In his short story “The Library of Babel” (1941), Argentinean writer Jorge LuisBorges (1899–1986) examines the nature of reality, in particular epistemologicalboundaries to knowing in the world and universe. In this tale Borges is concerned withepistemic certainty, whether the universe is decipherable by use of reason, philosophy,or scientific investigation. I examine Borges’ tale as an allegory of the dilemma modernsfind themselves in, in an age when the moorings which have anchored us, belief inGod, religious faith, moral absolutes, the idea of (...) progress, that language can mirrorreality, have all been subject to radical critique. In this regard, Borges stands at the cuspof postmodernism and can be seen as a precursor of this movement. Borges finds thesearch for meaning a noble yet frustrating human endeavor, underlain with a fear weare denied contact with the reality of things. The Library offers hope of revelation ofthe universe’s secrets, yet presents formidable barriers to understanding. In his visionBorges presents thought-provoking images of society, the search for knowledge, and ofhuman-imposed order on a chaotic reality. Keywords: Epistemology, knowledge, certainty, postmodernism, mathematics, North Carolina,USA. (shrink)

1. Introduction . In the chapter which he devotes to the applications of his principle of individual liberty, Mill considers the question ‘how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of accident’. On the latter topic, he writes:—‘… it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents. If either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were (...) no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river.”. (shrink)

What is one who takes normativity seriously to do if normativity can neither be discovered lurking out there in the world independently of us nor can it be sufficiently grasped from a merely explanatory perspective? One option is to accept that the normative challenge cannot be met and to retreat to some form of moral skepticism. Another possibility has recently been proposed by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity where she aims to develop an account of normativity which is (...) grounded in autonomy. Furthermore, she argues that on her account reasons are "essentially public" and that this captures how it is that we can obligate one another. In this paper I argue that there is a serious tension between her account of normativity and the publicity of reasons-namely, that if reasons are essentially public, then it is not possible for individuals to legislate laws for themselves. However, I then argue that if we revise her conception of normativity such that it is understood to involve collective rather than individual legislation that it may then be possible to account for interpersonal reasons. (shrink)

Abstract:Comparatively few studies have analyzed the social behavior of multinational corporations (MNCs) at a cross-national level. To address this gap in the literature, we propose a “transnational” model of corporate social responsibility (CSR) that permits identification of universal domains, yet incorporates the flexibility and adaptability demanded by international research. The model is tri-dimensional in that it juxtaposes: 1) Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1998, 2000) typology of MNC strategies (multinational, global, “international,” and transnational); 2) the three conceptual domains of CSR (human rights, (...) labor, and the environment) proposed by the UN Global Compact (Compact 2003); and 3) Zenisek’s (1979) description of three CSR perspectives (ideological, societal, and operational). The end result is a multidimensional typology that permits the organization and development of empirical CSR research in an international setting. (shrink)

Abstract:Comparatively few studies have analyzed the social behavior of multinational corporations (MNCs) at a cross-national level. To address this gap in the literature, we propose a “transnational” model of corporate social responsibility (CSR) that permits identification of universal domains, yet incorporates the flexibility and adaptability demanded by international research. The model is tri-dimensional in that it juxtaposes: 1) Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1998, 2000) typology of MNC strategies (multinational, global, “international,” and transnational); 2) the three conceptual domains of CSR (human rights, (...) labor, and the environment) proposed by the UN Global Compact (Compact 2003); and 3) Zenisek’s (1979) description of three CSR perspectives (ideological, societal, and operational). The end result is a multidimensional typology that permits the organization and development of empirical CSR research in an international setting. (shrink)

In 1956 W. B. Gallie advanced the thesis that certain political concepts, such as that of social justice, are .1 Since then, a considerable literature on the subject has developed, some of it in support of the thesis, some of it in opposition to it.2 W. E. Connolly is a leading supporter of it, and John Gray is a leading opponent of it. However, Connolly's advocacy of it in the second edition of his book is significantly more moderate than that (...) in the first (1974) edition of it. (shrink)

In this paper I shall analyse in detail one part of Hume 's writing on politics in order to explain and criticise his method of inquiry there. This will involve me in assessing the value of Hume 's contribution in this section of his work to the theory of politics. I shall make my investigation into Hume 's method bearing in mind his admiration of Newton and other natural scientists and his intention of adopting their methods in his studies.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Obesity is a public health problem influenced by behavioral patterns that span an ecological spectrum of individual-level factors, social network factors and environmental factors. Both individual and environmental approaches necessarily include significant influences from social networks, but how and under what conditions social networks influence behavior change is often not clearly mapped out either in the obesity literature or in many intervention designs. In this paper, we provide an analysis of recent empirical work in obesity research that explicates social network (...) influences on eating behaviors. We argue that a relational rather than individualistic view of personhood should help us better understand the content and context of social network relations that inform health behavior choices. We introduce the concept of ‘identity-constitutive affiliations’ as the glue that binds these social relationships together. Finally, we outline the implications for public health ethics in the development of effective interventions to address overweight and obesity, leveraging the content and context of social network ties to reinforce healthy (or alter unhealthy) eating. More complex treatment of positive and negative behaviors stemming from social network connections should lead to more comprehensive theoretical models of health behavior change and more effective public health interventions. (shrink)

This paper discusses the nature and the status of inference to the best explanation. We outline the foundational role given IBE by its defenders and the arguments of critics who deny it any place at all ; argue that, on the two main conceptions of explanation, IBE cannot be a foundational inference rule ; sketch an account of IBE that makes it contextual and dependent on substantive empirical assumptions, much as simplicity seems to be ; show how that account avoids (...) the critics ' complaints and leaves IBE an important role ; and sketch how our account can clarify debates over IBE in arguments for scientific realism. (shrink)

In this paper I critically evaluate Ronald Dworkin's attempt in Life's Dominion to understand sacred value as a form of intrinsic value which is grounded in investment. I argue that there are two problems with Dworkin's conception of intrinsic value. First, it does not allow him to distinguish, as he must, between incremental and sacred values. Secondly, sacred value qua intrinsic value is not the kind of value which can be grounded in investment. I argue that both of these problems (...) are an implication of a realist conception of intrinsic value. Nevertheless, investment does seem to play a role in our judgements about intrinsic value and in light of this I aim to develop an alternative account of intrinsic value whichcan make sense of this. (shrink)

This paper discusses the problems of an ontological value of the variable in Russell’s philosophy. The variable is essential in Russell’s theory of denotation, which among other things, purports to prove Meinongian being outside of subsistence and existence to be logically unnecessary. I argue that neither Russell’s epistemology nor his ontology can account for the ontological value of the variable without running into qualities of Meinongian being that Russell disputed. The problem is that the variable cannot be logically grounded by (...) Russell’s theory of denotation. As such, in so far as being is concerned, Meinong and Russell’s theories are much closer than is typically thought. The arguments are supported with concerns raised by Russell, Frege, and Moore regarding the ontological value of the variable. The problem can be summarised as follows: the variable is the fundamental denoting-position of a formal theory that is meant to explain the structure of the ontological. If such a formal theory is meant to ground the ontological, then the formal must also represent the actual structure of the ontological. Yet the variable, the fundamental symbol of denotation in a theory that defines objects, is ontologically indefinable. (shrink)

In popular image, Jesus as friend is sentimentalized, but not so in the Fourth Gospel. Jesus gave his life in love for others and always spoke and acted boldly—marks of friendship in the cultural world of the New Testament.

The cyclical nature of the church's timekeeping means that the sacred story begins anew at Advent, inviting the church to place the coming of the Christ child in a cosmic context in which even time is redefined by God's anticipated in-breaking into the world. Advent is the season of new beginnings and new hopes in its anticipation of the dawning of God's new age.

This is the introduction to Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, eds. William Day & Victor J. Krebs (Cambridge UP, 2010), a collection of essays on Ludwig Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-seeing. Section 1: Why Seeing Aspects Now?; Section 2: The Importance of Seeing Aspects; Section 3: The Essays. (The front matter to Seeing Wittgenstein Anew appears above under "Books.").

The first section of this book surveys the development of Islamic philosophy though an examination of the definitions for substance, cause and matter. These important philosophical terms were defined by each new generation of philosophers. The definitions show an awareness of Greek philosophy, but also take metaphysical thought into an Islamic matrix. In the second section the author translates Ibn Sina's Kitab al-hudud and puts the tenth-century philosopher in his proper geopolitical sphere. Questions of Ibn Sina' connection with the East (...) as well as medieval scholastic philosophy are considered. Teaching Islamic philosophy outside of the Arabic-speaking world has been handicapped by a lack of primary texts in translation and studies of basic concepts. This book makes the foundation of this field more accessible to students and a general readership. By translating this little-known but pivotal text into readable English, Kennedy-Day has opened a door for a wider range of readers. (shrink)

Moral dilemmas, or moral conflicts, present a leading problem in Ethics. Ross calls them the problem of conflicting prima facie moral obligations. Lemmon calls them ‘moral dilemmas’, and Sinnott-Armstrong in his recent book discusses them thoroughly and provides extensive references to relevant literature.

"Lest one think that the focus on aspect-seeing in Wittgenstein is only a means to more contemporary philosophical ends, one ought to read Day’s remarkable 'Wanting to Say Something: Aspect-Blindness and Language'. Day considers the issue of aspect-blindness, arguing that universal aspect-blindness is impossible for beings with language. Specifically, he shows that a child’s first attempt at language, at trying “bloh” for “ball,” is neither an indication that the child sees the ball for the first time, nor an indication that (...) the child is giving a first label for an object seen all along. Rather, he shows that this attempt is an indication of the dawning of an aspect. The dawning of aspects, so common during the phase of language acquisition, becomes supplanted by language itself. Universal aspect-blindness is not humanly possible, then. Day argues that the acquisition of language results in a loss of desire for aspects (which it is possible to regain through art). Localized aspect-blindness is familiar because as language-users, we have lost our desire for aspects. Day then turns to questions about the deep purpose behind Wittgenstein’s style. Why are those doubting voices prominent? Why does Wittgenstein demand so often that the reader answer his questions? Day shows that these elements of Wittgenstein’s style arise from a motivation to regain his own desire for aspects, and he wants to re-awaken our own desire for aspects. Day motivates us to consider aspect-seeing in order to see Wittgenstein himself anew." --Chris Weigel, Book Review of Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, Journal of the History of Philosophy 49:2 (April 2011): 263. (shrink)

Seeing Wittgenstein Anew is the first collection to examine Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks on the concept of aspect-seeing. These essays show that aspect-seeing was not simply one more topic of investigation in Wittgenstein’s later writings, but, rather, that it was a pervasive and guiding concept in his efforts to turn philosophy’s attention to the actual conditions of our common life in language. Arranged in sections that highlight the pertinence of the aspect-seeing remarks to aesthetic and moral perception, self-knowledge, mind and consciousness, (...) linguistic agreement, philosophical therapy, and “seeing connections,” the sixteen essays, which were specially commissioned for this volume, demonstrate the unity of not only Philosophical Investigations but also Wittgenstein’s later thought as a whole. They open up novel paths across familiar fields of thought: the objectivity of interpretation, the fixity of the past, the acquisition of language, and the nature of human consciousness. Significantly, they exemplify how continuing consideration of the interrelated phenomena and concepts surrounding aspect-seeing might produce a fruitful way of doing philosophy. The volume includes a concordance for the unnumbered remarks in the various editions of Philosophical Investigations, including the latest (4th) edition. (The front matter is posted here. The introduction - "Seeing Aspects in Wittgenstein" - appears below under "Published articles."). (shrink)

Like theories of punishment, theories of reverse discrimination can usefully be divided into forward-looking ones and backward-looking ones. One example of the former type of theory is Dworkin's, who defends the policy on the ground that it will produce ‘a more equal society’. Another is Sher's, who defends it on the ground that it increases equality of opportunity. This essay is an examination of the latter type of theory. Compensatory discrimination is related, then, to discrimination thus: discrimination is the genus, (...) of which reverse discrimination is a species, of which compensatory discrimination is a sub-species. It will be convenient to proceed by examining successively the ideas of discrimination, of compensation, and of compensatory discrimination. (shrink)

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

Mill holds a metaphysical theory about the nature of things which is of the sensationalist or phenomenalist variety, and which he derives admittedly from the idealism of Berkeley. This metaphysical theory is introduced into a discussion in which he is attempting something different, namely, to offer a rival psychological account to Hamilton's intuitionist one of how it is that men possess that familiar but complex conception, Nature or the external world. It will be convenient to consider his psychological theory first.