This paper considers the revolutionary developments occurring in the field of genetic mapping and the genetic identification of disease propensities. These breakthroughs are discussed relative to the ethical and economic implications for the insurance industry. Individual's privacy rights and rights to employment must be weighed against the insurers desire for better estimates of future loss costs associated with health, life and other insurances. These are in turn related to the fundamental conception of insurance as a financial intermediary versus insurance as (...) a vehicle for social policy. (shrink)
L'ouvrage regroupe plusieurs chapitres et les notices et photographies de 170 statues et objets présentés lors de trois expositions dans des musées américains, à Yale en 1996, San Antonio et Raleigh en 1997. Après un premier chapitre sur le « genre » (Gender theory in roman art, N.B. Kampen), concept moderne, fruit de plusieurs décades de travail sur la théorie féministe, qui est un chapitre de réflexions sur l'organisation sociale hiérarchisée, fondée sur les différences sexuelles, ..
In this paper I lay out what I take to be the crucial insights in Susan Bordo's "Feminist Skepticism and the 'Maleness' of Philosophy" and point out some additional difficulties with the skeptical position. I call attention to an ambiguity in the nature or content of the "maleness" of philosophy that Bordo identifies. Finally, I point out that, unlike some feminist skeptics, Bordo never loses sight in her work of women's lived experiences.
Susan Stebbing’s work on incomplete symbols and analysis was instrumental in clarifying, sharpening, and improving the project of logical constructions which was pivotal to early analytic philosophy. She dispelled use-mention confusions by restricting the term ‘incomplete symbol’ to expressions eliminable through analysis, rather than those expressions’ purported referents, and distinguished linguistic analysis from analysis of facts. In this paper I explore Stebbing’s role in analytic philosophy’s development from anti-holism, presupposing that analysis terminates in simples, to the more holist or (...) foundherentist analytic philosophy of the later 20th century. I read Stebbing as a transitional figure who made room for more holist analytic movements, e.g., applications of incomplete symbol theory to Quinean ontological commitment. Stebbing, I argue, is part of a historical narrative which starts with the holism of Bradley, an early influence on her, to which Moore and Russell’s logical analysis was a response. They countered Bradley’s holist reservations about facts with the view that the world is built up out of individually knowable simples. Stebbing, a more subtle and sympathetic reader of the British idealists, defends analysis, but with important refinements and caveats which prepared the way for a return to foundherentism and holism within analytic philosophy. (shrink)
Reviewing "The Ethics of Gender, Feminism and Christian Ethics," and "The Cambridge Companion to Feminist Theology," the author suggests that Susan Parsons responds to questions postmodernism has posed to both feminism and Christian ethics by using insights gained from various accounts of the moral subject found in feminist philosophy, ethics, and theology. Hesitant to embrace postmodernism's critique of the possibility of ethics, Parsons redefines ethics by establishing a moral point of view within discursive communities. Yet in her brief treatment (...) of Emmanuel Levinas, Parsons does not explore the postmodern option he offers feminists: an understanding of moral responsibility that can be critical of ethics. Parsons also ignores some feminist perspectives in the physical and natural sciences, thereby missing valuable insights of feminists who insist upon the materiality of the body. (shrink)
The understanding of the meaning of Jewish identity in Clement Greenberg's work follows the deep relationship between the conception of Modernism and the interpretation of Franz Kafka's short story The Great Wall of China. Greenberg, whose role as one of the first american popularizers of Kafka's narratives has been relevant, ascribes to the bohemian author an halachic reasoning closely related to his jewish origins. This strictly firm and normative mindset finds resemblances in Greenberg's modernist theory and critical practice, which, according (...) to Susan Noyes-Platt's study, could be interpreted as a derivation, in many aspects, of his Jewish origins and, particularly, as the critic's need to preserve his intellectual thinking from the nazi-fascist advance. Moreover, the article proposes to interpret Greenberg's purism as a form of messianism, that is a faith in a future, but indefinitely belated, absolute purification of the medium. (shrink)
Should the insane and the mentally ill be held morally responsible for their actions? To answer ‘No’ to this question is to classify the mentally abnormal as not fully human: and indeed legal tradition has generally oscillated between assimilating the insane to brutes and assimilating them to children below the age of discretion, neither of these two categories being accountable in law for what they do. In what respect relevant to moral responsibility were the insane held to resemble brutes and (...) children? In the case of brutes, the answer seems to have been that the doings of the insane appeared to lack whatever it is that marks out human actions as distinctively human. What the insane did could not be thought of as issuing from deliberation, or as capable of having issued from deliberation, but seemed rather to be the result of the unbridled operation of nature — if a diseased nature. The natural comparison with insane killings seemed to be, for example, the killing of birds by cats. This distinction between animal doings and human actions does not depend on Cartesian views about the workings of animals; the operation of nature need not be thought of as mechanical. The thought is simply that where there is no room for deliberation there is no room for moral appraisal. Children, on the other hand, though capable of distinctively human action — i.e. of deliberating about what they do — were held not to be capable of the relevant kind of deliberation: for they were held ‘not to know the difference between right and wrong’. (shrink)
Il buono, il brutto e il cattivo. Disambiguare il naturalismo di Quine - Quine’s ‘epistemology naturalised’ has been profoundly influential, but it is also highly ambiguous. Quine seems at times to claim only that epistemology is not a purely a priori enterprise but an empirical study, continuous with the sciences of cognition; at others, that epistemological questions can be turned over to the sciences to resolve; and on other occasions, that epistemological questions are misconceived and should be replaced by scientific (...) investigation into cognition. What is argued here is that the first and most modest version of Quine’s epistemological naturalism is potentially fruitful, the second and more ambitious indefensible, and the third and most ambitious not only false but disastrous. (shrink)