ニューロン発火がなぜ「心」になるのか? 私が私であることの不思議、意識の謎に正面から挑んだ、茂木健一郎の核心!

Do conventions need to be common knowledge in order to work? David Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann and others militates against Lewis’s approach, because it shows that it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein’s Email Game suggests that coordinated action (...) is no less hard for rational players without a common knowledge requirement. But an unnecessary simplifying assumption in the Email Game turns out to be doing all the work, and the current paper concludes that common knowledge is better excluded from a definition of the conventions that we use to regulate our daily lives. (shrink)

A 2015 experiment by Hanson and Delft colleagues provided further confirmation that the quantum world violates the Bell inequalities, being the first Bell test to close two known experimental loopholes simultaneously. The experiment was also taken to provide new evidence of ‘spooky action at a distance’. Here we argue for caution about the latter claim. The Delft experiment relies on entanglement swapping, and our main claim is that this geometry introduces an additional loophole in the argument from violation of the (...) Bell inequalities to action at a distance: the apparent action at a distance may be an artifact of ‘collider bias’. In the absence of retrocausality, the sensitivity of such experiments to this ‘Collider Loophole’ depends on the temporal relation between the entanglement swapping measurement C and the two measurements A and B between which we seek to infer a causal connection. CL looms large if the C is in the future of A and B, but not if C is in the past. The Delft experiment itself is the intermediate case, in which the separation is spacelike. We argue that this leaves it vulnerable to CL, unable to establish conclusively that it avoids it. (shrink)

This article criticises one of Stuart Rachels' and Larry Temkin's arguments against the transitivity of 'better than'. This argument invokes our intuitions about our preferences of different bundles of pleasurable or painful experiences of varying intensity and duration, which, it is argued, will typically be intransitive. This article defends the transitivity of 'better than' by showing that Rachels and Temkin are mistaken to suppose that preferences satisfying their assumptions must be intransitive. It makes cler where the argument goes wrong by (...) showing that it is a version of Zeno's paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise. (shrink)

Can people be relied upon to be nice to each other? Thomas Hobbes famously did not think so, but his view that rational cooperation does not require that people be nice has never been popular. The debate has continued to simmer since Joseph Butler took up the Hobbist gauntlet in 1725. This article defends the modern version of Hobbism derived largely from game theory against a new school of Butlerians who call themselves behavioral economists. It is agreed that the experimental (...) evidence supports the claim that most people will often make small sacrifices on behalf of others and that a few will sometimes make big sacrifices, but that the larger claims made by contemporary Butlerians lack genuine support. (shrink)

Some behavioral economists argue that the honoring of social norms can be adequately modeled as the optimization of social utility functions in which the welfare of others appears as an explicit argument. This paper suggests that the large experimental claims made for social utility functions are premature at best, and that social norms are better studied as equilibrium selection devices that evolved for use in games that are seldom studied in economics laboratories.

’Tis vain to talk of adding quantities which after the addition will continue to be as distinct as they were before; one man’s happiness will never be another man’s happiness: a gain to one man is no gain to another: you might as well pretend to add 20 apples to 20 pears.

Games are played everywhere: from economics and online auctions to social interactions, and game theory is about how to play such games in a rational way, and how to maximize their outcomes. This VSI reveals, without mathematical equations, the insights the theory can bring to everything from how to play poker optimally to the sex ratio among bees.

I explicate the conditions required for criminal responsibility, provide an overview of criminal defenses, distinguish criminal responsibility from both tort liability and moral responsibility, and explicate the current state of the insanity defense.

This article is extracted from a forthcoming book, ‘Natural Justice’. It is a nontechnical introduction to the part of game theory immediately relevant to social contract theory. The latter part of the article reviews how concepts such as trust, responsibility, and authority can be seen as emergent phenomena in models that take formal account only of equilibria in indefinitely repeated games. Key Words: game theory • equilibrium • evolutionary stability • reciprocity • folk theorem • trust • altruism • responsibility (...) • authority. (shrink)

The target article by Henrich et al. describes some economic experiments carried out in fifteen small-scale societies. The results are broadly supportive of an approach to understanding social norms that is commonplace among game theorists. It is therefore perverse that the rhetorical part of the paper should be devoted largely to claiming that “economic man” is an experimental failure that needs to be replaced by an alternative paradigm. This brief commentary contests the paper's caricature of economic theory, and offers a (...) small sample of the enormous volume of experimental data that would need to be overturned before “economic man” could be junked. (shrink)

This article focuses on Zhuangzi’s discussions of language to demonstrate how they can clarify his positions on two particular philosophical issues about which there has been significant interest and debate in recent years: relativism and the problem of oneness and skepticism. I argue that Zhuangzi is committed to a universe composed of real, constantly transforming actualities that nevertheless always escape being captured in conventional modes of human logic and language. Examining language metaphors in the text reveals that skepticism and relativism (...) in the Zhuangzi are better understood as rhetorical rather than philosophical strategies. (shrink)

The United States is the hegemon. As the world's superpower, it dominates political discourse and economic policy. Around the world, our hegemony inspires in turn admiration, intimidation, anger, retaliation, and despair. What is the future of our hegemonic world? Is it viable? How will it maintain order? How one answers these questions depends on one's worldview. Many view the world in the clockwork/domination model. Others view it in terms of a self-organizing/web model. Current United States policy works within the first (...) paradigm. I consider the world situation within the self-organization/web paradigm and propose effective methods for conscious evolution. (shrink)

If some external enforcement agency compels us to honor deals reached in the original position, then Harsanyi has shown that the outcome will be utilitarian. Under the same hypotheses, Rawls claims that the outcome will be egalitarian. This chapter confirms that Harsanyi is correct. It goes on to use the concept of an empathy equilibrium to predict the standard of interpersonal comparison needed to operate a utilitarian norm that will evolve in the medium run.

Savage denied that Bayesian decision theory applies in large worlds. This paper proposes a minimal extension of Bayesian decision theory to a large-world context that evaluates an event E\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$E$$\end{document} by assigning it a number π\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\pi $$\end{document} that reduces to an orthodox probability for a class of measurable events. The Hurwicz criterion evaluates π\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\pi $$\end{document} (...) as a weighted arithmetic mean of its upper and lower probabilities, which we derive from the measurable supersets and subsets of E\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$E$$\end{document}. The ambiguity aversion reported in experiments on the Ellsberg paradox is then explained by assigning a larger weight to the lower probability of winning than to the upper probability. However, arguments are given here that would make anything but equal weights irrational when using the Hurwicz criterion. The paper continues by embedding the Hurwicz criterion in an extension of expected utility theory that we call expectant utility. (shrink)

This paper summarizes a theory of fairness that replaces the metaphysical foundations of the egalitarian theory of John Rawls and the utilitarian theory of John Harsanyi with evolutionary arguments. As such, it represents an attempt to realize John Mackie’s call for a theory based on the data provided by anthroplogists and the propositions proved by game theorists. The basic claim is that fairness norms evolved as a device for selecting one of the infinity of efficient equilibria of the repeated game (...) of life played by our prehuman ancestors. (shrink)

This article is my latest attempt to come up with a minimal version of my evolutionary theory of fairness, previously summarized in my book Natural Justice. The naturalism that I espouse is currently unpopular, but Figure 1 shows that the scientific tradition in moral philosophy nevertheless has a long and distinguished history. John Mackie's Inventing Right and Wrong is the most eloquent expression of the case for naturalism in modern times. Mackie's demolition of the claims made for a priori reasoning (...) in moral philosophy seem unanswerable to me. (shrink)

Where should experimental economics go next? This paper uses the literature on inequity aversion as a case study in suggesting that we could profit from tightening up our act.

How might the supernatural be represented in those religious paintings that imply a continuity between the virtual space of painting and the real space of the beholder? Such an implied continuity, dependent upon an engagement where the beholder imaginatively realigns her frame of reference to that of the picture, might be thought to threaten a necessary distance demanded of religious works. This paper examines how a number of painters exploited innovative displacement devices, utilizing inherent ambiguities as to where a painting (...) is relative to its beholder through the withholding of perspectival distance and positional cues for a discrete section of the work. (shrink)

Readers of Eastern Christianity and Late Antique Philosophy will find a collection of authoritative papers from across the Neoplatonic and Eastern Christian traditions. It is only recently that scholars have started to take notice of the Eastern Christian engagement with late antique philosophical texts. This volume builds upon this new interest in order to show the dynamic nature of Neoplatonism and Eastern Christianity at a time when both faced a variety of challenges. The legacy of Greek philosophy in the Christian (...) East fills the gap between the schools of Alexandria and Baghdad and brings into focus the intellectual history of the period. The aim of the volume is to stimulate interest in late antique philosophy and its reception in the Christian East. (shrink)

This chapter surveys the relevant bargaining theory, namely the Nash bargaining solution, the utilitarian bargaining solution, and the egalitarian bargaining solution. The importance of how interpersonal comparisons of utility are made is emphasized.

This chapter reviews the calumnies that are commonly directed at moral naturalists. Philosophical rationalism is compared unfavorably with the empirical tradition by drawing attention to the inadequacies in the reasoning that supposedly leads to Kant's categorical imperative. Moral naturalism is defended on the same basis as biological naturalism. Moral relativism — the big no-no for metaphysical moralists — is defended against a variety of common criticisms; reductionism gets the same treatment. Finally, the life of David Hume is advanced as a (...) counter-example to those who feel that naturalism is necessarily dehumanizing or dispiriting. (shrink)

Metaphysical moral theories can be loosely be divided into theories of the Good or Right. Naturalistic theories can be said to be theories of the seemly — what is appropriate in a particular place and time. This chapter explains how rights and duties can fit within a theory of the seemly. You have a right to do something if you do not have a duty not to do it. You have a duty to do something if you would otherwise diverge (...) from equilibrium play in the social contract currently operated by your society. (shrink)

After demolishing metaphysical notions of moral behavior, John Mackie's Inventing Right and Wrong argues that the way forward is through the study of anthropology and game theory. This chapter begins a review of the basic ideas of game theory by explaining both the rational and the evolutionary interpretation of Nash equilibria in various games, including the Prisoners' Dilemma, the Stag Hunt Game, the Ultimatum Game, the Centipede Game, and the Nash Demand Game.

Sympathy refers to caring about another to some degree as one cares for oneself. Empathy refers to the capacity to put yourself in the position of others to see things from their point of view. Empathetic preferences compare being one person in one situation with being another person in another situation. John Harsanyi showed that mild assumptions imply that to have empathetic preferences is the same thing as having rates at which the utility units of different people are to be (...) traded off against one another. A consequence is that empathetic preferences have the same structure as Hamilton's rule, and so may have originated from strangers adopted into a clan being treated as surrogate kinfolk. But since empathetic preferences are cultural artifacts, they are subject to cultural evolution. The idea of an empathy equilibrium is introduced to capture the medium-run effects of such cultural evolution on empathetic preferences. (shrink)

This chapter explores the consequence of taking Rawls' concerns about the strains of commitment to their logical extreme. If there is no external enforcement at all, so that all agreements must be self-policing, it is shown that deals reached in the original position will generate an egalitarian outcome, as Rawls would wish. The conclusions are broadly consistent with the class of laboratory results that psychologists refer to as “modern equity theory”. The concept of an empathy equilibrium is used to predict (...) the standard of interpersonal comparison needed to operate an egalitarian norm that will evolve in the medium run. The manner in which this standard should be expected to respond to need, effort, ability, and status is then explored. (shrink)

Philosophers used to say that all their endeavours were merely a footnote to Plato. In ethics, this is still largely true.

Economists have in recent years found the theory of games to be an attractive route for exploring imperfectly competitive markets. In this collection of articles, some of the best minds in contemporary economics on both sides of the Atlantic explore both the potential and the limitations of this theoretical framework.

Robert Aumann argues that common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information. I have argued that it does not. A literature now exists in which various formal arguments are offered in support of both positions. This paper argues that Aumann's claim can be justified if knowledge is suitably reinterpreted.

When do we care for others as we care for ourselves? William Hamilton showed that we should be expected to care for our family members in proportion to our degree of relationship to them. Such reasoning explains why eusociality evolved independently at least twelve times in the order Hymenoptera, which includes ants, bees, and wasps, but only three times elsewhere in the animal kingdom. It also verifies Thomas Hobbes' answer to the question: Why cannot mankind live sociably one with another (...) as bees or ants? (shrink)

This commentary on Philip Kitcher’s Ethical Project compares his theory of the evolution of morality with my less ambitious theory of the evolution of fairness norms that seeks to flesh out John Mackie’s insight that one should use game theory as a framework within which to assess anthropological data. It lays particular stress on the importance of the folk theorem of repeated game theory, which provides a template for the set of stable social contracts that were available to ancestral hunter-gatherer (...) communities. It continues by drawing attention to the relevance of Harsanyi’s theory of empathetic preferences in structuring the fairness criteria that evolved as one response to the equilibrium selection problem that the folk theorem demonstrates is endemic in our species. (shrink)

The folk theorem shows that cooperative behavior can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in indefinitely repeated games — a phenomenon known as reciprocal altruism. The same theorem offers a solution to various other social mysteries. Who guards the guardians? How are authority, blame, courtesy, dignity, envy, friendship, guilt, honor, integrity, justice, loyalty, modesty, ownership, pride, reputation, status, trust, virtue, and the like to be explained as emergent phenomena? How do beliefs that many people privately know to be false survive?

This paper suggests that rights are best seen as being part of the description of a social state rather than as constituents of the mechanism by means of which society selects a social state. A theory of this kind is outlined in which a social state is modeled as an equilibrium in the game of life played by the citizens of a society.

This paper uses a 4 × 4 expansion of the Hawk–Dove Game to illustrate how sexual drift in a large genotype space can shift a population from one equilibrium in a smaller phenotype space to another. An equilibrium is only safe from being destabilized in this way when implemented by recessive alleles.

This chapter reviews the relevant anthropology, starting with the apparent universality of the golden rule — do as you would be done by — in hunter-gatherer societies. It points out that all pure foraging societies have two properties: they do not tolerate bosses, and they share very fairly. A putative explanation of the first property is offered that appeals to the game theory discipline of mechanism design. The second property is explained as an evolutionary consequence of the implicit insurance contracts (...) that are common in animals as ahedge against hunger and starvation. If so, then we have an argument in support of the contention that Rawls' original position captures the deep structure of fairness norms wired into our brains. The analogy with Chomsky's deep structure of language is close. (shrink)

We attempt to quantify and qualify the preferences of consumers for beef with a number of environmental and food quality attributes. Our goal is to evaluate the viability of a proposed food co-operative based in the Wood River watershed of southern Saskatchewan, Canada. The food co-operative was designed to provide a price premium to producers who adopted alternative management practices. In addition, the study evaluated the acceptance of a proposed food co-operative by consumer that had environmental interests as compared to (...) the general population. Conjoint analysis was used to determine the trade-off and relative value of beef with the following production and purchasing characteristics: (a) use of hormones, antibiotics and vaccination in production; (b) method of obtaining the beef including monthly or yearly purchase contracts or a local market; (c) price relative to beef purchased from the local grocery store; and (d) impact on the river ecosystem. Consumers from environmental groups had stronger environmental and food quality preferences than individuals from the general population. However, consumers from both groups expressed a willingness to pay higher prices for food that had these attributes. It was uncertain whether the magnitude of the premium, in combination with a desire not to enter a long-term purchasing commitment, would be large enough to encourage farmers to adopt the alternative management. (shrink)