Orthodox neurocognitive accounts of the bodily sense of agency suggest that the experience of agency arises when action-effects are anticipated accurately. In this paper, I argue that while successful anticipation is crucial for the sense of agency, the role of unsuccessful prediction has been neglected, and that inefficacy and uncertainty are no less central to the sense of agency. I will argue that this is reflected in the phenomenology of agency, which can be characterized both as the experience of efficacy (...) and effort. Specifically, the “sense of efficacy” refers to the perceptual experience of an action unfolding as anticipated. The “sense of effort”, in contrast, arises when an action has an uncertain trajectory, feels difficult, and demands the exertion of control. In this case, actions do not unfold as anticipated and require continuing adaptation if they are to be efficacious. I propose that, taken individually, the experience of efficacy and effort are insufficient for the sense of agency and that these experiences can even disrupt the sense of agency when they occur in isolation from each other. I further argue that a fully-fledged sense of agency depends on the temporally extensive process of prediction error-cancelation. This way, a comparator account can accommodate both the role of accurate prediction and prediction error and thus efficacy and effort. (shrink)

One of the most effective ways of winning an argument is to show that your opponent has begged the question. If you are sufficiently skilful in asking him leading questions and have a good sense of timing you can usually succeed in stripping him to his bare principles, with no ascertainable means for their support. That such a tactic of debate should be so effective suggests that it is more than just a ploy. Indeed some philosophers would say that it (...) takes advantage of a characteristic which is inherent in the nature of argument itself, for all arguments must be question-begging. However, few would voice this conviction publicly—for fear of being accused of begging the question. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic plunged economies into recessions and advancements in artificial intelligence create widespread automation of job tasks. A debate around how to address these challenges has moved the introduction of a universal basic income (UBI) center stage. However, existing UBI research mainly focuses on economic aspects and normative arguments but lacks an individual perspective that goes beyond examining the association between socio-demographic characteristics and UBI support. We add to this literature by investigating not only socio-demographic but also psychological predictors (...) of UBI acceptance in a multivariate analysis using a representative sample of the German working population collected in 2020 (N = 1986). Our results indicate that being more supportive of a UBI went along with being comparably younger, of East-German origin, and more in favor of equal living standards, as well as perceiving one’s economic situation to be worse and the threat of the corona-pandemic to be higher. (shrink)

Time, space and matter are the most pervasive and inescapable aspects of the physical universe. And yet, notwithstanding the fact that they represent the most fundamental and ubiquitous characteristics of reality, they have always presented elements of mystery to the human mind. Thus on the level of common thought we ponder how the withering hand of time reaches from out the past into the future to bring decay and destruction to all things; and on the more sophisticated level, after the (...) fashion of Immanuel Kant, we are puzzled by certain antinomies of thought concerning the necessity for an origin, and an end, of the universe in time and space, in the face of the equally necessary reasons for regarding the universe as being unlimited in its space and time dimensions. In either case, however, we are paying tribute to the tantalizing nature of these problems concerning the cosmic framework of space-time-matter in which we live, and move, and have our being. Indeed, it is not too much to say that genuine philosophy took its origin in Zeno's paradoxes of motion, and will have its final consummation when it solves Kant's antinomies. (shrink)

The paper is a combination of criticism and defense of ethical intuitionism, Meaning by this the view that we have insights about such matters that we can know to be true. Although the thesis is accepted that intuition is an authentic source of ethical knowledge, Many of the claims of intuitionists are subjected to critical scrutiny.

P. KOnig: Einleitung - P. ZIche: Idiographik und allgemeine Wissenschaftlichkeit - Windelband und die Wissenschaftsreflexion um 1900 - G. HArtung: Ein Philosoph korrigiert sich selbst - Wilhelm Windelbands Abkehr vom Relativismus - O. SChlaudt: Philosophie am Leitfaden der Empirie. WIndelbands relativistisches Programm - S. KUft: Windelbands Konzeption von Transzendentalphilosophie und ihr Bezug zur Kulturphilosophie - R. BOnito Oliva: Windelband. KUlturphilosophie und Kulturkrise - P. KOnig: Teleologie und Geschichte bei Wilhelm Windelband - J. BOhr: Im Fortschreiben der Probleme: Windelbands 19. JAhrhundert (...) - T.-H. CHang: Der Wertbegriff beiWilhelm Windelband und sein Konzept der Problemgeschichte - T. KUbalica: Die Geschichte der Philosophie als Problemgeschichte - J. MEhlich: Windelbands Praludien und das Silberne Zeitalter in Russland - G. SChluter: Windelbands italienische Kontakte und Bezugnahmen - D. STefanelli: Notizen uber Karl Vossler und die "Sudwestdeutsche Schule" - C. ZAnfi: Geschichte, Natur und Leben: Windelband und Bergson in der Historismus-Debatte - J.-I. LIndén: Der beseelte Geist: Dilthey als Kritiker der badischen Schule - H. GUndlach: Windelbands Ringen mit der Psychologie - Anhang: Wilhelm Windelband: Blaue Hefte zur Psychologie. (shrink)

Oblak, Boyadzhieva, and Bon claim that fractality is a modal property of the experience of perceptual presence. I will instead argue that the concept of fractality implies amodality and that modal ….

The paper is an investigation of the concept ‘reflexivity’ and its possible relation to consciousness. By taking advantage of Knud Grue-Sørensens discussions of ‘reflexivity’ in his treatise Studier over refl eksivitet. En fi losofi sk afhandling, I discuss a number of arguments to the effect that there is an intimate connection between reflexivity, consciousness and epistemology. The idea that pedagogy is somehow essentially related to reflexivity is also briefly taken into consideration.

The following two questions are addressed: to what extent and in what sense are concepts of consciousness subject to plasticity? And what is the relation between brain plasticity and phenomenal consciousness in particular? To answer these questions I discuss the extension thesis of the mind and also take advantage of a number of results from experimental brain science that demonstrate the brain's plasticity with respect to the processing of sensory information and associated qualitative expression. Interpretations of these results in the (...) hands of some researchers within the field of 'embodied cognition' are drawn upon. (shrink)

John Dewey has played a major role for philosophy of education and for educational theory as such. This paper deals with Dewey’s conception of consciousness, an issue which is rarely dealt with. It is claimed that Dewey’s thoughts on this issue are original and has actuality in the light of recent attempts to understand cognition and consciousness as intimately related to the subject’s interaction with the environment.

This paper deals with the epistemological foundations of Jean Piaget’s theory of learning and genetic epistemology. The purpose is to estimate the form of Piaget’s constructivism. I take advantage of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s ‘radical constructivist’ interpretation of Piaget. Contrary to von Glasersfeld, it is argued that Piaget at the same time is a realist with respect to the existence of the external world, and a ‘genetic-transcendental constructivist’ in relation to the development of knowledge. I interpret this paradox as Piaget’s acknowledgement (...) of the co-existence of a 3. person and a 1. person epistemological perspective in the scientific investigation of cognition. (shrink)