The threat to the survival of humankind posed by nuclear weapons has been a frightening and essential focus of public debate for the last four decades and must continue to be so if we are to avoid destroying ourselves and the natural world around us. One unfortunate result of preoccupation with the nuclear threat, however, has been a new kind of "respectability" accorded to conventional war. In this radical and cogent argument for pacifism, Robert Holmes asserts that all war--not just (...) nuclear war--has become morally impermissible in the modern world. Addressing a wide audience of informed and concerned readers, he raises dramatic questions about the concepts of "political realism" and nuclear deterrence, makes a number of persuasive suggestions for nonviolent alternatives to war, and presents a rich panorama of thinking about war from St. Augustine to Reinhold Niebuhr and Herman Kahn. Holmes's positions are compellingly presented and will provoke discussion both among convinced pacifists and among those whom he calls "militarists." "Militarists," we realize after reading this book, include the majority of us who live a friendly and peaceful personal life while supporting a system which, if Holmes is correct, guarantees war and risks eventual human extinction. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

There are several ways one can make an appraisal of Husserl’s turn to transcendental phenomenology. One way would be to look at some of the implications of this turn, such as, whether Husserl is thereby prevented from answering certain philosophical questions. Taking this course here, I treat one of the implications that appears when one critically examines the transcendental turn, namely that Husserl’s philosophy is idealistic. This is an implication that many critics of transcendental phenomenology have alleged is philosophically intolerable (...) and requires modification or abandonment of Husserl’s transcendental turn. Important to this task is the distinction between what I shall call “epistemological idealism” and “metaphysical idealism”. As I detail later, epistemological idealism can be characterized as the thesis that consciousness is the sole medium of access to whatever is seen as actually or possibly existing and “metaphysical idealism” can be characterized as including the additional thesis that consciousness creates whatever actually or possibly exists and what exists is dependent on it. It is my contention that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, which he labels transcendental idealism, is epistemologically idealistic but metaphysically neutral. Also I contend that metaphysical neutrality is not a deficiency of his philosophy but that such is the necessary conclusion of any philosophy that successfully adheres to the policy of describing, explicating and accepting all objectivities only as they present themselves to the consciousness of them, and in terms of the consciousness of them. (shrink)

In a world riven with conflict, violence and war, this book proposes a philosophical defense of pacifism. It argues that there is a moral presumption against war and unless that presumption is defeated, war is unjustified. Leading philosopher of non-violence Robert Holmes contends that neither just war theory nor the rationales for recent wars defeat that presumption, hence that war in the modern world is morally unjustified. A detailed, comprehensive and elegantly argued text which guides both students and scholars through (...) the main debates clearly but without oversimplifying the complexities of the issues or historical examples. (shrink)

Philosophical ethics comprises metaethics, normative ethics and applied ethics. These have characteristically received analytic treatment by twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. But there has been disagreement over their interrelationship to one another and the relationship of analytical ethics to substantive morality – the making of moral judgments. I contend that the expertise philosophers have in either theoretical or applied ethics does not equip them to make sounder moral judgments on the problems of bioethics than nonphilosophers. One cannot "apply" theories like Kantianism or (...) consequentialism to get solutions to practical moral problems unless one knows which theory is correct, and that is a metaethical question over which there is no consensus. On the other hand, to presume to be able to reach solutions through neutral analysis of problems is unavoidably to beg controversial theoretical issues in the process. Thus, while analytical ethics can play an important clarificatory role in bioethics, it can neither provide, nor substitute for, moral wisdom. Keywords: abortion, applied ethics, bioethics, metaethics, normative ethics CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Abstract Medical futility is commonly understood as treatment that would not provide for any meaningful benefit for the patient. While the medical facts will help to determine what is medically appropriate, it is often difficult for patients, families, surrogate decision-makers and healthcare providers to navigate these difficult situations. Often communication breaks down between those involved or reaches an impasse. This paper presents a set of practical strategies for dealing with cases of perceived medical futility at a major cancer center. Content (...) Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s10730-011-9168-3 Authors Colleen M. Gallagher, Section for Integrated Ethics in Cancer Care, Unit 1430, The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, P.O. Box 301402, Houston, TX 77230-1402, USA Ryan F. Holmes, St. Louis University, St. Louis, MO, USA Journal HEC Forum Online ISSN 1572-8498 Print ISSN 0956-2737. (shrink)

“Daddy, is God real or is he a part of people's imagination?” The brain constructs reality by bottom‐up, genetically programmed mechanisms. Nature selected the human holistic, symbolically thinking, aesthetic brain using a mechanism of brain‐language coevolution. Our religious nature and moral capabilities are rooted in this brain, and in the real images it constructs.

Cautioning in advance that summary treatment of any aspect of Dewey's thought, much less one as far-reaching in compass as his ethics, must of necessity be omissive, I shall in the following develop what I believe to be the most plausible rendering of his ethical philosophy. In so doing I will confine myself principally to explicating his stand vis-à-vis contemporary metaethical positions, though I will expand upon this in the later sections and introduce some of his normative, or substantive, views (...) as well. In the final section I will outline a theory of morality as a whole which, though nowhere explicitly defended by Dewey, is consonant with the various theses he does defend. The burden of my argument, however, will be to show, first, that he is not holding the sort of position usually characterized as ethical naturalism, and secondly, that the position he does hold marks a significant departure from all three of the conventional metaethical positions, intuitionism, naturalism, and noncognitivism. Metaphorically he stands at the third point of a triangle, the other two points of which are naturalism and emotivism, for he adapts salient features of each of these positions to an orientation which fits the framework of his view of the nature of ethics, science and philosophy in general. Let us begin by assessing the chief arguments in support of a naturalistic interpretation, as these will provide a point of departure for clarifying his considered view. (shrink)

A problem of paramount importance to understanding John Dewey’s ethics is to clarify his conception of judgment and his distinction between judgments and propositions. Depending upon how one interprets him on this matter, different answers suggest themselves to some of the most basic questions underlying his ethical theory, particularly those dealing with the relationship between science and ethics, the relationship between practical judgments and descriptive statements, and the differentiae of moral and scientific judgments within the genus practical judgment. Oversimplified answers (...) are usually given to these, the stock interpretation being that he believes that ethics is reducible to science, that practical judgments are descriptive and hence that moral judgments are essentially scientific in nature. Although he undeniably says much to invite such an interpretation, it nonetheless fails to do justice to his considered view, and a probe of his account of the nature of judgments and propositions reveals that he views the whole relationship of moral to scientific judgments, hence of ethics to science, in a different light than is generally supposed. In consequence, much of his ethics needs reappraisal, particularly as having relevance to topics in the forefront of contemporary British and American ethical thought. (shrink)

The following sketches a constellation of views constituting the implicit philosophy of violence that one finds in much of the Western world. While I believe that much of this philosophy is deeply flawed, I shall, in a sense, be setting forth the case for violence because any hope of a nonviolent and peaceful world order must begin with a deeper understanding of violence and its attractiveness. After exploring various arguments for violence, I conclude that once we probe beneath the surface, (...) it is clear that most of those who deplore violence do not oppose all violence, only that of which they disapprove, and that social manipulation backed by violence in the end seems to most people to be justified. (shrink)

Winner of the 1989 Whitbread Prize for Book of the Year, this is the first volume of Holmes's seminal two-part examination of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, one of Britain's greatest poets.

Despite its centrality for ethical theory, and the near-axiomatic status it enjoyed for years, the thesis that an Ought cannot be derived from an Is has not until fairly recently come in for close scrutiny. During this time, however, there has been a swing of the pendulum from the view of G. E. Moore, that no one in his right mind could deny the thesis, to that of some contemporary philosophers who speak as though no one in his right mind (...) could affirm it. Predictably, the fact that traditional defenders of the thesis were not always clear about what they meant by it has meant that it has not always been clear what contemporary critics have been asserting when they deny it. Also predictably, this has meant that there has been no conclusive resolution of the issue. (shrink)

Despite its centrality for ethical theory, and the near-axiomatic status it enjoyed for years, the thesis that an Ought cannot be derived from an Is has not until fairly recently come in for close scrutiny. During this time, however, there has been a swing of the pendulum from the view of G. E. Moore, that no one in his right mind could deny the thesis, to that of some contemporary philosophers who speak as though no one in his right mind (...) could affirm it. Predictably, the fact that traditional defenders of the thesis were not always clear about what they meant by it has meant that it has not always been clear what contemporary critics have been asserting when they deny it. Also predictably, this has meant that there has been no conclusive resolution of the issue. (shrink)

How do you decide what is ethically wrong and right? Few people make moral judgments by taking the theory first. Specifically written with the interests, needs, and experience of students in mind, this textbook approaches thinking ethically as you do in real life – by first encountering practical moral problems and then introducing theory to understand and integrate the issues. Built around engaging case studies from news media, court hearings, famous speeches and philosophical writings, each of the 15 chapters: - (...) explains and defines the moral problem dealt with - provides excerpts of readings on all sides of the issue - analyses the problem, using the relevant theory The examples are recognizable ethical problems, including judgments about racism and sexism, controversial debates such as assisted suicide and the death penalty, and contemporary concerns like privacy and technology, corporate responsibility, and the environment. The mission of the book is to assist you to engage in informed, independent, critical thinking and to enable you to enter into ethical discussions in the classroom and beyond. Supported by learning features, including study questions, key quotes, handy definitions and a companion website, this book is essential for any student of moral philosophy. (shrink)