El pluralismo en América Latina ha permitido en años recientes la aparición de manifestaciones religiosas complejas y multilaterales que se expresan más allá de la lógica del catolicismo tradicional. Estas opciones operan a través de mecanismos simbólicos provisionales, híbridos y flexibles, subjetivados mediante éticas polivalentes vinculadas a la participación de nuevos actores sociales, quienes mediante espacios hermenéuticos diversos construyen una discursividad política vinculada a la comprensión de Dios a mediante sistemas teológicos abiertos. Tal es el caso de la agrupación religiosa (...) conocida como CEGLA (Cristianos Evangélicos Gays y Lesbianas de Argentina), que constituye una manifestación de formas de socialización religiosa expresadas más allá de las instituciones católicas. (shrink)

The aim of the present study was to carry out a qualitative and quantitative synthesis of the existing literature studying the relationship between emotional intelligence and risk behavior. We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of the scientific evidence available relating both constructs. Particular attention was paid to identifying possible differences in this relationship as a function of the different conceptualizations of EI and the risk domain. The study was conducted following the Cochrane and PRISMA guidelines. Our results revealed a (...) significant negative relationship between EI and health-related risk behaviors. However, this relationship was not observed in other risk domains such as finance and gambling. The relationship between EI and risk behavior differed according to the risk domain studied, which supports the notion that risk is a domain-specific construct. The results associated with the health-related risk behaviors are consistent with existing literature about the positive impact of emotional abilities on the health domain. A more complete understanding of the emotional mechanisms that underlie risk behavior could help to establish action guidelines and improve programmes to prevent and reduce the negative effects of risk behavior on our society. (shrink)

Background and ObjectiveThe outbreak of Coronavirus Disease 2019 has raised increased challenges for older adults’ personal growth in diverse cultural settings. The aim of this study was to analyze negative emotions and their role on older adults’ self-growth in Mexico, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, during the COVID-19 pandemic. For this purpose, a cross-national qualitative research was carried out.MethodsData were collected from 338 community-dwelling participants aged 65 years and older, using a semi-structured interview protocol. Older adults were asked about negative emotions (...) that significantly contribute to their self-growth during the COVID-19 pandemic. Content analysis was used to identify key themes.ResultsSeven main negative emotions significantly contributed to seven themes of self-growth, across the samples: sharing difficult experiences with others, supportive partner, spiritual practices, engagement with life, generativity, volunteering activities, and intimacy and sexual satisfaction. Sharing difficult experiences with others was most pertinent to Mexican and to Italian participants, and a supportive partner to Portuguese, and to Spanish participants.ConclusionThe findings of this study indicate that negative emotions during the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to their older adults’ self-growth. This study highlighted the cultural diversity of experiences during the pandemics and underlined the upside of negative emotions and its relation to older adults’ self-growth during this period. (shrink)

En este trabajo se estudia la determinación escotista del objeto de la lógica, en tanto ciencia intencional común. La reflexión se concentra en la tercera de las Cuestiones a la Isagoge de Porfirio, donde Escoto presenta y evalúa varios candidatos al rol de objeto de la lógica. Teniendo como parámetro de evaluación un conjunto de condiciones a cumplir por el objeto de una ciencia, Escoto concluye que el objeto de la lógica es el silogismo. Sobre ese resultado, el artículo defiende (...) la tesis de que, junto a dicho objeto, entendido como objeto propio, se puede inferir la presencia de un objeto común: las segundas intenciones. En cuanto al silogismo como objeto, se sostiene que este da unidad a la lógica por atribución y no por predicación. (shrink)

In his essay against Eberhard, Kant denies that there are innate concepts. Several scholars take Kant’s statement at face value. They claim that Kant did not endorse concept innatism, that the categories are not innate concepts, and that Kant’s views on innateness are significantly different from Leibniz’s. This paper takes issue with those claims. It argues that Kant’s views on the origin of the intellectual concepts are remarkably similar to Leibniz’s. Given two widespread notions of innateness, the dispositional notion and (...) the input/output notion, intellectual concepts are innate for Kant no less than for Leibniz. (shrink)

Some people have stressed that there is a close analogy between meaning experiences, i.e., experiences as of understanding concerning linguistic expressions, and seeing-in experiences, i.e., pictorial experiences of discerning a certain item – what a certain picture presents, viz. the picture’s subject – in another item – the picture’s vehicle, the picture’s physical basis. Both can be seen as fusion experiences, in the minimal sense that they are experiential wholes made up of different aspects. Actually, two important similarities between such (...) experiences may lead one to think that they are experiences of the same type. In this paper, however, I will try to show that notwithstanding such similarities, these experiences are typologically different. For there are two dissimilarities between such experiences that are more relevant on this typological concern than their similarities. Indeed, unlike meaning experiences, seeing-in experiences are first of all recognitional experiences of a sort that makes them perceptual experiences as well. Moreover, again unlike meaning experiences, seeing-in experiences are fusion experiences in the substantial sense that the experiential whole is more than the sum of its experiential parts taken in isolation, for when such parts figure in that whole, they interact with each other. In a nutshell, unlike meaning experiences, seeing-in experiences are proper fusion experiences. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to deal with the problem of how to find an adequate context of interpretation for indexical sentences that enables one to account for the intuitive truth-conditional content which some apparently puzzling indexical sentences like “I am not here now” as well as other such sentences contextually have. In this respect, I will pursue a fictionalist line. This line allows for shifts in interpretation contexts and urges that such shifts are governed by pretense, which has to (...) be understood in terms of socially shared make-believe games. By appealing to pretense so conceived, I will show that the fictionalist perspective is halfway between an intentionalist perspective, according to which the above indexical sentences have to be interpreted in a shifted intended context, (this perspective is primarily defined by Predelli 1998, Analysis 58, 107; Mind and Language 13, 400) and a conventionalist perspective, according to which indexical reference shifts in accordance with a conventional setting. (For this perspective, cf. Corazza et al. 2002, Philosophical Studies 107, See also Corazza 2004, Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality, Oxford University Press). Finally, I will claim that the fictionalist analysis of cases of non-ordinary uses of indexicals like “here” and “now” can be retained in face of a new alternative analysis of those cases in terms of an ‘unbound anaphora’ – theory (cf. Corazza 2004, Synthese 138, 145). (shrink)

Desde la perspectiva de las ciencias jurídicas y, en particular, del derecho internacional ambiental, la presente intervención aborda la emergencia de un Derecho internacional contemporáneo y acude a las ideas del cosmopolitismo blando y la vertiente normativa del constitucionalismo global, como debates filosóficos-jurídicos que podrían cimentar un terreno fértil, un sustrato material, para incidir en las fuentes formales de creación de normas internacionales para enfrentar los problemas globales ambientales. En ese sentido, hace mención a la emergencia y reconocimiento del derecho (...) humano al ambiente sano y saludable como un derecho humano autónomo y exigible, desde su vertiente sustantiva y procesal, lo que puede vislumbrase como el embrión de una ciudadanía global ambiental. (shrink)

Many theories of racism presuppose that ordinary usage of the term “racism” should be preserved. Rarely is this presupposition—the presumption of conservatism—defended. This paper discusses the work of Lawrence Blum, Joshua Glasgow, Jorge Garcia, Tommie Shelby, and others, in order to develop a critique of the presumption of conservatism. Against this presumption, I defend the following desideratum: If ordinary usage of “racism” prompts significant practical difficulties that can be averted by revising ordinary usage, then this counts as a mark against (...) the normative status of ordinary usage and so counts as a reason for revising it. The significance of this argument is that it clears the way for a rigorous defense of revisionism. My paper provides a prima facie case for revisionism, built on two practical criticisms of the ordinary usage of “racism.” First, ordinary usage reflects incompatible norms that promote conceptual confusion and misunderstanding, among other problems. Second, ordinary usage reflects an individualistic conception of racism that serves the interests of whites. By championing ordinary usage in our philosophical theories, we (unwittingly) promote the interests of whites over nonwhites. (shrink)

Beginning from some passages by Vācaspati Miśra and Bhāskararāya Makhin discussing the relationship between a crown and the gold of which it is made, this paper investigates the complex underlying connections among difference, non-difference, coreferentiality, and qualification qua relations. Methodologically, philological care is paired with formal logical analysis on the basis of ‘Navya-Nyāya Formal Language’ premises and an axiomatic set theory-based approach. This study is intended as the first step of a broader investigation dedicated to analysing causation and transformation in (...) non-difference. (shrink)

In this paper, against a new imagination-based account defended by Anna Ichino in some recent works, I defend the intuitive and traditional idea that so-called religious beliefs are indeed those doxastic attitudes that they are traditionally taken to be, i.e., bona fide beliefs. Yet I take that the objects of such beliefs amount to be different from what religious believers consciously take them to be; namely, they are mythological characters, a species of fictional characters – namely, fictional characters not consciously (...) recognized as such – instead of being concrete individuals possibly endowed with supernatural powers. Yet religious believers also unconsciously recognize the fictional nature of religious objects of belief as mythological characters, as their behavior ultimately shows. This account indeed allows me to give a different yet still doxastic explanation of the two main reasons that Ichino advocates in favor of her account; namely, the incompatibility of so-called religious beliefs with other beliefs and their imperviousness to evidence, especially of a negative kind. (shrink)

Alireza Bagheri supports a policy on organ procurement where individuals could choose their own definition of death between two or more socially accepted alternatives. First, we claim that such a policy, without any criterion to distinguish accepted from acceptable definitions, easily leads to the slippery slope that Bagheri tries to avoid. Second, we suggest that a public discussion about the circumstances under which the dead donor rule could be violated is more productive of social trust than constantly moving the line (...) between life and death. (shrink)

In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which fictional characters arise (...) out of a reflexive stance on a certain make-believe process. For MC, success of a fictional character across different works amounts to the fact that, first, different work-bound ficta are related with each other by means of a relation weaker than numerical identity, transfictional sameness, and second, that all those ficta are related by transfictional inclusion to a fictum that in some sense gather them all, the so-called general character. Since a general character is an abstract constructed entity, moreover, the more those particular ficta are generated, the more general fictional characters including all of them arise. (shrink)

En un estilo claro, despojado de t rminos t cnicos, Alberto Clemente de la Torre traza un recorrido por los principales t picos de la f sica cu ntica destinados a todos aquellos que quieren descubrir uno de los temas m s sugerentes de la ciencia contempor nea, sin exigirles Para ello conocimientos previos.

El presente trabajo busca exponer las premisas y la fundamentación teológica que subyace a la moral de Pedro Abelardo, con el fin de mostrar cómo en el sistema filosófico de dicho autor, conocido por su racionalismo, hay una justificación que extralimita dicho sistema. Para ello, se expondrá la terminología clave de su moral, la aplicación práctica de dichos conceptos, y una serie de objeciones tanto teológicas como filosóficas.

Este artículo busca problematizar parcialmente la constitución ontológica de la noción de praxis hegemónica en Antonio Gramsci; producir una definición de posthegemonía como posición política y no como doctrina; arriesgar la noción de que, de haber una “ontología” posthegemónica, convendría asentarla bajo tacha en el lugar de un posible pensamiento de la diferencia ontológica; describir brevemente un espacio de praxis emergente en el que la noción posthegemónica se hace explícita; y regresar a Antonio Gramsci a partir de una posible entrada (...) en crisis del concepto de hegemonía en su obra misma. (shrink)

Con esta ceremonia culminan los actos del otorgamiento del título de Doctor Honoris Causa de la Universidad de Buenos Aires al filósofo, maestro de maestros, Thomas Moro Simpson.De este modo nuestra Universidad, siguiendo una noble idea iniciada por los romanos mucho antes de que existieran las universidades, la idea de destacar la labor de aquellos ciudadanos que hubieran contribuido notablemente a mejorar la vida de la ciudad común, ha resuelto hacer público su reconocimiento de los excepcionales méritos intelectuales, éticos y (...) académicos de nuestro querido Tomás Simpson. He sido encargado de recordar ahora, sumariamente, ante la comunidad universitaria y, con eso, ante nuestra comunidad simpliciter, algunos de los motivos que condujeron a esta resolución. (shrink)

Gregorio Klimovsky argumentó en contra de los análisis sintacticistas de la noción de lenguaje. En este trabajo se examinan sus argumentos, destacando su vínculo con las discusiones recientes sobre universalidad expresiva, y se plantean algunas réplicas atendibles. Luego se adopta un enfoque general de la cuestión que resulta incompatible con el sintacticismo estricto pero que permite una reformulación aceptable, vinculada con una idea minimalista sobre el alcance de la teoría semántica. Gregorio Klimovsky argued against syntactical analyses of the notion of (...) language. In this paper I examine his arguments, noting their links with recent discussions of universal expressibility, and raise some plausible objections. Afterwards I adopt a general approach to the issue which is incompatible with strict syntacticism but allowing an acceptable reformulation, associated with a minimalist notion of the scope of the semantic theory. (shrink)

Along with a well-honoured tradition, we will accept that intentionality is at least a property a thought holds necessarily, i.e., in all possible worlds that contain it; more specifically, a necessary relation, namely the relation of existential dependence of the thought on its intentional object. Yet we will first of all try to show that intentionality is more than that. For we will claim that intentionality is an essential property of the thought, namely a property whose predication to the thought (...) is true in virtue of the identity, or nature, of such a thought. More particularly, for us intentionality will again be a relation, yet a relation of ontological dependence of the thought on its intentional object; specifically, the relation for the thought of being constituted by its object. Moreover, we will try to show that if intentionality is such a constitutive relation for the thought that has it, certain metaphysical consequences ensue. First, an objectual thought, a thought whose content basically consists in its intentional object, is nothing but that object in a certain cogitative modality, or, which is the same, as playing a certain motivational role for the subject entertaining the thought itself (at a certain time). Second, if an objectual thought is nothing but an intentional object in a cogitative modality, such a thought, not only as a type, but also as a token, is an abstract entity. More specifically, an objectual thought-type, an abstract object par excellence, is indeed instantiated by objectual thought-tokens which are again abstract particulars, yet of a specific kind: namely, tropes of a relational sort depending for their existence on their bearers (and possibly also on their temporal location). (shrink)

In this paper, I will first of all claim that once one takes proper names as indexicals of a particular sort, indexinames for short, one may account for some tensions that affect our desiderata regarding the use of such names in sentences directly or indirectly involving fiction. According to my proposal, a proper name “N.N.” is an indexical whose character is roughly expressed by the description “the individual called ‘N.N.’ (in context)”, where this description means “the individual one’s interlocutor’s attention (...) is called to by means of ‘N.N.’ (in context)”. This character is a partial function that maps narrow contexts onto referents. Such contexts are enriched narrow contexts, for they also include an ‘acquisition’ parameter, i.e., a parameter filled by a naming practice constituted by a dubbing, which consists in calling via the name one’s interlocutor’s attention to something (if any), and usually also by a certain transmission chain. I will also claim that such a proposal works independently of one’s ontological stance on fictional entities, that is, independently of whether one believes either that there are or that there are no such entities. Moreover, I will claim that such a proposal is better than similar indexicalist proposals such as the one put forward by Tiedke (2011), Finally, I will try to show how this proposal can deal with some objections one may raise against an indexicalist treatment of proper names. (shrink)

In this paper I will first contend that semantically based arguments in favour of or against problematic entities—like those provided, respectively, in a realist Meinongian and in an antirealist Russellian camp—are ultimately inconclusive. Indeed, only genuinely ontological arguments, specifically addressed to prove (or to reject) the existence of entities of a definite kind, suit the purpose. Thus, I will sketch an argument intended to show that there really are entities of an apparently specific kind, i.e. _intentionalia_, broadly conceived as things (...) that may actually exist as well as actually not exist. Finally, I will try to explain why that argument proves the existence of only some sorts of _intentionalia_, by showing how this is related to the fact that, as some have correctly maintained, _intentionalia_ have no intrinsic nature. (shrink)

The present paper is a continuation of a previous one by the same title, the content of which faced the issue concerning the relations of coreference and qualification in compliance with the Navya-Nyāya theoretical framework, although prompted by the Advaita-Vedānta enquiry regarding non-difference. In a complementary manner, by means of a formal analysis of equivalence, equality, and identity, this section closes the loop by assessing the extent to which non-difference, the main issue here, cannot be reduced to any of the (...) former. The following sections of this study will focus on the assessment of the eventual possibility of causation and transformation in non-difference. (shrink)

In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach (...) does not mean to buy an ontologically deflationary approach, according to which we have to accept all the intentional objects there apparently are. Being metaphysically deflationary on intentionalia rather means that from the ontological point of view one must really allow only for those intentionalia for which one is entitled to say that there are such things; typically, for which an ontological proof is available. From metaphysical schematism plus conditional, or partial, ontological committment to intentionalia, further interesting consequences follow. First, this theoretical combination allows one to deal with the ‘too-many entities’ problem (may one fail to accept an ontological proof for an entity of a given kind if she thinks that the entity we would have to be committed to is an entity of another kind?). Second, it allows one to deal with the ‘genuinely true report’ problem (how is it that if we exercise mindreading with respect to a somehow deluded person, we want our reports to come out as really, not merely fictionally, true?). (shrink)

In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities, noneism and Crane’s psychological reductionism are different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished (...) from Quinean allism in terms of the different scope of the overall ontological domain on which the only particular/existential quantifier that there is ranges. This may orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by means of first-order related notions. (shrink)

This paper discusses the positions of Italian philosopher Giulio Preti in relation to the quarrel between Analytic and Continental philosophy. Preti?s thought appears as a systematic thought permitting to overcome, through his logical, epistemological and linguistic reflection, the divide between these two approaches. The different features of his philosophy are analyzed here in detail and compared to the main theoretical assumptions of Analytic and Continental philosophy.

This paper discusses the positions of Italian philosopher Giulio Preti (1911?1972) in relation to the quarrel between Analytic and Continental philosophy. Preti?s thought appears as a systematic thought permitting to overcome, through his logical, epistemological and linguistic reflection, the divide between these two approaches. The different features of his philosophy are analyzed here in detail and compared to the main theoretical assumptions of Analytic and Continental philosophy.

There is definitely a family resemblance between what contemporary contextualism maintains in philosophy of language and some of the claims about meaning put forward by the later Wittgenstein. Yet the main contextualist thesis, namely that linguistic meaning undermines truth-conditions, was not defended by Wittgenstein. If a claim in this regard can be retrieved in Wittgenstein despite his manifest antitheoretical attitude, it is instead that truth-conditions trivially supervene on linguistic meaning. There is, however, another Wittgensteinian claim that truly has a contextualist (...) flavour, namely that linguistic meaning is itself wide-contextual. To be sure, this claim does not lead to the eliminativist/intentionalist conception of linguistic meaning that radical contextualists have recently developed. Rather, it goes together with a robust conception of linguistic meaning as intrinsically normative. Yet it may explain why Wittgenstein is taken to be a forerunner of contemporary contextualism. (shrink)

Biomedicine in recent decades has been defined by an increasing tendency to turn social problems into biomedical questions. Precision or personalized health initiatives have gained attention due to...

O presente artigo tem como objeto o historicismo, a abordagem filosófica que considera a história como um fator crucial para a configuração dos valores e crenças e critérios dos homens e mulheres. De modo mais específico, eu exploro nas páginas seguintes alguns problemas que cercam a abordagem historicista e sua relação com a ação política e o discurso filosófico. Faço isso através da análise do pensamento de dois filósofos cuja contribuição tem sido considerada muito importante para a filosofia política hodierna: (...) Cornélius Castoriadis e Richard Rorty. Ambos os autores, além de decididamente historicistas, desenvolveram sua obra a partir de crítica e releitura de alguns elementos filosofia hegeliana e os dois procuram oferecer uma alternativa para a filosofia marxista. A minha análise de Castoriadis acompanha a sua crítica ao “universalismo objetivista do marxismo” e a sua proposta de uma “ontologia histórica” para daí então comentar alguns possíveis problemas decorrentes do seu historicismo. Em seguida eu exploro as possíveis virtudes da filosofia de Castoriadis, apontadas por Richard Rorty, para em seguida mostrar como o próprio Rorty oferece uma possível saída aos impasses do historicismo de Castoriadis. (shrink)

Chile has established hybrid policies for the administrative distribution of its educational establishments, leading to significant gaps in educational results and school conditions between public, mixed, and private schools. As a result, there are high levels of segregation, and social and economic vulnerability that put public schools at a disadvantage, affecting their image and causing a constant decrease in enrollment. An abbreviated version of Luhtanen and Crocker’s collective self-esteem scale was adapted and validated for the Chilean educational context because of (...) its usefulness in studying processes of social segregation and cultural coherence, seeking to identify student perception about the appreciation of school actions in the context of belonging and identification with schools, in order to compare between groups according to types of establishment and assess the effects of school conditions on the perception of students. A representative sample of Chilean secondary students between 9th and 12th grades participated. Descriptive analyses, comparison of means between groups, confirmatory factorial analyses, and multi-group analyses were conducted to test the adjustment and invariance of the unifactorial structure of a reduced version of four items. The results indicated that the scale satisfactorily complies with the proposed adjustment indexes, presents total invariance by gender and partial invariance by administrative dependence, and allows establishing statistically significant differences in the collective self-esteem, indicating a higher score for students in the private system, and a lower score for those in the public system. These results show the negative effects of high school segregation on students’ collective self-esteem, affecting the appreciation of personal, collective, and institutional activities and the sense of belonging. Although previous research has explored some of the effects of school segregation, the present study focuses on collective self-esteem, which is closely related to identity and belonging, and allows for further innovative research on school segregation. The scale is useful as an instrument for researching social conditions of student well-being, in regards to educational management. (shrink)

As a continuation of the previous paper,Praying for a Miracle – Negative or Positive Impacts on Health Care, published in this research topic, this second paper aims at delving deeper into the same theme, but now from a simultaneously practical and conceptual approach. With that in mind, we revisit three theoretical models based on evidence, through which we can understand the role of a miracle in hospital settings and assess its impact in health contexts. For each of the models described, (...) we seek to illustrate the possible outcomes of belief in miracles as a modality of religious coping in situations of stress and suffering experienced by patients and caregivers in the face of gloomy diagnoses on coming across the limits of medicine to revert certain illnesses (e.g., child cancer) or biological conditions (e.g., fetal malformation). We posit that the judgment about how such a mechanism is healthy or not for each of the people involved (patient, caregiver, and/or health professional) depends on the modulation between the conception of the miracle adopted by the patient and/or caregiver and the concrete outcomes of the way of responding to the situations that accompany the gravity of the illness or condition. To better understand this process of psychological modulation that accompanies belief in miracles, we revisit the concepts of spirituality, religiosity, and religion, pointing out the connections and distinctions between them from a phenomenological perspective. We then present a conceptual model that takes these connections and distinctions into consideration to foster an understanding of miracles, their relations with the diversity of experiences of people who meet in hospital settings (patients, caregivers, and health professionals), and their respective impacts on healthcare. (shrink)

The end of the 1990s witnessed the development of evidence-based medicine, which proposed to screen, organize, and classify knowledge production in the health sciences. In this period, an increasing number of scientific publications started to incorporate the digital format and became easily accessible through the Internet. Since then, we have become used to the idea that there is a hierarchy in medical evidence. Its upper stratum, the gold standard of evidence, contains systematic reviews and meta-analyses of randomized clinical trials. The (...) base of such hierarchy contains case studies, clinical cases, and personal opinions.This knowledge hierarchy is not harmless. It has practical influences on... (shrink)

In the philosophy of fiction, a majority view is continuism, i.e., the thesis that ordinary names, or genuine singular terms in general, directly refer to ordinary real individuals in fiction-involving sentences – e.g. “Napoleon” in the sentences that constitute the text of Tolstoy’s War and Peace. But there is also a minority view, exceptionalism, which is the thesis that such terms change their semantic value in such sentences, either by directly referring to fictional surrogates of those individuals – what we (...) may call exceptional hyperrealism about fictional characters – or by acquiring a semantic value that turns them into nonreferential terms, involving no ontological commitment to such characters – exceptional irrealism about fictional characters. In this paper, first of all, I want to support hybrid exceptionalism, according to which both parties are partly right and partly wrong. In the fictional use of fiction-involving sentences, those terms directly refer to ordinary real individuals, as continuists claim, while both in the internal and the external metafictional use of fiction-involving sentences, such terms change their semantic value, as exceptionalists claim. (By contrast, for pure exceptionalists such terms either always refer to fictional surrogates or are nonreferring on all such uses.) Moreover, I will argue that hybrid exceptional hyperrealism must be preferred to hybrid exceptional irrealism: in the latter uses, I claim, such terms directly refer to fictional surrogates. (shrink)

The Religion is a fascinating topic despite it has some hurdles. Although the study of its constitution, objective and relevance has been understood with effort for different research fields, most of its meaningful contributions do not get more than refuse each other. This research, which presents the main proposals of the United States philosopher Daniel Dennett about religion as natural phenomenon in contrast with the proposal of distinguished religion philosopher, has as a propose to point the less inhospitable lands, in (...) the center of the debate in which it can be possible, making an interdisciplinary proposal, a less conflictive comprehension about religion that can allow those limits that sometimes are imposed to it in a conclusive way for the scientific convictions, biologists postulates, or even for the metaphysics speculations of some theologist forms. (shrink)

: In Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of perception Athanasios Raftopoulos provides a new defense of the thesis that, unlike early vision, late vision is cognitively penetrable, in accordance with a new definition of cognitive penetrability that is centered on the ideas of direct influence of cognition upon perception and of the epistemic role of perception. This new definition allows him to maintain that late vision is a genuinely perceptive stage of the perceptual process. In this paper, I try (...) to discuss not only whether this new definition has plausible consequences that allow only late vision to be cognitively penetrable but also whether the claim that late vision is genuinely perceptual allows it to have the kind of hybrid content, half nonconceptual and half conceptual, that Raftopoulos now wants to ascribe to it. Keywords: Cognitive Penetrability, weak, strong, and superstrong; Early and Late Vision; Nonconceptual Content Penetralibità cognitiva e visione secondaria Riassunto: In Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of perception Athanasios Raftopoulos dà una nuova difesa della tesi secondo cui, a differenza della visione primaria, la visione secondaria è penetrabile cognitivamente, secondo una nuova definizione della nozione di penetrabilità cognitiva centrata sulle idee di influenza diretta della cognizione sulla percezione e di ruolo epistemico della percezione. Questa nuova definizione gli consente di sostenere che la visione secondaria è una fase genuinamente percettiva del processo percettivo. Nell’articolo, provo a discutere non solo se la nuova definizione ha conseguenze plausibili che consentono solo alla visione secondaria di essere penetrabile cognitivamente, ma anche se l’idea che la visione secondaria sia genuinamente percettiva consente ad essa di avere il contenuto ibrido, in parte nonconcettuale e in parte concettuale, che Raftopoulos vuole ora ascriverle. Parole chiave: Penetrabilità cognitiva debole, forte e superforte; Visione primaria e secondaria; Contenuto nonconcettuale. (shrink)

The paper attempts at yielding a language-independent argument in favour of fictional entities, that is, an argument providing genuinely ontological reasons in favour of such entities. According to this argument, ficta are indispensable insofar as they are involved in the identity conditions of semantically-based entities we ordinarily accept, i.e. fictional works. It will also be evaluated to what extent this argument is close to other arguments recently provided to the same purpose.

A theory of intentionality is outlined, in which the desideratum that the intentional be the same as the real object is argued for in terms of an anti-realist ontology. According to such an ontology, an ordinary object is in itself an object of discourse taken as intentional when posited phenomenologically and as possible when posited naturalistically, i.e. as not existing in some possible worlds but as existing in others. If the actual world is included among the latter, the object deserves (...) to be called "rear". Qua possible object, it answers to a principle of individuation which also works as a criterion of discrimination. According to such a principle, any possible object has a counterfactual individualising property which takes substance plus origin in a given spacetime as the object's essential properties, where it exists. It is, moreover, an object of discourse insofar as it generically depends, for its own being, on a singular term being publicly used to refer to it. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.