In medical practice and research it is necessary to consider the rights of the researcher or physician and of the subject or patient, to conform to scientific standards and to examine the appropriateness with respect to laws and moral values. Research ethics committees have an important role to play in ensuring the ethical standards and scientific merit of research on human subjects. Research of no scientific value is also against ethical principles. To obtain valid and reliable results from biomedical research, (...) it is a scientific and ethical obligation to make use of the science of statistics. Therefore, for research to be evaluated using biostatistics intensively from ethical and scientific points of view, a biostatistics expert is necessary on research ethics committees. Developments in Turkey are used as examples. (shrink)

Nesta contribuição, a filosofia da cultura de Cassirer é apresentada como uma aplicação especial da filosofia transcendental kantiana, então comparada a outra tradição aqui, a Escola de Pittsburgh, especialmente McDowell. O resultado é o conceito de Sellars de “espaço de razões”, que é então expandido por McDowell com seu conceito de “segunda natureza”. Uma interpretação interessante de um dos primeiros intérpretes de Cassirer – Howe – torna possível trazer “Marburgo” e “Pittsburgo” para a conversa. O resultado dessa comparação será uma (...) posição que transmite ambas as tradições e que Howe poderia descrever como “idealismo naturalista”. No final, tenta-se demonstrar a superioridade da posição de Cassirer, o que não significa uma refutação da de McDowell, mas sim um encaixe de sua posição na de Cassirer. (shrink)

Background: Hospital nurses are frequently the first care givers to receive a patient’s request for euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide (PAS). In France, there is no consensus over which medical practices should be considered euthanasia, and this lack of consensus blurred the debate about euthanasia and PAS legalisation. This study aimed to investigate French hospital nurses’ opinions towards both legalisations, including personal conceptions of euthanasia and working conditions and organisation. Methods: A phone survey conducted among a random national sample of 1502 (...) French hospital nurses. We studied factors associated with opinions towards euthanasia and PAS, including contextual factors related to hospital units with random-effects logistic models. Results: Overall, 48% of nurses supported legalisation of euthanasia and 29%, of PAS. Religiosity, training in pallative care/pain management and feeling competent in end-of-life care were negatively correlated with support for legalisation of both euthanasia and PAS, while nurses working at night were more prone to support legalisation of both. The support for legalisation of euthanasia and PAS was also weaker in pain treatment/palliative care and intensive care units, and it was stronger in units not benefiting from interventions of charity/religious workers and in units with more nurses. Conclusions: Many French hospital nurses uphold the legalisation of euthanasia and PAS, but these nurses may be the least likely to perform what proponents of legalisation call “good” euthanasia. Improving professional knowledge of palliative care could improve the management of end-of-life situations and help to clarify the debate over euthanasia. (shrink)

Originally published in 1954, on behalf of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, this book presents a general review of British economic statistics in relation to the uses made of them for policy purposes. The text begins with an examination, in general terms, of the ways in which statistics can help in guiding or assessing policy, covering housing, coal, the development areas, agricultural price-fixing, the balance of external payments and the balance of the economy. The problems of statistical (...) application are then separately discussed under the headings of quality, presentation and availability, and organization. A full bibliography and reference table of principal British economic statistics are also included. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in British economic history and statistics. (shrink)

Mealey's etiological distinction between primary and secondary sociopathy blurs the delineation between individual and group differences. She uses physiological evidence to support her claim of genetic influences, neglecting variability within social classes, frequency of delinquent behavior in upper and middle classes (measured by self-report), and discontinuity of criminal behavior across the life span. Finally, Mealey's proposals for differential intervention fall short of a future agenda, which should tailor to individual needs, not social classes.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:342 BOOK REVIEWS (5) What follows for the " critical " and " systematic " dimensions of theology, if, accepting Balthasar's centering of thought in (the paradoxes of) love and beauty, one sees mystery, metaphor, concrete imagery, and indeed "myth" as essential and not "accidental" to all theological meaning? In opening up these questions, O'Hanlon's important book identifies the areas where dialogue with Balthasar's work might best begin, even (...) as it makes its own constructive contribution to theology. John Paul II Institute Washington, D.C. DAVID L. SCHINDLER Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. By JAMES F. KEENAN, S.J. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992. Pp. xii + 212. $25.00 (paper). James Keenan says that he began his work on this book " believing the simple presupposition that goodness describes persons and rightness describes actions" (p. ix). The main focus of the study is the question of whether and to what extent this distinction can be found in the work of Aquinas. The author holds that the understanding of the relation of reason and will in the early work of Aquinas precludes the distinction of goodness and rightness held by the author and other contemporary moralists. Keenan claims, however, to find in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae a significant shift in Aquinas's notion of the will and its relation to reason, a shift toward an " autonomous will." Keenan states in the Introduction: "The will's autonomy is a necessary condition for understanding moral goodness "; indeed he proceeds to note that " without it there can be no distinction " between goodness and rightness (pp. ix-x). Before commenting on Keenan's work I will first briefly summarize the basic points of the book. The book is divided into four parts. In the first part we see the distinction between goodness and rightness. Keenan explains the distinction: Goodness and badness describe whether or not we strive to the extent we are able to attain rightness in our lives and actions. Rightness and wrongness describe whether or not we attain the end that reason dictates is proper and necessary for our lives and actions (p. ix). Keenan finds the foundation for this distinction in the reasoning of G. E. Moore. A person's actions can he judged right or wrong independently of a consideration of the person's motives. For instance, a BOOK REVIEWS 343 right action might be performed by a good person or by a bad person, the goodness or badness being determined by the motive. There are, then, two distinct moral descriptions; one, goodness or badness, pertains to persons and the other, rightness and wrongness, pertains to actions. Keenan joins several contemporary moral theologians in claiming something which Moore did not, namely, that " a person who performs a wrong action can be called good for performing the action" (p. 6). This assertion is based upon an understanding of goodness as determined " antecedent to action " (p. 15), and likewise as " antecedent to and distinct from rightness" (p. 7). Moral goodness is determined by the motivation, and motivation alone, of the person acting (p. 14). For example, does the person act out of love for God and neighbor, or rather out of a desire for self-aggrandizement? Jn question here is what Keenan calls the " fundamental, formal self-movement of the agent" (p. 14). Rightness on the other hand is a moral description determined by the measure of reason. It describes actions, and can also describe the agent, in terms of right order in relation to the end of human life. In Part II (the second and third chapters) Keenan turns to the supposed shift in the thought of Aquinas regarding reason and will. Keenan finds the early position of Aquinas incompatible with the distinction of goodness and rightness, but the later position compatible with the distinction. Keenan also presents Aquinas's distinction between specification and exercise in the act of the will as crucial to the distinction between goodness and rightness. I will return to this point shortly. Part III (the fourth and fifth chapters) considers Aquinas's treatises on the human act and moral virtue found in Summa Theologiae I-II. Keenan holds that... (shrink)

We investigate an approach for drawing logical inference from inconsistent premisses. The main idea in this approach is that the inconsistencies in the premisses should be interpreted as uncertainty of the information. We propose a mechanism, based on Kinght’s [14] study of inconsistency, for revising an inconsistent set of premisses to a minimally uncertain, probabilistically consistent one. We will then generalise the probabilistic entailment relation introduced in [15] for propositional languages to the first order case to draw logical inference from (...) a probabilistic set of premisses. We will show how this combination can allow us to limit the effect of uncertainty introduced by inconsistent premisses to only the reasoning on the part of the premise set that is relevant to the inconsistency. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell. Volume I: Separate Publications, 1896–1990 by Kenneth Blackwell, Harry RujaG. A. Wedeking and A. D. IrvineKenneth Blackwell and Harry Ruja. A Bibliography of Bertrand Russell. Volume I: Separate Publications, 1896–1990. Pp. lvi + 611. Volume II: Serial Publications, 1890–1990. Pp. xiv + 575. Volume III: Indexes. Pp. xi + 305. London: Routledge, 1994. Cloth, $455.00 the set.As Russell remarked: “It is a curious (...) fact that the most indubitably useful books are those most devoid of literary merit; for example, railway timetables and the telephone [End Page 146] book” (Vol. I, p. xlviii). Even so, since it will be agreed immediately that, for anyone interested in learning more about Russell’s writings, this beautifully crafted bibliography will be extremely useful, it would be a disservice to the authors to imply that it has no more literary merit than a railway timetable. The entire project simply has too much style.When Russell’s bibliographers began their task, fewer than 600 publications by Russell were known. By the time of publication they were able to record 181 of Russell’s books, pamphlets and leaflets, 629 contributions to books, pamphlets, and leaflets primarily authored by others, and approximately 3,550 serial publications of various types. Not being content merely to record the details of these publications, the authors follow each publication through its various editions, impressions, reprints, and translations. This is no mean task, given that Russell’s work has been translated into some 47 languages. In addition, the authors cite related pre-publication materials, give sources for rare and difficult-to-find books and documents, and include a comprehensive index. In short, they do nothing less than provide an authoritative, detailed record of Russell’s published work from 1890 to 1990.As the authors also point out, this is “a bibliography not only of Russell’s writings submitted and actually published, but also of certain other texts. Together they can be regarded as his published thoughts” (I: xix). Thus the bibliography mentions not only Russell’s books, articles, and published letters, but published accounts of his speeches, addresses, press conferences, and interviews; book reviews and recommendations (what Russell called “puffs”) for other people’s books; multiple-signatory letters to the editor and other similar documents; published extracts from Russell’s private correspondence and originally unpublished manuscripts; and audio recordings and films. A mark of the bibliography’s completeness is its catalogue of works that have been spuriously attributed to Russell, including two posthumous “spirit communications” (II: 573–74).The authors candidly describe Russell’s reaction when in 1966 he was shown slips of accumulated new entries: “ ‘I am impressed’, he said, ‘but I don’t think it’s worth it’ “ (I: li). Now, after several decades, we are finally in a position to evaluate Russell’s opinion. To do so, users of the bibliography will want to know the answer to three questions: Is the bibliography complete? Is it accurate? Is it easy to use?With regard to the first two of these three questions, the authors have made a commendable effort to balance comprehensiveness with accuracy (see their discussion of some problem cases, “Introduction,” I: xxvi ff.), rightly preferring accuracy to other desiderata. Concerning ease of use, one issue which comes to mind is whether the inclusion of such minor items as political pamphlets, letters to the editor, and statements made at news conferences, are always worth recording, or whether these items simply make the project so large as to be unmanageable. Once again, upon seeing the completed work, the reader will have little doubt that the correct decision has been made. Researchers interested in Russell’s political involvements and their relation to his more theoretical works, for example, will find this an invaluable resource. All in all, we believe that the bibliography will surpass the requirements of even the most demanding of users. It was, pace Russell, definitely worth it. [End Page 147]As with other volumes associated with the Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell project, these three volumes are beautifully typeset and bound. They will be a pleasure to use for both students and scholars alike for generations to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 118-119 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Cambridge Companion to Augustine Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, editors. The Cambridge Companion to Augustine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xv + 307. Cloth, $59.95. Paper, $21.95. Given the immeasurable influence of Augustine upon the Western tradition, a volume devoted to him in the Cambridge Companion Series has been long overdue. Fortunately, (...) the lacuna has been filled by a work that exhibits the quality of scholarship and clarity of presentation that has become a hallmark of this series. Ably edited by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, it will serve admirably as a guide for students and professionals alike, with much that is of interest to seasoned Augustine scholars.As Stump tells us in her introduction, the eighteen essays of the volume are loosely grouped according to eight topics. These are philosophy of religion, metaphysics and theology, philosophy of mind, theory of knowledge, philosophy of language, ethics, political philosophy, and Augustine's influence. As is apparent from this list, the essays cut a vast swath through Augustine's corpus, though they focus on what is of greatest interest to philosophers. In addition, since Augustine did not recognize a clean division between philosophy and theology, much that we now classify as theology gets attention as well.In keeping with the aim of the series, the character of the essays is, for the most part, expository. Each author takes pains to explain the outlines of Augustine's position on the particular topic under consideration, and most do so with considerable attention to the evolution of his thought and the context in which he wrote. Christopher Kirwan's essay, for example, not only traces the development of Augustine's philosophy of language from his early De magistro and De dialectica through his mature De doctrina Christiana, but highlights those areas in which the influence of Stoic dialectic can be detected. Similarly, John Rist's essay on faith and reason includes a discussion of the relation of Augustine's views on credibilia to the Platonic tradition, and Paul Weithman's essay on political theory examines Augustine's critique of Ciceronian ideals of political society. Thus, while systematic in their exposition, the essays give due recognition to the fact that Augustine's views evolved through continual reassessment of the antique heritage in light of changing concerns and circumstances, particularly an increasing concern to articulate the foundations of a new, scripturally inspired, vision of God, humanity, and society. [End Page 118]In addition to exposition and historical analysis, many of the authors use their essays as occasions for constructive philosophical engagement. Perhaps the best of these is Stump's essay. Noting the pervasive disagreement among interpreters over Augustine's doctrine of free will, she distinguishes three positions available to defenders of free will--compatiblism, common libertarianism, and modified libertarianism--in order to bring greater conceptual clarity to the interpretive task. She then shows that in his early work, De libero arbitrio, Augustine develops an essentially libertarian position (though which form he is committed to remains ambiguous), but that this account comes into tension with his views concerning the action of grace on the will as they were later developed in opposition to the Pelagians. In itself this is not a startling claim, but Stump's analytical skills enable her to identify precisely where the tension lies, and she suggests a way that Augustine could have resolved this tension without compromising his basic commitments.If there is any quibble to be had with the volume, it is that several of the essays are too compressed. Roland Teske's essay on the soul and William Mann's essay on evil, for example, run a mere seven and nine pages each. Though informative, given the centrality of these topics to Augustine's thought, they would have been more useful had they been expanded. Because of this, the most satisfying essays are those in which the authors stretch out. Scott MacDonald's piece on the divine nature is particularly good in this regard. In... (shrink)

At the risk of proving myself such a caviller, I want to ask a question which I have seldom heard raised, and which I have never seen discussed in anything that I have read about Berkeley. If I am right, it poses a problem for his immaterialism, not only different, but coming from a different direction, from those objections that are commonly levelled against him. If I am wrong, it will show how right Berkeley was to stress the difficulty of (...) using for one purpose our language which has become fashioned for another. At least, I hope that I shall not fail to be the ‘fair and ingenuous reader’for whom he asked. (shrink)

A. D. M. Walker; III*—Gratefulness and Gratitude, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093.

A. D. M. Walker; III*—Gratefulness and Gratitude, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093.

The Problem of Perception offers two arguments against direct realism--one concerning illusion, and one concerning hallucination--that no current theory of ...

Anselm of Canterbury, in his work Proslogion," originated the "ontological argument" for God's existence, famously arguing that "something than which nothing greater can be conceived," which he identifies with God, must actually exist, for otherwise something greater could indeed be conceived. Some commentators have claimed that although Anselm may not have been conscious of the fact, the Proslogion "as well as his Reply to Gaunilo" contains passages that constitute a second independent proof: a "modal ontological argument" that concerns the supposed (...) logical necessity of God's existence. Other commentators disagree, countering that the alleged second argument does not stand on its own but presupposes the conclusion of the first. Anselm's Other Argument "stakes an original claim in this debate, and takes it further. There is" a second a priori" argument in Anselm, A. D. Smith contends, but it is not the modal argument past scholars have identified. This second argument surfaces in a number of forms, though always turning on certain deep, interrelated metaphysical issues. It is this form of argument that in fact underlies several of the passages which have been misconstrued as statements of the modal argument. In a book that combines historical research with rigorous philosophical analysis, Smith discusses this argument in detail, finally defending a modification of it that is implicit in Anselm. This "other argument" bears a striking resemblance to one that Duns Scotus would later employ. (shrink)

An assessment is made of Rudolf Otto's criticisms of Friedrich Schleiermacher's claim that religious feeling is to be interpreted as essentially involving a feeling of absolute dependence. Otto's criticisms are divided into two kinds. The first suggest that a feeling a dependence, even an absolute one, is the wrong sort of feeling to locate at the heart of religious consciousness. It is argued that this criticism is based on misinterpretations of Schleiermacher's view, which is in fact much closer to Otto's (...) than the latter appreciated. The second kind of criticism suggests that the feeling of absolute dependence cannot play the foundational role assigned to it by Schleiermacher, since it is itself a secondary response. It is argued not only that Otto provides no justification for this criticism, but that Otto's own position is incoherent unless Schleiermacher's view is accepted. (shrink)

Volume 46, Issue 6, November 2020, Page 727-743.