Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.

Going beyond the scope of psychiatric diagnoses, this study introduces the concept of human vulnerability as a means of linking the phenomenological approach—focusing on the patient’s experience—with psychotherapeutic treatment. To this end, it applies Karl Jaspers’ concept of “limit situation” to the existential vulnerability in the manifestation of mental illness and the ontological vulnerability in schizophrenia. From a psychological or empathic standpoint, vulnerability, as experienced in different cases of mental illness, refers to the condition of being confronted with disturbing meaningful (...) social encounters with others. In these social encounters, existential meanings acquire disturbing qualities for a person’s integrity, giving rise to various psychopathological phenomena. This study incorporates the practice of psychotherapy and empirical research to suggest that the experience of vulnerability is crucial not only in understanding the manifestation of mental illness but also a key element of phenomenological psychotherapeutic treatment, and it uses schizophrenia as an example. (shrink)

En América Latina, las teologías han estado atentas a lo socio-económico, las identidades, la espiritualidad. Hoy también se considera el genero, la ecología, el diálogo entre culturas y entre religiones. Nos preguntamos ¿cómo ocurre la salvación en Cristo? Se retoman reflexiones andinas de Vicenta Mamani, Domingo Llanque, Víctor Bascope. La cosmovisión indígena y mestiza plantea, por ejemplo, cómo creer en el Dios de la Vida y no creer en ídolos del mercado. Subrayo que las culturas sean tratadas, no como esencias, (...) sino más bien como procesos históricos en medio de los cuales la comunidad cree y ama. En cuanto a lo intercultural, no es un tema de moda, sino más bien un polílogo entre comunidades humanas. Esto ocurre en contextos asimétricos; por eso la propuesta de liberación busca la correlación entre pueblos. En la teología latinoamericana, luego de los pasos dados en la inculturación, se ha comenzado a ver el desafío intercultural. (shrink)

If is a random sequence, then the sequence is clearly not random; however, seems to be “about half random”. L. Staiger [Kolmogorov complexity and Hausdorff dimension, Inform. and Comput. 103 159–194 and A tight upper bound on Kolmogorov complexity and uniformly optimal prediction, Theory Comput. Syst. 31 215–229] and K. Tadaki [A generalisation of Chaitin’s halting probability Ω and halting self-similar sets, Hokkaido Math. J. 31 219–253] have studied the degree of randomness of sequences or reals by measuring their “degree (...) of compression”. This line of study leads to various definitions of partial randomness. In this paper we explore some relations between these definitions. Among other results we obtain a characterisation of Σ1-dimension in terms of strong Martin-Löf ε-tests , and we show that ε-randomness for ε is different than the classical 1-randomness. (shrink)

In the philosophical debate on aging, it is common to raise the question of the theoretical definition of aging in terms of its possible characterization as a disease. Understanding aging as a disease seems to imply its medicalization, which has important practical consequences. In this paper, we analyze the question of whether aging is a disease by appealing to the concept of disease in the philosophy of medicine. As a result of this analysis, we argue that a pragmatist approach to (...) the conception of disease is the best alternative to highlight the relevance of the medicalization of aging. From this pragmatist perspective, it can be seen that the notion of aging is going through a conceptual change, and aging can today be understood as a not radically different process from any other condition that is usually considered a disease. (shrink)

This article seeks to clarify the way in which phenomenology is conceptualized and applied in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology, emphasizing the suitability of qualitative research. It will address the What, Why, and How of phenomenological interviews, providing not only preliminary answers but also a critical analysis, and pointing to future directions for research. The questions it asks are: First, what makes an interview phenomenological? What are phenomenological interviews used for in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology? Second, why (...) do we carry out phenomenological interviews with patients? Is merely contrasting phenomenological hypotheses or concepts enough to do justice to the patients’ involvement? Third, how should we conduct phenomenological interviews with patients? How can we properly perform analysis in empirical phenomenological research in psychiatry and psychology? In its conclusion, the article attempts to go a step beyond these methodological questions, highlighting the “bigger picture”: namely, the phenomenological scientific paradigm and its core philosophical claim of reality as mind-dependent. (shrink)

In contrast to the “normativist” view, “naturalist” theorists claim that the concept of health refers to natural or normal states and propose different characterizations of healthy and diseased conditions that are meant to be objectivist and biologically grounded. In this article, we examine the core concept of these naturalist accounts of disease, i.e., the concept of biological malfunction, and develop a new formulation of the notion of malfunction following the recent organizational approach to functions in the philosophy of biology. We (...) focus on the notions of adaptive regulation and functional presupposition to develop a new conceptual framework that justifies the ascription of malfunctional behaviors to biological systems according to the embodied normativity of biological organizations. (shrink)

Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it is false that x (...) is worse than y with respect to V and (iii) it is false that x and y are equally good with respect to V . Most philosophers have followed Raz in adopting this account of incomparability. Recently, however, John Broome has advocated an alternative view, on which value incomparability is explained in terms of vagueness or indeterminacy . In this paper I aim to further Broome’s view in two ways. Firstly, I want to supply independent reasons for thinking that the phenomenon of value incomparability is indeed a matter of the indeterminacy inherent in our comparative predicates. Secondly, I attempt to defend Broome’s account by warding off several objections that worry him, due mainly to Erik Carlson and Ruth Chang. (shrink)

Is it justified to hold that an agent S has a (moral) right to P if the duty-bearer is not specified? There is an intense ongoing debate on this question. There are two positions in the literature. On the one hand, O´Neill´s much-discussed account of rights holds that it is justified to say that an agent S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined – i.e. if and only if it is clear against (...) whom S may claim her right to P (O’Neill 1986, 1988, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2016). Call this, the ‘claimability condition’. On the other hand, interest-based theorists argue that it can be justified to say that an agent S has a right to P even if the duty-bearer is not sufficiently determined (Caney 2007; Griffin, 2008; Raz 1988; Tasioulas 2007; see also: Etinson, 2013; Ypi 2010). Who (if anyone) is correct in this fundamental discussion about the very nature of rights? In this paper, I provide an answer to this crucial question. Neither O´Neill nor interest-based theorists provide good reasons to justify their positions. However, I argue, the claimability condition is an existence condition of rights justified on the basis of their action-guiding character. The reason is that if the duty-bearer is not specified, the content of the right (its correlative obligation) does not sufficiently guide what the agent should do because it is indeterminate who is required to act (or refrain from acting). (shrink)

In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘tall’, and ‘heap’ are said to be. I then argue that (...) the moral non-naturalist seeking to countenance moral vagueness faces a dilemma: are moral properties vague, or perfectly sharp? On either horn of the dilemma, serious problems arise for some of the central tenets of non-naturalism: vague properties seem to threaten Objectivism, Supervenience, and Non-reductivism; on the other hand, sharp properties raise problems for Supervenience and Rationalism. The difficulties on each horn of the dilemma are real, and while they may not be insuperable, they do, at the very least, drastically limit the things non-naturalists can consistently say about moral properties, facts, and reasons. (shrink)

The intellectual property regimes we have currently in place are heavily under attack. One of the points of criticism is the interaction between two elements of article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the widely discussed issue of being able to benefit from scientific progress and the less argued for position of having a right to take part in scientific enterprises. To shine light on the question if we should balance the two elements or prioritize one of them, (...) an exploration will be offered on how benefiting from scientific progress and the ability to participate in the advancement of science relate to securing human capabilities. A different perspective to the question will be gained by identifying the problem as an issue of misrecognition, especially the failure to recognize many willing collaboration partners in scientific research as peers. Lastly, I will argue that cooperative justice requires that if we have an innovation incentive system that disproportionally benefits one particular group, a certain duty to counterbalance this advantage exists when we are relying on mutual cooperation for the recognition of intellectual property rights. (shrink)

A critical commentary on the article “The Epistemic Harms of Empathy in Phenomenological Psychopathology” by Lucienne Spencer and Matthew Broome (2023) is presented. The authors committed the “fallacy of ambiguous or vague definition” by incorrectly interpreting Karl Jaspers’ conceptualizations, resulting in difficulties following logical arguments and arriving at reasonable conclusions. To overcome this fallacy, the commentary provides conceptual clarifications regarding Jaspers’ empathic understanding (einfühlendes Verstehen), conceived as the foundational concept of his project to develop a phenomenologically oriented psychopathology. Jaspers initially (...) introduced this concept in the article “Die phänomenologische Forschungsrichtung in der Psychopathologie” [The Phenomenological Research Direction in Psychopathology], published in 1912, and extended in his magnum opus “Allgemeine Psychopathologie” [General Psychopathology], published in 1913. (shrink)

Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy, which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world (...) at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon. (shrink)

En este artículo se discute la visión de la teoría de la argumentación como una forma de epistemología aplicada. El punto de partida es la descripción de cuatro perspectivas que se consideran fundadoras de la teoría moderna de la argumentación, para desde allí observar si en ellas hubo un concepto s..

Mercier and Sperber (2011a, 2011b; Mercier, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, and 2011d) have presented a stimulating and provocative new theory of reasoning: the argumentative theory of reasoning. They maintain that argumentation is a meta-representational module. In their evolutionary view of argumentation, the function of this module would be to regulate the flow of information between interlocutors through persuasiveness on the side of the communicator and epistemic vigilance on the side of the audience. The aim of this paper is to discuss the (...) perspective of the authors in which they conceive this competence as the natural scenario of reflective reasoning. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es analizar la noción de subjetivación, clave en el último Foucault, a la luz de la metáfora barroca del _pliegue_. Según Deleuze, hay dos fuentes distintas, la memoria del Ser de Heidegger y la monadología de Leibniz, que se reúnen en cierto sentido en esta noción foucaultiana. A este respecto, pretendo destacar la importancia del concepto de subjetivación en el contexto de un giro performativo en la filosofía contemporánea, así como diversas formas históricas de entender (...) este concepto. Un aspecto técnico, pero crucial, que hay que subrayar es la compleja interacción y la mutua co-dependencia entre la subjetivación activa y la sujeción (_assujettissement_). La comprensión del «modo de la sujeción» en Foucault como uno de los «cuatro pliegues de la subjetivación» proporciona un argumento convincente para el pluralismo ético. Por último, esta perspectiva brinda una importante clave para revisar la interpretación de Deleuze de Foucault. Pues es la memoria violenta de Nietzsche, y no la memoria heideggeriana del Ser, la que se revela como decisiva en el proceso de subjetivación, y también como una vía de conversión necesaria de la libertad «negativa» en libertad positiva en el sentido de la autonomía y autodisciplina, en concordancia con el proyecto nietzscheano de hacer que el «ascetismo vuelva a ser natural». (shrink)

This article elaborates local selective realism in view of the shifting from classical to quantum electrodynamics. After some introductory remarks, we critically address what we call global selective realism, hence setting forth the background for outlining local selective realism. When examining the transition from classical to quantum electrodynamics, we evaluate both continuities and discontinuities in observational features, mathematical structures, and ontological presuppositions. Our argument leads us to criticise the narrow understanding of limiting-case strategies, and to reject the claim that we (...) need a fully coherent theoretical framework to account for the transition from one theory to its successor in the case of electrodynamics. We close with a few remarks on the scope of local selective realism. (shrink)

The much-discussed “claimability objection” holds that it is unjustified to believe that all individuals have a human right to subsistence because the bearers of the correlative duties are not sufficiently determined. This argument is based on the so-called “claimability-condition”: S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined. Practice-based theorists defend the human right to subsistence by arguing that if we take the existing human rights practice seriously, there is no indeterminacy about the allocation (...) of duties. In this paper, I challenge this (apparently compelling) defense of the human right to subsistence with a dilemma. If the claimability condition is true, the practice-based defense fails to undermine the claimability objection because the duty-bearer is determined in some, but not all, cases. If practice-based theorists reject the claimability condition, they generate an account of human rights that is problematic from the practical perspective because it may contain duties that are unable to guide action. (shrink)

Agroecology has been criticized for being more labor-intensive than other more industrialized forms of agriculture. We challenge the assertion that labor input in agriculture has to be generally minimized and argue that besides quantity of work one should also consider the quality of work involved in farming. Early assessments on work quality condemned the deskilling of the rural workforce, whereas later criticisms have concentrated around issues related to fair trade and food sovereignty. We bring into the discussion the concept of (...) contributive justice to welcome the added labor-intensity of agroecological farming. Contributive justice demands a work environment where people are stimulated to develop skills and learn to be productive. It also suggests a fairer distribution of meaningful work and tedious tasks. Building on the notion of contributive justice we explore which capabilities and types of social relationships are sustainably promoted and reinforced by agroecological farming practices. We argue that agroecological principles encourage a reconceptualization of farm work. Farmers are continuously stimulated to develop skills and acquire valuable experiential knowledge on local ecosystems and agricultural techniques. Further, generalized ecological studies recognize the significance of the farmer’s observations on natural resources management. This contributes to the development of a number of capabilities and leads to more bargaining power, facilitating self-determination. Hereby farm work is made more attractive to a younger generation, which is an essential factor for safeguarding the continuity of family farms. (shrink)

Archaeology, like most sciences that rely on stratigraphic excavation for studying the past, tends to conceptualize this past as lying deep underneath the ground. Accordingly, chronologies tend to be depicted as a movement from bottom to top, which contrast with sciences that illustrate the passage of time horizontally. By paying attention to the development of the visual language of disciplines that follow stratigraphy, I show how chronologies get entangled with other temporalities, particularly those of writing. Relying on recent ethnographic work (...) with archaeologists, the analysis reveals that excavation emerges as a double vertical movement of downward destruction and upward reconstruction that coincides with a systematic dissociation of time and space that has important effects for the understanding of the formation of sites. I conclude by looking at some of the implications of this dissociation for contemporary theoretical discussions, particularly those that emerged after the phenomenological push to horizontalize the discipline. Challenging this dissociation, I argue that the conceptualization of time in science should be understood as a process that depends on the body and unfolds in movement. (shrink)

The debate about how neurotechnologies impact authenticity has focused on two inter-related dimensions: self-discovery and self-creation. In this paper, we develop a broader framework that includes the experimental and relational dimensions of authenticity, both understood as decisive for shaping one’s narrative identity. In our view, neurointerventions that alter someone’s personality traits will also impact her very own self-understanding across time. We argue that experimental authenticity only needs a minimum conception of narrative coherence of the self and that reversibility should remain (...) a key feature in the ethical assessment of neurotechnologies. The relational dimension of authenticity derives from the fact that a process of self-constitution is never a solitary business. The significant others act not just as subsequent judges of one’s life decisions, but as real co-authors of one’s self. We discuss relevant cases in which others are actively contributing to the meaning-making process, as to the direction one’s life is taking. We also claim that the experimental and the relational dimensions of authenticity should aim to correct each other. The relational dimension introduces socially approved standards as well as limitations to the array of available possibilities of self-fashioning or human enhancement. The experimental side enables us to avoid confusing one’s personal identity with a social and narrative construct that only bears the mark of social pressure and conformism. (shrink)

This paper argues for a revised concept of authenticity entailing two demands that must be balanced. The first demand moves authenticity from the position of a strictly self-regarding virtue towards the position of a fully social virtue, acknowledging the crucial feature of steadiness, i.e. self-consistency, as being precisely what we ‘naturally’ lack. Nevertheless, the value of personal authenticity in a modern, open society comes from the fact that it brings about not only steadiness, but also the public development of a (...) variety of existential options that can be understood as Millian ‘original experiments in living’. Thus the second demand of authenticity is a demand for ‘experimental’ authenticity which covers the whole spectrum of technologies of the self, from Nietzschean ‘brief habits’, to the use of enhancement technologies. (shrink)

The organizational account of biological functions interprets functions as contributions of a trait to the maintenance of the organization that, in turn, maintains the trait. As has been recently argued, however, the account seems unable to provide a unified grounding for both intra- and cross-generation functions, since the latter do not contribute to the maintenance of the same organization which produces them. To face this ‘ontological problem’, a splitting account has been proposed, according to which the two kinds of functions (...) require distinct organizational definitions. In this article, we propose a solution for the ontological problem, by arguing that intra- and cross-generation functions can be said to contribute in the same way to the maintenance of the biological organization, characterized in terms of organizational self-maintenance. As a consequence, we suggest maintaining a unified organizational account of biological functions. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an organizational account that defines biological functions as causal relations subject to closure in living systems, interpreted as the most typical example of organizationally closed and differentiated self-maintaining systems. We argue that this account adequately grounds the teleological and normative dimensions of functions in the current organization of a system, insofar as it provides an explanation for the existence of the function bearer and, at the same time, identifies in a non-arbitrary way the norms that (...) functions are supposed to obey. Accordingly, we suggest that the organizational account combines the etiological and dispositional perspectives in an integrated theoretical framework. IntroductionDispositional ApproachesEtiological TheoriesBiological Self-maintenance Closure, teleology, and normativityOrganizational differentiationFunctions C1: Contributing to the maintenance of the organization C2: Producing the functional trait Implications and Objections Functional versus useful Dysfunctions, side effects, and accidental contributionsProper functions and selected effectsReproductionRelation with other ‘unitarian’ approachesConclusions. (shrink)

In this article I shall defend, against the conventional understanding of the matter, that two coherent and tenable approaches to time reversal can be suitably introduced in standard quantum mechanics: an “orthodox” approach that demands time reversal to be represented in terms of an anti-unitary and anti-linear time-reversal operator, and a “heterodox” approach that represents time reversal in terms of a unitary, linear time-reversal operator. The rationale shall be that the orthodox approach in quantum theories assumes a relationalist metaphysics of (...) time, according to which time reversal is nothing but motion reversal. But, when one shifts gears and turn to a substantivalist metaphysics of time the heterodox approach to time reversal in quantum mechanics comes up in a more natural way. (shrink)

In this paper a tentative explanation of the competence of argumentation from an evolutionary point of view is offered. Because in contemporary argumentation theory and the informal logic approach the evolutionary perspective has been neglected, this paper gives an initial overview on the matter with the hope that core aspects of the argumentative faculty—such as argumentative normativity, the function of arguments, or fallacious moves, among others—can be seen differently afterwards. In order to specify the proposal, the main concepts considered are (...) the notion of collective intentionality, cooperation, reputation, niche construction and, of course, basic evolutionary terms. (shrink)

Currently, humanity is experiencing an explosive growth in technological objects designed to improve the body and mind. The main objective of this article is to review two recent classificatory and explanatory systems to cognitive enhancement cybernetic technologies, including both wearable and implantable artifacts that reorganize human embodiment or extend the mind. I argue that an outdated model of the cognitive sciences serves as the basis for these revised systems and taxonomies. Taking an embodied approach to the cognitive sciences, I propose (...) an alternative focus to classify cognitive enhancement cybernetic technologies. Specifically, by adopting a non-orthodox enactive approach to embodied cognition, I propose a new classificatory system that redefines the notion of the cybernetically enhanced human, restricting it to a purely cognitive context. Finally, I evaluate some philosophical implications of my system. (shrink)

This paper examines some aspects of the institutional history of post-war Romanian philosophy, with a special focus on the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of People’s Republic of Romania. The aim of this article is to shed more light on the main aspects of philosophical research during cultural Stalinism, and to underline the inflexion points within Romanian “philosophical” writings between 1948 and 1965. I examined the lack of human resources and its impact on the emergence of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, as (...) well as the main research topics studied at the Philosophy Section of the Institute of History and Philosophy and Institute of Philosophy especially in the 1950s. I focused also on the context of unmasking and purging of the “philosophical” front mainly in late 1950s, underlining the Agitprop fight against Revisionism and “bourgeois” influence in social sciences. The avatars of the philosophical field are analysed through the lens of professor’s Constantin Ionescu Gulian’s destiny as an important manager of the institutions producing philosophy during the aforementioned period. (shrink)

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems have the same scientific status as Einstein's principle of relativity, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and Watson and Crick's double helix model of DNA. Our aim is to discuss some new faces of the incompleteness phenomenon unveiled by an information-theoretic approach to randomness and recent developments in quantum computing.

ENTREVISTA COM PROFESSORAS (ES) DE FILOSOFIA DO ENSINO SUPERIOR DO CEARÁ – BLOCO IICom: Cristiane Maria Marinho, Francisco José da Silva, Camila do Espírito Santo Prado de OliveiraPor: Antônio Alex Pereira de Sousa, Paulo Willame Araújo de Lima.

Because of the way that the international lending system works, poor nations have been forced to repay sovereign debts without having a moral obligation to do so. Suppose a corrupt public official borrows money from an international agency, or from private investors, and later on embezzles this money, or uses it to oppress the population. Suppose, further, that the lender is aware of the potential of this situation and still lends. Typically, the international community considers that successor governments have the (...) obligation to repay the funds and the interests associated to them. In fact, this is what they usually end up doing. Public officials are all aware that if they do not honour sovereign debts, they will face all kinds of negative consequences, including exclusion from future markets, loss of reputation and legal sanctions. Owing to this mechanism, entire generations have been burdened with debts fraudulently incurred in their name by governments in the past. These kinds of debts have been known in the legal literature as ‘odious’.In this article, I discuss the conditions defining the bindingness of a debt. I suggest that they can be made explicit by looking at the rules under which the lending system works at the domestic level, and by then extending these rules to the international domain. I argue that, because of their plausibility, these are the rules that should govern international lending from now on. I also discuss the feasibility of extending these rules globally, and consider potential objections to my proposal. (shrink)

A widespread view in physics holds that the implementation of time reversal in standard quantum mechanics must be given by an anti-unitary operator. In foundations and philosophy of physics, however, there has been some discussion about the conceptual grounds of this orthodoxy, largely relying on either its obviousness or its mathematical-physical virtues. My aim in this paper is to substantively change the traditional structure of the debate by highlighting the philosophical commitments underlying the orthodoxy. I argue that the persuasive force (...) of the orthodoxy can benefit from a relational metaphysics of time and a by-stipulation view on symmetries. Within such philosophical background, I submit, the orthodoxy of time reversal in standard quantum mechanics could find a fertile terrain to lay the groundwork for a more thorough conceptual justification. (shrink)

Barnes (2014) has argued in this journal for the following conditional: If there is any metaphysical indeterminacy, this must be at the most fundamental level of reality. To argue for this claim, Barnes relies on two principles that I shall call bivalent completeness and determinate link. According to the former, a complete description is a bivalent assignment of truth values to every sentence. The determinate link, instead, establishes that the determination relation between levels of reality preserves determinacy from one level (...) to another. In response to Barnes’ conclusion, Eva (2018) has recently pointed out that bivalent completeness is question begging. In this paper, I will first show why Eva's line of reasoning can be resisted. My aim will then be to present a stronger case against Barnes’ argument by challenging the determinate link. In the presence of metaphysical indeterminacy, the link between fundamental and derivative facts might itself be the locus of indeterminacy. I will conclude by showing that Barnes and Eva make many unwarranted assumptions regarding both indeterminacy and fundamentality. The logical space around the connection between these two notions appears to be much wider than what they seem to be aware of, or so I will argue. (shrink)

En este artículo defendemos la existencia de un perspectivismo ontológico pluralista inherente a la filosofía de Baruch Spinoza. Indispensable para la constitución de esta noción es la relación establecida entre su teoría general de composición de los cuerpos y los conceptos de “afecto”, “inmanencia”, “potencia” y “multitud”. El objetivo de este análisis es una fundamentación interior del concepto de “puntos de vista”: es imposible pensarlo como una característica epistemológica de un individuo aislado, pero tampoco es posible unificarlo mediante el postulado (...) de una propiedad común. En consecuencia, el perspectivismo ontológico espinosista implica una teoría del punto de vista pluralista que elude los problemas planteados por la clausura del modelo Uno-Todo. (shrink)

In this article I shall defend, against the conventional understanding of the matter, that two coherent and tenable approaches to time reversal can be suitably introduced in standard quantum mechanics: an “orthodox” approach that demands time reversal to be represented in terms of an anti-unitary and anti-linear time-reversal operator, and a “heterodox” approach that represents time reversal in terms of a unitary, linear time-reversal operator. The rationale shall be that the orthodox approach in quantum theories assumes a relationalist metaphysics of (...) time, according to which time reversal is nothing but motion reversal. But, when one shifts gears and turn to a substantivalist metaphysics of time the heterodox approach to time reversal in quantum mechanics comes up in a more natural way. (shrink)

What is a valid measuring instrument? Recent philosophy has attended to logic of justification of measures, such as construct validation, but not to the question of what it means for an instrument to be a valid measure of a construct. A prominent approach grounds validity in the existence of a causal link between the attribute and its detectable manifestations. Some of its proponents claim that, therefore, validity does not depend on pragmatics and research context. In this paper, I cast doubt (...) on the possibility of a context-independent causal account of validity. I assess several versions, arguing that all of them fail to judge the validity of measuring instruments correctly. Because different research purposes require different properties from measuring instruments, no account of validity succeeds without referring to the specific research purpose that creates the need for measurement in the first place. (shrink)

Introdução: A Educação Permanente (EP) tem relação entre ensino e as práticas de atenção, levando em consideração a gestão, o desenvolvimento institucional e o controle social. Objetivo: Identificar fatores envolvidos na adesão dos profissionais nos programas de formação oferecidos pelo Complexo Hospitalar do Estado de Minas Gerais. Metodologia: Questionário aplicado a colaboradores da saúde do Complexo Hospitalar, relacionado às características dos profissionais e ao programa de EP. Resultados: A maioria dos participantes não sabia o verdadeiro conceito de EP. Participam das (...) capacitações e da análise de eficácia e o cronograma das ações educativas é feito com a equipe. A prioridade foi por ações presenciais. Discussão: A presença de mais de um vínculo empregatício, filhos e carga horária extensa de trabalho contribuíram para a baixa adesão fora do ambiente de trabalho. Conclusão: Colaboradores desconhecem o significado real da EP. As ações educativas agregam no conhecimento e na melhoria da assistência. (shrink)

Aun se utilizan insistentemente los conceptos de ‘paradigma’, ‘inconmensurabilidad’ y ‘regla’ tal como Thomas Kuhn lo propuso para referirse al modo en que se organizaría la ciencia. Lo problemático es que La estructura de las revoluciones científicas se cita como un caso de debate epistemológico, más que como un ensayo sobre la ciencia con perspectiva histórica. Se discute aquí el uso de Kuhn de estos conceptos para mostrar que esta posición no tiene otro apoyo más que una muy particular visión (...) de la ciencia expuesta en el contexto de las décadas de 1950 y 1960 en Estados Unidos.Palabras llave: paradigma; inconmensurabilidad; epistemología contemporáneaThe concepts of ‘paradigm’, ‘incommensurability’ and ‘rule’ are still widely quoted. Thomas Kuhn applied them to refer to the way in which science could be organized. The problem is that The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is quoted as a case of epistemological discussion, rather than a case of an historical perspective of science. In this paper Kuhn’s use of these concepts is commented upon to show that this position has no other backing than a particular vision of science as exposed in the context of the 1950s in the United States.Palabras llave: Thomas S. Kuhn; Thomas S; paradigm; incommensurability; contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

Se ofrece una respuesta inicial a la pregunta sobre el recorrido evolutivo de la competencia argumentativa. Se asume decididamente la hipótesis de la intencionalidad colectiva y la cooperación como rasgos estructurales que permiten entender la argumentación como un fenómeno normativo. Se concluye que la argumentación fue producto de una presión selectiva para la multiplicación de representaciones alternativas provenientes de una mayor cantidad de agentes de un mismo o diferente grupo. La presión evolutiva seleccionó la comunicación de buenas razones a través (...) del conflicto verbal y permitió, al agente individual, generar reputación, lo que va en su directo beneficio reproductivo. (shrink)