The ‘Αρμονικ Στοιχεα of Aristoxenus, being the earliest treatise on Greek Music extant, have hitherto held an unchallenged position as the foundation of much of our knowledge of ancient musical theory. Mr. R. P. Winnington-Ingram's shrewd and critical examination of the many difficulties involved in Aristoxenus’ treatment of subtleties of intonation is a very welcome contribution to a thorny subject; and it is in the hope of furthering our understanding that I venture to offer these comments on one or two (...) points where alternatives or modifications may be suggested. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between common-sense psychology (CSP) and scientific psychology (SP) — which we could call the mind-mind problem. CSP has come under much attack recently, most of which is thought to be unjust or misguided. This paper's first section examines the many differences between the aims, interests, explananda, explanantia, methodology, conceptual frameworks, and relationships to the neurosciences, that divide CSP and SP. Each of the two is valid within its own territory, and there is no competition between (...) them — primarily because CSP is not, and has no interest in being, a scientific theory. In the second section some implications are drawn. First, neither CSP nor SP has the mind-body problem in its familiar form. Second, CSP, for excellent reasons, is not equipped to handle irrational or non-rational behaviour; there are some grounds for believing that this can and should be the task of SP. Third, philosophical psychology, or armchair theories of action, perception, etc., are doomed to failure. And, fourth, the realm of the psychological is so heterogeneous that no single model for either CSP or SP is likely to succeed. (shrink)

It is notorious that Aristotle gives two distinct and seemingly irreconcilable versions of man's eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics. These offer conflicting accounts not only of what the good man should do, but also of what it is good for a man to do. This paper discusses the incompatibility of these two pictures of eudaimonia, and explores the extent to which the notions of 'the life of a good man' and 'the life good for a man' can be successfully united (...) in a single concept of eudaimonia. (shrink)

This article finds little to disagree with in Neurophilosophy The sole area of disagreement is with Professor Churchland's attitude to common?sense psychology. Unfortunately, though, the author has already attempted to describe what should be the proper view of common?sense psychology in an earlier article in this very journal. Therefore the present article tries to build on the earlier one, advocating an instrumentalist constraal of many ordinary?language mental terms ? a construal with which Professor Churchland is unlikely to agree, but which, (...) if she did agree, would give her further ammunition with which to beat her opponents. The other main strand of this article suggests that Aristotle has anticipated Professor Churchland (and also most other theoreticians of psychology and physiology), and so, willy?nilly, we are ? correctly ? returning to an Aristotelian picture of human capacity and activity. (shrink)

The voluntary and informed consent of subjects has been the central focus of concern in research reviews, overshadowing the importance of all other considerations. The Nuremberg Code, with its rights-based protection of the subject's autonomy above all else, made it difficult to justify research with no intended benefit when subjects are incompetent to make a valid informed choice to participate. Subsequent codes providing for research with incompetent subjects followed the lead of Nuremberg, substituting the informed authorization of a proxy for (...) the informed consent of the subject. (shrink)

The use of analogy and metaphor as descriptive and explanatory devices in neuroscientific research was examined. In particular, four analogies/metaphors common to research having to do with the brain and its function were illustrated. It is argued that the use of these and other similar literary devices in neuroscientific research sometimes leads to certain conceptual confusions and, thus, fails to aid in clarifying the nature of those phenomena they are intended to explain. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

A content analysis of 48 children's realistic animal stories shows an emphasis on pets and petkeeping that can both challenge and support traditional human-animal boundaries. The genre's sympathetic portrayal of pet animals and the condemnation of theirmistreatment invite the reader to challenge such boundaries. Yet the genre's stereotypical portrayal of these animals also constrains our conceptualization of the human-animal bond. The author discusses these and other narrative elements which render this form of popular culture ambiguous terrain for negotiating an ethic (...) of respect for nonhuman others which goes beyond most contemporary arrangements. (shrink)

A traditional association of judgment with "reason" has drawn upon and reinforced an opposition between reason and emotion. This, in turn, has led to a restricted view of the nature of moral judgment and of the subject as moral agent. The alternative, I suggest, is to abandon the traditional categories and to develop a new theory of judgment. I argue that the theory of judgment developed by Justus Buchler constitutes a robust alternative which does not prejudice the case against emotion. (...) Drawing on this theory I then develop how to conceptualize the ways in which feeling and emotion can be (or be components of) moral judgments. (shrink)

Santayana gives a rich account of the self which is simultaneously bound by material conditions and circumstances and able to transcend those boundaries if not in material fact, at least in the life of spirit. In this essay I pursue the question, whether and how Santayana’s view of "spirit" can be reconciled with his materialism. There is a tension between two of Santayana’s claims about spirit: its inefficacy (required by his materialism) and its role in transforming human life from merely (...) physical organic life to conscious, feeling life. What seems problematic to me is the account of "material" efficacy which Santayana commits himself to, and this problem in turn, I argue, has its origins in a limited notion of relation. (shrink)

The stormy development of vocal production during the first postnatal weeks is generally underestimated. Our longitudinal studies revealed an amazingly fast unfolding and combinatorial complexification of pre-speech melodies. We argue that relying on “melody” could provide for the immature brain a kind of filter to extract life-relevant information from the complex speech stream.

When we ask what it takes to be a person, the criteria we impose usually leave questions outstanding about some merits of the human species. This paper discusses the questions that concern the status of the very young or the unborn, and the extra problems that arise when we consider children born with savage mental or physical impairments. The paper exploits the notion of potentiality to suggest that the title of “person” is relatively unimportant, since our ethical obligations to infants (...) and foetuses can be shown to be as stringent as are those to any adult; and introduces the idea of “an Aristotelian loss” to explain the extent of our obligations to the impaired. It is suggested in conclusion that the development of IVF techniques adds no extra dimensions to this problem. The article is adapted from a chapter of a forthcoming book on personal identity. (shrink)

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The principles of ontological parity and ordinality have distinct functions in Buchler's ontology. Ontological parity could be independently subscribed to, whereas ordinality signals the positive conception of the nature of reality as irreducibly complex or indefinitely related, which Buchler's metaphysical system seeks to articulate. Both principles inform Buchler's system, but each has a distinctive function. They are not, I suggest, necessarily at odds with one another, as some critics claim. I do identify several difficulties that follow from (1) the level (...) of generality claimed by Buchler and (2) the claim of irreducible complexity or indefinite relatedness. (shrink)

A Bazinian commitment to cinematic realism, grounded as it is in the ontology of the photograph, sets up the aesthetic ambition of cinema as irreparably opposed to the structures and ambitions of high modernism ? whether high modernism be taken to have its essence in formal experiment, medium specificity, or negation. Bazin himself licenses such an opposition, but the sense of a divide here is not his alone: there are structural and grammatical reasons why realism (photographic or otherwise) and modernism (...) appear as incompatible. Yet however strong this opposition is ? and however much he himself sometimes endorses it ? Bazin equally offers us resources for closing the gap. In his distinction between aesthetic and psychological realism, his sense of the importance of automatism in cinema's significance, and finally in his insistence that true representation is achieved through poetry, Bazin uncovers a concept of realism as transformative, not transparent, fidelity. This idea of poetic, formalist realism allows for a tentative reconciliation between modernism and realism generally. However, it does so by giving up on a robust idea of photographic transparency as the basis of cinema's power, and thus threatens to efface its specificity as a medium. Stanley Cavell's redescription of medium as automatism helps uncover a Bazinian version of cinematic specificity, one which allows for cinema's appetite for realism without reducing that capacity to a mere inflexible fact of the medium. (shrink)

The prevention of disability has been the driving force behind much research. In epidemiology three levels of prevention are defined: primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. Primary prevention is the prevention of the initiation or occurrence of a disease; secondary prevention is the prevention or amelioration of the consequences of a disease, and tertiary prevention refers to rehabilitation or the limitation of disability associated with the disease. We have examples of all three levels of prevention in the area of childhood disability. (...) Primary prevention is the protection of infants against congenital rubella syndrome by ensuring that women of childbearing age have adequate immunity before they become pregnant. The prevention of choreoathetosis, mental retardation, and deafness, by treating hyperbilirubinemia and preventing kernicterus in newborns, is a great success story in prevention. Similarly, at the level of secondary prevention, is the reduction in mental retardation caused by phenylketonuria, or PKU, by eliminating phenylalanine in the diets of newborns who lack the enzyme to metabolize this amino acid. Tertiary prevention is the area of rehabilitation medicine, and is regarded as the least desirable level of prevention. Indeed, tertiary prevention can be seen as “doing the best we can” in terms of rehabilitation, often while seeking a means of really preventing the disease. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.2 (2004) 223-224 [Access article in PDF] Jacqueline Broad. Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. x + 191. Cloth, $55.00. In this impressive study of early Modern Philosophy, Jacqueline Broad analyzes the influence that Cartesianism has had in the development of feminist thought. Her work covers the early modern philosophy of Elisabeth of Bohemia, Margaret Cavendish, (...) Ann Conway, Mary Astell, Damaris Cudworth Masham and Catherine Trotter Cockburn. She points out the paradoxical relationship between current feminist philosophy and the writings of early Modern women. Broad concentrates on the metaphysical issues of mind-body dualism, thinking matter, and the role of reason in knowledge.Recent feminists have argued that even though Cartesianism appears to emphasize an egalitarian concept of reason, it entails a male bias which excludes women from philosophy. Broad covers the work of Genevieve Lloyd, Hilda Smith, Margaret Atherton and other feminists. Her goal is to show that the common Cartesian interpretation of early women's writings obscures the anti-Cartesian and anti-dualist aspects of their thought. Like Lloyd, she argues that historically women were associated with a lesser form of reason following the rise of Cartesianism.The conflict between reason and femininity is noted in the complexity of early Modern thought. Broad argues that even though Elisabeth is remembered as a critic of Descartes, many of her suggestions are not as anti-dualist as some scholars believe. Broad highlights the critical content of Elisabeth's letters to Descartes and discusses her criticisms of dualism and her Cartesian method of discovering truth and certainty. On the basis of her letters she contends that Elisabeth can be regarded as a precursor to feminist philosophers who give an equal role to the body and emotions in their metaphysical and ethical writings.Like Elisabeth, Margaret Cavendish rejects Cartesian dualism. The common thread that runs through early Modern feminist philosophy is the argument that interaction between two unlike substances is inconceivable. Broad argues that like Cavendish, Anne Conway ascribes spiritual characteristics to the body and material properties to the soul. According to Broad, their ontological views amount to a rejection of the stereotypes of femininity.Broad argues that Mary Astell's metaphysical views diverge from the modern Cartesians of her time. Although she is indebted to Descartes, Broad contends that she supports a metaphysical system which avoids some of the gender biases identifiable in Cartesianism. Astell, for example, does not find a life based on reason as a rival to a life concerned with the body; her emphasis on rationality is simply a reaction to the stereotype of women as irrational material beings.Damaris Masham is generally considered a philosophical rival of Astell, but Broad argues that Masham's arguments are focused on the same presuppositions as Astell's. She argues that both philosophers champion women's education, criticize the occasionalism of Norris and believe in interaction between the corporeal and incorporeal worlds. Broad emphasizes the common theological outlook inspired by Cambridge Platonism. Contrary to the interpretation of Ruth Perry, she finds that there is sufficient evidence that Masham was positively inspired by the second part of Astell's Serious Proposal.Broad concludes with an analysis of Catherine Cockburns' metaphysics and moral philosophy. According to Cockburn, women's ignorance is simply the result of being discouraged from rational pursuits. Cockburn's defense of Locke's notion of thinking matter and her rejection of Cartesian notions of substance mark the end of the Cartesian influence on women philosophers in England. [End Page 223]Broad has shown that a reverence for reason and dualistic theories do not necessarily go hand in hand. She points out that early Modern feminist thinkers are not simply handmaidens to the great philosophical masters. As other scholars have argued, one can find unique approaches to substance as well as original moral positions.This text is a significant contribution to the literature on early Modern philosophy. Broad's in depth analysis will not fail to interest scholars in metaphysics, the history of philosophy and moral theory. Kathy... (shrink)