A new translation of the 6th-century Taoist text Bai Yao Lu (Statutes of the Hundred Remedies), with practical commentary. Explains how the Hundred Remedies of the Bai Yao Lu offer a practical guide to what enlightened or sagely behavior looks like. Shows how each short verse of the Hundred Remedies presents a spiritual precept as a solution to the problems encountered in daily life and on the spiritual path. Provides insightful commentary for each of the Hundred Remedies, showing how they (...) relate to meditation practice and can help us navigate emotional and social challenges. (shrink)

For more than 30 years, historians have rejected what they call the ‘warfare thesis’ – the idea that there is an inevitable conflict between religion and science – insisting that scientists and believers can live in harmony. This book disagrees. Taking as its starting point the most famous of all such conflicts, the Galileo affair, it argues that religious and scientific communities exhibit very different attitudes to knowledge. Scripturally based religions not only claim a source of knowledge distinct from human (...) reason. They are also bound by tradition, insist upon the certainty of their beliefs, and are resistant to radical criticism in ways in which the sciences are not. If traditionally minded believers perceive a clash between what their faith tells them and the findings of modern science, they may well do what the Church authorities did in Galileo’s time. They may attempt to close down the science, insisting that the authority of God’s word trumps that of any ‘merely human’ knowledge. Those of us who value science must take care to ensure this does not happen. (shrink)

In close collaboration with the late Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret Sharp pioneered the theory and practice of ‘the community of philosophical inquiry’ (CPI) as a way of practicing ‘Philosophy for Children’ and prepared thousands of philosophers and teachers throughout the world in this practice. In Community of Inquiry with Ann Margaret Sharp represents a long-awaited and much-needed anthology of Sharp’s insightful and influential scholarship, bringing her enduring legacy to new generations of academics, postgraduate students and researchers in the fields of (...) education, philosophy, philosophy of education, Philosophy for Children and philosophy of childhood. Sharp developed a unique perspective on the interdependence of education, philosophy, personhood and community that remains influential in many parts of the world. This perspective was shaped not only by Sharp’s work in philosophy and education, but also by her avid studies in literature, feminism, aesthetic theory and ecumenical spirituality. Containing valuable contributions from senior figures in the fields in which Sharp produced her most focused scholarship, the chapters in this book present a critical overview of how Sharp’s ideas relate to education, philosophy of education, and the Philosophy for Children movement as a whole. The historical and philosophical nature of this collection means that it will be a vital resource for philosophers and educators. It should also be of great interest to teacher educators and those involved in the study of pragmatism and feminism, as well as the history of education across the globe, particularly in the United States of America. (shrink)

Fernand Dumont (1927-1997) was a sociologist, philosopher, theologian, and poet. A prominent intellectual in Quebec, he is recognized for his research on the sociology of knowledge and the foundations of modern culture. Dumont's work conceives of culture in terms of both memory and distance, arguing that without culture, man would be immersed in the monotony of his present actions, never achieving the distance necessary to create a past or a future. In Fernand Dumont: A Sociologist Turns to Theology, Gregory (...) Baum interprets Dumont's L'institution de la théologie, which studies the assumptions and commitments implicit in the rational reflection of Catholic thinkers on the meaning of their faith. Baum shows that while Dumont's book is preoccupied with the theoretical, its methodology is informed by the cognitive presuppositions of the social sciences, and its contents - dealing with the spiritual, personal, and social struggles that constitute daily life - are concrete. For Dumont religious truth is insufficient, and may have no impact on everyday life. What counts is relevance, insights that reply to urgent questions and unresolved conflicts. He offers an innovative interpretation of Catholicism that is faithful to the Gospel and relevant to the problems of modern life and the serious questions Quebecers are asking themselves. In Fernand Dumont: A Sociologist Turns to Theology, Baum elucidates Dumont's main ideas and connects the concerns of the Christian gospel with those of contemporary society. (shrink)

The summa of a distinguished philosopher's career, and full treatment of the temporal in philosophical terms, this volume shows us that by taking time seriously we can discover something essential to almost every question of human concern. Are we IN time? Charles Sherover asks, and in pursuing this question he considers time in conjunction with cognition, morality, action, physical nature, being, God, freedom, and politics. His essays, while drawing upon Royce, Heidegger, Kant, Leibniz, and even Hartshorne and Bergson, defy categorization (...) by method or school; instead, they reveal the diversity and divergence of thinking about time as well as the myriad features and values within the omnipresence of time and change. The volume begins with an overview of the history of thought on time and a clarification of some fundamental conceptual distinctions in temporal ideas. Sherover then offers a critique of Kant, the first thinker to recognize that all human experience has a temporal form. In a series of essays on metaphysics--a valuable corrective to the dominant metaphysical tradition of talking about being as if time does not matter--he pursues temporal responses to such problems as being, internal relations, individuation, mind, and free will. Finally, in essays on time, freedom, and the common good, Sherover argues that these three phenomena are intrinsically related to one another, the fulfillment of each involving the other two. Throughout, these essays brilliantly depict human life and thought thoroughly steeped in time and argue for the significance of the future for human activity. Portraying the openness of the future as the basis for purposiveness and freedom, knowledge and moral action, social life and religious hope, Sherover's work conveys a hopeful message of human finitude that nonetheless allows us a measure of control over events in our own time. (shrink)

One of the early steps in the process of putting together an issue of the Hastings Center Report is ticking through each column we plan to run in that issue and making sure that we have somebody lined up to write it and—if we already have somebody lined up to write it—that the person hasn't forgotten. But as this issue approached, one of those we had all nicely lined up contacted us first, to say that he was retiring from this (...) particular gig.For many years, we have had a wonderful rotating line-up for At Law: Rebecca Dresser, of Washington University of St. Louis; Lawrence O. Gostin, of George Washington University; and Carl Schneider, of the University of Michigan, have taken turns, each writing twice a year. .. (shrink)

Since the late 1960s, philosophy for children has become a global, multi-disciplinary movement involving innovations in curriculum, pedagogy, educational theory, and teacher education; in moral, social and political philosophy; and in discourse and literary theory. And it has generated the new academic field of philosophy of childhood. Gareth B. Matthews (1929-2011) traced contemporary disrespect for children to Aristotle, for whom the child is essentially a pre-intellectual and pre-moral precursor to the fully realized human adult. Matthews Matthews dubbed this the “deficit (...) conception of childhood” and wrote extensive critiques of its perpetuation in Jean Piaget’s stage model of cognitive development and in Lawrence Kholberg’s stage model of moral development. He published the first book (1994) in the field of philosophy of childhood and wrote a column of reviews of philosophically-oriented children’s books. He argued that even academic philosophers can benefit from the freshness and directness of children’s thinking. For Matthew Lipman (1923-2010) and Ann Margaret Sharp (1942-2010), the child is only potentially a philosophical agent and grows into becoming such by means of a philosophical education. Lipman invented the literary genre of children’s philosophical fiction, which systematically reconstructs key philosophical issues and positions in language accessible by children, attempts to help children recognize philosophical dimensions of their own experience, and models philosophical dialogue. Lipman and Sharp developed a protocol for a “community of philosophical inquiry,” in which people with diverse experiences, ideas and concerns dialogue together around a shared philosophical question, with the aim of forming reasonable, meaningful judgments about the matter. The early success of philosophy for children was due in part to its coincidence with the critical thinking movement in education, in which Lipman was an important figure. Its emphasis on ethics has justified its use as a program of ethics, character, and even religious education. It has also been used for civics education, because of how it instantiates democratic deliberation and power-sharing. At the same time, philosophy for children has been criticized by religious and social conservatives, developmental psychologists, and philosophers. Today, the diversity of approaches, aims, materials, and grounding theories of philosophy for children signifies different understandings of philosophy, childhood and education, which have become “essentially contested concepts” within the movement. Philosophy for children is no longer unified by an identifiable theory, purpose, pedagogy, method or curriculum, but is now used to further a number of disparate educational agendas. Shaun Gallagher’s (1992) heuristic of four schools of hermeneutics is helpful in understanding these competing agendas. Conservative hermeneutics is the attempt to devise methods of interpretation that uncover and preserve truth or original meaning without distortion or bias. This is consonant with the use of philosophy for children to help young people appropriate the fundamental questions, ideas and skills of (Western) philosophy as a resource for understanding the world and managing their own experience, and with the understanding critical thinking as a way of avoiding prejudice and approaching truth. Critical hermeneutics approaches interpretation—including teaching and learning—as a method of liberating the interpreter from the racist, sexist, homophobic, capitalist, religiously fanatical, and other kinds of ideologies that commonly distort thinking, feeling and behavior. This is consonant with those who argue that the attributes of mutual criticism, inclusion, solidarity, self-regulation, and distributed power make the community of philosophical inquiry an ideal site for recognizing and overcoming ideology. Others find philosophy for children politically ineffectual due to the limited role of students and teachers in co-constructing the curriculum and its lack of an explicit component of political critique and action. Radical hermeneutics suggests that because every text is open to a plurality of meanings, the purpose of interpretation is not to artificially constrain that plurality but to play with the signs that constitute the text in order to achieve fresh insights. A radical hermeneutical strand is identifiable in the philosophy for children literature when scholars resist the idea that the aim of philosophical dialogue is to find consensus or to narrow down on the most reasonable conclusions. Moderate hermeneutics holds that the work of interpretation is the attempt to reach meaning or shared understanding in a process modeled on dialogue between the familiar and the strange. This is consonant with those who argue that philosophical traditions can still give meaning to (young) people’s lives, but that those traditions must be continually reinterpreted (including by children) in order to survive and flourish. Fifty-odd years since its inception, philosophy for children has deepened and diversified, both theoretically and as a field of practice. Perhaps the only point of agreement among (most) everyone in the movement is that children’s philosophical thinking, variously understood, is necessary for the realization of the intellectual, moral, and political agency the movement attributes to them. (shrink)

Inner speech is known as the “little voice in the head” or “thinking in words.” It attracts philosophical attention in part because it is a phenomenon where several topics of perennial interest intersect: language, consciousness, thought, imagery, communication, imagination, and self-knowledge all appear to connect in some way or other to the little voice in the head. Specific questions about inner speech that have exercised philosophers include its similarities to, and differences from, outer speech; its relationship to reasoning and conceptual (...) thought; its broader cognitive roles—especially within metacognition and self-knowledge; and the role it can play in explanations of auditory verbal hallucinations and “thought insertion”. (shrink)

A comprehensive study of German materialism in the second half of the nineteenth century is long overdue. Among contemporary historians the mere passing references to Karl Vogt, Jacob Moleschott, and Ludwig Buchner as materialists and popularizers of science are hardly sufficient, for few individuals influenced public opinion in nineteenth-century Germany more than these men. Buchner, for example, revealed his awareness of the historical significance of his Kraft und Stoff in comments made in 1872, just seventeen years after its original appearance. (...) A philosophical book which has undergone twelve big German editions in the short span of seventeen years, which further has been issued in non-German countries and languages about fifteen to sixteen times in the same period, and whose appearance (although its author was entirely unknown up to then) has called forth an almost unprecedented storm in the press,... such a book can be nothing ordinary; the world-calling it enjoys at present must be justified through its wholly special characteristics or by the merits of its form and content. ' Vogt, Moleschott and Buchner explicitly held that their materialism was founded on natural science. But other materialists of the nineteenth century also laid claim to the scientific character of their own thought. It is likely that Marx and Engels would have permitted their brand of materialism to have been called scientific, provided, of course, that 'scientific' was understood in their dialectical meaning of the term. Socialism, Engels maintained, had become a science with Marx. (shrink)

OPINION IS DIVIDED as to whether the "qualitative characters" or "qualia" of conscious sensory experiences such as color perceptions and pain sensations genuinely constitute a major obstacle to the success or tenability of contemporary physicalist theories of mind. Do the enormous complexities of human brain activity--conceived more or less as we now conceive it--alone suffice to account for our conscious sensory experiences, and thereby show how the experiences are nothing over and above the brain activities, or must there be some (...) further kind of thing, if we are to account for the existence of our kind of consciousness? This issue, representing perhaps the most profound division of opinion in contemporary philosophy of mind, cannot possibly reach a genuine resolution in the absence of a satisfactory answer to a question which has suffered astonishing neglect in the extensive debate on this issue: What exactly is the qualitative character of a conscious sensory experience? What exactly is it about color perception, for example, that makes it so distinctive in a "qualitative" respect, allegedly making trouble for contemporary theories of mind? (shrink)

Augustine—for all of his influence on Western culture and politics—was hardly a liberal. Drawing from theology, feminist theory, and political philosophy, Eric Gregory offers here a liberal ethics of citizenship, one less susceptible to anti-liberal critics because it is informed by the Augustinian tradition. The result is a book that expands Augustinian imaginations for liberalism and liberal imaginations for Augustinianism. Gregory examines a broad range of Augustine’s texts and their reception in different disciplines and identifies two classical themes (...) which have analogues in secular political theory: love—and related notions of care, solidarity, and sympathy—and sin—as well as related notions of cruelty, evil, and narrow self-interest. From an Augustinian point of view, Gregory argues, love and sin constrain each other in ways that yield a distinctive vision of the limits and possibilities of politics. In providing a constructive argument for Christian participation in liberal democratic societies, Gregory advances efforts to revive a political theology in which love’s relation to justice is prominent. _Politics and the Order of Love _will provoke new conversations for those interested in Christian ethics, moral psychology, and the role of religion in a liberal society. (shrink)

First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The purpose of this article is to explore the close link between technology and death in the philosophical writings of Lewis Mumford. Mumford famously argued that throughout the history of western civilization we find intertwined two competing forms of technics; the democratic biotechnic form and the authoritarian monotechnic form. The former technics were said to be strongly compatible with an organic form of life while the latter were said to be allied to a mechanical power complex. What is perhaps less (...) well known is the extent to which Mumford characterizes the authoritarian technical form as being a technics of death. This article will argue that the connection between death and technics is a key theme in Mumford’s philosophy of technology. In addition to elaborating this theme and detailing how it informs Mumford’s other positions on the nature of technology, this article will also argue that Mumford’s theory of a technics of death bears witness, both implicitly and explicitly, to the influence of Sigmund Freud’s theory of the death instinct. Freud’s account of the death instinct will be outlined briefly and its influence on Mumford’s writings will be explained. Death, in Mumford’s technological writings, has a generally negative function and serves to warn humanity of the perilous course that its technological civilization is set upon. However it also has a positive function in that it encourages man to transcend its biological existence in acts of creativity and purpose. Death, in this positive sense, serves the purpose of life whereas, in the negative sense, it hinders it. The role of death, in both aspects, will be explored and related to Mumford’s overall perspective on technics and life. It is argued that Mumford’s philosophy of technology cannot be fully understood without an awareness of his views on death and its role in the life of technological society. (shrink)

As Dr Johnson said, argument is like a crossbow: it owes its force to the mechanisms of the bow, as argument owes its force to its intrinsic rational power. But testimony is like the longbow: we cannot tell what it will do unless we know the strength of the user.

[The war for a ring through the eyes of philosophers].

This makes three main interpretative points about the progression from perception to universals described in 'Posterior Analytics' II.19: (1) The noun "'aisthesis'" as used in the chapter may refer not to the act of perceiving but to perceptual contents retained in memory. (2) An 'empeiria' (experience) should be understood as a capacity to generate expectations about new members of an unconceptualized kind based on memories of other members of the kind. (3) The famous rout analogy is a metaphor for the (...) perfection of such a capacity into a concept that can underwrite demonstrative knowledge (rather than mere expectation). (shrink)

L? Esquisse d?une théorie des émotions est traduite en anglais une première fois en 1948 1 . Elle le sera une seconde fois en 1962. Ces traductions ont suscité de nombreux comptes rendus et ont donné lieu depuis lors à de nombreuses lectures du petit livre de Sartre, alors que l?ouvrage a longtemps été négligé par les travaux de langue française 2 . En 1950, deux articles de grande qualité scellent cet intérêt anglo-saxon pour l??uvre de Sartre en général, et (...) pour l? Esquisse d?une théorie des émotions en particulier, dans cette période d?immédiat après-guerre. Le premier est écrit par Günther Stern, le second par Frederik Jacobus Johannes Buytendijk 3 . Ils adressent des questions fondamentales au livre de Sartre, à propos du rapport de l?émotion à la réalité d?une part, du rapport de l?émotion au langage de l?autre. L?émo­tion chez Sartre semble en effet se définir comme une façon de fuir la réalité, devenue trop difficile . C?est ce que semble indiquer la définition de l?émo­tion comme conscience magique. L?émotion serait ainsi, pour Sartre, la manière dont la conscience tenue en échec, mise en impasse, prétend agir directement, sans médiation, sur le monde. Dans le cadre de cet article, je me limiterai à une discussion du premier article, qui adressait déjà, sans que les commentaires suivants aient pu égaler son acuité, les questions fondamentales. Dans un premier temps, je rappellerai de. (shrink)