"Ist der Mensch in seinem Denken und Handeln ein geistig freies Wesen oder steht er unter dem Zwange einer rein naturgesetzlichen ehernen Notwendigkeit? Auf wenige Fragen ist so viel Scharfsinn gewendet worden als auf diese. Die Idee der Freiheit des menschlichen Willens hat warme Anhänger wie hartnäckige Gegner in reicher Zahl gefunden. Ein und dasselbe Ding wird hier gleich oft für das kostbarste Gut der Menschheit wie für die ärgste Illusion erklärt." Rudolf Steiner (Gröls-Klassiker - Edition Werke der Weltliteratur).

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Being Made Strange: Rhetoric Beyond RepresentationPat J. GehrkeBeing Made Strange: Rhetoric Beyond Representation. Bradford Vivian. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004. Pp. 229. $55.00.To call Being Made Strange an important contribution to our ongoing conversation about rhetoric and its philosophical dimensions would be too trite for a book of the density and complexity that Professor Vivian has given us. This book, for whatever weaknesses it (...) may have, stands alone in its boldness, scope, and aggressiveness in pursuing some of the most important questions facing rhetorical theorists and communication ethicists. Being Made Strange goes after what has been a critical and unyielding question for rhetoricians for some time now: "Can one conceive of rhetoric without appealing to essential notions of human being?" (9). To explore this possibility, Vivian has turned his significant knowledge of twentieth-century continental philosophy to bear upon rhetorical studies with a particular emphasis upon ethos and the middle voice. In so doing, he continually appeals to a privileging of "difference rather than identity, multiplicity instead of unity, and mutation instead of essential continuity" (15).This is not a book that I recommend lightly, for it is not a book to be read lightly. Those without the particular type of patience required to read primary texts in continental philosophy likely will tire quickly and lose sight of its contributions or read too hastily and miss the significance of this text. Being Made Strange was not written as a primer or a translation, but as a study that speaks to scholars who are seriously invested in the questions that Vivian is asking and who are willing and able to read slowly and carefully. Those who ascribe dogmatically to the populist or Orwellian schools of writing and scholarship may well be frustrated by this text's tendency to presume more capacity, engagement, and work from its readers. For those willing to do such work and expend the energy and time required to really read this book, I think the rewards will more than justify the effort. Certainly, there are some chapters that make for easier reading than others. In general, the second half of the book demands far less from the reader than the first.Being Made Strange is divided into three major sections. The first section offers an overview of the history of rhetorical studies, contrasting it to the sentiments of contemporary philosophy. Vivian particularly notes the priority of [End Page 340] representation and active voice in rhetoric and thus sets out the foundation of his critique. The second section offers the theoretical intervention that is to serve as salve for the difficulties of representation and active voice. Here, Vivian offers us an explication of rhetoric in the middle voice, as neither active nor passive, dissociated "from its conventional affinity with speech and intention" (77). Working primarily from the writings of Michel Foucault, he refigures ethos as "a discursive practice rather than the expression of an essential state of being" (104). These moves then enable Vivian to set his sights on theories of style and ethical inquiry in rhetorical studies. Finally, the third major section provides us with two more concrete studies that set out to demonstrate how rhetorical inquiry might look after the revolutionary reforms proposed in section two. The first study, on discourses concerning the relationship between Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemmings, is an outstanding piece of scholarship that can stand (and has stood) alone. The second is a study of the rhetoric of silence that offers a compelling criticism to how silence has been figured in most rhetorical studies as another form of speech, maintaining the privileged space and operation of speech and representation in rhetoric. The concluding chapter, entitled "Rhetoric in a Nonmoral Sense," is perhaps the most ambitious, but it is also the most prone to excesses, which is entirely normal for conclusions of such books.I would be remiss if I did not mention some of the weaknesses that trouble me about Being Made Strange. I have to confess, without playing the apologist too strongly, that at times Vivian paints an excessively bleak picture of the history of rhetorical studies. Particularly in the first... (shrink)

Relying on Husserl as well as on the reflections by Merleau-Ponty on Cézanne, Henry on Kandinsky and Deleuze on Bacon, this essay sketches some basic problems that arise in a phenomenological account of non-figurative painting. An investigation of the distinction between phenomenological and pictorial perception, of the transposition of the painter’s mode of perception into a painted image, and of the expressive force of paintings inevitably confronts one with the enigma of the appearing of something invisible. The essay proceeds in (...) three steps. The first step describes pictorial perception in terms of a ‘seeing according to’. Such a mode of perception pays attention to visual ambiguities, to the ‘gaze of things’ and to the conditions of visibility that are ordinarily overlooked. The second step moves on to the issue of the transposition of a pictorial perception in a painted image. Deleuze’s account of “manipulated chance” proves to be very helpful here. In the final step, Henry’s and Deleuze’s emphasis on the painting’s expression of totally invisible ‘forces’ is discussed. (shrink)

APA PsycNET abstract: This is the first volume of a two-volume work on Probability and Induction. Because the writer holds that probability logic is identical with inductive logic, this work is devoted to philosophical problems concerning the nature of probability and inductive reasoning. The author rejects a statistical frequency basis for probability in favor of a logical relation between two statements or propositions. Probability "is the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis (or conclusion) on the basis of some given evidence (...) (or premises)." Furthermore, all principles and theorems of inductive logic are analytic, and the entire system is to be constructed by means of symbolic logic and semantic methods. This means that the author confines himself to the formalistic procedures of word and symbol systems. The resulting sentence or language structures are presumed to separate off logic from all subjectivist or psychological elements. Despite the abstractionism, the claim is made that if an inductive probability system of logic can be constructed it will have its practical application in mathematical statistics, and in various sciences. 16-page bibliography. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

This thought-provoking book discusses the concept of progress in economics and investigates whether any advance has been made in its different spheres of research. The authors look back at the history, successes and failures of their respective fields and thoroughly examine the notion of progress from an epistemological and methodological perspective. The idea of progress is particularly significant as the authors regard it as an essentially contested concept which can be defined in many ways – theoretically or empirically; locally or (...) globally; or as encouraging or impeding the existence of other research traditions. The authors discuss the idea that for progress to make any sense there must be an accumulation of knowledge built up over time rather than the replacement of ideas by each successive generation. Accordingly, they are not concerned with estimating the price of progress, reminiscing in the past, or assessing what has been lost. Instead they apply the complex mechanisms and machinery of the discipline to sub-fields such as normative economics, monetary economics, trade and location theory, Austrian economics and classical economics to critically assess whether progress has been made in these areas of research. -/- Bringing together authoritative and wide-ranging contributions by leading scholars, this book will challenge and engage those interested in philosophy, economic methodology and the history of economic thought. It will also appeal to economists in general who are interested in the advancement of their profession. (shrink)

Available for the first time in 20 years, here is the Rudolf Carnap's famous principle of tolerance by which everyone is free to mix and match the rules of ...

This is identical with the first edition (see 21: 2716) except for the addition of a Supplement containing 5 previously published articles and the bringing of the bibliography (now 73 items) up to date. The 5 added articles present clarifications or modifications of views expressed in the first edition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

This article reviews and brings together two literatures: classical political economists’ views on the skilling or deskilling nature of technological change in England, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when they wrote, are compared with the empirical evidence about the skill effects of technological change that emerges from studies of economic historians. In both literatures, we look at both the skill impacts of technological change and at the “inducement mechanisms” that are envisaged for the introduction of new technologies. Adam Smith (...) and Karl Marx both regarded the deskilling of the labour force as the predominant form of biased technical change, but other authors such as Charles Babbage also took account of capital-skill complementarities and skill-enhancing effects of technological change. For Smith, the deskilling bias was an unintended by-product of the increasing division of labour, which in his view “naturally” led to ever more simplification of workers’ tasks. As opposed to Smith, Marx considered unskilled-biased technical change as a bourgeois weapon in the class struggle for impairing the workers’ bargaining position. Studies of economic historians lend support to Marx’s hypothesis about the inducement mechanisms for the introduction of unskilled-biased innovations, but have produced no clear-cut empirical evidence for a deskilling tendency of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century technological change as a whole. Industrialization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rather led to labour polarization, by simultaneously deskilling a large part of the workforce and raising the demand for some high-skilled workers. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce canonical extensions of partially ordered sets and monotone maps and a corresponding discrete duality. We then use these to give a uniform treatment of completeness of relational semantics for various substructural logics with implication as the residual(s) of fusion.

Since its publication fifty years ago, this work has established itself as a classic. It casts the visual process in psychological terms and describes the creative way one's eye organizes visual material according to specific psychological premises. In 1974 this book was revised and expanded, and since then it has continued to burnish Rudolf Arnheim's reputation as a groundbreaking theoretician in the fields of art and psychology.

From the contents: Philosophie, Politik und Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: zur Frage der Philosophie in Osterreich und Deutschland (B. Smith). - Facts, truths and the ontology of logical realism (H. Hochberg). - Franz Brentano und die Wiederentdeckung der Intentionalitat Richtigstellung herkommlicher Missverstandnisse und Missdeutungen (M. Antonelli). - Erneuerung der Philosophia Perennis: uber die ersten vier Habilitationsthesen Brentanos (W. Sauer). - Confessions of a Meinongian logician (D. Jacquette). - Lewis and Sylvan on noneism (A. Witherall). - What is it to compose a musical (...) work (M.E. Reicher).". (shrink)

We prove that S4 is complete with respect to Boolean combinations of countable unions of convex subsets of the real line, thus strengthening a 1944 result of McKinsey and Tarski 45 141). We also prove that the same result holds for the bimodal system S4+S5+C, which is a strengthening of a 1999 result of Shehtman 369).

This volume provides a valuable discussion of Husserl's lifelong project of the critique of science which makes no attempt to conflate the pre-World War I ...

In this paper we consider distributive modal logic, a setting in which we may add modalities, such as classical types of modalities as well as weak forms of negation, to the fragment of classical propositional logic given by conjunction, disjunction, true, and false. For these logics we define both algebraic semantics, in the form of distributive modal algebras, and relational semantics, in the form of ordered Kripke structures. The main contributions of this paper lie in extending the notion of Sahlqvist (...) axioms to our generalized setting and proving both a correspondence and a canonicity result for distributive modal logics axiomatized by Sahlqvist axioms. Our proof of the correspondence result relies on a reduction to the classical case, but our canonicity proof departs from the traditional style and uses the newly extended algebraic theory of canonical extensions. (shrink)

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce canonical extensions of partially ordered sets and monotone maps and a corresponding discrete duality. We then use these to give a uniform treatment of completeness of relational semantics for various substructural logics with implication as the residual(s) of fusion.

Algebraic work [9] shows that the deep theory of possible world semantics is available in the more general setting of substructural logics, at least in an algebraic guise. The question is whether it is also available in a relational form.This article seeks to set the stage for answering this question. Guided by the algebraic theory, but purely relationally we introduce a new type of frames. These structures generalize Kripke structures but are two-sorted, containing both worlds and co-worlds. These latter points (...) may be viewed as modelling irreducible increases in information where worlds model irreducible decreases in information. Based on these structures, a purely model theoretic and uniform account of completeness for the implication-fusion fragment of various substructural logics is given. Completeness is obtained via a generalization of the standard canonical model construction in combination with correspondence results. (shrink)

Knapp sechs Jahre nach Rudolf Heinz' sechzigstem Geburtstag und dem auf dieses Ereignis ausgerichteten Erscheinen der Festschrift "Kontiguitäten. Texte-Festival für Rudolf Heinz" (Christoph Weismüller [Hg.] unter Mitarbeit von Ralf Bohn, Wien: Passagen 1997) folgt die Nachbearbeitung der "Kontiguitäten" und deren Produktion. Die Post-Skripts zum Texte-Festival für Rudolf Heinz setzen ein mit den Dokumenten der Feierlichkeit der Festschriftüberreichung: Laudatio, Geburtstagskomposition - inklusive Audio-CD -, Photographien der Festschriftübergabe. Unter dem topos Festschrift-Mechané folgt diesen Initialien die Korrespondenz von Heide Heinz (...) und Christoph Weismüller nebst notwendigen Paraphrasen und Hinweisen. Die Après nehmen einschlägige Kontiguitäts-Effekte auf, die mit der Fertigstellung der Festschrift, der Feierlichkeit der Übergabe, ihrer Distribution und ersten Nachbearbeitungen ihrer Konstitution einhergingen oder diesen folgten. Die Katamnese von Heide Heinz und Rudolf Heinz sowie weitere Korrespondenzen - Heide Heinz mit Ralf Bohn, Doris Dorner, Axel Schünemann; Rudolf Heinz mit Manfred Pohlen - finden sich als Zuträge ein. (shrink)

Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle.

Rudolf Arnheim has been known, since the publication of his groundbreaking _Art and Visual Perception_ in 1974, as an authority on the psychological interpretation of the visual arts. Two anniversary volumes celebrate the landmark anniversaries of his works in 2009. In _The Power of the Center_, Arnheim uses a wealth of examples to consider the factors that determine the overall organization of visual form in works of painting, sculpture, and architecture. _The Dynamics of Architectural Form_ explores the unexpected perceptual (...) consequences of architecture with Arnheim's customary clarity and precision. (shrink)

A portrait of scholastic approaches to a qualified disagreement of opinions, focusing on the antagonism of scholastic probabilism and anti-probabilism in the early modern era.

Das Ziel: Konstitutionssystem der Begriffe Das Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchungen ist die Aufstellung eines erkenntnismäßig-logischen Systems der ...

In the fall of 1957 the University of California Press expanded Arnheim’s 1933 book _Film_ by four essays and brought that landmark work back into print as _Film as Art._ Now nearly fifty years after that re-edition, the book continues to occupy an important place in the literature of film. Arnheim’s method, provocative in this age of technological wizardry, was to focus on the way art in film was derived from that medium’s early limitations: no sound, no color, no three-dimensional (...) depth. (shrink)

'My endeavour in these pages is to explain the main features of the method of philosophizing which we, the Vienna Circle, use, and by using try to develop further. It is the method of the logical analysis of science, or more precisely, of the syntactical analysis of scientific language.... The purpose of the book -- as of the lectures -- is to give a first impression of our method and of the direction of our questions and investigations to those who (...) are not yet acquainted with them.' -- From the Preface. (shrink)

A basic system of inductive logic; An axiomatic foundation for the logic of inductive generalization; A survey of inductive systems; On the condition of partial exchangeability; Representation theorems of the de finetti type; De finetti's generalizations of excahngeability; The structure of probabilities defined on first-order languages; A subjectivit's guide to objective chance.

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

Clear, comprehensive, intermediate introduction to logical languages, applications of symbolic logic to physics, mathematics, biology.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 35.1 (2002) 1-21 [Access article in PDF] Turning Kant Against the Priority of Autonomy: Communication Ethics and the Duty to Community Pat J. Gehrke Communication ethics scholars afford Immanuel Kant significantly less attention than one might expect. This may be because, as Robert Dostal notes, Kant argues that rhetoric merits no respect whatsoever (223). This rejection of rhetoric, Dostal writes, is grounded in the significant (...) emphasis given to Kant's concept of autonomy (232). The focus on autonomy and, hence, rhetoricians' relative neglect of Kant's ethical theory are both connected to the separation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (hereinafter CPuR) from his subsequent ethical and moral philosophy. Kenneth Burke writes that Kant's first critique has no ethical implications, "no 'wills,' 'oughts,' 'shoulds,' or 'thou shalt nots'... nothing but an inevitable is, a description of conditions as they necessarily are for human experience" (191; emphasis in original). Such readings lose much of the richness and complexity of Kant's thought and tend instead to produce simple moral duties, such as Mike Markel's assertion that technical communicators must be truthful.Perhaps the most critical element of Kant's work lost in our focus on autonomy is his articulation of a ground for a duty to community. While Kant makes clear the importance of community for his metaphysics in the first critique (CPuR), the importance of community in Kant's moral philosophy often is overlooked. Some scholars claim that an ethical duty to community is either rejected by Kant's emphasis on the autonomy of will or simply ignored. This article combines a reading of Kant's metaphysics of experience with his moral philosophy to articulate a communication ethic grounded in community. This argument is made in three parts: first, the community of objects in experience—the Third Analogy of Experience—is an organizing principle of and a necessary condition for the possibility of all experience; second, this metaphysical principle of community is relevant [End Page 1] to community as developed in Kant's ethical writings; and finally, Kant's own work undermines the primacy of autonomy and better supports a communication ethic grounded in a duty to community.Scholars interested in Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action have special reason to take note of Kant's work. Kant is not only a figure that Habermas sees reflected in his own work, 1 but a constant point of contrast. Craig Calhoun writes that much of Habermas's own philosophy emerges by rejecting Kant's epistemology and elements of his metaphysics while still giving credence to Kantian moral philosophy (2). However, like most communication scholars and philosophers, Habermas believes that autonomy governs Kantian ethics: "Formalistic ethics (Kant) binds the criterion of generality of norms to the further criterion of autonomy, that is, independence from contingent motives" (Habermas, Legitimation 89). Since autonomy excludes or represses the contingent, if our readings of Kant give primacy to autonomy we leave little room for any notion of community as manifest in experience. In no small part, it is the criticism of Kant for privileging autonomy that has given Habermasians their break from Kantian ethics. However, if we turn to the first critique to guide our reading of the moral philosophy, there is another way to understand the role of autonomy and community in Kant's thought. By linking Kant's metaphysics with his moral philosophy, this article turns Kant away from the primacy of autonomy and uses Kant's own works to argue that autonomy is but one half of an antinomy that is organized under the principle of community. Thus, this article recuperates the possibility of deploying Kantian metaphysics and moral philosophy together as grounds for a communication ethic that privileges community and recovers the value of rhetoric.For rhetorical scholars, the resistance to the priority of autonomy may be related to the frequent expression of community through appeal to commonality, sameness, or identification. Today, feminist, race, postmodern, and poststructural communication scholars are questioning the value of commonality as a ground for ethics (e... (shrink)

A clarification of Husserl's changing conceptions of imaginary consciousness ( phantasy ) and memory, especially at the level of auto-affective time-consciousness, suggests an interpretation of Freud's concept of the Unconscious. Phenomenology of consciousness can show how it is possible that consciousness can bring to present appearance something unconscious, that is, something foreign or absent to consciousness, without incorporating it into or subordinating it to the conscious present. This phenomenological analysis of Freud's concept of the Unconscious leads to a partial critique (...) of Freud's metapsychological determination of the Unconscious as a simple, internally unperceived representational consciousness. It also suggests an account of how a reproductive inner consciousness can free the subject from the experience of anxiety by allowing for possibilities of self-distanciation and symbolic self-representation that protect the subject from traumatic affection by and through its own instinctual drives. (shrink)