In recent years a number of books have been published that offer short autobiographical essays of academics, focusing on their research and how their life history affected their scholarly development. These could be labeled as "intellectual journey narratives." Some volumes focus on philosophers and their religious faith or lack thereof (e.g., Clark, 1997, Antony, 2007). Psychology has its own version of the intellectual journey narrative, in T. S. Krawiec's (1972, 1974, 1978) multivolume set of autobiographical essays by contemporary psychologists. In (...) 1987, Rosemary Pilkington edited her first volume of essays entitled Men and Women of Parapsychology: Personal Reflections, Esprit Volume 1. It contains autobiographical essays by Jule Eisenbud, Montague Ullman, Jan Ehrenwald, Eileen Coly, Joseph H. Rush, Gertrude R. Schmeidler, Emilio Servadio, Renée Haynes, Hans Bender, Karlis Osis, George Zorab and Bernard Grad. The second (2013) volume contains autobiographical essays by Mary Rose Barrington, Eberhard Bauer, William Braud (now deceased), Stephen Braude, Richard S. Broughton, Larry Dossey, Sally Rhine Feather, Erlendur Haraldsson, Arthur Hastings, Stanley Krippner, Lawrence LeShan, Roger Nelson, John Palmer, Guy Leon Playfair, William G. Roll (now deceased), Serena Roney-Dougal, Stephan A. Schwartz, Rex G. Stanford, Russell Targ, Charles T. Tart, and Walter von Lucadou. Between the two volumes almost every significant contemporary parapsychologist is represented, with the major exceptions being the late John Beloff and the late Ian Stevenson. (shrink)

Why are conditional degrees of belief in an observation E, given a statistical hypothesis H, aligned with the objective probabilities expressed by H? After showing that standard replies are not satisfactory, I develop a suppositional analysis of conditional degree of belief, transferring Ramsey’s classical proposal to statistical inference. The analysis saves the alignment, explains the role of chance-credence coordination, and rebuts the charge of arbitrary assessment of evidence in Bayesian inference. Finally, I explore the implications of this analysis for Bayesian (...) reasoning with idealized models in science. (shrink)

On the standard interpretation, if a person holds cyclical preferences, the person is prone to acting irrationally. I provide a different interpretation, tying cyclical preferences not to irrationality, but to indecision. According to this alternative understanding – coined the indecision interpretation – top cycles in a person’s preferences can be associated with a difficulty in justifying one’s choice. If an agent’s justificatory impasse persists despite attempts to resolve the cycle, the agent can be deemed undecided. The indecision interpretation is compatible (...) with the standard interpretation of such cycles as instances of irrationality. Yet indecision corresponds to a first-person, non-instrumental perspective on the problem, whereas irrationality usually corresponds to a third-person, instrumental perspective. Due to these differences, interpreting cycles in terms of indecision offers a novel conceptual perspective, pertinent both for explanatory purposes and for the aim of normative theorizing. (shrink)

The concept of a socially extended mind suggests that our cognitive processes are extended not simply by the various tools and technologies we use, but by other minds in our intersubjective interactions and, more systematically, by institutions that, like tools and technologies, enable and sometimes constitute our cognitive processes. In this article we explore the potential of this concept to facilitate the development of a critical neuroscience. We explicate the concept of cognitive institution and suggest that science itself is a (...) good example. Science, through various practices and rules, shapes our cognitive activity so as to constitute a certain type of knowledge, packaged with relevant skills and techniques. To develop this example, we focus on neuroscience, its cultural impact, and the various institutional entanglements that complicate its influence on reframing conceptions of self and subjectivity, and on defining what questions count as important and what kind of answers will be valued. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic creates an unprecedented threatening situation worldwide with an urgent need for critical reflection and new knowledge production, but also a need for imminent action despite prevailing knowledge gaps and multilevel uncertainty. With regard to the role of research ethics in these pandemic times some argue in favor of exceptionalism, others, including the authors of this paper, emphasize the urgent need to remain committed to core ethical principles and fundamental human rights obligations all reflected in research regulations and (...) guidelines carefully crafted over time. In this paper we disentangle some of the arguments put forward in the ongoing debate about Covid-19 human challenge studies and the concomitant role of health-related research ethics in pandemic times. We suggest it might be helpful to think through a lens differentiating between risk, strict uncertainty and ignorance. We provide some examples of lessons learned by harm done in the name of research in the past and discuss the relevance of this legacy in the current situation. (shrink)

The mind–body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment, employing a basic nonlinear process, it is shown that epistemologically emergent properties may develop in a physical system. Turning to the significantly more complex neural network of the brain it is subsequently argued that consciousness is epistemologically emergent. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears not possible; the mind–body problem does not have a reductionist solution. The ontologically emergent (...) character of consciousness is then identified from a combinatorial analysis relating to universal limits set by quantum mechanics, implying that consciousness is fundamentally irreducible to low-level phenomena. (shrink)

I had the opportunity recently to referee a submission to a clinical psychology journal that examined the apparent manifestation of ESP in the psychiatric setting. I’d been solicited for this chore, not simply because of my background in parapsychology, but also because of my earlier research into dissociative identity (multiple personality) disorder (e.g., Braude, 1995, 1996, 1998). The submitted paper was not awful, and commendably the author had apparently done a considerable amount of reading of relevant works in parapsychology. Nevertheless, (...) the paper had one glaring flaw, and that flaw reminded me of one of my long-standing concerns about the current state of parapsychological research. Moreover, it wouldn’t surprise me if similar concerns can be raised in other areas of frontier science. Although this paper had a reasonably extensive (and perhaps superficially impressive) bibliography, there was not a single mention of important work on the topic done in the mid twentieth-century—most notably, the work of Jule Eisenbud (e.g., Eisenbud, 1946, 1970, 1992) and Jan Ehenwald (e.g., Ehrenwald, 1948, 1978). I found it astonishing that the author would presume to summarize the conceptual and empirical antecedents to the research described in the paper without reference to this material. (shrink)

Body, Community, Language, World, here made available in English for the first time is Patocka's presentation of phenomenology as a living tradition - as a philosophical heritage that requires to be rethought and redirected in light of possibilities that it has itself uncovered. Jan Patocka lived for most of his adult life in Communist Czechoslovakia where he was at times banned from publishing or teaching. Mentor of Vaclav Havel, Patocka defied the regime as one of the spokespersons for Charta 77, (...) and died in 1977, following two months of police interrogation. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungHistorische, theoretische und ethische Aspekte der Medizin sind Lehrinhalte des medizinischen Ausbildungscurriculums, die in dem neu eingeführten Querschnittsbereich 2 "Geschichte, Theorie, Ethik der Medizin" vermittelt werden sollen. Gegenstand dieser Arbeit ist die Darstellung von Unterrichtskonzept und Evaluationsergebnissen eines medizinhistorische und -ethische Inhalte intergrierenden Lehrmoduls zum Thema der Aufklärung und Einwilligung in Klinik und medizinischer Forschung. Die integrierte Vermittlung medizinethischer und -historischer Inhalte wurde von den Studierenden positiv bewertet. Die von den Kursteilnehmenden im Rahmen der Evaluation gezeigten Kenntnisse sowie die Selbsteinschätzung (...) ausgewählter Fähigkeiten und Fertigkeiten können als Hinweis für eine effektive Vermittlung der korrespondierenden Lehrinhalte gewertet werden. Die Definition fachübergreifender Lehrziele sowie die Entwicklung geeigneter Evaluationsinstrumente sind Voraussetzungen für die die Evaluation zukünftiger Lehrveranstaltungen, in denen historische und ethische Aspekte integriert vermitteltwerden sollen. Neben einem Beitrag zur wissenschaftlich fundierten medizinischen Ausbildung im Querschnittsbereich GTE bieten interdisziplinäre Lehrprojekte mit Begleitforschung auch die Möglichkeit das Verhältnis von Geschichte und Ethik der Medizin hinsichtlich der für beide Fächer relevanten Lehrinhalte und Lehrmethoden zu reflektieren. (shrink)

Heidegger’s ontological account of affectivity provides an interesting angle to consider questions of politics. On the one hand, one might take some of what Heidegger wrote on affectivity in the late 1920s and early 1930s—usually couched in the idiom of Stimmungen and Befindlichkeit—as a foreshadowing of his involvement with Nazi politics, culminating in his time as Führer-Rektor of Freiburg University. On the other hand, Heidegger’s views on affectivity might be taken as a starting point for an ontological perspective on the (...) political as such. His perspective on Befindlichkeit as disclosive postures can prepare such a reading, while especially his views on the ontological character of anxiety and boredom lead into the founding dimension of the political as such.This is because these affective orientations reveal the ungroundedness and thus radical contingency of existence. The flip side of this ungroundedness is the inevitability for self-determination—in other words: the need for deciding the undecidable. Although Heidegger’s own politics—at least in the early 1930s—did not explicitly relate to the affectively disclosed ungroundedness of existence, but rather curtailed this openness and indeterminacy in an individualistic and decisionistic closure, we argue that Heidegger’s view yields to a radically political reading. Not least, this is evidenced in much of French political thought since the 1960s which heavily draws on Heidegger’s ontological difference. The political as such does not refer to politics as a sub-system of society, but to the questioning of the foundations of politics, which turn out to be necessarily “contingent foundations”. It is our aim to trace this line of thought back to its origins in Heidegger’s works, in order to assess the potentials and pitfalls of ‘Heidegger on politics’. (shrink)

This paper develops axiomatic foundations for a probabilistic-interventionist theory of causal strength. Transferring methods from Bayesian confirmation theory, I proceed in three steps: I develop a framework for defining and comparing measures of causal strength; I argue that no single measure can satisfy all natural constraints; I prove two representation theorems for popular measures of causal strength: Pearl's causal effect measure and Eells' difference measure. In other words, I demonstrate these two measures can be derived from a set of plausible (...) adequacy conditions. The paper concludes by sketching future research avenues. (shrink)

Assessing the risk-benefit ratio has always been considered key in designing clinical trials. These benefits can be diverse and may include social value and psychological benefits. When it comes to...

Since the Niels Bohr centenary of 1985 there has been an astonishing international surge of scholarly analyses of Bohr's philosophy. Now for the first time in Niels Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy Jan Faye and Henry Folse have brought together sixteen of today's leading authors who have helped mould this new round of discussions on Bohr's philosophy. In fifteen entirely new, previously unpublished essays we discover a surprising variety of the different facets of Bohr as the natural philosopher whose `framework of (...) complementarity' shaped the final phase of the quantum revolution and influenced two generations of the century's leading physicists. There is much on which the authors included here agree; but there are also polar disagreements, which assure us that the philosophical questions revolving around Bohr's `new viewpoint' will continue to be a subject of scholarly interest and discussion for years to come. This collection will interest all serious students of history and philosophy of science, and foundations of physics. (shrink)

It was not only in his infamous speeches as NSDAP-approved Führer- Rektor of Freiburg University that Heidegger advocated what can be seen as an ‘activist’ understanding of human existence. To exist, according to this approach, means to be called upon to take charge of one’s life - actively, responsibly, authentically - whether mandated by Volk and Führer or not. Heideggerian resoluteness amounts to being active in a deep sense, a view articulated during the Rektoratszeit in the form of an outright (...) equation of dasein and work. I will revisit Heidegger’s phenomenology of boredom in Basic Concepts of Metaphysics, and contrast it with passages from Fernando Pessoa’s Book of Disquiet. Pessoa presents a radical counterpoint to Heidegger, utterly at odds with his intellectual and political persona. Insofar as the early Heidegger still represents the sinister forces ruling on the death star of western metaphysics, Pessoa carries the light that can set us on a path toward very different horizons for thinking being. (shrink)

This article engages the anthropological assumptions underlying the apprehensions and promises associated with language in artificial intelligence (AI). First, we present the contours of two rivalling paradigms for assessing artificial language generation: a holistic-enactivist theory of language and an informational theory of language. We then introduce two language generation models – one presently in use and one more speculative: Firstly, the transformer architecture as used in current large language models, such as the GPT-series, and secondly, a model for 'autonomous machine (...) intelligence' recently proposed by Yann LeCun, which involves not only language but a sensory-motor interaction with the world. We then assess the language capacity of these models from the perspectives of the two rivalling language paradigms. Taking a holistic-enactivist stance, we then argue that there is currently no reason to assume a human-comparable language capacity in LLMs and, further, that LeCun's proposed model does not represent a significant step toward artificially generating human language because it still lacks essential features that underlie the linguistic capacity of humans. Finally, we suggest that proponents of these rivalling interpretations of LLMs should enter into a constructive dialogue and that this dialogue should continuously involve further empirical, conceptual, and theoretical research. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to introduce a new concept of “pain-related bodily doubt,” which complements current concepts currently in use, such as pain-related fear, pain catastrophizing, and pain self-efficacy. This new concept, adapted from recent philosophical work on illness experience, has the potential to positively contribute to pain research and clinical practice by providing a vocabulary for clinicians and patients to discuss implicit or tacit dimensions of pain-related experiences.

Are the political ideals of liberty and equality compatible? This question is of central and continuing importance in political philosophy, moral philosophy, and welfare economics. In this book, two distinguished philosophers take up the debate. Jan Narveson argues that a political ideal of negative liberty is incompatible with any substantive ideal of equality, while James P. Sterba argues that Narveson's own ideal of negative liberty is compatible, and in fact leads to the requirements of a substantive ideal of equality. Of (...) course, they cannot both be right. Thus, the details of their arguments about the political ideal of negative liberty and its requirements will determine which of them is right. Engagingly and accessibly written, their debate will be of value to all who are interested in the central issue of what are the practical requirements of a political ideal of liberty. (shrink)

This introduction provides an overview of the current state of the debate on the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In sect. 1, we discuss the main concepts ‘ignorance’ and ‘responsibility’. In sect. 2, we ask why agents should inform themselves. In sect. 3, we describe what we take to be the core agreement among main participants in the debate. In sect. 4, we explain how this agreement invites a regress argument with a revisionist implication. In sect. 5, we provide an (...) overview of the main responses to the regress argument. In sect. 6, we address the question why blameless ignorance excuses. In sect. 7, we describe further issues that are addressed in the book. In sect. 8, we conclude with some discussion of future directions the debate might take. (shrink)

Kann man Jonas als Technikphilosophen lesen? Obgleich Jonas’ Praktische Philosophie, insbesondere sein Spätwerk Das Prinzip Verantwortung und die sich anschließenden Schriften auf der Diagnose eines ›technologischen Zeitalters‹ und eines durch die Technikentwicklung induzierten Epochenbruchs der Menschheitsentwicklung basiert, bleibt sein Technikverständnis doch merkwürdig implizit. Eine systematisch entwickelte Technikphilosophie hat Jonas nicht vorgelegt.

Perceived consistency, and even more so inconsistency of behavior is an important factor in the evaluation of other people. This is especially true for leaders, whose behavior is typically closely monitored and interpreted by their followers. While perceived consistency is typically rewarded, behaving inconsistently as a leader can be ethically problematic, as it violates fundamental ethical principles. To theoretically capture how followers interpret and react to unexpected, ambiguous and/or confusing leader behavior, we introduce the concept of inconsistent leadership. We define (...) this new concept as a process in which over a longer period of time the activities, experiences, and/or relationships of an individual or the members of a group are repeatedly influenced by their leader in a way that followers cannot make sense of in light of prior behavior or traits of that leader. We propose that a sensemaking process is triggered in followers whenever they register salient/important leader behavior that is novel, ambiguous and/or confusing when compared to behavioral expectations for that leader. Ascriptions of inconsistent leadership arise when followers’ sensemaking strategies temporarily or permanently fail to resolve the behavior–expectation discrepancy. Moreover, we clarify the relationships to other leadership concepts and delineate relevant follower and environmental influences on the sensemaking process. In doing so, we offer a clear conceptualization of inconsistent leadership and provide a solid base for future research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Freedom to BreatheJan Söffner (bio)It almost goes without saying: During the current pandemic, breathing lost its mere subliminal existence as an automated subsystem of our conscious existence and gained an oppressive presence. It did so in medical terms, in the spread of a virus attacking the respiratory system. It did so in terms of the lockdowns that virtualized much of our physical existence, cutting breath off from being (...) part of the communal atmosphere we dwell in. It did so in terms of the fear of taking in the contaminated breath of others, or of letting others inhale our own viruses. It did so by forcing us to wear face masks that simultaneously protected and obstructed our breath, and made us constantly smell our own bad breath. It did so by means of a fear, and regulation-induced deformation of our embodied interaction–which forced us to avoid each other rather than share our embodied lives. Breathing emerged into consciousness in a way that problematized the permeability of our breathing bodies, promoting instead an increasingly monadic existence reducing that permeability–an existence allowing only for an extremely mediated partaking in the world and interacting with others, as if (or indeed) talking to images on a computer screen.This change to our everyday breathing activity, as I will argue, profoundly altered the "metaphor we live by" that breathing is: If the emotional and enacted feeling of being a breathing body is altered, and if the habits of breathing change, then the ways we organize and understand our lives using breathing as a metaphor will lead to different meanings. And these meanings can be centered around a new feel of longing for freedom–a feel by means of which the concept of freedom is changed as well.A bitter example is the now worldwide awareness, and, as I will argue, altered understanding of the rallying cry, "I can't breathe." Originating from the 2014 police murder of Eric Garner, these had also been George Floyd's last words, uttered while being suffocated by police officers in 2020. The agony condensed in these words provided for an even more powerful metaphor to be adapted by the Black American community and beyond: people who had not literally been suffocated, but for whom the phrase spoke on their systemic historical oppression. [End Page 145] "I can't breathe" became a metaphor upon which a continuing legacy of repressions was projected.Yet, the term "metaphor," as precise as it is, can be misleading, because it seems to suggest this act of generalizing the lack of breath to be an act of mere comparison: People who are suppressed and metaphorically lack the air to breathe would then simply compare their lives to the suffocation of George Floyd; the similarity between their suppression and his would then be brought down to an "as if," wherein Black communities would simply feel as if they were suffocated (while what their 'suffocation' really means would remain an open point). However, things are not that simple: Adopting the words "I can't breathe" as a "metaphor we live by" does not only turn George Floyd's last words into an iconic comparison; it also evokes and suggests suffocation as a "feeling of being," as an experiencing of one's own existence. "Metaphors we live by" (Lakoff and Johnson) reside on subliminal bodily re-enaction and embodied empathy, enabling us to experience a feeling of suffocation which–as a feeling–is as real as the coldness of anxiety (as Louise Bourgeois would have it [see Klemm et al. 321]) or the warmth of social inclusion. This experience of felt suffocation, in turn, helps us talk and think about the state of subaltern existence, by replacing the question of whether the subaltern can speak (per Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak [1988]) with the question of whether they can breathe. Doing so aids in expressing indignation, and provides conceptual and iconic clarity. The clarity and precision of such metaphors is not about concepts, but about existential feelings. And in order to provide for this particular precision, these metaphors do not only rely on acts of comparison; much more than this, they rely on acts... (shrink)

Although affect and emotion are often discussed in institutional and organizational research, they are rarely studied systematically and in accordance with their overall relevance. To investigate the decisive but subtle, sometimes barely noticeable or taken-for-granted power of institutions, we need to achieve a better understanding of the close intertwining of institutional rules, operations, and spaces with complex affective dynamics. In this article, we therefore develop an analytical framework that allows to investigate the countless affective dynamics that characterize institutions. First, this (...) framework can help to come to terms with the multidimensionality of institutional affect and thus inform empirical studies of institutions. Second, our approach allows scholars and researchers to make visible those developments and modes of agency that run counter to the official functions and self-understandings of institutions. As a an initial step, we propose a conceptual clarification of „institution“ and „organization“ that incorporates various references to social theory which already foreshadow some dynamics of institutional affect. Further detailing this perspective, we develop an analytical grid that focuses, first, on what we call the „guiding affects“ of institutions and, second, on the internal affective dynamics of institutions. The proposed framework provides a variety of links to discussions of institutions in cultural studies and the social sciences. (shrink)

Wayfinding is generally understood as the process of purposefully navigating to distant and non-visible destinations. Within this broad framework, uninformed searching entails finding one’s way to a target destination, in an unfamiliar environment, with no knowledge of its location. Although a variety of search strategies have been previously reported, this research was largely conducted in the laboratory or virtual environments using simplistic and often non-realistic situations, raising questions about its ecological validity. In this study, we explored how extant findings on (...) searching translate to a real-world environment, using a phenomenologically informed experiment. Our findings demonstrate a previously undescribed complex and dynamic interplay of different search strategies. Importantly, our results reveal that: (i) the presence of other people is importantly entangled with the process of searching; and (ii) people frequently probe and switch between search strategies based on local environmental characteristics. Together, our results reveal that search behaviour is critically dependent on environmental features and that searching in complex real-world settings should not be conceptualised as depending on a simple singular strategy. This raises questions about the dominance of laboratory-based experiments and their narrow cognitivist framework, highlighting the value of studying wayfinding in the real world. (shrink)

This volume brings together a group of researchers from different European countries and disciplines who are involved in Clinical Ethics Consultation. The work provides a discussion on the theories and methods underlying CEC and on the issues of implementation and evaluation.

English summary: In this volume, Jan-Hendryk de Boer investigates the upheaval in the world of scholars in the Roman-German Empire at the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries. He shows how during this time hegemonic humanism developed as a new discursive formation. This re-organised the humanistic movement as well as its relationship to scholasticism and ultimately the place of humanism in the scholarly world as a whole. After humanistic ideas were initially taken on board as being (...) relatively unproblematic, the representatives of hegemonic humanism, such as poets, grammarians and philologists, claimed that they alone were in possession of useful skills and relevant knowledge. In a cultural transfer of the corresponding developments in Italy, a scholastic-humanist antagonism was generated that is still reflected in today's research. German description: Jan-Hendryk de Boer untersucht in dieser Studie den Umbruch in der Gelehrtenwelt des romisch-deutschen Reichs am Ende des 15. und zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts. Er zeigt, wie sich in diesem Zeitraum der hegemoniale Humanismus als eine neue diskursive Formation ausbildete. Diese organisierte die humanistische Bewegung wie auch deren Verhaltnis zur Scholastik und schliesslich den Ort des Humanismus in der Gelehrtenwelt insgesamt um. Nachdem humanistische Ideen zunachst relativ problemlos Aufnahme gefunden hatten, beanspruchten die Vertreter des hegemonialen Humanismus als Dichter, Grammatiker und Philologen fur sich allein, uber nutzliche Fertigkeiten und relevantes Wissen zu verfugen. In einem Kulturtransfer der entsprechenden italienischen Entwicklungen wurde so ein scholastisch-humanistischer Antagonismus erzeugt, der bis in die heutige Forschung nachwirkt. (shrink)

Translators' Preface to three texts on Henri Bergson by Jan Patočka: "Review of 'Bergson' by Vladimir Jankélévitch"; "Preface to Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion"; "Bergson" (encyclopedia entry).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Far-Future Paleontology: The Baffling Case of Brunaspis enigmaticaAnne-Sophie Milon (bio) and Jan Zalasiewicz (bio)Paleontologists, for more than two centuries, have studied and debated the petrified remains of plants and animals that have evolved over the past three billion years on Earth. They have argued over the grand concepts that they reveal, such as biological evolution and climate change, and also the many specific questions thrown up by these (...) relics: was such-and-such a shell, a mollusk, or an arthropod? Did this fossil fish live high up in the water, among the plankton, or grub in the mud on the sea floor?These studies have for many paleontologists been a blessedly human-free zone, detached from the busy realities of our everyday lives. The science of paleontology, though, is simply one obscure part of a burgeoning and rapidly evolving technosphere that underpins our lives, and that is now evolving millions of new kinds of fossils—technofossils—far more rapidly than ever happened in biological evolution. Many of these objects will, quite certainly, become part of Earth’s future fossil record.If such an endeavor as paleontology were ever to arise again, in a distant post-human future, how would its practitioners deal with these bizarre relics?We provide a preview, on the following pages, of just one such enigma, and how it may be resolved (or not) by our puzzled disciplinary descendants. [End Page 31] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 32] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 33] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 34] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 35] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 36] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 37] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 38] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 39] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 40] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 41] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 42] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 43] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 44]Anne-Sophie Milon Anne-Sophie Milon is an artist-researcher who applies her illustration skills (HEAR, Strasbourg, France, 2010) and 2D traditional animation (UWE, Bristol, UK, 2012) to political arts (SPEAP, Sciences Po, 2015) and science and technology studies (HSTS, EHESS, 2022). For the past ten years, she has translated geological narratives–and ordinary ones for Earth sciences–into extraordinary plots for the uninitiated, including the humanities. She is currently working with Jan Zalasiewicz on a play, The Petrified Museum (2024), based on the British Geological Survey (Keyworth, UK), and on a PhD project in science and technology studies looking at limestones’ agencies in extractive industry practices (2025). She regularly collaborates with researchers from the Anthropocene Working Group: The Cosmic Oasis (Oxford University Press, 2022), “The Victims of Carbon Dioxide are Starting to Appear” in Feral Atlas (2021), and The Epochs of Nature (University of Chicago Press, 2016).Jan Zalasiewicz Jan Zalasiewicz is Emeritus Professor of Paleobiology at the University of Leicester. He was formerly a field geologist and paleontologist with the British Geological Survey, involved in the geological mapping of eastern England and central Wales. His interests include Early Paleozoic fossils, notably the graptolites (a kind of extinct zooplankton), mud and mudrocks, the Quaternary Ice Ages, the nature of geological time, and the geology made by humans. In recent years, he has helped develop the concept of an Anthropocene epoch. He enjoys writing popular science articles and books, and being involved in art/science projects.Copyright © 2023 Johns Hopkins University Press and SubStance, Inc... (shrink)

Several experimental studies on moral judgment and moral decision-making show that in virtual reality people tend to make more “characteristically utilitarian” decisions than when responding to standard questionnaires. An explanation of this phenomenon that has been considered by many authors states that the feature of VR studies that is responsible for this effect is the visual salience of the harmful consequences of “deontological” decisions. The present paper makes three points, the first of which is theoretical: we argue that this explanation, (...) which draws from Cushman’s dual-process account of moral judgment, is in fact not coherent with this account’s predictions with respect to behavior in VR. The second point is that this explanation does not sufficiently explain the existing empirical findings concerning the footbridge dilemma because these studies differ in important aspects of experimental design from studies on the switch dilemma. The third point is empirical: we present two original VR studies that were designed to check the robustness of the increased “utilitarian” tendency and directly test the explanation that is based on the visual salience of harmful consequences. The results of the experiments provide evidence that the effect is quite robust but the proposed explanation is inadequate. (shrink)

Proposition 28 from Proclus'Elements of Theologyis consistently cited as saying that every producing causefirstbrings about effects that are like it andtheneffects that are unlike it. This is a theorem to which Proclus is indeed committed, but I argue that it is not what Proclus is claiming here. At this stage of his general argument, he merely argues that every cause produces things that are like it, without saying anything about other products than the immediate ones. The standard interpretation of proposition (...) 28 is therefore wrong. This becomes clear if one pays close attention to the argumentative structure of theElements of Theologyand to the proof given for proposition 28. (shrink)

The phenomenon of wonder has fascinated scholars for centuries, yet today the subject is understudied and not rooted in any specific academic discipline. Attempts at building a preliminary account of wonder reveals that the experience of wonder is characterised by seven properties: wonder is sudden, extraordinary and personal; intensifies the cognitive focus; intensifies the use of imagination; instigates awareness of ignorance; causes temporary displacement; makes the world newly present; and brings emotional upheaval. Furthermore, wonder can be distinguished from other similar (...) altered states, including awe, horror, the sublime, curiosity, amazement, admiration and astonishment. Human flourishing is a concept in ethics that has enjoyed a revival since Elizabeth Anscombe’s 1958 article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. Through the work of Neo-Aristotelian philosophers Douglas Rasmussen, Alasdair McIntyre and Martha Nussbaum who have contributed to the field a working model of human flourishing attentive to human nature was established. As a result of in-depth examination of the contribution of both emotion and imagination in the experience of wonder through a Neo-Aristotelian lens it becomes evident that wonder may contribute to human flourishing via a number of effects, including widening of perception, extension of moral scope or sensitivity and prompting deep wonder, a wondrous afterglow, openness, humility, an imaginative attitude, reverence and gratitude. Importantly, for wonder to act as a strong contributor to human flourishing one needs to wonder at the right thing, in the right amount, in the right time, in the right way and for the right purpose. Cultivating a balanced sense of wonder is thus by no means an easy task but having a critical attitude towards one’s wonderment would aid one to wonder in a virtuous way. (shrink)

A systematic study of testimony rooted in contemporary continental philosophy and drawing on literary case studies. From analytic epistemology to gender theory, testimony is a major topic in philosophy today. Yet, one distinctive approach to testimony has not been fully appreciated: the recent history of contemporary continental philosophy offers a rich source for another approach to testimony. In this book, Gert-Jan van der Heiden argues that a continental philosophy of testimony can be developed that is guided by those forms of (...) bearing witness that attest to limit experiences of human existence, in which the human is rendered mute, speechless, or robbed of a common understanding. In the first part, Van der Heiden explores this sense of testimony in a reading of several literary texts, ranging from Plato’s literary inventions to those of Kierkegaard, Melville, Soucy, and Mortier. In the second part, based on the orientation offered by the literary experiments, Van der Heiden offers a more systematic account of testimony in which he distinguishes and analyzes four basic elements of testimony. In the third part, he shows what this analysis implies for the question of the truth and the truthfulness of testimony. In his discussion with philosophers such as Heidegger, Derrida, Lyotard, Agamben, Foucault, Ricoeur, and Badiou, Van der Heiden also provides an overview of how the problem of testimony emerges in a number of thinkers pivotal to twentieth- and twenty-first-century thought. “The Voice of Misery is a special book. Van der Heiden has presented an argument that is poised to challenge discourse in analytic philosophy, reshape approaches in continental philosophy, and give new orientation to interdisciplinary research in continental philosophy and literary theory. The book will find a large readership across the discipline of philosophy and in several areas of the humanities.” — Theodore George, author of Tragedies of Spirit: Tracing Finitude in Hegel’s Phenomenology. (shrink)

For animal research, the precautionary principle was written into public policy through the so-called three R’s of replacement, reduction, and refinement. These guidelines, as developed by Russell and Burch six decades ago, aimed to establish safeguards against the abuse of animals in the pursuit of science. While these safeguards, which started from the basic premise that science itself would benefit from a reduction of animal suffering, seem compelling at first, the three R’s have in practice generated a degree of confusion (...) while opening up loopholes that have enabled researchers to effectively dismiss some of the more inconvenient aspects of ethical concerns. Such problems have been discussed in detail by multiple authors. Here, we suggest a different approach by arguing that a clear parallel can be drawn between the shortcomings evident in the current three R’s model and the flawed practice of early modern judicial torture, in which a set of elaborate safeguards that were designed to prevent abuses served instead to create the same combination of confusion and easily exploited loopholes. In the case of judicial torture, attempts to refine the system from within produced limited results, and effective change only took place when individual legal systems succeeded in enforcing clear absolutes. We explore the implications of this for the regulation of animal research by pointing to the need for achievable absolutes, based on a clear, evidence-based, and publicly deliberated rationale, in order to facilitate and improve research ethics. (shrink)

This Editorial reports an exchange in form of a comment and reply on the article “History and Nature of the Jeffreys–Lindley Paradox” (Arch Hist Exact Sci 77:25, 2023) by Eric-Jan Wagenmakers and Alexander Ly.