What modal relation must a fact bear to a belief in order for this belief to constitute knowledge of that fact? Externalists have proposed various answers, including some that combine externalism with contextualism. We shall find that various forms of externalism share a modal conception of “sensitivity” open to serious objections. Fortunately, the undeniable intuitive attractiveness of this conception can be explained through an easily confused but far preferable notion of “safety.” The denouement of our reflections, finally, will be to (...) show how replacing sensitivity with safety makes it possible to defend plain Moorean common sense against the spurious advantages over it claimed by skeptical, tracking, relevant-alternative, and contextualist accounts. (shrink)

Rational beings pursue and value truth . Intellectual conduct is to be judged, accordingly, by how well it aids our pursuit of that ideal. I ask whether these platitudes mean, and whether they are true.

This paper presents an account of intuitions, and a defense of their epistemic efficacy in general, and more specifically in philosophy, followed by replies in response to various objections.

An intellectual virtue is a quality bound to help maximize one’s surplus of truth over error; or so let us assume for now, though a more just conception may include as desiderata also generality, coherence, and explanatory power, unless the value of these is itself explained as derivative from the character of their contribution precisely to one’s surplus of truth over error. This last is an issue I mention in order to lay it aside. Here we assume only a teleological (...) conception of intellectual virtue, the relevant end being a proper relation to the truth, exact requirements of such propriety not here fully specified. (shrink)

The mind-body problem arises because of our status as double agents apparently en rapport both with the mental and with the physical. We think, desire, decide, plan, suffer passions, fall into moods, are subject to sensory experiences, ostensibly perceive, intend, reason, make believe, and so on. We also move, have a certain geographical position, a certain height and weight, and we are sometimes hit or cut or burned. In other words, human beings have both minds and bodies. What is the (...) relation between these? Religion often tells us that we are really embodied souls released at death from our bodily prisons. Could this be right? (shrink)

In Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (OUP, 2002).

[ES] La creencia es considerada como una especie de expresión, que alcanza un nivel de éxito si es verdadera, un segundo nivel si es competente, y un tercero si es verdadera por ser competente. El conocimiento a un nivel es una creencia apta. La normatividad epistémica que constituye tal conocimiento es, de esta manera, una especie de normatividad de la expresión. Un problema surge para esta explicación del hecho de que la suspensión de la creencia parece caer bajo la misma (...) especie de normatividad epistémica que la creencia misma; aunque suspender es, sin embargo, precisamente no actuar, en todo caso no teniendo como objetivo la verdad. El presente trabajo examina este problema, y propone una solución que distingue varios niveles de normatividad de expresión, incluyendo un primer orden donde la competencia de expresión está en juego, y un segundo orden en que el ejecutante tiene que evaluar el riesgo concomitante con la realización de una expresión de primer orden. Esto introduce un nivel de conocimiento reflexivo que se eleva encima del nivel animal. [EN] Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true, a second level if competent, and a third if true because competent. Knowledge on one level is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of epistemic normativity as does belief itself, yet to suspend is of course precisely not to perform, certainly not with the aim of truth. The paper takes up this problem, and proposes a solution that distinguishes levels of performance normativity, including a first order where execution competence is in play, and a second order where the performer must assess the risks attendant on issuing a first-order performance. This imports a level of reflective knowledge that ascends above the animal level. (shrink)

Survey results are in the first instance utterances, which require interpretation. Moreover, when the results seem to involve disagreement in intuitive responses to a thought experiment, the results are most directly responsive to the scenario as envisaged by the particular subject, where the text of the example can give rise to relevantly different scenarios, depending on how the scenario is shaped by the subjects involved, under the guidance of the text. All of this opens up a defense of intuitions against (...) results that ostensibly imply extensive intuitive disagreement based on cultural or socio-economic background. Critics of the armchair have replied to this defense in recent publications. This paper takes up some of those replies. (shrink)

Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true, a second level if competent, and a third if true because competent. Knowledge on one level is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of epistemic normativity as does belief itself, yet to suspend (...) is of course precisely not to perform, certainly not with the aim of truth. The paper takes up this problem, and proposes a solution that distinguishes levels of performance normativity, including a first order where execution competence is in play, and a second order where the performer must assess the risks attendant on issuing a first-order performance. This imports a level of reflective knowledge that ascends above the animal level. (shrink)

Stephen Grimm finds me inclined to bifurcate epistemic assessment into higher and lower orders while showing awareness of this only in recent writings. Two untoward consequences allegedly follow: (a) my rejection of Virtue Reliabilism, and (b) my knowledge-based account of the value attaching to our knowledge on the higher level. By contrast, Grimm considers Virtue Reliabilism a perfectly adequate account of knowledge, while the higher epistemic state he believes to be, rather, understanding, which he takes to be quite distinct from (...) knowledge. Once knowledge and understanding are seen to be distinct, finally, this will help us to avoid the two untoward consequences. I am grateful for these interesting points, and would like to respond briefly in what follows. (shrink)

This time Pritchard is on a rescue mission. Veritism is besieged and he rises to defend it. I do agree with much in his Veritism, but I demur when he adds: “So, the goodness of all epistemic goods is understood instrumentally with regard to whether they promote truth”. If Big Brother brainwashes us to believe the full contents of The Encyclopedia Britannica, then even if we suppose those contents to be true without exception, that would not make what they do (...) an unalloyed good thing, not even epistemically. But it does seem to promote truth. What might then diminish Big Brother’s action so much, so as to make it so deplorable epistemically after all, despite how powerfully it does instrumentally promote truth. At a minimum we need to say more about the relations between epistemic goods and truth, so as to better understand how it is that the epistemic good is made so good by what specific relation to the truth. I lay out a way to understand Veritism so that it can say more about the relations between epistemic goods and truth, thus enhancing our understanding of epistemic normativity. And in a second part I lay out a solution to Linda Zagzebski’s Swamping problem for reliabilism. I argue that it is a problem for process reliabilism, but not for a virtue epistemology that accepts a kind of reliabilism, but in an agential telic framework, and not in a process framework. So, I lay out one way to be a “veritist”, by defending explicitly its Axiological side, and by implication its Conceptual side as well. I have raised questions for Pritchard’s own defense and have offered in each case an alternative defense that I believe fits the words of his formulations, and is in their spirit as well. (shrink)

Review of John Greco's The Transmission of Knowledge This paper responds to the Lackey objection to virtue epistemology. Its response is one that can be used to defend Greco's virtue epistemology as well as the author's own virtue epistemology.

Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects. One of the most comprehensive and authoritative metaphysics anthologies available - now updated and expanded Offers the most important contemporary works on the central issues of metaphysics Includes new sections on ontology and the metaphysics (...) of material objects, as well as readings on the topics of fictionalism, fundamentality, tropes, vague identity, temporary intrinsics, stage theory, and composition Surpasses other anthologies in its combination of contributions from leading metaphysicians and a younger generation of "rising-stars". (shrink)

Problems for Generic Reliabilism lead to a more specific account of knowledge as involving the exercise of intellectual virtues or faculties.

The received definition of knowledge (as true, evident belief) has recently been questioned by Edmund Gettier with an example whose principle is as follows. A proposition, p, is both evident to and accepted by someone S, who sees that its truth entails (would entail) (that either p is true or q is true). This last is thereby made evident to him, and he accepts it, but it happens to be true only because q is true, since p is in fact (...) false. Hence, inasmuch as he has no evidence for the proposition q, S can hardly be said to know (that either p is true or q is true). Here then is a formula for true, evident beliefs that are not cases of knowledge. I discuss the possibility of adding a fourth condition to this triad. (shrink)

This paper lays out and rebuts methodological objections to philosophers’ reliance on intuitions in pursuit of metaphysical analysis.

Este artículo aborda el papel que juega la “admiración” en la traducción heideggeriana de tres pasajes de la Metafísica de Aristóteles. Con base en el volumen 62 de la Gesamtausgabe, se muestra que la “admiración” se relaciona con tres temas fundamentales, a saber: el mundo, la vida y la comprensión. En primer lugar, analizo el tema del mundo compartido y del mundo circundante. En segundo lugar, describo el tema de la vida, la cual es interpretada como “premura insoslayable” y “clara (...) permanencia tranquila”. En tercer lugar, desarrollo el tema de la comprensión en tres fases: “epistémica”, “propia” y “visible”. Estos temas serán retomados en trabajos ulteriores como Ser y tiempo. Por tal motivo, las lecciones de 1922 son valiosas para conocer el itinerario filosófico de Heidegger en los años veinte. Finalmente, se intenta mostrar que la triple traducción del vocablo griego θαυμάζειν realizada por Heidegger, obedece a un criterio específico de interpretación fenomenológica acorde a los temas mencionados. (shrink)

The traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief has collapsed under weighty objections. Some of these are well known; but others, though equally weighty and puzzling, have attracted comparatively little attention, and still demand careful study. Only through such study can we approach correct understanding of propositional knowledge.

Drawing on insights of W ang Yangming 王陽明, Yong H uang proposes an account of a phenomenon that has in recent times suffered neglect. This neglect has been relieved only by the idea of a “besire,” a mental attitude that combines features of both beliefs and desires. I accept the insightfully discerned phenomenon, but offer a different account of its nature and importance. The phenomenon is real, though, and different from the familiar phenomena of knowledge that and knowledge how.

This paper considers well known results of psychological researchinto the fallibility of human reason, and philosophical conclusionsthat some have drawn from these results. Close attention to theexact content of the results casts doubt on the reasoning that leadsto those conclusions.

Philosopher Judith Butler has influenced how people talk about vulnerable bodies and sees vulnerability as universal, existential, and relational. Being vulnerable is part of the human condition. The main theoretical areas that run across Butler’s work; power, knowledge and subjectivity, performativity, and ethics—are of particular relevance to nursing practice. This review aims to explore how Butler’s theoretical work is reflected in research literature within a nursing context. We conducted a scoping review guided by Arksey and O’Malley’s methodological framework. A systematic (...) literature search of CINAHL (EBSCOhost), MEDLINE (Ovid), Embase (Ovid), PsycINFO (Ovid), and Web of Science identified 15 papers. Butler’s theoretical work was applied at an individual and social level in research literature within a nursing context. Nurses need to reflect on their clinical practice and role as health professionals in relation to power and performativity in encounters with patients who are marginalized. Nurses’ working conditions, recognition, and understanding are strongly influenced by society, and calling nurses heroes undermines their capacity to challenge and resist the hero identity. The healthcare system’s impact on patient-nurse encounters challenges patients’ and nurses’ subjectivity, performativity, and power relations. The review allowed us to describe how Butler’s theoretical work can facilitate a reflection on nursing practice which is a prerequisite for caring, ethical relationships, and working conditions within a nursing context. Butler’s concepts can provide useful perspectives on how nurses understand, communicate with, and care for patients, as well as a nuanced understanding of the nursing role and power relations and structures. (shrink)

La Práctica Filosófica es un movimiento internacional constituido por filósofos que buscan que la filosofía rebase su actual circunscripción a los circuitos académicos y recupere su relevancia para la vida individual y social. Consideran que, mediante esta recuperación, la filosofía se aproxima, dentro de marcos contemporáneos, a su espíritu inicial, pues ésta no nació simplemente como especulación sobre las cuestiones de ultimidad, menos aún como mera reflexión sobre la historia del pensamiento, sino también como guía en el arte de vivir, (...) como una disciplina que incumbía indisociablemente a la comprensión profunda de la realidad y de nosotros mismos y a nuestra transformación interior, la ordenada al desarrollo de nuestras mejores posibilidades. Philosophical Practice Philosophical Practice is an international movement comprised by philosophers whose aim is for philosophy to outrun its present confinement to academic circles, so as to regain its relevance in individual and social life. They consider that by doing this philosophy will come closer, within a contemporary framework, to its initial spirit, for the former was not born simply as speculation on matters of ultimacy let alone as a mere reflection on the history of thought, but also as a guide on the art of living, as a discipline that inextricably had to do with the profound understanding of reality and ourselves, as well as with. (shrink)

La ciudadanía y lo político. Ciudadanía y crisis de la democracia liberal en un mundo en transformación es un texto provocador, que desafía directamente a las esferas de poder económico, político y social en el marco de la corrupción. Deja al descubierto las entrañas cancerígenas de una política enferma de poder, donde priman los intereses particulares o políticos sobre los intereses del pueblo. El libro es una lanza que atraviesa las profundidades que erosionan nuestra sociedad, realizando así un análisis riguroso (...) desde distintas aristas, que tienen un elemento común: la corrupción política. A lo largo de las páginas se ofrece un enorme panorama sobre el papel de la ciudadanía dentro de la sociedad, que reclama a gritos una revolución desalienante frente a la cleptoestructura. Es así como, el papel de la ciudadanía es el centro de la reflexión analítica que nos presenta Joan Lara Amat y León. (shrink)

The theory of knowledge has two sides - epistemology and a bridge to join them: that a belief is justified if and only if obtained by appropriate use of an adequate organon - a principle of theoretical epistemology requiring an organon or manual of practical methodology. Such organon justification is internalist. (How could one ever miss one's source for it?) But it leads briskly to skepticism on pain of regress or circularity - or so it is argued in section 1. (...) In section 2 we consider the epistemology embodied in the Socratic elenchus, which provides a new angle on how methodology relates to epistemology and to science and metaphysics. Thus are we made to face once again the organon account of justification: our internalist bridge principle. That account proves in section 3 to be a special case ,of a more general argumentative account of justification, which in turn agrees with intuitions so powerful as to be enshrined already in our dictionaries. Good rhetoric suggests therefore that 'justification' and its cognates be yielded to the argumentative account; in which case justification must likely fall from its status as principal concept of epistemology. Justification is hence unlikely to be all that is required in general for knowledge, nor is it likely to be what is always required in any premises of use to justify anything. That way, apparently, lies regress or circularity. Better to demote justification to the status of one way for a belief to be appropriate or apt for knowledge, while allowing other ways not dependent on already attained justification: perception, perhaps, or introspection, or memory. (shrink)

In his important monograph, Hypothetical Reasoning, Nicholas Rescher develops a modal theory in order to throw some light on the nature of hypothetical reasoning and on the so-called "problem of counterfactual conditionals." I should like both to expound the theory and consider its application.

En este ensayo recuperamos algunas reflexiones acerca de la noción de cuerpo y del sustrato que se moviliza al razonar sobre ella a la luz del desarrollo tecnológico desplegado en décadas recientes. Tomamos como punto de partida los postulados de Boaventura De Sousa Santos respecto de que vivimos un desfasaje entre lo que se intenta imponer como “lo que es” y lo que las sociedades vivencian, encarnan y exigen, en un marco en el que los avances tecnológicos imprimen una nueva (...) dimensión subjetiva, no solo en el establecimiento de la interfaz, en tanto vinculación profunda y compleja entre el cuerpo y la tecnología, y sus efectos de sentido, sino también en la intervención desde y sobre los cuerpos extendiendo los límites de lo concebible. En este contexto retomamos planteos como el multinaturalismo, la teoría cyborg o la formulación posabismal, como posibles marcos a partir de los cuales diseñar corpus de conocimientos acordes a los nuevos desarrollos. (shrink)

1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the question answered. 10. Conclusion.

Our main topic is epistemic agency, which can be either free or unfree. This aligns with a distinction between two sorts of knowledge, the reflective and the animal. We first take up the nature and significance of these two sorts of knowledge, starting with the refl ective. In a second section we then consider the nature of suspension and how that relates suspension to higher orders of meta-belief. Finally, we consider a distinction in epistemology between animal competence and refl ective (...) justification. All of these topics and distinctions are important for virtue epistemology, in ways to be considered. (shrink)