Thinking About Judaism: Philosophical Reflections on Jewish Thought examines the light shed by philosophy upon significant areas of Jewish life and academic studies, including Jewish history, Jewish ethics, Jewish law, and Jewish aesthetics. As the author clearly illustrates, the teachings of leading theorists on the subjects of general history, ethics, law, and aesthetics inspire us to think about corresponding subjects related to Judaica.

Anthropology of Consciousness, EarlyView.

Obsessive doubt and commitment phobia are relationship wreckers. Written by an anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) expert, Relationship OCD offers an evidence-based, cognitive-behavioral approach to finding relief from chronic relationship anxiety. Readers will learn to challenge the intrusive thoughts and worries that trigger harmful emotions, embrace the uncertainty inherent in all human connections, and discover a deeper sense of intimacy and trust.

The paper provides a systematic overview of recent debates in epistemology and philosophy of science on the nature of understanding. We explain why philosophers have turned their attention to understanding and discuss conditions for “explanatory” understanding of why something is the case and for “objectual” understanding of a whole subject matter. The most debated conditions for these types of understanding roughly resemble the three traditional conditions for knowledge: truth, justification and belief. We discuss prominent views about how to construe these (...) conditions for understanding, whether understanding indeed requires conditions of all three types and whether additional conditions are needed. (shrink)

Es spricht einiges dafür, daß sich die Zukunftsfähigkeit auch westlicher Gesellschaften an ihrer Fähigkeit zur demokratischen Selbsttransformation, z.B. durch eine Ausweitung der Mitwirkungsrechte der Bürgerinnen und Bürger, erweisen wird.Vor diesem Hintergrund wird hier der Versuch unternommen, die Bedingungen und Chancen einer partizipatorischen Reform parlamentarischer Demokratien zu sondieren. Dabei führt der Verfasser zunächst im Durchgang durch die neuere staats- und demokratietheoretische Diskussion die Idee einer deliberativen Politik ein, die er dann in ein Modell reflexiver Demokratie übersetzt und so eine Perspektive auf (...) die grundlegende Reform politischer Institutionen eröffnet. Der Schlußabschnitt konzentriert sich auf neue Formen der politischen Willensbildung in Verhandlungssystemen, politischen Netzwerken o.ä., um vor allem am Beispiel der Umwelt- und Technologiepolitik zu prüfen, unter welchen Voraussetzungen sich diese Entwicklungen für Zwecke einer durchgreifenden Strukturreform aufgreifen und weiterführen lassen. (shrink)

Bruns lucidly depicts the distinctions and convergences between these two lines of thought by examining the works of Mallarme, Flaubert, Joyce, Beckett, and ...

In science and philosophy, a relatively demanding notion of understanding is of central interest: an epistemic subject understands a subject matter by means of a theory. This notion can be explicated in a way which resembles JTB analyses of knowledge. The explication requires that the theory answers to the facts, that the subject grasps the theory, that she is committed to the theory and that the theory is justified for her. In this paper, we focus on the justification condition and (...) argue that it can be analyzed with reference to the idea of a reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

Carnap and Goodman developed methods of conceptual re-engineering known respectively as explication and reflective equilibrium. These methods aim at advancing theories by developing concepts that are simultaneously guided by pre-existing concepts and intended to replace these concepts. This paper shows that Carnap’s and Goodman’s methods are historically closely related, analyses their structural interconnections, and argues that there is great systematic potential in interpreting them as aspects of one method, which ultimately must be conceived as a component of theory development. The (...) main results are: an adequate method of conceptual re-engineering must focus not on individual concepts but on systems of concepts and theories; the linear structure of Carnapian explication must be replaced by a process of mutual adjustments as described by Goodman; Carnap’s condition of similarity can be analysed into two components, one securing a relation to the specific extensions of the pre-existing concepts, one regulating the transition to the new system of concepts; these two criteria of adequacy can be built into Goodman’s account of reflective equilibrium to ensure that the resulting concepts promote theoretical virtues while being sufficiently similar to the concepts we started out with. (shrink)

Elgin has presented an extensive defence of reflective equilibrium embedded in an epistemology which focuses on objectual understanding rather than ordinary propositional knowledge. This paper has two goals: to suggest an account of reflective equilibrium which is sympathetic to Elgin’s but includes a range of further developments, and to analyse its role in an account of understanding. We first address the structure of reflective equilibrium as a target state and argue that reflective equilibrium requires more than an equilibrium in the (...) sense of a coherent position. On the one hand, the position also needs to be stable between a ‘conservative’ pull of input commitments and a ‘progressive’ pull of epistemic goals; on the other hand, reflective equilibrium requires that enough of the resulting commitments have some credibility independent of the coherence of the position. We then turn to the dynamics of reflective equilibrium, the process of mutual adjustment of commitments and theories. Here, the most pressing internal challenges for defenders of reflective equilibrium arise: to characterize this process more exactly and to explain its status in relation to reflective equilibrium as a target state. Finally, we investigate the role of reflective equilibrium in Elgin’s account of understanding and argue that objectual understanding cannot be explained in terms of reflective equilibrium alone. An epistemic agent who understands a subject matter by means of a theory also needs to be able to use this theory and the theory needs to meet some external rightness condition. (shrink)

The Irish language represents a material link ensuring continuity between the past and present of the Irish experience, but as that link has gradually been obscured, the language has become a form of alterity, indicated in the notion of Gaelic Ireland going ‘underground’. The choice between maintaining the continuity of the Irish literary tradition and abandoning it was characterized by Franciscan theologian and philosopher Froinsias Ó Maolmhuaidh (Francis O’Molloy) as the choice between keeping one’s reason and embracing folly. Thus, his (...) envoi to the first printed Irish grammar in 1677 exhorts the people of Ireland to engage in a revival of literacy in the Irish language so as to transform their future by keeping faith with the past. Yet the desire to revive past knowledge or values is problematic. Is it possible, as the Irish revivalist Douglas Hyde desired, to ‘render the present a rational continuation of the past’? Or is it the case that revivals are attempts at a renewal of tradition, involving a dialectical transition similar to Hegel’s notion of Aufhebung? This inaugural lecture considers this question and the wider implications of revival by situating the Irish tradition of Revivalism within the broader history of ideas. (shrink)

SummaryIn a theory of representational or intentional states content is generally supposed to play various roles. It has to be the bearer of a truth‐value, it has to determine the way a representation is about something , and finally it has to 6e used in order to give intra‐ and interpersonal psychological explanations. It has been argued that no unique kind of content can play all these roles. What criterion should one adopt in order to draw the dividing line? We (...) suggest that the divide be based on ontological considerations related to the way content depends on external factors. There is a fundamental difference, we submit, between object‐dependent and property‐dependent contents. The requirements concerning modes of presentation as well as cognitive significance can be met by one kind of content. This content, it will appear, is property‐dependent, but never object‐dependent. (shrink)

​Kaum ein Konzept in der jüngeren politischen Theoriegeschichte kann auf eine solch steile und, wie sich mittlerweile gezeigt hat, auch langanhaltende Karriere zurückblicken wie das der Deliberation. Die in diesem Sammelband vereinigten Überlegungen stehen unter der zweiteiligen übergreifenden Überschrift "Deliberative Kritik – Kritik der Deliberation", die in einem Zug den kritischen Sinn der Deliberation und die Notwendigkeit einer reflexiven Kritik am Konzept der Deliberation selbst deutlich macht. Neben Erkundungen der Ideengeschichte und der normativen Grundlagen der Deliberation geht es um eine (...) Auseinandersetzung mit alternativen Konzeptionen und institutionellen Kontexten. Angesichts des Umstands, dass sich politische Prozesse bekanntlich seit geraumer Zeit aus den nationalstaatlichen Rahmungen herauslösen, werden zudem transnationale und kosmopolitische Perspektiven umfassend ausgeleuchtet. All diese topoi berühren wesentliche Denklinien der Arbeiten Rainer Schmalz-Bruns’, dem dieser Sammelband zum sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet ist. (shrink)

Taking Carnap’s classic exposition as a starting point, this paper develops a pragmatic account of the method of explication, defends it against a range of challenges and proposes a detailed recipe for the practice of explicating. It is then argued that confusions are involved in characterizing explications as definitions, and in advocating precising definitions as an alternative to explications. Explication is better characterized as conceptual re-engineering for theoretical purposes, in contrast to conceptual re-engineering for other purposes and improving exactness for (...) purely practical reasons. Finally, three limitations which call for further development of the method of explication are discussed. (shrink)

L'objectif de cet ouvrage est d'exposer la mise en application de la praxéologie, son implication et ses potentialités au sein de contextes éducatifs, afin d'inciter les intervenants à développer son emploi dans les dynamiques sociétales. L'intérêt de cet ouvrage est de proposer des pistes d'intervention aux enseignants, aux formateurs, aux actants sociétaux afin que la praxéologie devienne un outil, un levier éducatif et un vecteur de la construction efficiente du monde de demain.

Partant du débat qui oppose les orientations sémiologique et esthétique, l'auteur propose une troisième voie qui, comme les deux autres, vise à rendre compte de la perception esthétique du film, mais, au lieu de s'enfermer dans l'antinomie discours-figure, ou représentation-visibilité, problématise le fait de " l'impossible à représenter " dans sa confrontation avec le langage et le visible. Ce projet peut être considéré, selon l'auteur, comme une poétique, en un sens plus radical que la notion traditionnelle ou son prolongement chez (...) les formalistes russes, étant donné le thème de " l'articulation des signifiants à l'impossible " - une poétique qui procède de la crise de la représentation dans certains films (Duras) et trouve ses principaux instruments dans la psychanalyse. La première partie du livre explore deux propositions majeures de poétique, comme étude du discours et comme approche du sensible, puis les met à l'épreuve du cinéma de Duras, avant d'utiliser les conclusions de cette partie pour instaurer un débat épistémologique autour de la théorie psychanalytique du sujet divisé, laquelle permet d'accéder à la problématique centrale du livre : la rencontre avec le réel comme impossible. Cette perspective renvoie aux travaux de Jacques Lacan sur lesquels l'auteur se fonde pour introduire sa contribution la plus personnelle : le projet d'une nouvelle poétique du cinéma. (shrink)

The main purpose of this book is to look at a range of ubiquitous phenomena that make up our daily life and to ask not so much "whether" but "what" psychoanalytic thinking can add to our current understanding of these phenomena. Could there be another layer, below the obvious surface-layer, that needs to be explored further? And if so, can psychoanalytic light reflect upon and illuminate some of the new contours and shapes perhaps previously not fully seen or appreciated? What (...) interim conclusions can we reach as a result of this reflection upon our modern world? This book is linked to its immediate predecessor Psychoanalytic Perspectives on a Turbulent World but it differs significantly in tone, light and composition. This new book no longer addresses itself to the complex and troubling issues such as war, conflict, the global financial crisis and our struggle with leadership, instead, it tends to focus on the lighter side of life. (shrink)

Recently, a number of Anglo-American philosophers of very different sorts--pragmatists, metaphysicians, philosophers of language, philosophers of law, moral philosophers--have taken a reflective rather than merely recreational interest in literature. Does this literary turn mean that philosophy is coming to an end or merely down to earth? In this collection of essays, one of the most insightful of contemporary literary theorists investigates the intersection of literature and philosophy, analyzing the emerging preferences for practice over theory, particulars over universals, events over structures, (...) inhabitants over spectators, an ethics of responsibility over a morality of rules, and a desire for intimacy with the world instead of simply a disengaged knowledge of it. (shrink)

Asexuality is overlooked in the philosophical literature and in wider society. Such neglect produces incomplete or inaccurate accounts of romantic life and harms asexual people. We develop an account of asexuality to redress this neglect and enrich discussion of romantic life. Asexual experiences are diverse. Some asexual people have sex; some have romantic relationships in the absence of sex. We accept the common definition of asexuality as the absence of sexual attraction and explain how sexual attraction and sexual desire differ (...) by giving an affordance‐like account of sexual attraction. Armed with that distinction, we show that asexuality is clearly different from celibacy or disorders of desire and that some existing philosophical theories of sexual desire struggle to accommodate asexual sexuality. We then build on asexual testimony about the diversity of non‐sexual attractions to answer two common objections levelled at asexual romance: that romantic relationships require sexual attraction or that sex in the absence of sexual attraction is insufficiently focused on someone as an individual. Finally, we describe some of the ways asexuality has been erased or denigrated in society, and the specific injustices and harms that result. (shrink)

Most philosophers acknowledge ways of overcoming blame, even blame directed at a culpable offender, that are not forgiving. Sometimes continuing to blame a friend for their offensive comment just isn't worth it, so we let go instead. However, despite being a common and widely recognised experience, no one has offered a positive account of letting go. Instead, it tends to be characterised negatively and superficially, usually in order to delineate the boundaries of forgiveness. This paper gives a more complete and (...) systematic account of this important practice. We argue that the basic distinction between forgiving and letting go of blame follows from distinctions that many philosophers already accept. We then develop a positive account in terms of the reasons one has to let go rather than forgive and show that letting go is as valuable a part of our shared moral lives as forgiveness. (shrink)

Social scientists, political scientists and philosophers debate key concepts such as democracy, power and autonomy. Contested concepts like these pose questions: Are terms such as “democracy” hopelessly ambiguous? How can two theorists defend alternative accounts of democracy without talking past each other? How can we understand debates in which theorists disagree about what democracy is? This paper first discusses the popular strategy to answer these questions by appealing to Rawls’s distinction between concepts and conceptions. According to this approach, defenders of (...) rival conceptions of, e.g. justice can disagree without talking past each other because they share the concept of justice. It is argued that this idea is attractive but limited in application and that it fails to do justice to the dynamic and normative aspects of concept formation. Reflective equilibrium is then suggested as an alternative approach. It replaces the static contrast between a conceptual ‘core’ and competing conceptions by a dynamic perspective of concept formation as a partly normative undertaking: pre-theoretic language use and commitments can provide a shared starting point for developing alternative accounts which yield different concepts of, e.g. justice. This perspective provides a new understanding of how it is possible that different theorists defend rival accounts of, e.g. justice, without talking past each other. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to re-assess reflective equilibrium (“RE”). We ask whether there is a conception of RE that can be defended against the various objections that have been raised against RE in the literature. To answer this question, we provide a systematic overview of the main objections, and for each objection, we investigate why it looks plausible, on what standard or expectation it is based, how it can be answered and which features RE must have to meet (...) the objection. We find that there is a conception of RE that promises to withstand all objections. However, this conception has some features that may be unexpected: it aims at a justification that is tailored to understanding and it is neither tied to intuitions nor does it imply coherentism. We conclude by pointing out a cluster of questions we think RE theorists should pay more attention to. (shrink)

Most philosophers have largely downplayed any relevance of multiple meanings of the folk concept of truth in the empirical domain. However, confusions about what truth is have surged in political and everyday discourse. In order to resolve these confusions, we argue that we need a more accurate picture of how the term ‘true’ is in fact used. Our experimental studies reveal that the use of ‘true’ shows substantial variance within the empirical domain, indicating that ‘true’ is ambiguous between a correspondence (...) and a coherence reading. We then explore the consequences of these results for the project of re-engineering truth. (shrink)

In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if (...) the process is successful, be justified. Since the method of reflective equilibrium does not essentially involve intuitions, it does not constitute a form of intuitionism in any substantial sense. It may be classified as intuitionist only in the minimal sense of not reducing justification to a matter of inference relations alone. (shrink)

Books reviewed in this article:Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Martin K??hler, Re‐imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy.Max Pensky, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays. By J??rgen Habermas.Beate Kohler‐Koch, Regieren in entgrenzten R??umen. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, special issue 29.Wolfgang Streeck, Internationale Wirtschaft, nationale Demokratie. Herausforderungen f??r die Demokratietheorie. Michael Z??rn, Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates.

The notion of exemplification is essential for Goodman’s theory of symbols. But Goodman’s account of exemplification has been criticized as unclear and inadequate. He points out two conditions for an object x exemplifying a label y: (C1) y denotes x and (C2) x refers to y. While (C1) is uncontroversial, (C2) raises the question of how “refers to” should be interpreted. This problem is intertwined with three further questions that consequently should be discussed together with it. Are the two necessary (...) conditions (C1) and (C2) conjointly sufficient? Do they amount to a definition of “exemplification”? Which notions of Goodman’s theory are basic, and hence undefined? In this paper, we address these questions and defend a reconstruction of the notion of exemplification that interprets “refers to” in (C2) as exemplificational reference and hence treats “exemplification” as a basic notion of Goodman’s theory. Firstly, we argue that even though the notion of exemplification is not defined, it is still sufficiently clear. This ensures its contribution to Goodman’s theory of symbols. Secondly, we show that our account is plausible as an interpretation of Goodman’s and Elgin’s writings, although it implies that some of Goodman’s theorems about selfreference have to be weakened. Thirdly, we argue that it is the only materially adequate reconstruction of Goodman’s notion of exemplification, whereas the alternative definitional accounts fail. (shrink)

Compersion is an important concept for non-monogamous people. Often described as jealousy's opposite, compersion labels positive feelings toward the intimacy of a beloved with other people. Since many people think jealousy is ordinary, intransigent, and even appropriate, compersion can seem psychologically and ethically dubious. I make the case for compersion, arguing it focuses on the flourishing of others and is thus not akin to pride, vicarious enjoyment, or masochistic pleasure. People cultivate compersion by softening their propensity to be jealous and (...) by attending to the flourishing of others, which requires them to tackle entitlement and temper vulnerability. I argue that jealousy is not a valuable emotional disposition; its instrumental benefits are minor, unstable, and have to be traded against the harms of aggression. Arguments that conclude that jealousy is a virtue rest on contentious premises and overlook the practical question as to whether jealousy and compersion could be cultivated together. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2022.

Traditional logical reconstruction of arguments aims at assessing the validity of ordinary language arguments. It involves several tasks: extracting argumentations from texts, breaking up complex argumentations into individual arguments, framing arguments in standard form, as well as formalizing arguments and showing their validity with the help of a logical formalism. These tasks are guided by a multitude of partly antagonistic goals, they interact in various feedback loops, and they are intertwined with the development of theories of valid inference and adequate (...) formalization. This paper explores how the method of reflective equilibrium can be used for modelling the complexity of such reconstructions and for justifying the various steps involved. The proposed approach is illustrated and tested in a detailed reconstruction of the beginning of Anselm’s De casu diaboli. (shrink)

Polyamory is a form of consensual non-monogamy. To render it palatable to critics, activists and theorists often accentuate its similarity to monogamy. I argue that this strategy conceals the distinctive character of polyamorous intimacy. A more discriminating account of polyamory helps me answer objections to the lifestyle whilst noting some of its unique pitfalls. I define polyamory, and explain why people pursue this lifestyle. Many think polyamory is an inferior form of intimacy; I describe four of their main objections. I (...) explain how commitment to ‘the polyamorous possibility’ prompts one to viscerally experience personal, practical, and social constraints. Unlike monogamous dynamics, these confrontations are mediated by third parties who destabilise the familiar dynamics of coupled life. Polyamory can be emotionally challenging but, as I outline in the article, it is sustained by interpersonal emotional work that helps people feel and understand their emotions, communicate without confrontation, and contain the difficult emotions of others. This work is qualitatively and quantitatively intensified in polyamory. Finally, I rebut objections to polyamory whilst also acknowledging the ways polyamory has its own pitfalls. (shrink)

Logik ist nach dem traditionellen Verständnis eine ars iudicandi, eine Kunst, die Gültigkeit von Schlüssen zu prüfen. Da mit die normalen Mittel der modernen Logik zu diesem Zweck eingesetzt werden können, müssen erst Formeln an die Stelle von Sätzen treten: umgangssprachliche Schlüsse müssen adäquat formalisiert werden. Die richtige Formel entwickelt ein theoretisches Konzept des Formalisierens und praktisch anwendbare Adäquatheitskriterien für Formalisierungen. Dabei werden zentrale Fragen der Philosophie der Logik unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Zusammenspiels von Umgangssprache und Formalismus untersucht. Die ausführliche (...) und systematische Diskussion von Formalisierungstests bietet eine wichtige Ergänzung zu den traditionellen Logiklehrbüchern. (shrink)

Evolutionary biology is paying increasing attention to the mechanisms that enable phenotypic plasticity, evolvability, and extra‐genetic inheritance. Yet, there is a concern that these phenomena remain insufficiently integrated within evolutionary theory. Understanding their evolutionary implications would require focusing on phenotypes and their variation, but this does not always fit well with the prevalent genetic representation of evolution that screens off developmental mechanisms. Here, we instead use development as a starting point, and represent it in a way that allows genetic, environmental (...) and epigenetic sources of phenotypic variation to be independent. We show why this representation helps to understand the evolutionary consequences of both genetic and non‐genetic phenotype determinants, and discuss how this approach can instigate future areas of empirical and theoretical research. (shrink)

In this chapter, Natasha McKeever and Luke Brunning consider (sexual) jealousy in romantic life. They argue that jealousy is best understood as an emotional response to the threatened loss of love or attention, to which one feels deserving, because of a rival. Furthermore, the general value of jealousy can be questioned, and jealousy’s instrumental value needs to be balanced against a range of potential harms. They assess two potential ways of managing jealousy (which are not mutually exclusive)—firstly by adopting a (...) policy of monogamy and secondly by engaging in emotional work. Neither of these methods is easy, and neither will solve jealousy altogether, but Brunning and McKeever argue that the second strategy should be taken more seriously. (shrink)