5 found
David M. Braun [5]David Martin Braun [1]
  1. Cognitive Significance, Attitude Ascriptions, and Ways of Believing Propositions.David M. Braun - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):65-81.
    We use names to talk about objects. We use predicates to talk about properties and relations. We use sentences to attribute properties and relations to objects. We say things when we utter sentences, often things we believe.
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  2. Russellianism and Psychological Generalizations.David M. Braun - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):203-236.
    (1) Harry believes that Twain is a writer. (2) Harry believes that Clemens is a writer. I say that this is Russellianism's most notorious consequence because it is so often used to argue against the view: many philosophers think that it is obvious that (1) and (2) can differ in truth value, and so they conclude that Russellianism is false. Let's call this the Substitution Objection to Russellianism.
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  3. Proper Names, Cognitive Contents, and Beliefs.David M. Braun - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (3):289 - 305.
  4. Comment on David Chalmers' "Probability and Propositions".David M. Braun - manuscript
    Propositions are the referents of the ‘that’-clauses that appear in the direct object positions of typical ascriptions of assertion, belief, and other binary cognitive relations. In that sense, propositions are the objects of those cognitive relations. Propositions are also the semantic contents (meanings, in one sense ) of declarative sentences, with respect to contexts. They are what sentences semantically express, with respect to contexts. Propositions also bear truth-values. The truth-value of a sentence, in a context, is the truth-value of the (...)
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  5.  79
    Content, Causation, and Cognitive Science.David M. Braun - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):375-89.