Analizamos las relaciones no siempre presentes entre deportes, barrios y políticas públicas en Chile en el marco de las vinculaciones entre Estado y sociedad civil en la que el barrio y los clubes deportivos, pese a su gran presencia y aporte a la sociabilidad, han estado ausentes. Hasta antes del golpe de Estado de 1973, la sociedad civil tenía una gran fortaleza, y muchas de sus instituciones, como los clubes deportivos, gozaban de buena salud institucional y sobre todo de autonomía. (...) El colapso institucional del año 1973 quebró las confianzas y tras un proceso muy largo, las instituciones deportivas volvieron a reconfigurarse. Las políticas neoliberales también alcanzaron al mundo del deporte. El Estado subsidiario, a través de proyectos concursables, presta ayuda al desarrollo de estas instituciones de base. (shrink)

Estrategia Minerva Podcast, una iniciativa para divulgar la filosofía.

Sponges branch basally in the metazoan phylogenetic tree and are believed to be composed of four distinct lineages with still uncertain relationships. Indeed, some molecular studies propose that Homoscleromorpha may be a fourth Sponge lineage, distinct from Demospongiae in which they were traditionally classified. They harbour many features that distinguish them from other sponges and are more evocative of those of the eumetazoans. They are notably the only sponges to possess a basement membrane with collagen IV and specialized cell‐junctions, thus (...) possessing true epithelia. Among Homoscleromorphs, we have chosen Oscarella lobularis as a model species. This common and easily accessible sponge is characterized by relatively simple histology and cell composition, absence of skeleton, and strongly pronounced epithelial structure. In this review, we explore the specific features that make O. lobularis a promising homoscleromorph sponge model for evolutionary and developmental researches. (shrink)

Ritual and Myth in the International Corona-Drama. A Conversation with Jeffrey Alexander.

Este estudio presenta un análisis bibliométrico de un total de 113 publicaciones sacadas a la luz entre los años 1996 y 2021, que analizan la formación académica en materia sostenible en las universidades de turismo a nivel mundial. El principal objetivo de este análisis es identificar las investigaciones más relevantes en este campo y las tendencias más actuales de investigación en la base de datos de la Web of Science. Con este fin, efectuamos un examen de la productividad de los (...) autores, revistas y regiones geográficas más prolíferas. A continuación, se realizaron los análisis de redes de coautoría y co-ocurrencias de palabras clave. (shrink)

Throughout his excellent book One Body, Alex Pruss relies upon the view that there is a requirement of universal love: each and every one of us is required to love each and every one of us. Although he often appeals to revealed truth in making arguments for his various theses, he supports the requirement of universal love primarily through a philosophical argument, an argument that I call the “argument from responsiveness to value.” The idea is that all persons bear a (...) sort of nonrelational value, and because this value gives every agent reasons to respond to it positively, each and every person is bound to love each and every person. The aim of this paper is to criticize this argument. Pruss’s argument has two important gaps, one concerning the sort of reasons that the value of persons gives and one concerning whether the required response is the response of love. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper aims to offer both an interpretation and a critique of the epistemological foundations underlying one of the most recent approaches to trauma studies: cultural trauma theory. After the First World War, the founding father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, inquired into whether his diagnostic of “traumatic neurosis” could shed light on how collectives deal with unsettling experiences and memories. Throughout the intervening decades, Freud´s insights into collective trauma have attracted the interest of scholars from various disciplines within the (...) humanities and social sciences, from literary studies to historiography, memory studies, and, finally – the focus of this paper – cultural and social theory. By underlining the ways in which the proponents of cultural trauma theory – Jeffrey Alexander, Neil Smelzer, Piotr Sztompka, Bernhard Giesen, and Ron Eyerman – have reframed Freudian ideas regarding the transmission of legacies of collective suffering, the paper considers whether the notion of trauma can be extended to the analysis of cultures and societies. It explores the ambivalent relationship between psychoanalysis and contemporary cultural trauma theory to disclose the theoretical assumptions and weaknesses of the latter. (shrink)

This edited work draws on a range of contributed expertise to trace the fortune of an Aristotelian thesis over different periods in the history of philosophy. It presents eight cases of direct or indirect challenges to the Aristotelian passive account of human cognition, taking the reader from late antiquity to the 20th century. Chapters analyse the effect of Aristotle’s account of cognition on later periods. In his influential De anima, Aristotle describes human cognition, both sensitive and intellectual, as the reception (...) of a form in the cognitive subject. Aristotle’s account has been commonly interpreted as fundamentally passive – the cognitive subject is a passive actor upon which a cognitive process is acted by the object. However, at least from the time of Alexander of Aphrodisias onwards, this interpretation has been challenged by authors who posit a fundamental active aspect of cognition. Readers will discover how one or more of three concerns – ontological superiority, direct realism and moral responsibility – drive the active accounts of cognition. Contributed chapters from top scholars examine how these three concerns lead thinkers to take issue with the idea that cognition is a passive process. The authors consider Jesuit accounts of cognition, Malebranche on judgment, and Wittgenstein on perception, as well as Stumpf on active cognition, among other relevant works. This book is ideally suited to scholars of philosophy, especially those with an interest in medieval epistemology, the influence of Aristotle, philosophy of mind and theories of cognition. (shrink)

A recent approach to the problem of logical omniscience holds that belief is question-sensitive: what an agent believes depends on what question they try to answer (Pérez Carballo, 2016; Yalcin, 2018; Hoek, 2022). While the question-sensitive approach can avoid some logical omniscience problems, we argue that it suffers from nearby problems. First, these accounts all validate closure principles that are just as implausible as the ones it was designed to avoid. Second, question-sensitivity by itself isn’t suitable for explaining many (...) kinds of failures of logical omniscience. Recognizing the flaws of this approach, however, naturally leads to a more promising solution. Our account generalizes the question-sensitive approach by appealing to (1) the defeasible nature of dispositions toward action associated with belief and (2) the algorithms an agent uses to make decisions. On our view, then, believing that φ means being disposed to employ an algorithm which outputs acting on the information that φ in normal circumstances associated with φ. We argue that this account naturally generalizes the question-sensitive accounts while avoiding their faults. (shrink)

¿Por qué democracia? Referencia a los derechos humanos y a la ciudadanía. Why democracy? Reference to human rights and citizenship. Bozo de Carmona, Ana Julia Libertad de expresión y "libertad cómica". Free speech and "comical liberty".Calvo González, José La justicia según J. Finnis. Justice according to John Finnis. Hocevar G., Mayda G. El lenguaje sagrado y su escritura. The sacred language and its writing. Lizaola, Julieta Del carácter coactivo de la μετηνεστασζ en Tucídides. On cornening to compelling nature of Thucydides' (...) μετηνεστασζ. Meabe, Joaquín E. Apuntes para una filosofía crítica de la historia regional. Notes for a critical philosophy concern to the regional history. Mora García, José Pascual Competencia política partidista en los textos de Simón Bolívar . The defender political competition in the Simon Bolivar’s writings . Ortiz Palanques, Marco Fundamentación socio-jurídica de los procesos normativos. Social and juridical reasoning about the normatives changes. Pavó Acosta, Rolando Filosofía y psicopatología en Karl Jaspers: los entramados de la existencia. Philosophy and psychopathology in Karl Jaspers: the studworks of the existence. Portuondo Pajón, Gladys L. La doctrina platónica del alma en la «república». The platonic doctrine of the soul in the «republic» dialogue. Suzzarini, Andrés Una aproximación a la concepción romana del derecho. An estimate study to the roman concept of law. Terán Pimentel, Milagros Interdisciplinares Lo dionisíaco y lo apolíneo en Don Juan Tenorio. The dionysiac and the apolline in Don Juan Tenorio. Pérez Lo Presti, Alirio. (shrink)

Los autores que dialogan en el número 27 de Ístmica con sus respectivos cuentos; el guatemalteco Francisco Alejandro Méndez y el costarricense Iván Molina Jiménez, han encontrado maneras subrepticias y transtemporales de erizarnos la piel a través de la narrativa que nos ofrecen en esta edición. Méndez (1964), es periodista, crítico literario, catedrático universitario y reconocido escritor del istmo, quien obtuvo el Premio Nacional de Literatura de Guatemala en el 2017. Ha publicado los siguientes libros de novela y cuento: Graga (...) y otros cuentos (Editorial Serviprensa Centroamericana, Guatemala, 1991), Manual para desaparecer (Arco Iris, El Salvador, 1997), Sobrevivir para contarlo (Praxis, México, 1999), Crónicas suburbanas (Editorial X, Guatemala, 2001), Ruleta rusa (Fondo de cultura económico, México-Guatemala, 2001), Completamente Inmaculada (Perro azul, San José de Costa Rica, 2002), Reinventario de ficciones. Catálogo marginal de bestias, crímenes y peatones (La Tatuana, Guatemala, 2006), Les ombres du jaguar et autres nouvelles (Éditions Equilibrio, París, 2009), Juego de muñecas. Un caso más para Wenceslao Pérez Chanán, (Editorial FLACSO, Guatemala, 2012) y Triple Play, (Germinal, Costa Rica, 2013).Como investigador, también ha publicado los siguientes ensayos de crítica literaria: América Central en el ojo de sus críticos (Universidad Rafael Landívar, Guatemala, 2005), Hacia un nuevo canon de la vanguardia en América Central (Ed. Cultura, Guatemala, 2006) y Diccionario de Autores yCríticos de Guatemala (La Tatuana, Guatemala, 2010).Por su parte, Molina (1961), es historiador y escritor de ciencia ficción costarricense, autor, coautor o editor de numerosos estudios sobre historia de CostaRica, en particular, y de Centroamérica, en general. Es catedrático de la Escuela de Historia e investigador del Centro de Investigación en Identidad y CulturaLatinoamericanas (CIICLA) de la Universidad de Costa Rica. Ha obtenido el Premio Nacional de Historia (1991), el Premio de la Academia de Geografía eHistoria (1991), el Premio Áncora del periódico La Nación (1992), el Premio al Investigador en Ciencias Sociales (2015) y el Premio Luis Ferrero de Investigación Cultural (2016). Entre sus investigaciones más recientes figuran: La educación en Costa Rica de la época colonial al presente (EUNA, Costa Rica, 2016) y Príncipes de las remotidades. Carlos Luis Fallas y los escritores proletarios costarricenses (EUNED, Costa Rica, 2016). En el género de la ciencia ficción hapublicado varios libros de cuentos cortos y algunos de sus relatos han sido incluidos en recopilaciones y revistas publicadas en México, Colombia, Perú, España, Argentina, Estados Unidos y Cuba. Su más reciente libro de ciencia ficción es Las fugitivas de Abidos (La Jirafa y Yo, Costa Rica, 2017).En los cuentos de ambos autores que presentamos en esta edición, confluyen la creación de una atmósfera de suspenso, que puede originar desde aparentes alucinaciones hasta revivir temores atávicos. En este encuentro convergen monstruos reales y ficticios -aunque nos cueste diferenciarlos-, así como las neurosis del siglo XXI y las leyendas del siglo XIX, que aliviadas unas por el psicoanálisis y alimentadas otras, por los primeros experimentos de “ingeniería genética”, consiguen sembrarnos una interrogante sobre la (in)distinción de lo real en nuestro entorno. (shrink)

El pensamiento de María Zambrano emerge, en la distancia histórica, bajo la imagen, siempre sugerente, de una Antígona contemporánea. Como ella asiste al conflicto trágico de una Guerra Civil; como ella apura el cáliz del sufrimiento y la soledad para hacer emerger una conducta ética y moral que sirva de Guía a sus contemporáneos, en un momento de crisis y confusión. Todas las grandes nociones del pensamiento zambraniano (sueño, confesión, guía, alba y aurora) se dan cita en esta máscara, pero (...) será el personaje galdoniano de la Nina de Misericordia, como aspiración pura nunca lograda, el verdadero motor que revela la personalidad de María Zambrano, tal como la vemos florecer en sus obras finales, Aurora, Claros del bosque y, sobre todo, Los bienaventurados. (shrink)

A supplemental document for "Metalinguistic Gradability".

Multiple states are at risk of becoming uninhabitable due to climate change, forcing their populations to flee. While the 1951 Refugee Convention provides the gold standard of international protection, it is only applied to a limited subset of people fleeing their countries, those who suffer persecution, which most people fleeing climate change cannot establish. While many journalists and non-lawyers freely use the term “climate refugees,” governments, and courts, as well as UNHCR and many refugee experts, have excluded most climate refugees (...) from the Convention as a matter of legal interpretation. In our 2015 paper, “Unable to Return in the 1951 Refugee Convention: Stateless Refugees and Climate Change”, we sought to reopen the debate on “climate refugees” by arguing that some climate refugees qualify under the 1951 Convention as it is currently written (even if they are not persecuted): those who are stateless and are unable to return to their country of origin because climate change has rendered it uninhabitable. Our interpretation, however, has been rejected by Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2021) and by Foster and Lambert (2019), which explicitly responds to our paper. Here, we address and respond to their arguments, and develop a new supplementary one, drawing on the principle of systemic integration, as enshrined in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. (shrink)

When is a belief or judgment justified? One might be forgiven for thinking the search for single answer to this question to be hopeless. The concept of justification is required to fulfil several tasks: to evaluate beliefs epistemically, to fill in the gap between truth and knowledge, to describe the virtuous organization of one’s beliefs, to describe the relationship between evidence and theory (and thus relate to confirmation and probabilification). While some of these may be held to overlap, the prospects (...) for fulfilling all may well seem poor. Furthermore the internalist requires that justification be an introspectible property of beliefs and a fundamental epistemic concept, while the externalist is often happy to ignore the concept altogether or at best regard it as an embarrassing add-on to their epistemology. In the light of this one might reasonably give up on justification altogether or adopt pluralist approach, denying that justification is any single property of beliefs of judgments. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss how Causal Decision Theory should be modified to handle a class of problematic cases involving deterministic laws. Causal Decision Theory, as it stands, is problematically biased against your endorsing deterministic propositions (for example it tells you to deny Newtonian physics, regardless of how confident you are of its truth). Our response is that this is not a problem for Causal Decision Theory per se, but arises because of the standard method for assessing the truth of (...) certain counterfactuals. The truth of deterministic laws is `modally fragile' on the standard semantics for counterfactuals: if determinism is true and you were to do otherwise, the laws would be different. We provide two ways of avoiding this problem: 1) supplement the standard semantics for counterfactuals with impossible worlds, or 2) introduce rigid designators into the description of problematic decision situations. We argue that both of these approaches are well-motivated and can be readily incorporated into Lewisian Causal Decision Theory. (shrink)

Two sources of possible disagreement in bioethics may be associated with pessimism about what bioethics can achieve. First, pluralism implies that bioethics engages with interlocutors who hold divergent moral beliefs. Pessimists might believe that these disagreements significantly limit the extent to which bioethics can provide normatively robust guidance in relevant areas. Second, the interdisciplinary nature of bioethics suggests that interlocutors may hold divergent views on the nature of bioethics itself—particularly its practicality. Pessimists may suppose that interdisciplinary disagreements could frustrate the (...) goals of bioethics. In this article, I explore how wonder may alleviate the concerns of the first group of pessimists regarding problems associated with pluralism, provided that we are willing to accept some interdisciplinary frustrations. Then, I invite readers of this issue of The Journal of Medicine & Philosophy to test these intuitions by considering the role of wonder in these articles. (shrink)

I develop an expressivist account of verbal disagreements as practical disagreements over how to use words rather than factual disagreements over what words actually mean. This account enjoys several advantages over others in the literature: it can be implemented in a neo-Stalnakerian possible worlds framework; it accounts for cases where speakers are undecided on how exactly to interpret an expression; it avoids appeals to fraught notions like subject matter, charitable interpretation, and joint-carving; and it naturally extends to an analysis of (...) metalinguistic negotiations. (shrink)

A common objection to the very idea of conceptual engineering is the topic continuity problem: whenever one tries to “reengineer” a concept, one only shifts attention away from one concept to another. Put differently, there is no such thing as conceptual revision: there’s only conceptual replacement. Here, I show that topic continuity is compatible with conceptual replacement. Whether the topic is preserved in an act of conceptual replacement simply depends on what is being replaced (a conceptual tool or a conceptual (...) role) and what the topic under discussion is. Thus, the topic continuity problem only arises from a failure to specify these two things. (shrink)

This paper commences by making a case for a naturalized approach to knowledge‐first epistemology. On this basis it then goes on to describe and defend a naturalized, functionalist account of group knowledge. It then contrasts this with Jennifer Lackey's (2021) account of the epistemological status of groups.

We focus on the literature about UBI and the experiments developed all around the world to test it in order to address how UBI implementation could affect entrepreneurship. Building on these findings and various strands of entrepreneurial theory, we develop a theoretical framework to explain how the implementation of UBI would dramatically change the environment of entrepreneurial activity, shaping entrepreneurial action at three levels: (i) the desirability of becoming an entrepreneur; (ii) the perceived feasibility of becoming an entrepreneur; (iii) the (...) propensity to act. Consequently, UBI implementation would arguably facilitate the decision to become an entrepreneur. The contribution of the paper is threefold. It firstly provides a theoretical framework that opens new directions for further research on the relationship between UBI and entrepreneurship. Secondly, it offers new insights for policy makers by shedding light on potential effects of UBI implementation. Finally, it raises further questions that remains unsolved related to the role of non-pecuniary motivations and financial constraints. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend moral relativism from the accusation that it would make it irrational to classify past changes in public opinion as instances of moral progress, for they would constitute an improvement only from our current point of view. The argument is this. For our assessment of a change in public opinion as an instance of moral progress to be rational, we need to take the moral claims made before the change to be false simpliciter (...) while being open to the possibility that we ourselves change our minds at some point. These two things can be made compatible if we construe moral relativism as taking the truth of moral claims to be relative to the context of assessment. Thus understood, moral relativism is in fact the only view that makes room for talk of moral progress, as the rest of candidate positions make it irrational. (shrink)

Hume argued that inductive inferences do not have rational justification. My aim is to reject Hume's argument. The discussion is partly motivated by an analogy with Carroll's Paradox, which concerns deductive inferences. A first radically externalist reply to Hume is that justified inductive inferences do not require the subject to know that nature is uniform, though the uniformity of nature is necessary condition for having the justification. But then the subject does not have reasons for believing what she believes. I (...) defend a moderate externalist account that seeks to partly accommodate that objection to the radical externalist proposal. It is based on an extension of Peacocke's theory of concepts: possession conditions for predicative concepts standing for natural properties include dispositions to project them to new cases in accordance with inductive inferential patterns. (shrink)

In the paper, a detailed analysis of some new logical aspects of Cantor’s diagonal proof of the uncountability of continuum is presented. For the first time, strict formal, axiomatic, and algorithmic definitions of the notions of potential and actual infinities are presented. It is shown that the actualization of infinite sets and sequences used in Cantor’s proof is a necessary, but hidden, condition of the proof. The explication of the necessary condition and its factual usage within the framework of Cantor’s (...) proof makes, Cantor’s proof invalid. It’s shown that traditional Cantor’s proof has a second necessary, but hidden as well, condition which is teleological by its nature, i.e., is not mathematical. The explication of the second necessary condition makes Cantor’s statement on the uncountability of continuum unprovable from the point of view of classical logic.One of the most dramatic facts in history of science is connected just with the notion of actual infinity and consists in the following. On the one hand, Aristotle, Berkeley, Locke, Descartes, Spinoza, Gauss, Kant, Cauchy, Kronecker, Hermite, Poincaré, Bair, Borel, Brouwer, Quine, Wittgenstein, Weyl, Luzin, and a lot of other outstanding creators of classical logic and classical mathematics, during millenniums, stated categorically and insistently warned about that the actual infinity is a self-contradictory notion and its usage in mathematics is inadmissible (e.g., according to Poincare, “There is no actual infinity. - Cantorians forgot that and fell into contradictions. Later generations will regard Mengenlehre (set theory) as a disease from which one has recovered”). On the other hand, a lot of outstanding scientists of the XX c.c., such as Hilbert, Church, Turing, Gödel, etc., and modern axiomatic set theory as a whole ignored this (intuitive though) opinion of genii and accepted Cantor’s “transfinite paradise”, based on the actual infinity. In the paper some logical, philosophical, and psychological aspects of this historical “favorable opposition” are analyzed, and the fact that the scientific intuition of genii has won the historical battle against the mytho-’logic’ of Cantor’s transfinite ‘paradise’ is explained and logically justified. (shrink)

In the paper, a detailed analysis of some new logical aspects of Cantor’s diagonal proof of the uncountability of continuum is presented. For the first time, strict formal, axiomatic, and algorithmic definitions of the notions of potential and actual infinities are presented. It is shown that the actualization of infinite sets and sequences used in Cantor’s proof is a necessary, but hidden, condition of the proof. The explication of the necessary condition and its factual usage within the framework of Cantor’s (...) proof makes, Cantor’s proof invalid. It’s shown that traditional Cantor’s proof has a second necessary, but hidden as well, condition which is teleological by its nature, i.e., is not mathematical. The explication of the second necessary condition makes Cantor’s statement on the uncountability of continuum unprovable from the point of view of classical logic.One of the most dramatic facts in history of science is connected just with the notion of actual infinity and consists in the following. On the one hand, Aristotle, Berkeley, Locke, Descartes, Spinoza, Gauss, Kant, Cauchy, Kronecker, Hermite, Poincaré, Bair, Borel, Brouwer, Quine, Wittgenstein, Weyl, Luzin, and a lot of other outstanding creators of classical logic and classical mathematics, during millenniums, stated categorically and insistently warned about that the actual infinity is a self-contradictory notion and its usage in mathematics is inadmissible (e.g., according to Poincare, “There is no actual infinity. - Cantorians forgot that and fell into contradictions. Later generations will regard Mengenlehre (set theory) as a disease from which one has recovered”). On the other hand, a lot of outstanding scientists of the XX c.c., such as Hilbert, Church, Turing, Gödel, etc., and modern axiomatic set theory as a whole ignored this (intuitive though) opinion of genii and accepted Cantor’s “transfinite paradise”, based on the actual infinity. In the paper some logical, philosophical, and psychological aspects of this historical “favorable opposition” are analyzed, and the fact that the scientific intuition of genii has won the historical battle against the mytho-’logic’ of Cantor’s transfinite ‘paradise’ is explained and logically justified. (shrink)

A new speculative ontology of aesthetics. In Aesthesis and Perceptronium, Alexander Wilson presents a theory of materialist and posthumanist aesthetics founded on an original speculative ontology that addresses the interconnections of experience, cognition, organism, and matter. Entering the active fields of contemporary thought known as the new materialisms and realisms, Wilson argues for a rigorous redefining of the criteria that allow us to discriminate between those materials and objects where aesthesis (perception, cognition) takes place and those where it doesn't. (...) Aesthesis and Perceptronium negotiates between indiscriminately pluralist views that attribute mentation to all things and eliminative views that deny the existence of mentation even in humans. By recasting aesthetic questions within the framework of "epistemaesthetics," which considers cognition and aesthetics as belonging to a single category that can neither be fully disentangled nor fully reduced to either of its terms, Wilson forges a theory of nonhuman experience that avoids this untenable dilemma. Through a novel consideration of the evolutionary origins of cognition and its extension in technological developments, the investigation culminates in a rigorous reevaluation of the status of matter, information, computation, causality, and time in terms of their logical and causal engagement with the activities of human and nonhuman agents. (shrink)

This is the second part of a two-part series on the logic of hyperlogic, a formal system for regimenting metalogical claims in the object language (even within embedded environments). Part A provided a minimal logic for hyperlogic that is sound and complete over the class of all models. In this part, we extend these completeness results to stronger logics that are sound and complete over restricted classes of models. We also investigate the logic of hyperlogic when the language is enriched (...) with hyperintensional operators such as counterfactual conditionals and belief operators. (shrink)