Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) argue that recent findings challenge the hypothesis of abstract numerical representations. Here we show that because, like many other authors in the field, they rely on inaccurate definitions of abstract and non-abstract representations, CK&W fail to provide compelling evidence against the abstract view.

With his massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH), Anderson claims that novel cognitive functions are likely to rely on pre-existing circuits already possessing suitable resources. Here, we put forward recent findings from studies in numerical cognition in order to show that the role of sensorimotor experience in the ontogenetical development of a new function has been largely underestimated in Anderson's proposal.

Rips et al. claim that the principles underlying the structure of natural numbers cannot be inferred from interactions with the physical world. However, in their target article they failed to consider an important source of interaction: finger counting. Here, we show that finger counting satisfies all the conditions required for allowing the concept of numbers to emerge from sensorimotor experience through a bottom-up process.

Rips et al.'s proposition cannot account for the facts that (1) a historical look at the word number systems suggests that the concept of natural numbers has been progressively elaborated; (2) people from cultures without an elaborate counting system do not master the concept of natural numbers; (3) children take time to master natural numbers; and (4) the competing advantage of the postulated math schema in the natural selection process is not obvious.

Humphreys & Forde concentrate on the living/nonliving dissociation. However, further dissociations have been reported, including selective loss or preservation in recognizing body parts and numbers. This commentary outlines the relevance of the number category for understanding the organising principles of semantic memory.

En enero de 1974 Zubiri dio un breve curso en la Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones de Madrid sobre el tema Tres dimensiones del ser humano: individual, social e histórica. Meses después publicó la última de esas lecciones bajo el título de La dimensión histórica del ser humano. El presente volumen recoge el texto de las tres conferencias, más la versión escrita de la última de ellas. La tesis que Zubiri desarrolla en estas lecciones es que el ser humano es (...) a la vez y necesariamente individual, social e histórico, y que estas dimensiones vienen exigidas por su propia realidad específica, que es pluralizante, continuante y prospectiva. (shrink)

How is it possible to have present memory experiences of things that, being past, are no longer presently experienced? A possible answer to this long-standing philosophical question is what I call the “ideality of time view,” namely the view that temporal succession is unreal. In this paper I outline the basic idea behind Brentano’s version of the ideality of time view. Additionally, I contrast it with Hume’s version, suggesting that, despite significant differences, it can nonetheless be construed as broadly Humean.

Como é possível ter experiências de memória presente de coisas que, sendo passadas, não são mais experimentadas no presente? Uma resposta possível a esta pergunta filosófica de longa data é o que eu chamo de "visão da idealidade do tempo", ou seja, a visão de que a sucessão temporal é irreal. Neste artigo, esboço a ideia por trás da versão de Brentano da visão da idealidade do tempo. Além disso, eu a contrasto com a versão de Hume, sugerindo que, apesar (...) das diferenças significativas, ela pode, no entanto, ser interpretada como humeana em sentido amplo. (shrink)

En un diálogo continuo con la tradición filosófica, Zubiri va página a página describiendo el acto de la intelección humana y desmontando el cúmulo de hipótesis y teorías que subyacen al llamado «problema del conocimiento». Zubiri consigue descubrir, mediante el recurso a un procedimiento puramente descriptivo, en qué consiste el acto humano por excelencia, la intelección. La intelección humana, dice Zubiri, no es una síntesis trascendental, sino algo más simple a la vez que más radical, la mera actualización de lo (...) real en la inteligencia sentiente. (shrink)

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn is mostly known for his contributions to the philosophy of science. However, it was chiefly to investigations in philosophy of language that he dedicated the last part of his career. The aim of this paper is to present a systematic view of Kuhn’s main ideas on this subject. I start by describing his theory of concept, in particular what he says about kind terms. Such terms, acquired in blocks that form contrast sets or “taxonomies,” are learned through ostensible (...) definitions. Next, I analyze Kuhn’s concepts of “meaning” and “truth.” Finally, I discuss a second type of kinds terms, not fully investigated by him, which is learned together with scientific laws. Resumo Thomas Kuhn é conhecido principalmente por suas contribuições para a filosofia da ciência. No entanto, foi em grande medida à filosofia da linguagem que ele dedicou a última parte de sua carreira. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma visão sistemática das principais ideias de Kuhn sobre esse assunto. Começo descrevendo sua teoria do conceito, em particular o que ele diz sobre termos para espécie. Tais termos, aprendidos em blocos que formam conjuntos de contraste ou “taxonomias”, são aprendidos através de definições ostensivas. Em seguida, analiso as concepções de Kuhn de “significado” e “verdade”. Finalmente, discuto um segundo tipo de termo para espécies, não totalmente investigado por ele, que é aprendido junto com as leis científicas. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...) a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account. (shrink)

RESUMENLa duración ha sido una de las nociones que ha hecho célebre la filosofía bergsoniana y es, sin duda, su noción central. La encontramos presente ya en el Ensayo referida a la vida psicológica. Más tarde, en La evolución creadora, Bergson la extiende a los seres vivos, a la evolución de las especies y, posteriormente, a todo el universo. Es pues, el tejido mismo de lo real. centrándonos en la duración "psicológica", este trabajo pretende mostrar la concepción bergsoniana del acto (...) libre y la libertad que de ella se desprende. PALABRAS CLAVEDURACION-ACTO LIBRE-TIEMPO FISICO-CONSCIENCIAABSTRACTThe duration has been one of the concepts wich has made Bergson's philosophhy famous and it is undoubtly its key concept. We already find it present in Essai concerning psychological life, and later on, in L'evolution creatrice. Bergson extends it to living beings, to the evolution of the species and still to whole universe. Therefore, it is the very "stuff" of reality. being imposible to deal with this concept under these aspects, in this paper, we will focus on the "psychological" duration, in order to demonstrate that this notion means a conception of the free act and the freedom concerned. KEYWORDSDURATION-FREE ACT-PHYSICAL TIMES-CONCIOUSNESS. (shrink)

RESUMENAunque Bergson no ignoró las tesis de Freud ni el psicoanálisis, sin embargo las divergencias entre los dos pensadores respecto al inconsciente resultan, en gran medida, irreconciliables. El presente trabajo pretende mostrar que sus intereses en este ámbito fueron dispares: mientras Freud se interesó por el funcionamiento de los procesos inconscientes atendiendo a un punto de vista experimental más que especulativo, a Bergson le preocupa su existencia y naturaleza.PALABRAS CLAVEINCONSCIENTE – PSICOLOGÍA – BERGSON – FREUD ABSTRACTAlthough Bergson did not ignore (...) Freud’s theses nor phychoanalysis, their divergencies concerning the unconcious are, to a great extent, irrenconciliable. The present article intentds to demostrate that ther interests were completely different : whereas Freud was interested in the unconcious processes from an experimental rather than a spectualtive point of view, Bergson was concerned with their existence and nature.KEYWORDSUNCONSCIOUS – PSYCHOLOGY – BEGSON – FREUD. (shrink)

RESUMENLos progresos tecnológicos y teóricos alcanzados por las neurociencias en estos últimos veinticinco añis, y sus implicaciones para la filosofía, han renovado las posibilidades de aproximación entre ambas, propiciando el desarrollo de un nuevo ámbito de estudio dentro de la filosofía: la neurofilosofía. El presente trabajo se propone sugerir cómo este campo emergente podría ser concebido como un punto de encuentro para la reflexión conjunta y la interacción entre filosofía y neurociencias, no marcado necesariamente por la absorción de la primera (...) por la segunda.PALABRAS CLAVENEUROFILOSOFÍA, FILOSOFÍA, NEUROCIENCIAS, CIENCIAS COGNITIVASABSTRACTThe technological and theoretical advances in neurosciencies in the past twenty-five years, as well as their implications for philosophy have opened promising perspectives for the renewal of approache between both, thus encouraging the development of a arising field within philosophy: neurophilosophy. The purpose of this paper is to suggest how this new field study could be considered to be a point of union for the joint reflection and interaction between philosophy and neurosciencies, without the first being absorbed by the second.KEYWORDSNEUROPHILOSOPHY, PHILOSOPHY, NEUROSCIENCES, COGNITIVE SCIENCES. (shrink)

Though the target article is not without fertile suggestions, at least two problems limit its overall validity: (1) the extended gene-culture coevolutionary framework is not an alternative to standard evolutionary theory; (2) the proposed model does not explain how much time is necessary for selective pressure to determine the stabilization of a new aspect of the genotype.

The past decade has seen a burgeoning of scholarly interest in conscientious objection in healthcare. While the literature to date has focused primarily on individual healthcare practitioners who object to participation in morally controversial procedures, in this article we consider a different albeit related issue, namely, whether publicly funded healthcare institutions should be required to provide morally controversial services such as abortions, emergency contraception, voluntary sterilizations, and voluntary euthanasia. Substantive debates about institutional responsibility have remained largely at the level of (...) first-order ethical debate over medical practices which institutions have refused to offer; in this article, we argue that more fundamental questions about the metaphysics of institutions provide a neglected avenue for understanding the basis of institutional conscientious objection. To do so, we articulate a metaphysical model of institutional conscience, and consider three well-known arguments for undermining institutional conscientious objection in light of this model. We show how our metaphysical analysis of institutions creates difficulties for justifying sanctions on institutions that conscientiously object. Thus, we argue, questions about the metaphysics of institutions are deserving of serious attention from both critics and defenders of institutional conscientious objection. (shrink)