Since our visual perception of physical things essentially involves our identifying objects by their colours, any theory of visual perception must contain some account of the colours of things. The central problem with colour has to do with relating our normal, everyday colour perceptions to what science, i.e. physics, teaches us about physical objects and their qualities. Although we perceive colours as categorical surface properties of things, colour perceptions are explained by introducing physical properties like reflectance profiles or dispositions to (...) cause certain experiences in normal human perceivers. Hence, it seems as if colours as they are experienced by us have no place in the physical world, because they are fundamentally different from the properties which we ascribe to physical objects in scientific accounts of colour perceptions. This special issue on perspectives on colour perception presents new suggestions to solve to this major problem. (shrink)

The first generation of children to grow up with electronic toys and games saw computers as our “nearest neighbors.” They spoke of computers as rational machines and of people as emotional machines, a fragile formulation destined to be challenged. By the mid-1990s, computational creatures, including robots, were presenting themselves as “relational artifacts,” beings with feelings and needs. One consequence of this development is a crisis in authenticity in many quarters. In an increasing number of situations, people behave as though they (...) no longer place value on living things and authentic emotion. This paper examines watershed moments in the history of human–machine interaction, focusing on the pertinence of relational artifacts to our collective perception of aliveness, life’s purposes, and the implications of relational artifacts for relationships. For now, the exploration of human–robot encounters leads us to questions about the morality of creating believable digital companions that are evocative but not authentic. (shrink)

Physician-based transparency approaches have been advanced as a strategy for informing patients of the likely financial consequences of using services. The structure of health care pricing and insurance coverage, and the low uptake of existing tools, suggest these approaches are likely to be unwieldy and unsuccessful. They may also generate new ethical challenges.

v. 1-32. Mou Zongsan xian sheng quan ji -- [33] Mou Zongsan xian sheng quan ji. Zong xu xiang mu.

According to a common sense theory, facial expressions signal specific emotions to people of all ages and therefore provide children easy access to the emotions of those around them. The evidence, however, does not support that account. Instead, children’s understanding of facial expressions is poor and changes qualitatively and slowly over the course of development. Initially, children divide facial expressions into two simple categories (feels good, feels bad). These broad categories are then gradually differentiated until an adult system of discrete (...) categories is achieved, likely in the teen years. Children’s understanding of most specific emotions begins not with facial expressions, but with their understanding of the emotion’s antecedents and behavioral consequences. (shrink)

The first generation of children to grow up with electronic toys and games saw computers as our “nearest neighbors.” They spoke of computers as rational machines and of people as emotional machines, a fragile formulation destined to be challenged. By the mid-1990s, computational creatures, including robots, were presenting themselves as “relational artifacts,” beings with feelings and needs. One consequence of this development is a crisis in authenticity in many quarters. In an increasing number of situations, people behave as though they (...) no longer place value on living things and authentic emotion. This paper examines watershed moments in the history of human–machine interaction, focusing on the pertinence of relational artifacts to our collective perception of aliveness, life’s purposes, and the implications of relational artifacts for relationships. For now, the exploration of human–robot encounters leads us to questions about the morality of creating believable digital companions that are evocative but not authentic. (shrink)

Izard (2010) did not seek a descriptive definition of emotion—one that describes the concept as it is used by ordinary folk. Instead, he surveyed scientists’ prescriptive definitions—ones that prescribe how the concept should be used in theories of emotion. That survey showed a lack of agreement today and thus raised doubts about emotion as a useful scientific concept.

Whereas professional persuasion is a means to an immediate and instrumental end, ethical persuasion must rest on or serve a deeper, morally based final end. Among the moral final ends of journalism, for example, are truth and freedom. There is a very real danger that advertisers and public relations practitioners will play an increasingly dysfunctional role in the communications process if means continue to be confused with ends in professional persuasive communications. Means and ends will continue to be confused unless (...) advertisers and public relations practitioners reach some level of agreement as to the moral end toward which their efforts should be directed. In this article we advance a five-part test that defines this moral end, establishes ethical boundaries that should guide persuasive practices, and serves as a set of action-guiding principles directed toward a moral consequence in professional persuasion. The TARES Test consists of five principles: Truthfulness, Authenticity, Respect, Equity and Social Responsibility. We provide checklists to guide the practitioner in moral reflection and application of TARES Test principles. (shrink)

Deduction is important to scientific inquiry because it can extend knowledge efficiently, bypassing the need to investigate everything directly. The existence of closure failure—where one knows the premises and that the premises imply the conclusion but nevertheless does not know the conclusion—is a problem because it threatens this usage. It means that we cannot trust deduction for gaining new knowledge unless we can identify such cases ahead of time so as to avoid them. For philosophically engineered examples we have “inner (...) alarm bells” to detect closure failure, but in scientific investigation we would want to use deduction for extension of our knowledge to matters we don’t already know that we couldn’t know. Through a quantitative treatment of how fast probabilistic sensitivity is lost over steps of deduction, I identify a condition that guarantees that the growth of potential error will be gradual; thus, dramatic closure failure is avoided. Whether the condition is fulfilled is often obvious, but sometimes it requires substantive investigation. I illustrate that not only safe deduction but the discovery of dramatic closure failures can lead to scientific advances. (shrink)

Nancy is ultimately most concerned about how to determine the relevance of evidence to implementation of evidence-based policy guidelines, in other words, the transferability of study results to a population different from the one that was studied and in which procedures or conditions are not the same as those in the study. And she is concerned about the privileged position Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) are given in the ranking schemes for evidence-based policy, because as she sees it RCTs do not (...) address this question while other methods do. RCTs are highly regarded because of their strength in ruling out confounding variables, but they can be weak on the transferability problem because the manipulations necessary for controlled experiment also guarantee that the setting and population are different from the situation and population targeted for application. However, both of these familiar points are simplifications that can be misleading. Some non-RCT type studies (e.g. soft interventions) can also be very good at ruling out confounding variables.1 And, as I will explain, the problems leading to the transferability problem – interacting variables and a difference between study and target populations – are present in any study, not unique to RCTs. In addition. (shrink)

Drawing upon contemporary virtue ethics theory, The Model of The Principled Advocate and The Pathological Partisan is introduced. Profiles are developed of diametrically opposed archetypes of public relations and advertising practitioners. The Principled Advocate represents the advocacy virtues of humility, truth, transparency, respect, care, authenticity, equity, and social responsibility. The Pathological Partisan represents the opposing vices of arrogance, deceit, secrecy, manipulation, disregard, artifice, injustice, and raw self-interest. One becomes either a Principled Advocate or a Pathological Partisan by habitually enacting or (...) embodying the virtues or vices in the context of professional practices. (shrink)

Many prescriptions offered in the literature for enhancing creativity and innovation in organizations raise ethical concerns, yet creativity researchers rarely discuss ethics. We identify four categories of behavior proffered as a means for fostering creativity that raise serious ethical issues: breaking rules and standard operating procedures; challenging authority and avoiding tradition; creating conflict, competition and stress; and taking risks. We discuss each category, briefly identifying research supporting these prescriptions for fostering creativity and then we delve into ethical issues associated with (...) engaging in the prescribed behavior. These four rubrics illustrate ethical issues that need to be incorporated into the creativity and innovation literature. Recommendations for how organizations can respond to the ethical issues are offered based on practices of exemplary organizations and theories of organizational ethics. A research agenda for empirically investigating the ethical impact these four categories of behavior have on organizations concludes the article. (shrink)

A framework is introduced consisting of five baselines of ethical justification for professional persuasive communications. The models provide a conceptual structure by which to identify and analyze the ethical reasoning, underlying justifications, motivations, and decision making in professional persuasive practices. Although the emphasis of this article is on defining the constructs, their ethical soundness as justification for persuasive practices and their usefulness in establishing direction and methodologies for research in persuasive also are addressed.

本书包括周敦颐的“太极图”,张载“气”的哲学,王安石的“新学”思想,二程的理学思想,朱熹的理本体论哲学,陆九渊的“心学”,陈亮“道在物中”的思想等内容。.

From the modern point of view, the Daoist regimen culture in China is actually a kind of oriental bionomy. Although it is less developed than the Western life sciences in terms of details and techniques, it has unique advantages in terms of its comprehensive grasp and dynamic observation of life, as well as its emphasis on the development of life potentiality and on the self adjustment and improvement of living bodies. Chen Yingning reestablished a Daoist bionomy through Xianxue 仙学 (Philosophy (...) of Immortals) which involves religious faith, philosophy and sciences, leaving us a valuable legacy. To establish a new bionomy system required by the modern society through learning from the Daoist bionomy, the academic circle has to seriously explore the four issues: (1) at the level of faith, to turn the Daoist faith in deities and gods into a pursuit of ideal personality; (2) with respect to the principles of regimen, to extend the dual cultivation into a kind of universal concept; (3) as with the way of regimen, to learn from the regimen thought of Daoism and combine the inner cultivation with the outer one, and static exercise with dynamic exercise; and (4) with regard to the ways of treatment of diseases, to combine the Daoist medicine with the Western medicine. (shrink)

The original meaning of the term Dao is a road. As the Explanation of the Characters says, "What we walk on is a way [Dao]." The character is derived from two parts: shou, a head, and chuo, to walk and stop and walk again—that is, to walk. The head indicates the way to go and the body walks in this direction. Later, the term Dao was extended in meaning from the concrete to the general, gradually becoming a more general and (...) abstract word. Thus it took on the sense of norm, law, -ism, guide, method, and technique. Yet all these meanings are still consonant with the original sense of the Way. In Laozi's time, most thinkers had not raised Dao to become a wholly independent philosophical concept. It was still a limited thing; thus, we find "the Way of heaven," "the Way of human beings," and "the Way of spirits.". (shrink)

Nursing practice occurs in the context of conversations with healthcare users, other healthcare professionals, and healthcare institutions. This discussion paper draws on symbolic interactionism and Fairclough's method of critical discourse analysis to examine language that nurses use to describe the people in their care and their practice. We discuss how nurses’ use of language constructs meaning about healthcare users and their own work. Through language, nurses are articulating what they believe about healthcare users and nursing practice. We argue that the (...) language nurses use can contribute to viewing their practice as tasks on bodies that must be accomplished efficiently and objectively within the biomedical model, rather than relational and person‐centered. Moreover, the language nurses use can perpetuate a sense of powerlessness within healthcare systems yet paradoxically they are in a position of power over healthcare users. Nurses’ compliance with the efficiency and biomedical model results in a lack of emphasis on the full breadth of nursing work, which could be enacted in relational rather than power‐laden practices. We conclude by positing that careful use of language among nurses in all settings is essential, if we are to begin to articulate what nursing is to ourselves and to others. (shrink)

American policymakers and health policy analysts have a love-hate relationship with job-based health insurance. The policy press routinely runs articles about the demise of the current system of voluntary employer-sponsored health insurance coverage. Conservatives argue that it ought to be replaced with individually-purchased insurance, such as tax-favored spending accounts. Liberals assert that government insurance ought to supplant it.Meanwhile, as the debate rages on about the future of employer coverage, states and the federal government pass legislation buttressing and building on the (...) existing employment-based system. Most recently, California has passed an employer mandate requiring employers to cover their workers and Maine has adopted a universal coverage initiative that includes a voluntary small employer insurance program offered through a state agency. (shrink)

Christy Mag Uidhir’s Art and Art-Attempts begins from two deceptively simple observations: artworks are the product of intentions, and intentions are the kinds of things that can fail to be realized successfully. Drawing on these observations, he argues that most contemporary theories of art must be rejected because they are not substantively intention-dependent: that is, they do not account for the fact that an attempt to make an artwork can fail. From his view that artworks must be the product of (...) art-attempts that are subject to failure, Mag Uidhir derives implications for many domains in the philosophy of art. He argues that artworks cannot be abstract objects, since abstract objects cannot participate in causal relations and thus can’t be the product of art attempts: one can’t coherently intend or attempt to create something that exists eternally. Things that we think of as repeatable artworks, then, can’t be abstract types: instead, Mag Uidhir proposes, every artwork is concrete, but some are tied together by a relation of relevant similarity. In this symposium, Mag Uidhir replies to three critics, David Davies, Sherri Irvin and Keith Lehrer. All three critics examine the relevant similarity relation that Mag Uidhir proposes to account for artworks that we treat as repeatable, while also considering a variety of other issues. (shrink)

This paper addresses two questions about audience misunderstandings of contemporary art. First, what is the institution’s responsibility to prevent predictable misunderstandings about the nature of a contemporary artwork, and how should this responsibility be balanced against other considerations? Second, can an institution ever be justified in intentionally mounting an inauthentic display of an artwork, given that such displays are likely to mislead? I will argue that while the institution has a defeasible responsibility to mount authentic displays, this is not always (...) sufficient to avoid misunderstanding; the institution will sometimes need to supply auxiliary information. And even where competing considerations require mounting an inauthentic display, thoughtful museum practice can promote the audience’s ability to grasp the work. The argument will be developed with consideration of artworks by El Anatsui, Lygia Clark, and Glenn Ligon. (shrink)

In this paper, I give a metaphilosophical analysis of the core idea of deflationism by discussing some basic conceptual and methodological issues involved in the debate between deflationism and substantivism. In so doing, I argue for three positive points. First, the crux of the dispute between deflationism and substantivism is whether or not truth is substantive in its metaphysical nature and in its explanatory role in philosophical enterprises, rather than whether or not a minimal approach regarding conceptual resources is taken (...) to explain truth; a minimal approach itself is philosophically innocent. Second, there is no intrinsic connection between the core idea of deflationism and the Tarski-style equivalence thesis, which is often identified as implying or supporting the former. Third, there are some unbridged fundamental gaps between the core idea of deflationism and various redundancy theses; these redundancy theses cannot be identified as the former, nor can they be used to justify the former on their own. (shrink)

Many feminists have aruged that researchers must “give voice” to hitherto silenced women by adopting “the view from below.” Critically reviewing the literature on feminist methodology, the author argues that this perspective, while absolutely essential, is not sufficient. Confining research to induction-based methods ignores the limits to such research: Ideologies of oppression are often internalized, while the underlying structures of oppression are hidden. Marxist approaches may help reveal hidden determinants of oppression, but they risk exacerbating inequalities between researcher and researched. (...) Women's experience of a world shaped by structures of inequality produces contradictory relationships among researcher and researched and requires a methodology that deals with difference and the blindness of privilege among women. Women's oppression is “a complex of many contradictions” and necessitates a new standpoint-based methodology, created by researchers and participants of diverse race, class, and other oppressed groups, refocusing and re-visioning knowledge based on theory, action, and experience. (shrink)

Recent accounts of the role of diagrams in mathematical reasoning take a Platonic line, according to which the proof depends on the similarity between the perceived shape of the diagram and the shape of the abstract object. This approach is unable to explain proofs which share the same diagram in spite of drawing conclusions about different figures. Saccheri’s use of the bi-rectangular isosceles quadrilateral in Euclides Vindicatus provides three such proofs. By forsaking abstract objects it is possible to give a (...) natural explanation of Saccheri’s proofs as well as standard geometric proofs and even number-theoretic proofs. (shrink)