Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information ac- quired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and as- suming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed. The paper explains: (i) how the varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) how they are subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) why there could not be (...) a conflict between the different varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why the traditional episte- mological inquiry is inclined to overestimate the role of propositional perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Based on Pritchard's distinction between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness. This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I call (...) embodied rationality -, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario. (shrink)

Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive (...) access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural couplings between organism and environment trigger viable pathways of maintenance and reproduction, instead of selecting the most adapted trait to a pregiven environment. Thus, although enactivists typically do not explore the consequences of their views regarding evolutionary dynamics, we show how natural drift provides a suitable starting point. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a possible solution to the puzzle unveiled by Kornblith about the sources and the possibility of knowledge of epistemic norms. The puzzle is: if such norms cannot be discovered solely by reflection, and if there are correct ways of thinking and inferring, then such norms can only be discovered by investigating the world —a counterintuitive conclusion. To avoid skepticism about normativity, I argue that we create normative correctness and discover normative demands by investigating the world (...) and reflecting about our epistemic practices. This is done by an exposition of the method known as reflective equilibrium, which is defended against Kornblith’s thesis that the appeal to reflective equilibrium is doomed to failure because it implies reflection. (shrink)

En 1785, Alexander Cozens publie un court traité, un manuel à l’usage des jeunes peintres les invitant à utiliser la tache et le hasard comme préalable à la composition de paysages. En 1969, Jean Messagier élabore une technique, « le Gel », pour parfaire un certain nombre de ses compositions. Cet article s’articule autour d’une mise en perspective de ces deux expériences. Il vise à porter un regard sur les rapports que l’art du paysage entretient avec l’abstraction, avant même qu’elle (...) n’existe ou au cœur de son plein épanouissement et propose de réfléchir à l’utilité ou la vacuité d’un tel débat. Il brosse une histoire rapide de l’utilisation de la tache et du hasard dans l’histoire de la création et enfin, il présente la position singulière de Jean Messagier au sein de l’histoire de la peinture abstraite et propose d’engager une étude plus fine de l’œuvre de ce dernier. (shrink)

The principle of energy conservation is widely taken to be a se- rious difficulty for interactionist dualism (whether property or sub- stance). Interactionists often have therefore tried to make it satisfy energy conservation. This paper examines several such attempts, especially including E. J. Lowe’s varying constants proposal, show- ing how they all miss their goal due to lack of engagement with the physico-mathematical roots of energy conservation physics: the first Noether theorem (that symmetries imply conservation laws), its converse (that conservation (...) laws imply symmetries), and the locality of continuum/field physics. Thus the “conditionality re- sponse”, which sees conservation as (bi)conditional upon symme- tries and simply accepts energy non-conservation as an aspect of interactionist dualism, is seen to be, perhaps surprisingly, the one most in accord with contemporary physics (apart from quantum mechanics) by not conflicting with mathematical theorems basic to physics. A decent objection to interactionism should be a posteri- ori, based on empirically studying the brain. (shrink)

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between basic and higher cognition. In this (...) paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

Primeiro apresento as linhas gerais do programa de pesquisa sobre cognição corporificada. Em uma posição central nesse programa, está a tese de que a cognição atravessa cérebro, corpo e mundo – e que, portanto, atividades cognitivas não são eventos exclusivamente intracraniais que ocorrem pela manipulação de representações. Eu apresento a gênese histórica desse programa, a saber, o projeto autopoiético dos chilenos Humberto Maturana e Francisco Varela. Desse projeto, é possível atestar um plano de fundo antirrealista e construtivista, segundo o qual (...) a cognição é uma construção do mundo pelo organismo. Depois, eu apresento o fundamento teórico que recentemente tomou os holofotes do programa, a saber, o enativismo sensório-motor. Esse enativismo manifesta o compromisso com um realismo comedido, segundo o qual há estruturas objetivas a serem exploradas de acordo com a morfologia corpórea do organismo. Assim, observa-se uma tensão epistemológica no cerne do programa. Eu apresento uma possibilidade de resolução dessa tensão pela rejeição de uma das teses centrais do projeto autopoiético – a continuidade forte entre vida e cognição – e por uma melhor interpretação do que significa dizer que a cognição requer que o oragnismo “construa” o seu ambiente. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing (...) an insurmountable gap between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds. RESUMO Proponho um meio-termo entre um modelo perceptual de autoconhecimento, segundo o qual os objetos de autoconhecimento são acessadas mediante um tipo de mecanismo causal, e um modelo racionalista, segundo o qual o autoconhecimento é constituído pela agência racional. Por analogia ao papel que o exercício de habilidades sensório-motoras desempenham no conhecimento perceptual racionalmente fundado, autoconhecimento é entendido como um exercício de habilidades que são orientadas pela e orientam a ação. Essa imagem satisfaz a condição de acesso privilegiado que geralmente é associada ao autoconhecimento sem implicar uma lacuna intransponível entre autoconhecimento e conhecimento de outras mentes. (shrink)

It is common in the cognitive and computational sciences to regard virtual reality (VR) as composed of illusory experiences, given its immersive character. In this paper, we adopt an ecological-enactive perspective on cognition (Sect. 3) to evaluate the nature of VR and one’s engagement with it. Based on a post-cognitivist conception of illusion, we reject the commonly held assumption that virtual reality experiences (VREs) are illusory (Sect. 4). Our positive take on this issue is that VR devices, like other technological (...) devices, can be embodied during use, which is why they can be the source of experiences (Sect. 5). We then propose a new concept to interpret VREs, namely, _allusion_, which means that the subject acts _as if_ the virtual experiences are real (Sect. 6). This kind of engagement has a volitional aspect, which is evident in the onboarding of VR devices and which allows us to distinguish VREs from other experiences. We conclude that, even though we have experiences that afford certain interactions in VR, the strong continuity between cognitive and biological processes is not sustained therein. This characterizes a difference of kind—given the current state of technology—between VREs and fully fledged cognitive states, which nevertheless allows for constrained experimentation in cognitive science. (shrink)

Semiotics and education -- Charles S. Peirce's list of categories and taxonomy of signs -- Semiotics as pragmatic logic -- Education in Peirce's divisions of science -- Suprasubjective being and suprasubjective learning -- From icon to argument -- Diagrammatic reasoning and learning -- Agapic learning -- The Peircean theory of learning and phenomenology -- Possible objections.

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment (which is sometimes labeled “basic” cognition) depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between (...) basic and higher cognition. In this paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

In order to meet the explanatory challenge levelled against non-representationalist views on cognition, radical enactivists claim that cognition about potentially absent targets involves the socioculturally scaffolded capacity to manipulate public symbols. At a developmental scale, this suggests that higher cognition gradually emerges as humans begin to master language use, which takes place around the third year of life. If, however, it is possible to show that pre-linguistic infants represent their surroundings, then the radical enactivists’ explanation for the emergence of higher (...) cognition is defeated. In this paper, I critically assess experiments designed to show that pre-linguistic infants inherit representational abilities. I begin by outlining these experiments in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, I argue that these experiments only succeed in supporting widespread representationalism by committing a particular kind of circular reasoning, which I call conjunctivist reasoning due to its origins in the debates about the nature of perception. I conclude by developing two independent yet congruent enactivist lines of interpretation for the experiments discussed in 2. I explain the infants’ responses to atypical experimental conditions based on agent-environment codetermination and then I argue that surprise behavior can be explained in terms of embodied habits and unfulfilled anticipation. (shrink)

Rajan Gurukkal is a leading social scientist and is currently the Sundararajan Visiting Professor at Centre for Contemporary Studies, Indian Institute of Science. He has been the former Vice Chancellor, M. G. University, Kottayam, Kerala. An avid reader, critical theorist and a prolific writer, he has authored several monographs, research articles and has been actively engaged with several projects in association with UGC, the Ford Foundation to name a few. His research interests explore the historiographic dimensions and dialectical processes involving (...) the state and society. He can be reached at [email protected]. (shrink)

Sundar Sarukkai is a philosopher and is currently associated with the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore as a Professor of Philosophy. His research interests range from philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, postmodernism, phenomenology to philosophy of art. A critical philosopher whocan, with élan, and a certain sense of analytical rigour, transverse the philosophical terrains between the Western and Indian traditions. He has authored several books, such as Translating the World: Science and Language, Philosophy of Symmetry and Indian Philosophy (...) and Philosophy of Science. Hehas earned his doctoral degree from Purdue University, USA following which he has been associated with several institutes such as Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Manipal University and National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. He has been the Founder-Director, Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities, Manipal University, Manipal. He can be reached at [email protected]. (shrink)

Interest in proportionalism as an important trend in Catholic moral theology seems to have faded in the recent decade. This has led some to view it as a movement that was somehow defeated. I suggest that proportionalism's influence can still be seen in contemporary Catholic ethics, most noticeably in the current interest in virtue ethics, casuistry, and feminist ethics. I argue that proportionalism encouraged a reappraisal of the methodology for evaluating moral action in a direction that was more hospitable to (...) concerns about the particularity and context of the agent. (shrink)

McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier’s call for a renewal of open and honest dialogue between secular and theologically grounded bioethics is admirable. Yet, their essay argues for more than mere dia...

Though there are many challenges to Ekman’s thesis that there are basic emotions with universal corresponding facial expressions, our main criticism revolves around the extent to which grounding situations alter how people read faces. To that end, we recruit testifying experimental studies that show identical faces expressing varying emotions when contextualized differently. Rather than dismissing these as illusions, we start with the position—generally favored by embodied thinkers—that situations are primary: they are where specifiable and hence knowable properties first show up. (...) We further argue that situationally inflected emotional expressions are informationally meaningful. We reject the idea that reading expressions is primarily about ascertaining internal mental states, arguing instead that people are registering overall situations when looking at faces. However, if mind is understood as a situated phenomenon that extends into active ecological frames, then one can still argue that mindreading is going on. Although we do not claim isolated things like cliffs or cars have agency, we speculate networked systems with cliffs, people, cars, bears, etc., collectively function with intentionality, more so if advancing a robust situated mind thesis, contra figures like Dennett who argue that people over-impute mind to things. Our position has practical implications insofar as it casts doubts on recent attempts to develop AI systems that extract emotional intent out of facial expressions since many of these systems are grounded on Ekman’s basic view. (shrink)

Our objective in this paper is twofold: first, we intend to address the tenability of the enactivist middle way between realism and idealism, as it is proposed in The Embodied Mind. We do so by taking the enactivist conception of bringing forth a world literally in three conceptual levels: enaction, niche construction and social construction. Based on this proposal, we claim that enactivism is compatible with the idea of an independent reality without committing to the claim that organisms have cognitive (...) access to a world composed of properties specified prior to any cognitive activity. Our second goal is to show that our literal interpretation of bringing forth a world not only sustains the legitimacy of the middle way, but it also allows us to revive the conception of evolution as natural drift—which is perhaps the least examined aspect of the original enactivist theory and is central to the understanding of cognition in an enactive way. Natural drift focuses on how structural couplings between organism and environment trigger viable pathways of maintenance and reproduction, instead of selecting the most adapted trait to a pregiven environment. Thus, although enactivists typically do not explore the consequences of their views regarding evolutionary dynamics, we show how natural drift provides a suitable starting point. (shrink)

At workplaces where nanomaterials are produced or used, risk assessment and risk management are extremely difficult tasks since there is still limited evidence about the risks of nanomaterials. Measurement methods for nanoparticles are contested and safety standards have not yet been developed properly. To support compliance with the legal obligation of the employer to care for safe workplaces a large number of ‘soft’ regulatory tools have been proposed (e.g. codes of conduct, benchmarks, standards). However, it is not clear whether and (...) under which conditions soft regulation is complied with. This article discusses the potential advantages and drawbacks of soft regulation. It explores compliance issues when exposure measurement devices and other technology-related factors are involved. The exploration of three examples of soft regulation on occupational health and safety (a ministerial recommendation on preliminary exposure benchmarks, a nano-specific guidance of a chemical company and a public–private OHS guideline) shows that the capacity of the regulated parties to comply depends on the availability of appropriate technological devices and methods, technical expertise and other resources. When technological prerequisites are met, compliance is likely to increase. (shrink)

This commentary addresses the concept of learning stemming from Eva Jablonka and Simona Ginsburg’s theory of the emergence of consciousness. Jablonka and Ginsburg find strong support in biosemiotics for their argument that learning offers an evolutionary transition marker for the emergence of consciousness. Indeed, biosemiotics embraces a view on evolution that integrates both phylogeny and ontogeny. It does not polarize learning and evolving. At the same time, Jablonka and Ginsburg’s argument gives both biosemiotics and learning theory a shake, forcing scholarship (...) in these fields to tackle difficult questions on agency, selfhood, consciousness and anthropological difference. I explore some of the main questions that arise from this theoretical development, particularly in reference to Andrew Stables’ semiotic learning theory, which has been easily nested in a biosemiotic framework. (shrink)

This paper intends to offer a critical evaluation of the role played by intuitions in the mainstream methodology in traditional analytic epistemology. The criticism directed to what I call methodology of evaluation by intuitions shows that epistemologists often idealize the reliability of intuitions when assessing a theory against potential counterexamples, ignoring that the disposition to answer intuitively to a case of concept attribution is bounded to the familiar dimension in which the relevant conceptual competence emerges. Thus, the reliability of intuitions (...) does not necessarily extend to far-fetched cases. Given that the assessment by our intuitions is not sufficient to decide for or against an epistemological theory, I offer a sketch for a pragmatic and naturalized conception of theoretical decision-making in epistemology.Key-words: Intuitions, Analytic epistemology, Conceptual abilities, Naturalism, Pragmatism. (shrink)

Rational beliefs and actions are typically evaluated against certain benchmarks, e.g., those of classical logic or probability theory. Rationality therefore is traditionally taken to involve some sort of reasoning, which in turn implies contentful cognition. Radically Enactive views of Cognition, on the other hand, claim that not all cognition is contentful. In order to show that rationality does not need to lie outside of REC’s scope of radicalizing cognition, I develop a Radically Enactive notion of Rationality, according to which rationality (...) is embodied, situated and contentless. For RER, an organism acts rationally insofar as it sustains a proficient interaction with its environment, which in turn requires the coordination of cognitive abilities in accordance with environmental constraints. Rationality is thus distinguished from reasoning, for reasoning is understood as a capacity to coordinate representational cognitive abilities. (shrink)

Resenha: Acidentes ambientais e planos de contingência.

Este artigo pretende apresentar as “representações obscuras” como parte da via disponível para se conceber um cultivo de si e da civilização, de acordo com a perspectiva de uma antropologia pragmática tal como concebida por Kant. As representações obscuras marcam a existência de um campo de representações intelectuais, estéticas e morais ocultas à consciência. Estas representações possuem, de um lado, a finalidade de fornecer um _cultivo de si_, espécie de conhecimento da natureza humana, por meio de sua funcionalidade empírica na (...) produção de determinados fenômenos, e, de outro, proporcionar as condições adequadas para a construção da civilização, por meio da “arte de ocultar” as verdadeiras intenções nos comportamentos em sociedade. Nos dois casos, o estudo dessas representações contribui para a compreensão do interior do ser humano, fornecendo uma via adequada para seu uso pragmático-prudente no mundo, o que justifica o prevalecimento privilegiado do tema nos escritos de antropologia. (shrink)

Based on Pritchard’s distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë’s actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement – (...) what I call embodied rationality –, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, it is intended to articulate theses that are often assessed independently, thus showing that a strong version of epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge implies a transformative conception of rationality. This entails that individuals in skeptical scenarios could not entertain rational thoughts about their environment, for they would fail to have perceptual states. The secondary aim is to show that this consequence is not a sufficient reason to abandon the variety of disjunctivism presented. (...) The argument for this claim depends on the assessment of rationality attributions to subjects in plausible cases of illusion and some clinical cases of hallucination. RESUMO Este artigo tem dois objetivos: primeiramente, pretende-se articular teses que são frequentemente avaliadas independentemente, mostrando com isso que uma versão robusta do disjuntivismo epistemológico sobre conhecimento perceptual implica uma concepção transformativa da racionalidade. Uma consequência disso é que indivíduos em cenários céticos não poderiam entreter pensamentos racionais sobre o ambiente em que habitam, pois eles não possuiriam estados perceptuais. Em segundo lugar, argumenta-se que a consequência delineada acima não é uma razão suficiente para rejeitar o disjuntivismo tal como apresentado. Esse argumento depende da avaliação de atribuições de racionalidade a indivíduos em casos plausíveis de ilusão e em alguns casos clínicos de alucinação. (shrink)

Background:Little is known about case managers’ ethical issues and professional values.Objectives:This article presents an overview of ethical issues in case managers’ current practice. Findings are examined in the light of nursing ethics, social work ethics and principle-based biomedical ethics.Research design:A systematic literature review was performed to identify and analyse empirical studies concerning ethical issues in case management programmes. It was completed by systematic content analysis of case managers’ national codes of ethics.Findings:Only nine empirical studies were identified, eight of them from (...) North America. The main dilemmas were how to balance system goals against the client’s interest and client protection against autonomy. Professional codes of ethics shared important similarities, but offered different responses to these two dilemmas.Discussion:We discuss the respective roles of professional and organizational ethics. Further lines of research are suggested. (shrink)

Buscar-se-á analisar o Programa Pró-Haiti, ação afirmativa instituída pelo Governo Brasileiro para facilitar o ingresso de haitianos em algumas universidades públicas brasileiras, após o terremoto que afetou o Haiti em 2010. A discussão se dá em torno do atendimento ou não do princípio da igualdade e da justiça distributiva. A conclusão baseia-se na necessidade de o programa atender às políticas públicas, com o propósito de concretização da cidadania. O tema se justifica pela atualidade e por alcançar o interesse de profissionais (...) das áreas do Direito e de Relações Internacionais. Utilizar-se-á, como metodologia, a análise documental e bibliográfica. (shrink)

A leitura pode ser analisada sob vários ângulos: social, pedagógico, cultural, cognitivo, dentre outros. Contudo, abordar os aspectos mencionados, em conjunto ou sequencialmente, demanda uma verticalização prodigiosa da pesquisa; por isso este artigo busca apenas apresentar e discutir alguns aspectos cognitivos relevantes para a prática leitora, dando ênfase à memória e, por isso mesmo, ao conhecimento prévio. Acreditamos que, conhecendo melhor os tipos de memória e não ignorando o vínculo necessário entre memória e conhecimento prévio, se torne mais viável para (...) o professor mobilizar meios eficazes para propor atividades de leitura compreensiva e, também, mais importante ainda, para mostrar e explicar aos alunos como fazer uma leitura desse tipo. A concepção subjacente à presente escolha decorre do entendimento de que a leitura é um processo sociocognitivo complexo não redutível a seu resultado imediato, obtido em testes padronizados e avaliado em termos positivos ou negativos, de modo negáabsoluto. Na verdade, não nos interessa exclusivamente conferir ao leitor a condição de leitor proficiente ou não, desconhecendo as práticas leitoras com as quais o sujeito testado tem ou teve contato até o momento. O que nos instiga e motiva, de fato, é o ensino-aprendizagem da compreensão do texto escrito. Assim, abordaremos ao longo deste artigo questões atinentes ao processamento cognitivo de textos, com a finalidade de elucidar a sua importância decisiva para o ensino-aprendizagem da habilidade de compreensão leitora, no contexto escolar. (shrink)

The church mission and objectives are more and more difficult to accomplish because of the secularization of the today’s society. Church’s use of marketing is a sensitive issue that has both supporters and critics. This article subscribes to the positive point of view that suggests that religious organizations can apply marketing in order to fulfill their mission and to obtain better results. It also claims that the use of marketing by the church and clergy does not contradict the religious core (...) values and that church marketing should develop a theoretical framework of its own and a specific set of methods, techniques and instruments. The present paper reveals the complexity of religious marketing. It presents a holistic view of the church marketing and proposes a specific conceptual framework for it. The article demonstrates that religious organizations’ marketing should be regarded as a form of social marketing and it briefly describes the church marketing process. (shrink)

The Catholic Church, as part of the year 2000 Jubilee celebrations, issued a prayer of confession for sins committed in the past. Most notable was the confession for "actions that may have caused suffering to the people of Israel." In this paper I identify two prominent metaphors in the magisterial literature associated with this act of contrition—the metaphor of Church as mother, and the metaphor of repentance as purification of memory. I analyze these metaphors and place them in the context (...) of important conversations about the Catholic Church and the Holocaust, and about collective responsibility and repentance. (shrink)

O artigo trata do tema hegeliano do reconhecimento (Anerkennung), que, graças aos cursos de Alexandre Kojève sobre a Fenomenologia do Espírito, ministrados na École des Hautes Études de 1933 a 1939, exerceu um forte impacto no pensamento francês do século XX. São explicitadas nele duas abordagens, uma otimista, a de Kojève, outra critico-construtiva, a de Jean-Paul Sartre.

Tem-se como temática central a atuação do poder judiciário no Brasil, em especial, do Supremo Tribunal Federal em relação ao fenômeno da judicialização da política. Por meio do estudo de processo judicial, a Ação Penal 937 no Supremo Tribunal Federal, procura-se constatar o movimento ativista de juízes que ganha forçano Brasil e no mundo, desde o fim da segunda guerra mundial. Tal prática, que se justifica na efetivação de direitos humanos e utiliza a retórica neoconstitucionalista, fere a separação de poderes (...) e ganha contornos evidentemente políticos. (shrink)

O modelo escolar moderno que foi universalizado durante o século XX, mostrou-se incapacitado de responder todas as demandas sociais que lhe foram impostas. Dessa forma, durante a segunda metade deste século a crise do sistema de ensino formal deu abertura a diversos debates sobre questões que permeiam a ação de educar, como os espaços, os atores e porque não sobre próprio conceito: o que é educar? Sendo assim, neste artigo trago reflexões sobre a educação formal, dentre outras formas, analisando o (...) contexto da educação no Brasil e em Cabo Verde, para compreender de que maneira determinados atores sociais, como os rappers, podem contribuir para a construção de uma educação emancipadora. (shrink)

'Globalização educação e movimentos sociais - 40 anos da Pedagogia do Oprimido'. O livro é composto por um conjunto de textos - trabalhos dos conferencistas - produzidos para o 'VI Encontro Internacional do Fórum Paulo Freire', realizado na Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, em setembro de 2008.