The neural representation of a repeated stimulus is the standard against which a deviant stimulus is measured in the brain, giving rise to the well-known mismatch response. It has been suggested that individuals with dyslexia have poor implicit memory for recently repeated stimuli, such as the train of standards in an oddball paradigm. Here, we examined how the neural representation of a standard emerges over repetitions, asking whether there is less sensitivity to repetition and/or less accrual of “standardness” over successive (...) repetitions in dyslexia. We recorded magnetoencephalography as adults with and without dyslexia were passively exposed to speech syllables in a roving-oddball design. We performed time-resolved multivariate decoding of the MEG sensor data to identify the neural signature of standard vs. deviant trials, independent of stimulus differences. This “multivariate mismatch” was equally robust and had a similar time course in the two groups. In both groups, standards generated by as few as two repetitions were distinct from deviants, indicating normal sensitivity to repetition in dyslexia. However, only in the control group did standards become increasingly different from deviants with repetition. These results suggest that many of the mechanisms that give rise to neural adaptation as well as mismatch responses are intact in dyslexia, with the possible exception of a putatively predictive mechanism that successively integrates recent sensory information into feedforward processing. (shrink)

It was, until recently, accepted that the two classes of acetylcholine (ACh) receptors are distinct in an important sense: muscarinic ACh receptors signal via heterotrimeric GTP binding proteins (G proteins), whereas nicotinic ACh receptors (nAChRs) open to allow flux of Na+, Ca2+, and K+ ions into the cell after activation. Here we present evidence of direct coupling between G proteins and nAChRs in neurons. Based on proteomic, biophysical, and functional evidence, we hypothesize that binding to G proteins modulates the activity (...) and signaling of nAChRs in cells. It is important to note that while this hypothesis is new for the nAChR, it is consistent with known interactions between G proteins and structurally related ligand‐gated ion channels. Therefore, it underscores an evolutionarily conserved metabotropic mechanism of G protein signaling via nAChR channels.Also watch the Video Abstract. (shrink)

A maximal almost disjoint (mad) family $\mathscr{A} \subseteq [\omega]^\omega$ is Cohen-stable if and only if it remains maximal in any Cohen generic extension. Otherwise it is Cohen-unstable. It is shown that a mad family, A, is Cohen-unstable if and only if there is a bijection G from ω to the rationals such that the sets G[A], A ∈A are nowhere dense. An ℵ 0 -mad family, A, is a mad family with the property that given any countable family $\mathscr{B} \subset (...) [\omega]^\omega$ such that each element of B meets infinitely many elements of A in an infinite set there is an element of A meeting each element of B in an infinite set. It is shown that Cohen-stable mad families exist if and only if there exist ℵ 0 -mad families. Either of the conditions b = c or $\mathfrak{a} ) implies that there exist Cohen-stable mad families. Similar results are obtained for splitting families. For example, a splitting family, S, is Cohen-unstable if and only if there is a bijection G from ω to the rationals such that the boundaries of the sets G[S], S ∈S are nowhere dense. Also, Cohen-stable splitting families of cardinality ≤ κ exist if and only if ℵ 0 -splitting families of cardinality ≤ κ exist. (shrink)

We study the partial orderings of the form ⟨P,⊂⟩\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\langle \mathbb{P}, \subset\rangle}$$\end{document}, where X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{X}}$$\end{document} is a binary relational structure with the connectivity components isomorphic to a strongly connected structure Y\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{Y}}$$\end{document} and P\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{P} }$$\end{document} is the set of substructures of X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} (...) \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb {X}}$$\end{document} isomorphic to X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{X}}$$\end{document}. We show that, for example, for a countable X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{X}}$$\end{document}, the poset ⟨P,⊂⟩\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\langle \mathbb {P}, \subset\rangle}$$\end{document} is either isomorphic to a finite power of P\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{P} }$$\end{document} or forcing equivalent to a separative atomless σ-closed poset and, consistently, to P/fin. In particular, this holds for each ultrahomogeneous structure X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{X}}$$\end{document} such that X\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{X}}$$\end{document} or Xc\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{X}^{c}}$$\end{document} is a disconnected structure and in this case Y\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{Y}}$$\end{document} can be replaced by an ultrahomogeneous connected digraph. (shrink)

A sequence x=xn:nω of elements of a complete Boolean algebra converges to a priori if lim infx=lim supx=b. The sequential topology τs on is the maximal topology on such that x→b implies x→τsb, where →τs denotes the convergence in the space — the a posteriori convergence. These two forms of convergence, as well as the properties of the sequential topology related to forcing, are investigated. So, the a posteriori convergence is described in terms of killing of tall ideals on ω, (...) and it is shown that the a posteriori convergence is equivalent to the a priori convergence iff forcing by does not produce new reals. A property of c.B.a.’s, satisfying -cc -cc and providing an explicit definition of the a posteriori convergence, is isolated. Finally, it is shown that, for an arbitrary c.B.a. , the space is sequentially compact iff the algebra has the property and does not produce independent reals by forcing, and that implies P is the unique sequentially compact c.B.a. in the class of Suslin forcing notions. (shrink)

The game Gls(κ) is played on a complete Boolean algebra B, by two players. White and Black, in κ-many moves (where κ is an infinite cardinal). At the beginning White chooses a non-zero element p ∈ B. In the α-th move White chooses pα ∈ (0.p)p and Black responds choosing iα ∈ {0.1}. White wins the play iff $\bigwedge _{\beta \in \kappa}\bigvee _{\alpha \geq \beta }p_{\alpha}^{i\alpha}=0$ , where $p_{\alpha}^{0}=p_{\alpha}$ and $p_{\alpha}^{1}=p\ p_{\alpha}$ . The corresponding game theoretic properties of c.B.a.'s are (...) investigated. So. Black has a winning strategy (w.s) if κ ≥ π(B) or if B contains a κ -closed dense subset. On the other hand, if White has a w.s., then κ ∈ [h₂(B). π(B)). The existence of w.s. is characterized in a combinatorial way and in terms of forcing. In particular, if 2κ = κ ∈ Reg and forcing by B preserves the regularity of κ, then White has a w.s. iff the power 2κ is collapsed to κ in some extension. It is shown that, under the GCH, for each set S ⊆ Reg there is a c.B.a. B such that White (respectively. Black) has a w.s. for each infinite cardinal κ ∈ S (resp. κ ∉ S). Also it is shown consistent that for each κ ∈ Reg there is a c.B.a. on which the game Gls(κ) is undetermined. (shrink)

A complete Boolean algebra ${\mathbb{B}}$ satisfies property ${(\hbar)}$ iff each sequence x in ${\mathbb{B}}$ has a subsequence y such that the equality lim sup z n = lim sup y n holds for each subsequence z of y. This property, providing an explicit definition of the a posteriori convergence in complete Boolean algebras with the sequential topology and a characterization of sequential compactness of such spaces, is closely related to the cellularity of Boolean algebras. Here we determine the position of (...) property ${(\hbar)}$ with respect to the hierarchy of conditions of the form κ-cc. So, answering a question from Kurilić and Pavlović (Ann Pure Appl Logic 148(1–3):49–62, 2007), we show that ${``\mathfrak{h}{\rm -cc}\Rightarrow (\hbar)"}$ is not a theorem of ZFC and that there is no cardinal ${\mathfrak{k}}$ , definable in ZFC, such that ${``\mathfrak{k} {\rm -cc} \Leftrightarrow (\hbar)"}$ is a theorem of ZFC. Also, we show that the set ${\{ \kappa : {\rm each}\, \kappa{\rm -cc\, c.B.a.\, has}\, (\hbar ) \}}$ is equal to ${[0, \mathfrak{h})}$ or ${[0, {\mathfrak h}]}$ and that both values are consistent, which, with the known equality ${{\{\kappa : {\rm each\, c.B.a.\, having }\, (\hbar )\, {\rm has\, the}\, \kappa {\rm -cc } \} =[{\mathfrak s}, \infty )}}$ completes the picture. (shrink)

The study of culture and cultural selection from a biological perspective has been hampered by the lack of any firm theoretical basis for how the information for cultural traits is stored and transmitted. In addition, the study of any living system with a decentralized or multi-level information structure has been somewhat restricted due to the focus in genetics on the gene and the particular hereditary structure of multicellular organisms. Here a different perspective is used, one which regards living systems as (...) self-constructing energy users that utilize their genome as a library of information, making the genetic system just another component that adds fitness to the overall integrated unit. In this framework, basic fitness is measured as the ability to gather energy for growth and reproduction, and the fitness of the genetic system is broken down into two aspects: first, the effectiveness in searching for new somatic functional information, and second, the effectiveness in searching for better structures to store and process information. With this more generalized perspective, major evolutionary transitions to higher levels of organization become competitions between different information structures; furthermore the functioning and fitness of cultural systems can be more easily described and compared with other modes of information storage within biological systems. Modern technological societies are self-constructing systems that rely on written (symbolic) information storage and very complex algorithms that effectively search for variation with a high probability of successful selection. These systems are currently competing with traditional organic systems, and this competition constitutes the latest major evolutionary transition. Upon comparison of the energy-gathering potential of symbolic-based systems with DNA-based life, it appears that symbolic systems have a tremendous fitness potential and the current shift to a higher level of selection may be as significant and far-reaching as any of the previous major evolutionary transitions. (shrink)

Cognitive overlap between art and science can be found in the processes of learning through experience. What necessarily needs to be present in these processes are not good reasons in favor of what is known or learnt, but the following features: The first feature art and science have in common is the negativity of learning processes: What a cognizer C learns through experience is that her theories, expectations, attitudes, trials, etc. are wrong and should be abandoned in order to advance. (...) This leads us to the second common feature of art and science: if C is to err, and thus to learn through experience, she must create something in advance. It is further argued that C learns through experience due to causal relations between the environment and her sensations and beliefs. This cannot be accomplished, however, if C is not aware of the notion of objective truth. Empirical knowledge is social and public, yet its truth is not reducible to social agreement. More could be learnt about the learning through experience in art and science, if anyone showed that some of the features or relations proposed in this paper are not necessary for learning. (shrink)

Atque illo die certe Aricia rediens devertit Clodius ad se in Albanum: quod ut sciret Milo ilium Ariciae fuisse, suspicari tamen debuit eum, etiam si Romam illo die reverti vellet, ad villam suam, quae viam tangeret, deversurum. THIS passage is interesting in that its argument runs counter to the main picture which Cicero had earlier presented of the movements of Milo and Clodius before they met on the Appian Way in January 52 B.C. In an earlier passage Cicero (...) says: ‘Interim cum sciret Clodius–neque enim difficile erat id scire–xiter sollemne, legitimum, necessarium ante diem XIII Kalendas Februarias Miloni esse Lanuvium ad flaminem prodendum, quod erat dictator Lanuvii Milo, Roma subito ipse profectus pridie est, ut ante suum fundum, quod re intellectum est, Miloni insidias conlocaret.’ Cicero remains true to this latter version in all the relevant arguments concerning the motives and movements of Clodius and Milo. Milo had legitimate business at Lanuvium, and hence a legitimate reason for being on the road at the time of the affray; Clodius′ presence is explained by Cicero as due solely to the desire to place an ambush for his enemy at a convenient spot, i.e. in front of his farm, and for this reason he had set out from Rome a day before Milo, when his presence was really required in Rome. (shrink)

Atque illo die certe Aricia rediens devertit Clodius ad se in Albanum: quod ut sciret Milo ilium Ariciae fuisse, suspicari tamen debuit eum, etiam si Romam illo die reverti vellet, ad villam suam, quae viam tangeret, deversurum.THIS passage is interesting in that its argument runs counter to the main picture which Cicero had earlier presented of the movements of Milo and Clodius before they met on the Appian Way in January 52 B.C. In an earlier passage Cicero says: (...) ‘Interim cum sciret Clodius–neque enim difficile erat id scire–xiter sollemne, legitimum, necessarium ante diem XIII Kalendas Februarias Miloni esse Lanuvium ad flaminem prodendum, quod erat dictator Lanuvii Milo, Roma subito ipse profectus pridie est, ut ante suum fundum, quod re intellectum est, Miloni insidias conlocaret.’ Cicero remains true to this latter version in all the relevant arguments concerning the motives and movements of Clodius and Milo. Milo had legitimate business at Lanuvium, and hence a legitimate reason for being on the road at the time of the affray; Clodius′ presence is explained by Cicero as due solely to the desire to place an ambush for his enemy at a convenient spot, i.e. in front of his farm, and for this reason he had set out from Rome a day before Milo, when his presence was really required in Rome. (shrink)

In 2006, Bill Crain was a psychology professor and his wife, Ellen, a pediatrician. They purchased a run-down farm in upstate New York, and two years later opened Safe Haven Farm Sanctuary. It is now home to over 170 animals rescued from slaughter. In Animal Stories, Bill writes about how he and Ellen decided to start the sanctuary and tells the stories of 25 animals and their many surprising behaviors. Read about Katie, a hen who cared for a little partridge; (...) Cesar, a little goat who constantly gets into trouble; Reggie, a rooster who instilled fear in all the staff; Milo, a goat who suddenly charged the dominant Duncan to defend his mother; four rambunctious young turkeys who quietly listened to a reverent Girl Scout ceremony; Ducky, a turkey who, despite severe arthritis, walked from her barn to greet a Buddhist monk; Ethel, an elderly cow who assumes the responsibility of a matriarch; and many others. In addition to enjoying the stories, readers will learn a great deal about nonhuman animals. (shrink)

Under no circumstances should the absurd "right to roam‟ be incorporated into the legislation of this country. In reality, it is clearly a mere licence to trespass. Armed with the appropriate economic and philosophical arguments, we should eventually be able to offer an effective counter-attack with a movement for the "right to own‟ privately every last one of the state-controlled commons, heaths, hills, mountains, downs, woodlands, rivers, beaches, and footpaths. As a result, there will be no imposition on legitimate landowners (...) and more access to better resources for ramblers. (shrink)

Książka stanowi wprowadzenie do twórczości Richarda Rorty'ego, a także próbę osadzenia jej na szerszym tle filozofii współczesnej, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem filozofii postmodernistycznej. Obecne są w niej szersze analizy stanu kultury współczesnej, a także relacje z istotnych koncepcji obecnych we współczesnej humanistyce, bez których nie można zrozumieć ewolucji współczesnej humanistyki i specjalnej roli, jaką odegrała w niej filozofia Richarda Rorty'ego.

_ Source: _Volume 56, Issue 3-4, pp 241 - 271 William of Ockham and John Buridan provide different accounts of the distinction between formal and material consequences. Some consequences – in particular, enthymemes – that Ockham would classify as formal would be classified as material by Buridan. This paper explains this taxonomical discrepancy. It identifies the root of the discrepancy not in a difference between Ockham’s and Buridan’s notions of propositional hylomorphism but rather in Ockham’s endorsement of relational characterizations of (...) consequences. (shrink)

As an important corollary of this interpretation of absolute knowledge, the dissertation concludes with the suggestion that Hegelian philosophy need not be regarded merely as an interesting curiosity in the history of ideas, but rather that it can serve as a vital and potentially rewarding source of fresh theoretical insights. ;Instead, the concrete completeness of speculative philosophy can only consist in the activity of a dynamical, ceaselessly self-examining and self-regulating intellectual community. In one sense, of course, no finite system can (...) ever be complete, insofar as it will inevitably be guilty of errors and misconceptions. Yet at the same time, the infinite System is perfect and complete, insofar as it contains within itself the means whereby its own unavoidable flaws will be discovered, corrected, and "forgiven"--i.e. aufgehoben into vanishing moments of a universal totality. ;In opposition to most traditional interpretations of Hegel, the position is maintained that Hegel himself deliberately faced this problem, and that a true understanding of his proposed solution requires a radical Aufhebung of the concept of cognition as such. Relying primarily on the penultimate chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the dissertation argues that absolute knowledge can neither be a finalized system of fully explicit content, nor an endless movement toward such an ideal state. ;This dissertation undertakes a critical examination of one central problem in Hegelian philosophy: viz., whether the final realization of "absolute knowledge" is logically consistent with significant epistemic progress in the system's continuing development. Serious consideration of the concept of systematic completeness, as interpreted on Hegel's terms, uncovers the existence of a profound paradox. On the one hand, if the Truth is the Whole, then the truth of any finite part or aspect of that Whole depends upon its place within the system as a totality. In order to grasp the part and comprehend it correctly, one must already have a systematically ordered knowledge of the universe in its entirety. Yet the methodological open-endedness of dialectical thinking precludes the acceptance of any particular theoretical formulation as final or complete in itself. Hegel interprets the history of philosophy as a progression of successive formulations of the Truth, each of which improves on its predecessors by reconciling their internal contradictions, but no one of which is adequate in itself. Hence, no theoretical world view, including Hegel's own, can rest content within its limits, for the inevitable advance of thought must in the end throw it down. (shrink)

The concept of cuteness, which can evoke positive emotions in people, is an essential aspect to consider in artificial intelligence design. This study aimed to investigate whether the use of baby schema designed avatars in computer-mediated communication elicits higher positive attitudes than neutral avatars and whether the ethnicity of the cute avatars influences individuals' perceived level of cuteness. 485 participants from Israel and Japan viewed six avatar images, including three baby schema avatars of different visual characteristics and ethnicities (Caucasian, Asian, (...) and Black) and three neutral avatars. Participants rated their attitudes on each avatar, and the results revealed that the baby schema designed avatars were rated cuter, more likable, approachable, and pleasant than the neutral mature avatars. Cultural differences were also evident, as the Caucasian baby schema avatar was rated cuter among Japanese participants, while the Asian and Black baby schema avatars were rated cuter among Israeli respondents. The study findings suggest that cute avatar design can serve as a powerful tool for promoting positive interactions in computer-mediated communication, especially in cultures that highly value cuteness, such as Japan. However, the subjective nature of cuteness is evident as attitudes toward cuteness varied significantly across cultures and individuals. This research highlights the significance of cultural diversity and emphasizes the importance of considering cuteness as a crucial aspect of artificial intelligence design, particularly when creating avatars intended to elicit positive emotions from users. Therefore, designers should be mindful of potential cultural and individual differences in the perception of cuteness while developing avatars for various applications. (shrink)

Here I reply to a recent exchange between Edgar Danielyan and Brian Garrett regarding Alvin Plantinga’s assessment of Gaunilo’s ‘ideal island’ objection to Anselm’s ontological argument. I argue that an ideal island is conceivable if it’s defined as any island exhibiting an ideal ratio of great-making island properties.

The book presents Transparent Intensional Logic in several of its latest realisations in such a way that it makes a case for the system and demonstrates how the theory can be applied to a wide range of cases.

The subject of this paper is Charles Morris’ semiotic theory that has as one of its major projects the unification of all sciences of signs. However, since the above project has proven to be unsuccessful, we will try to examine here the reasons that led to this. Accordingly, we will argue that to transcend the particularities of individual disciplines that he wanted to unify, Morris had to make certain ontological assumptions, instead of theoretical and methodological ones, that they could share. (...) However, because the 'sign' as an ontological category could in our view only be established if we follow the principles of the pragmatic philosophical tradition, we will try to show that the reasons for this failure should be primarily sought in different effects that consistent application of the pragmatic principles has in each of them (primarily in linguistics and the philosophy of language). On the other hand, this should enable us to draw several important conclusions regarding Morris’ project: namely, that his failure does not have to mean giving up semiotics as a potentially key discipline in approaching some fundamental philosophical problems, but also that it would demand return to the original semiotics developed in Peirce’s works. (shrink)

This paper deals with Schaffer’s distinction between metaphysical structures, as well as his appeal for revival of neo-Aristotelian approaches that imply ordered structure, based on the criticism of Quine’s method that, in his view, implies flat metaphysical structure. However, although we believe that Schaffer’s distinction between metaphysical structures is an interesting and, basically, acceptable view, we will try to show that Schaffer’s arguments are not convincing enough to persuade us to abandon Quine’s method and adopt the Aristotelian metaphysical model. Moreover, (...) when mistakes that Schaffer makes are corrected and Quine’s method is given due attention, we will see that this can enable us a more tenable interpretation of the concepts that Schaffer speaks of (metaphysical structures), but also – as in his case – to draw certain conclusions that go beyond objectives of classification as such. (shrink)

Very often moral disagreements can be resolved by appealing to factual considerations because in these cases the parties to the dispute agree as to which factual considerations are relevant. They agree, that is, with respect to their basic moral standards. Hence, when their disagreement about the non-moral facts is resolved, so is their moral disagreement. But sometimes moral disagreement persists in spite of agreement on factual considerations. When this happens, and when neither party is guilty of illogical thinking, we have (...) a case of moral deadlock. (shrink)

Although Williams’ contextual thesis is above all a critique of one way of interpreting contextualism in epistemology, viz., simple conversational contextualisam, I will argue that this thesis has also been a very successful means for the critique of a standpoint on which that interpretation, and the entire traditional epistemology rests - epistemological realism. Accordingly, in spite of certain weaknesses in Williams’ position pointed out by his critiques, in this paper I will try to show that, by interpreting the problem of (...) scepticism as first and foremost a methodological necessity of epistemological realism, Williams succeeds in offering an enlightening diagnosis of the sceptical paradox problem which is at the centre of epistemology traditionally construed. (shrink)

In this paper we will try to show the differences between Quine’s and Gibson’s interpretation of the naturalized epistemology project. Namely, although Gibson points out that the genetic approach advocated by Quine is the best strategy there is to investigate the relations between evidence and theory, and that externalizing of empiricism that it requires is one of Quine’s major philosophical contributions, we argue that the assumptions on which Gibson’s project is based, apart from the fact that they are in conflict (...) with some strongly held intuitions, would have to be essentially different from Quine’s. In other words, contrary to Quine’s position within which we have the possibility of staying on more moderate, and in our opinion, more plausible behavioristic line of approach, we will try to show that one of the consequences of Gibson’s interpretation is that this possibility is ruled out in Gibson’s case. On the other hand, this should enable us to draw some more radical conclusions about the nature of Quine’s epistemological project. (shrink)

In this paper, we will try to confront Quine’s and Davidson’s holistic position through Davidson’s thesis of the mental as a non-ontological category. In this regard, since Davidson came to this position through the thesis of the mental as a decidedly conceptual category, we will try to show how this approach does not, nevertheless, rule out the possibility of its interpretation in ontological terms. However, in what follows we will draw attention to the fact that the mental can be interpreted (...) so that it proves to be immune to ontologizing in Quine’s sense. This would be the evidence of different ways, which are not necessarily compatible, to argue for Davidson’s central thesis - the thesis about holistic character of the mental - as well as, which is closely related, a certain difference that exists between Davidson’s view of the mental as a conceptual category on the one hand, and a holistic category on the other. (shrink)

This paper deals with Peirce’s understanding of perceptual judgment, relating it to the conditions for the use of language defined by Michael Dummett. Namely, drawing on Dummett’s requirement for harmony between descriptive and evaluative aspects of our linguistic practice, we will try to give an interpretation of Peirce’s view of perception that implies rejecting the idea that the formation of a perceptual judgment has an inferential structure. On the other hand, since it is, in Peirce’s opinion, the structure of abductive (...) inference, this approach should enable us to draw some conclusions related to abduction in general. (shrink)

The article provides a critical review of the books Rijec je o slici by Jagor Bucan and Slika i rec by the Serbian Society for Aesthetics. From the titles it is already evident that they share the same topic. The paper points out the similarities between the two texts on both what is present and what is absent in them, which also seems important for understanding the theoretical problems they deal with.