three degrees of ontological involvement in dispositional truths; viz., three ways, of increasing robustness, to read ontological commitments from dispositional truths. Relatedly, by exploring the literature, and focusing on some selected examples of power realism and anti-realism, we can observe that power realists vastly disagree over the intrinsic nature ad make-up of dispositional properties. Such examples furthermore invite the thought that the question of realism for powers is best understood not as the debate around the existence of properties with a distinctive identity, but rather as a debate about metaphysical hierarchy. Finally, some anti-realists positions are indistinguishable from realist ones, using merely intensional resources: power realism is best appreciated by going hyperintensional. (shrink)

In international politics, bridging the gap between the real and knowledge poses a persistent challenge as translating the real into concepts and narratives can nurture the epistemic fallacy. Critical realism addresses this by separating ontology from epistemology at the meta-theoretical level, yet in practical research, critical realism tends to impose assumptions about the ontological complexity of the real at the transcendental level. This paper examines the practical difficulty of overcoming the epistemic fallacy in International Relations inquiries, asserting that critical (...) realism does not effectively guide practical inquiries in separating ontology from epistemology at a methodological level. Despite the meta-theoretical separation, research inquiries can remain theory-laden and epistemically dependent. The solution lies in problematizing ontological presentation, and sustaining critique at the discursive level on International Relations theories, methodologies, and implications. This approach maintains a critical focus on ontological aspects at the practical level to deal with the challenge of the epistemic fallacy. (shrink)

There are two different ways of understanding the notion of ‘ontological commitment ’. A question about ‘what is said to be’ by a theory or ‘what a theory says there is’ deals with ‘explicit’ commitment ; a question about the ontological costs or preconditions of the truth of a theory concerns ‘implicit’ commitment. I defend a conception of ontological commitment as implicit commitment, and argue that existentially quantified idioms in natural language are implicitly, but not explicitly, committing. I (...) use the distinction between the two kinds of ontological commitment to diagnose a flaw in a widely used argument to the effect that existential quantification is not ontologically committing. (shrink)

The handout of my talk at the Nordic Network in Metaphysics webinar on Friday 2/10/2020.

The question of fiction is omnipresent within the work of Paul Ricoeur throughout his prolific career. However, Ricoeur raises the questions of fiction in relation to other issues such the symbol, metaphor and narrative. This article sets out to foreground a traditional problem of fiction and logic, which is termed the existence of non-existent objects, in relation to the Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative. Ricoeur’s understanding of fiction takes place within his overall philosophical anthropology where the fictions and histories (...) make up the very nature of identity both personal and collective. The existence of non-existent objects demonstrates a dichotomy between fiction and history, non-existent objects can exist as fictional objects. The very possibility of the existence of fictional objects entails ontological status considerations. What ontological status do fictional objects have? Ricoeur develops a concept of narrative configuration which is akin to the Kantian productive imagination and configuration frames the question historical narrative and fictional narrative. It is demonstrated that the ontological status of fictional objects can be best understood in a model of possible worlds. (shrink)

This work is of the view that the question of being is not only a problem in Western philosophy but also in African philosophy. It, therefore, posits that being is that which is and has both abstract and concrete aspect. The work arrives at this conclusion by critically analyzing and evaluating the views of some key African philosophers with respect to being. With this, it discovers that the way that these African philosophers have postulated the idea of being is (...) in the same manner like their Western philosophers whom they tried to criticize. This work tries to synthesize the notions of beings of these African philosophers in order to reach at a better understanding of being. This notion of being leans heavily on Asouzu’s ibuanyidanda ontology which does not bifurcate or polarize being, but harmonizes entities or realities that seem to be contrary or opposing in being. (shrink)