The Socratic method is conventionally understood to be a one-on-one interaction between Socrates and an individual interlocutor. Why, then, does Socrates conduct so many of his dialogues in public places, where they are prone to being witnessed or even interrupted? Through a careful reading of the Gorgias, a dialogue traditionally appealed to in studies of both the Socratic method and the philosophy of rhetoric, I argue that Socrates deliberately involves his audience in his conversations with individuals. The Socratic method (...) seeks to harness the group's constructive potential in the formation of a temporary community around a joint philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

This article argues for two theses: first, that Plato’s Apology is not directed to the Athenian public in general, but to an elite audience. Second, that because of this fact, the argument advanced by Vlastos that the Apology must be close to the historical defence of Socrates, because Plato could not present a fictional Socrates to his compatriots, is not compelling. The paper looks at the way Plato’s Socrates responds to the religious charges and concludes that he successfully refutes (...) the charge of atheism but evades the charge of heterodoxy. Although sufficient from a legal point of view and from the perspective of a highly educated audience, Socrates’ defence against the religious charges is actually ineffective from the point of view of the average Athenian. Burnyeat is therefore right to say that the Athenians correctly convicted Socrates of heterodoxy. This fact, along with Ledger’s recent stylometric evidence which places the Apology in 387 BC, effectively making it a middle dialogue, indicates that the work may never have been meant as a reasonably close reiteration of what Socrates said in his trial. On the question of the historicity of the Apology, then, the only reasonable response is to remain agnostic. (shrink)

In Plato’s early dialogues, the impossibility of talking to the crowd appears as a constitutive element of the opposition between rhetoric and dialectic and raises the understudied question of the role of the audience in Socratic thought. However, Xenophon’s Socrates constantly identifies public and private speech. But this likening is also found in the Alcibiades Major, which gives a key to understand the true meaning of this assimilation: one can convince an audience, by talking to each individual in (...) the crowd. The need to address each one implies an adaptation of language that can be found in the texts of different disciples of Socrates. The rhetorical aspects of the Phaedrus’ psychagogia should then be understood, not as a new Platonic concept which allows the good orator to address the many, but rather as a new for- mulation of a well-known and shared Socratic ideal. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Ancient Portraits Socratic Narratives and Other Ancient Images Summary Postantique Images Socrates as Wise Man Moralizing Tales The Death of Socrates Socrates and the Erotic Conclusion.

_Socrates and Alcibiades: Four Texts _gathers together translations our four most important sources for the relationship between Socrates and the most controversial man of his day, the gifted and scandalous Alcibiades. In addition to Alcibiades’ famous speech from Plato’s Symposium, this text includes two dialogues, the Alcibiades I and Alcibiades II, attributed to Plato in antiquity but unjustly neglected today, and the complete fragments of the dialogue Alcibiades by Plato’s contemporary, Aeschines of Sphettus. These works are essential reading for anyone (...) interested in Socrates’ improbable love affair with Athens’ most desirable youth, his attempt to woo Alcibiades from his ultimately disastrous worldly ambitions to the philosophical life, and the reasons for Socrates’ failure, which played a large role in his conviction by an Athenian court on charges of impiety and corrupting the youth. Focus Philosophical Library translations are close to and are non-interpretative of the original text, with the notes and a glossary intending to provide the reader with some sense of the terms and the concepts as they were understood by Plato’s immediate audience. (shrink)

Socratic irony can be understood independently of the immortal heroics of Plato’s Socrates. We need a systematic account and criticism of it both as a debate-winning strategy of argumentation and teaching method. The Speaker introduces an issue pretending to be at a lower intellectual level than her co-debaters, or Participants. An Audience looks over and evaluates the results. How is it possible that the Speaker like Socrates is, consistently, in the winning position? The situation is ironic because the Participants (...) fight from a losing position but realize it too late. Socratic irony compares with divine irony: divine irony is a subtype of Socratic irony since you lose when you challenge gods. Socratic irony is also, prima facie, a subtype of dramatic irony when the Audience knows more than the Participants on the stage. We must distinguish between the ideal and realistic elements of Socratic Irony. The very idea of Socratic irony looks idealized, or it is an ideal case, which explains the Speaker’s consistently winning position. In real life, the debate must be rigged, or the Dutch Book argument applies to the Participants, if the Speaker is so successful. (shrink)

In this piece, I propose a reading of Plato’s Gorgias that pays special attention to the role that the fictional audience plays in the unfolding of the dialogue. To this end, I use some of the insights that Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts–Tyteca conveyed in their seminal work, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation in order to argue that thinking about the way in which Socrates’ arguments are shaped by the different audiences that Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles aim (...) to address and represent provides us with a new hermeneutical understanding of what is at stake in each of the different interactions Socrates engages in throughout the dialogue. In unpacking the way in which Socrates appropriates Gorgias’ particular audience, transforms Polus’ universal audience, and challenges Callicles’ elite audience, I provide an outline of the difficulties that Plato’s Socrates has to overcome in order to achieve the ‘community of minds’ that Perelman and Olbrechts–Tyteca identify as the bedrock of fruitful argumentation. Having done this, in the last section I turn to Plato’s Phaedrus, for the purpose of making evident that thinking about Plato’s deployment of rhetorical audiences is a crucial step in the effort to expose the implicit continuity that links the discussion of rhetoric delivered by the Gorgias to that of the Phaedrus. (shrink)

The few people familiar with the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Axiochus generally have a low opinion of it. It's easy to see why: the dialogue is a mish-mash of Platonic, Epicurean and Cynic arguments against the fear of death, seemingly tossed together with no regard whatsoever for their consistency. As Furley notes, the Axiochus appears to be horribly confused. Whereas in the Apology Socrates argues that death is either annihilation or a relocation of the soul, and is a blessing either way, "the (...) Socrates of the Axiochus wants to have it both ways": death is both annihilation and a release of the soul from the body into a better realm. This may be used to construct a valid argument for the conclusion that death is not evil, but at the expense of having a contradiction as one of its premises. But D. S. Hutchinson has recently proposed that these inconsistencies shouldn't surprise us if we view the Axiochus as "an unconventional version of a very conventional genre--the consolation letter." In this paper I expand on Hutchinson's brief suggestion and argue that the Axiochus can be rehabilitated by paying attention to its genre. Although the Axiochus does display many similarities to the consolation letter, the shift from letter to dialogue does--pace Hutchinson--significantly affect what's going on. Within the dialogue, Socrates behaves toward Axiochus in a way similar to the way the author of a consolation letter behaves towards the letter's reader: he is willing to use inconsistent arguments, borrowed from any source, in order to soothe the patient. However, in depicting this type of consolatory relationship between Socrates and Axiochus, the dialogue itself is not aiming at consoling its readers. Instead, it should be seen as displaying for the reader's consideration a certain type of consolatory argumentative practice. -/- Socrates notes that Axiochus is "very much in need of consolation" (365a), and he uses any means necessary to accomplish this task. Socrates exhibits many ways in which he is willing to sacrifice argumentative hygiene for the sake of therapeutic effectiveness. These include: -/- * Use of arguments with inconsistent premises, presented in propria persona. * Appeals to emotion * Tailoring arguments to the audience. * Presenting invalid arguments so as to induce unjustified but comforting beliefs. * Evasion. In these respects, I think that Socrates' argumentative practice is best compared to PH III 280-1, where Sextus Empiricus says that the skeptic will deliberately use logically weak arguments as long as they work. Dorothy Tarrant claims that what links the Socrates of the Axiochus to Socrates as he appears elsewhere in the Platonic corpus is his evident care for the welfare of his interlocutor's psyche. But this concern takes a quite different form in the Axiochus than it usually does. As with Sextus, psychic therapy in the Axiochus involves relief from pain. The primary difference between them is that Socrates, unlike Sextus, is not aiming at producing epochê in his patient. (shrink)

This article argues that the Paraphrasis of St John’s Gospel by Nonnus offers a response to late antique concerns as to why the salvific message of Jesus failed to be recognised by authorities of the Roman Empire in the Gospels. By reworking the portrait of Pilate found in John’s Gospel, Nonnus transforms the governor into an unambiguously late antique pepaideumenos, one who ultimately participates in the promulgation of Christian salvation and truth. The analysis shows that Nonnus accomplishes this portrait through (...) the use of Homeric parallels and allusions to Plato’s Apology of Socrates, which transform Jesus’ trial before Pilate from John 18 into a philosophical dialogue about justice, kingship, and truth. The poem invites its late antique audience to better identify with Pilate and to see his inscription of the title (titulus) on Jesus’ cross as an early gentile confession of faith, ultimately making Pilate into an apostle avant-la-lettre and rehabilitating the role of Rome vis-à-vis Christianity for late antique audiences.This work is part of a project on the reception of John’s Gospel in Late Antiquity under the direction of Prof. Michele Cutino and his research group, GIRPAM, at the Faculté de théologie catholique, Université de Strasbourg. (shrink)

In Republic X, the “problem of the irrational part” is this: Greek tragedy interacts with non-reasoning elements of the soul, affecting audiences in ways that undermine their reasoned views about virtue and value. I suggest that the common construal of Socrates’s critique of Greek tragedy is inadequate, in that it belies key elements of Plato’s audience psychology; specifically, the crucial role of the spirited part and the audience’s cognitive contribution to spectatorship. I argue that Socrates’s emphasis on the (...) audience’s cognitive contribution to spectatorship allows him to anticipate a non-authoritarian solution to the problem of the irrational part. (shrink)

Xenophon's Socratic Works demonstrates that Xenophon, a student of Socrates, military man, and man of letters, is an indispensable source for our understanding of the life and philosophy of Socrates. David M. Johnson restores Xenophon's most ambitious Socratic work, the Memorabilia, to its original literary context, enabling readers to experience it as Xenophon's original audience would have, rather than as a pale imitation of Platonic dialogue. He shows that the Memorabilia, together with Xenophon's Apology, provides us with our best (...) evidence for the trial of Socrates, and a comprehensive and convincing refutation of the historical charges against Socrates. Johnson's account of Socrates' moral psychology shows how Xenophon's emphasis on control of the passions can be reconciled with the intellectualism normally attributed to Socrates. Chapters on Xenophon's Symposium and Oeconomicus reveal how Xenophon used all the literary tools of Socratic dialogue to defend Socratic sexual morality and debate the merits and limits of conventional elite values. Throughout the book, Johnson argues that Xenophon's portrait of Socrates is rich and coherent, and largely compatible with the better-known portrait of Socrates in Plato. Xenophon aimed not to provide a rival portrait of Socrates, Johnson shows, but to supplement and clarify what others had said about Socrates. Xenophon's Socratic Works thus provides readers with a far firmer basis for reconstruction of the trial of Socrates, a key moment in the history of Athenian democracy, and for our understanding of Socrates' seminal impact on Greek philosophy. This volume introduces Xenophon's Socratic works to a wide range of readers, from undergraduate students encountering Socrates or ancient philosophy for the first time to scholars with interests in Socrates or ancient philosophy more broadly. It is also an important resource for readers interested in Socratic dialogue as a literary form, the trial of Socrates, Greek sexual morality, or Greek social history. (shrink)

Scholars have typically viewed book 3 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics as an unsystematic array of different metaphysical problems. In this article, the author argues that Aristotle organizes them with great care. The principle behind his ordering of the problems stems from Aristotle’s concern with impressing upon his audience the difficulty of becoming thoroughly perplexed. This principle is found to make sense of the discrepancies between Aristotle’s list of the problems in 3.1 and his discussion of them in 3.2–6. In short, (...) Aristotle’s primary concern in Metaphysics 3 is to temper the ambitions of his audience of enterprising physicists, a concern that takes him from the aim of metaphysics to the tension between theology and philosophy. Borrowed as this concern is from the Platonic Socrates, the author shows that the arc of Metaphysics 3 is Socratic, and how it is Socratic. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to discuss Socrates’ idea of philosophy asa service to the god. First the article investigates why Chaerephon wentto Delphi and why he asked Pythia the famous question concerningSocrates. The investigation provides a basis for distinguishing two majorperiods in his activity. The one preceding the Delphic oracle consists inconducting inquiries in a group of closest friends. The one following theDelphic oracle consist in addressing a much larger audience. An analysisof both periods suggests that (...) the oracle from Delphi greatly affectedSocrates’ relations with other Athenians. While the present article dealsalso with the issue of Socrates’ daimonion, it hypothesizes that the voiceof daimonion and the voice of Pythia could be regarded as Apollo’sinterventions. (shrink)

As in America, so in Athens, citizens received a basic education that made them literate and gave them simple skills. But if Athenian families wanted their children to be successful, more was needed. This concern with success led to the birth of sophism in the second half of the fifth century BCE. The Daily Show commonly takes on sophists in its satirical news segments. Jon Stewart's primary objects of derision, though, are sophists in politics and the mainstream media. The ironic (...) element in Enter Socrates' and Stewart's method should not be denigrated or underestimated, for it's what helps both of them to attract such large audiences. Based on a shared understanding of the deeper underlying meaning of an ironic exchange, people bond, and bond more closely. In their way, both Socrates and Stewart seek to create a dialogue among people who use their minds in an active way. (shrink)

It is a commonplace of modern criticism that every text is to be located within a complex network of cultural practices and material. Students of the ancient world may sometimes feel at a disadvantage; we simply do not have as much information as we would like in order to contextualize thoroughly. This has been especially true in the study of Platonic dialogues. The meagre remains of the writings of the sophists against whom Plato measured himself and of the art to (...) which he refers entail that analysis of Plato is often confined to the structure of his philosophy. Of course, the requirements of Plato's arguments must always be assigned primary importance; the relative lack of information about Plato's cultural context has not prevented detailed exposition of his method and achievements. Occasionally, however, a kindly fate allows us to set a dialogue, or part of it, in its appropriate material and ideological context and to create an interface between literary, philosophical, and archaeological evidence. Such evidence may not alter our evaluation of Plato's arguments on the analytic level, but it can enrich our appreciation of his literary artistry and recapture for us some of the resonance that his work would have had for a contemporary audience. (shrink)

In the "Republic," Plato has Socrates attack poetry’s use of mimēsis, often translated as ‘imitation’ or ‘representation.’ Various scholars (e.g. Blondell 2002; Frank 2018; Halliwell 2009; K. Morgan 2004) have noticed the tension between Socrates’ theory critical of mimēsis and Plato’s literary practice of speaking through various characters in his dialogues. However, none of these scholars have addressed that it is not only Plato the writer who uses mimēsis but also his own character, Socrates. At crucial moments in several dialogues, (...) Socrates takes on a role and speaks as someone else. I call these moments “Socratic mimēsis.” While previous commentators have noticed some of these moments, they have either overstated their rarity or they have not studied them collectively. My dissertation is the first in-depth investigation of this phenomenon in the dialogues. Socrates’ dramatic imitation of others is way of teaching in a voice separate from his own, and it is also a way for Plato to speak to, and to educate, different kinds of audiences. Although “Socratic mimēsis” occurs throughout the Platonic corpus, I focus on three passages from three different dialogues, which are paradigm instances: [1] in the "Crito" Socrates plays the part of ‘the Laws’ (50a-54c); [2] in the "Theaetetus" he acts the part of ‘Protagoras’ (166a-168c); and [3] in the "Menexenus" he recites a funeral speech learned from ‘Aspasia’ (236d-249c). Instead of one-sidedly reading the dialogues as either only literary works of art or as only a series of philosophical arguments, this study gleans philosophic insights from the literary and dramatic details of the dialogues. In chapter one I argue that in the "Crito" Socrates tries to convince Crito of a universal and absolute ethics based on never committing injustice, but Crito is not able to understand. In order to make Crito more just—but not yet at the level of Socratic ethics—Socrates creates ‘the Laws’ to persuade Crito to expand his personal notion of justice. Socrates instills a political obedience in place of Crito’s existing lawlessness as a second-best recourse. Plato expects the astute listener or reader to see the contrast between Socrates’ earlier ethical principles, said in his own voice, with what he says in the voice of ‘the Laws.’ In chapter two I argue that in the part of the "Theaetetus" where Socrates defends Protagoras (often called ‘the Defense’), Socrates, by imitating ‘Protagoras,’ is actually criticizing Protagorean relativism. The Protagorean theory cannot account for mimēsis and Socrates’ mimetic act performatively contradicts the identity of appearance and reality, which the theory presupposes. Finally, in chapter three I argue that in the Menexenus the funeral oration that Socrates recounts for Menexenus that he heard from ‘Aspasia’ is actually a disguised criticism of political rhetoric and of Athenian imperialism. Although the speech is never interrogated within the dialogue, Plato provokes the listener or reader outside the dialogue to question its message and to see how it conflicts with many of Socrates’ positions in other dialogues. Beyond reconsidering the long-standing and persistent view that Plato was against poetry and mimetic performance, I re-examine the role that performance and role-playing can have in philosophy and pedagogy more generally. Actors, by taking on other personas, and audience members, in observing actors and their actions, are both involved in acts of imagination that can expand their horizon of thinking and feeling. (shrink)

In the present paper I analyze some relevant textual keys of Plato's Apology to show the many strands underlying Socrates' claims of ignorance. I advocate a position that seeks to reevaluate the use of epistemic lexica by considering other evidence, such as cultural and dramatic context, the use of hypothetical clauses, the comparative and the rhetoric of the pair real/apparent. From this approach, I hope to show that there are good reasons to interpret Socrates' claims of ignorance in the light (...) of amiable irony, whereby the use of language and other literary devices create layers of meaning to express the full sense of Socratic wisdom for the audience without resorting to the charge of contradiction or insincerity. Against a position that reduces Socrates' message to the use of epistemic lexica to interpret it either by synonymy, equivocity or low/high cognitive grading, I propose to read Socrates' claims of ignorance, always in comparison to others' claim of wisdom, as a sort of cultural appropriation and revaluation of the traditional title σοφία/σοφός. (shrink)

It is a commonplace of modern criticism that every text is to be located within a complex network of cultural practices and material. Students of the ancient world may sometimes feel at a disadvantage; we simply do not have as much information as we would like in order to contextualize thoroughly. This has been especially true in the study of Platonic dialogues. The meagre remains of the writings of the sophists against whom Plato measured himself and of the art to (...) which he refers entail that analysis of Plato is often confined to the structure of his philosophy. Of course, the requirements of Plato's arguments must always be assigned primary importance; the relative lack of information about Plato's cultural context has not prevented detailed exposition of his method and achievements. Occasionally, however, a kindly fate allows us to set a dialogue, or part of it, in its appropriate material and ideological context and to create an interface between literary, philosophical, and archaeological evidence. Such evidence may not alter our evaluation of Plato's arguments on the analytic level, but it can enrich our appreciation of his literary artistry and recapture for us some of the resonance that his work would have had for a contemporary audience. (shrink)

This is an English translation of four of Plato’s dialogue (Protagoras, Euthydemus, Hippias Major, and Cratylus) that explores the topic of sophistry and philosophy, a key concept at the source of Western thought. Includes notes and an introductory essay. Focus Philosophical Library translations are close to and are non-interpretative of the original text, with the notes and a glossary intending to provide the reader with some sense of the terms and the concepts as they were understood by Plato’s immediate (...) class='Hi'>audience. (shrink)

This is a delightful book, a lively and thoroughly engaging survey of what some of the great Western philosophers have said about the nature, aims, and proper conduct of thought. Its intended audience is the general educated reader and the novice philosopher. Among Govier's selections are some obvious choices—Socrates, Descartes, Kant, and Wittgenstein—and some less obvious ones, such as Wollstonecraft and Beauvoir. Her concluding chapter takes up what she calls "contemporary voices": artificial intelligence research, the critical thinking-informal logic movement, (...) deconstruction, and feminist epistemology. (shrink)

Reasonable reconstruction of public statements is an essential component of civil discourse especially in contentious political contexts. This essay addresses the problems posed by irony through the perspective of the speaker and the audience. I argue that existing attempts to systematize the identification and reconstruction of irony focus unduly on forms of contrary irony, thereby neglecting the more complex figure of Socratic Irony. Socratic Irony, which can be characterized by the invocation of the voice of the other, is distinguished (...) from other important meanings of the word “irony” and illustrated by one ancient and three contemporary examples. When encountering this stylistic device, reasonable audiences must choose their principle of reconstruction. Of the five options for this choice, the final one reconstructing Socratic Irony using recurring markers is ultimately championed and its functionality demonstrated on the four earlier examples. (shrink)

L’hypothèse développée ici est que la « meilleure amie » évoquée par Socrate à la fin du chapitre n’est autre que son âme. L’exemple ainsi donné par Socrate de sa maîtrise de soi face à l’attrait exercé par une femme à la beauté « plus forte que les paroles»s’adresse non à cette dernière, mais aux assistants. On comprend ainsi pourquoi ce chapitre prend place dans une série d’entretiens où Socrate prodigue ses conseils à ceux qui « désirent les belles choses (...) ». Cette interprétation plaide en faveur de l’unité du livre III des Mémorables.The hypothesis exposed here is that the « better friend » called up by Socrates in the last sentence of the chapter is just his own soul. By giving a such example of self-control in face of an appealing woman whose beauty was « stronger than words », Socrates is not addressing this woman but his audience. We thus understand why this chapter is located in a series of conversations in which Socrates is giving advices to people who « desire beautiful things ». The thesis of the unity of Book III of Memorabilia is supported by this interpretation. (shrink)

L’hypothèse développée ici est que la « meilleure amie » évoquée par Socrate à la fin du chapitre n’est autre que son âme. L’exemple ainsi donné par Socrate de sa maîtrise de soi face à l’attrait exercé par une femme à la beauté « plus forte que les paroles » s’adresse non à cette dernière, mais aux assistants. On comprend ainsi pourquoi ce chapitre prend place dans une série d’entretiens où Socrate prodigue ses conseils à ceux qui « désirent les (...) belles choses » . Cette interprétation plaide en faveur de l’unité du livre III des Mémorables.The hypothesis exposed here is that the « better friend » called up by Socrates in the last sentence of the chapter is just his own soul. By giving a such example of self-control in face of an appealing woman whose beauty was « stronger than words », Socrates is not addressing this woman but his audience. We thus understand why this chapter is located in a series of conversations in which Socrates is giving advices to people who « desire beautiful things » . The thesis of the unity of Book III of Memorabilia is supported by this interpretation. (shrink)

This collection of essays, all previously published, offers selections from the life work of Robert Nozick. The essays range widely both temporally, from 1969 to 1995, and topically, from an analytic study of coercion to thoughts on Socrates’ profession of ignorance, to short “philosophical fictions.” The themes and approaches will be familiar to those who know anything of Nozick’s work. More than half the book is taken up by formal, analytic studies of topics of social, political, and moral significance. Questions (...) about how we might decide between competing individual preferences, or what strategies of decision making are the most rational and/or effective, or even how we come to judge certain actions immoral, are treated with remarkable precision and the maximum amount of formal, symbolic aid. Indeed, the occasional page packed with little but probability matrices, set theory, and the like makes for slow and somewhat typographically intimidating reading. Yet in Nozick’s hands these tools are well used, and offer to the patient reader both clarity and convincingness to a degree not likely to be available in another format. In fact, I think the formal essays offer the further advantage of being relatively self-contained, and thus fully accessible to anyone with sufficient education to read them. In contrast, some of the less formal work relies on the reader having a great deal of philosophical education and experience. Here to be capable of reading the essay is not sufficient for understanding it; one must also have read a good deal of Quine, and maybe some Hilary Putnam and B. F. Skinner just to be sure. For this reason, the audience for these essays must range, too. I can imagine having great fun reading “Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice” with a group of smart undergraduates, and certainly advanced students in the social sciences, with little philosophical training, could profitably work their way through “Coercion” and “Interpersonal Utility Theory,” but most of the book is clearly designed for a rather highly trained philosopher. From this perspective, the chief value of the collection is the convenience of having so much interesting work in one volume. Less book than encyclopedia, it will make a useful reference volume for the serious student of philosophy, a place to turn for guidance in unraveling some of the intricacies of codifying rational principles of choice. (shrink)

Crito was written in response to popular slanders concerning Socrates' failure to escape from prison, and accompanying misgivings within the Socratic circle. Plato responds by asking his audience to disregard the slander of the mob and obey the moral expert instead. But he also responds by creating an image of Socrates and his friends widely at odds with the popular slander; by implying that Socrates' critics were themselves guilty of some of the behaviour they charged against Socrates; by pointing (...) out that Socrates had no viable alternative to death; and, in partial contradiction to all this, by rejecting the popular morality which saw Socrates' abandonment and death as signs of failure. In the rhetorical climax of the composition, Plato shows that Socrates chose to die rather than victimize or offend the laws of the city, which he represents as sentient beings. The weaknesses that have been perceived in the arguments of the Athenian Laws are not fatal to the composition, because it aims not at a convincing demonstration, but at providing a portrait of Socrates' own overwhelming conviction of the rightness of his decision. (shrink)

When contemplating the origins of philosophical paideia one is tempted to think of Socrates, perhaps because we feel that Socrates has been a philosophical educator to us all. But it is Plato and his literary genius that we have to thank as his dialogues preserve not just Socratic philosophy, but also the Socratic educational experience. Educators would do well to better understand Plato's pedagogical objectives in the Socratic dialogues so that we may appreciate and utilize them in our own educational (...) endeavors, and so that we may adapt the Socratic experience to new interactive educational technologies. Plato designed his Socratic dialogues to arm students for real world challenges and temptations. First, in both form and function the dialogues attempt to replicate the Socratic experience for their audience. They demand from their readers what Socrates demanded from his students: active learning, self-examination, and an appreciation for the complexity and importance of wisdom. Second, the dialogues challenge the conflation of professional and personal excellence, best exemplified by sophists such as Hippias, and exhort their reader to pursue personal aretê separately from and alongside practical and professional skills or technai. Third, they aim not to transmit some prepackaged formula for success, but to teach students to learn for themselves; that is to love and pursue wisdom. The Socratic dialogues, and philosophic dialogue itself, are educationally important in that they teach us to be philosophers in the literal sense. (shrink)

The eminent philosopher and classical scholar Alexander Nehamas presents here a collection of his most important essays on Plato and Socrates. The papers are unified in theme by the idea that Plato's central philosophical concern in metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics was to distinguish the authentic from the fake, the original from its imitations. In approach, the collection displays Nehamas's characteristic combination of analytical rigor and sensitivity to the literary form and dramatic effect of Plato's work. Together, the papers represent Nehamas's (...) distinct and original contributions to scholarship on Plato and Socrates and serve as a comprehensive introduction to the thought of these two philosophers.In the book's opening section, Nehamas discusses Plato's representation of Socrates as a model of authentic human goodness, showing that Plato's Socrates is a more skeptical, troubling, and individualistic thinker than is usually supposed. The papers in the second section form a sustained defense of a new and important understanding of Plato's theory of the forms and the evolution of that theory in Plato's later writings. The third section examines Plato's contention that popular entertainment--by which he meant Greek epic and tragic poetry--misleads its audience into a debased life, an argument Nehamas relates to modern anxieties about television and other forms of popular culture. The collection also includes a discussion of Plato's use of the dialogue form in his representation of Socrates and carefully examines the combination of literary and philosophical elements in his work.Nehamas argues in the book that Plato's specific judgments of what is authentic are often flawed, but that his idea of authenticity as the mark of truth, beauty, and goodness is stronger than many modern scholars have assumed. In drawing together Nehamas's many influential ideas about Plato and Socrates, Virtues of Authenticity is a major contribution to the study of ancient Greek philosophy. (shrink)

In order to understand the Gricean "logic of conversation" that underlies the Nicomachean Ethics, Burger believes it necessary to identify the audience to which the work is addressed: this is the audience of men and citizens who have received a good education, that is, have learned the virtues through habit, but have doubts about the content of the education received, that is, about the beautiful and the just. Aristotle proposes on the one hand to give them reasons to (...) defend and justify the moral virtues they have learned and they practice, but on the other hand also to lead them to understand a dimension that goes beyond the horizon of traditional ethos. (shrink)

In the Symposium, there are two revelations: one is that of the woman of Mantinea, the other that of Alcibiades. The former proposes a Socrates reshaped by Plato, but what Socrates does the latter express? Can the praise for Socrates contained in the latter also be considered a tribute by Plato to his teacher? The opinions are divided. I looked at two scholars: Michel Narcy and Bruno Centrone, whose judgments, as they are set out and argued, are irreconcilable. The contrast (...) may be determined by a certain ambiguity in Plato’s attitude towards Alcibiades. Part One – In order to clarify this ambiguity and to overcome the contrast between the two scholars I have tried to show how in the praise of Alcibiades there overlap different portraits of Socrates that refer to the tradition, to different experiences of various Socratics and of Plato himself in Apologia, and how this differs from the others and from himself by proposing a whole new portrait of Socrates as a representative of an Eros megas daimōn, revealed by the woman of Mantinea, in contrast to an Eros megas theos. Part Two – As instead regards the accusation of hybris, the hypothesis is this: for Plato his colleagues, and especially Antisthenes and Xenophon, offering an image of Socrates founded exclusively on his way of life and not also on the erotic aspects alluding to the supersensible world, seem to end up arousing laughter and looking like “fools”, like Alcibiades, who at the end of his speech, after making the audience laugh, is unmasked by Socrates for his clumsy attempt to impart a “life lesson” to Agathon, which he did not need at all, paying at his own expenses for his ignorance of the revelation through arriving late at the party. (shrink)

If one includes the methodological preface the final argument of the Phaedo is by far the longest, as well as the one Socrates’ audience and Plato's readers are most ready to accept, and is often regarded as the one argument in the Phaedo that Plato himself accepted. Nevertheless it is also the most obscure, elusive, and frustrating of the arguments, whose intention as well as validity are in continual dispute. It has aptly been compared to an intricate maze, and (...) while it is perhaps appropriate that Socrates, who is portrayed in the dialogue as a kind of Theseus battling the Minotaur of fear of death, should finally pick his way through a labyrinth of distinctions, it is exceptionally difficult for the reader to find the thread and follow it. (shrink)

While committed to the argumentative and reasoned discourse recognizable in the work of contemporary professional philosophers, the actual practice that both Socrates and Diogenes routinely engaged in was in many ways more similar to stand-up and other forms of contemporary performative comedy. This paper analyzes the commonalities between Socrates’s and Diogenes's public philosophizing in Ancient Greece and performative comedy in the contemporary world, and emphasizes the subversive rhetorical efficiency and skeptical significance of public irony for their audiences. The paper begins (...) by exploring the ways in which ancient philosophers relied on irony and humor to promote skepticism and critical thinking, analyzes contemporary comic performances that seem similar, and concludes with reflections on the varieties of philosophical activity and experience. (shrink)

This is an English translation of one of Plato's least political dialogues of Socrates and Phaedrus discussing many themes: the art and practice of rhetoric, love, reincarnation, and the soul. It includes an introduction, notes, glossary, appendices, and an interpretive essay and introduction. Also included are rarely seen illustrations, stone carvings, and vase paintings. Focus Philosophical Library translations are close to and are non-interpretative of the original text, with the notes and a glossary intending to provide the reader with some (...) sense of the terms and the concepts as they were understood by Plato’s immediate audience. (shrink)

Socrates engages his audience in Phaedrus with speeches that include revised or newly composed myths that express his theory of philosophical eros. The aim of the speeches is to generate a love for truth that spills over into dialogue. Speeches are a starting point for dialogue, just like physical attraction is the beginning of love. In the case of Phaedrus, the beginning of philosophy is portrayed using playful and rhetorically rich speeches that serve as "love potions" awakening the novice's (...) soul, and ultimately leading Phaedrus to higher rungs on the ladder of love through the palinode, a medicinal speech. It is thinking about speeches, not the speeches themselves, which moves Socrates' student Phaedrus from the love of speeches to the love of Beauty itself. This is a stark contrast to the purpose of speechmaking for the sophist. The sophist seeks to enchant the soul, while the philosopher seeks to charm the soul into loving wisdom through stimulating discussions. Socrates also uses role reversals in the lover-beloved relationship to model the soul's ascent, contrasting the traditional roles with the way the lover and beloved are presented in Socrates' speeches. The novice must actively recollect Beauty itself in order to ascend, rather than passively listening to speeches that provide an image of beauty. Socrates' interlocutors must move themselves up the ladder of love from their own philosophical eros; wisdom is not attained by merely being pushed all the way up the ladder of love. (shrink)

In educational discourse dialogue tends to be viewed as being (morally) superior to monologue. When we look at them as basic forms of communication, we find that dialogue is a two-way, one-to-one form and monologue is a one-way, one-to-many form. In this paper I revisit the alleged (moral) superiority of dialogue. First, I problematize certain normative features of dialogue, most notably reciprocity. Here I use Socrates as my example (the Phaedrus). Second, I discuss monologue, using Jesus as my example (St. (...) Luke's gospel). I argue that there are values in the monological form that tend to be overlooked and unrecognized, for example the freedom of the audience not to respond. (shrink)

In this work, Robert Solomon tries to put the fun back in philosophy, recapturing the heart-felt confusion and excitement that originally brings us all into philosophy. It is not a critique of comtemporary philosophy so much as it is an attempt to engage in philosophy in a different kind of way, beginning with a re-evaluation of Socrates and the nature of philosophy and defending the passionate life in contrast to the calm life of thoughtful contemplation so often held up as (...) an ideal by traditional philosophers. In short, it is an attempt to recapture the kind of philosophy that Nietzsche celebrated as a "joyful wisdom". The author tries to break down the walls between academic philosophy and its lost audience, between thin logic and thick rhetoric, between philosophical reason and philosophical passion, between 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophy, between philosophy and life. (shrink)

This is an English translation of one of the more challenging and enigmatic of Plato's dialogues between Socrates and Parmenides and Zeno of Elea, that begins with Zeno defending his treatise of Parmenidean monism against those partisans of plurality. Focus Philosophical Library translations are close to and are non-interpretative of the original text, with the notes and a glossary intending to provide the reader with some sense of the terms and the concepts as they were understood by Plato's immediate (...) class='Hi'>audience. (shrink)

RADIO ADAPTATION OF THE PLATO’S DIALOGUES’ TRANSLATED BY W. WITWICKI AND ITS RECEPTION AT H. JAKUBANIS’ PHILOSOPHICAL SEMINAR IN THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LUBLIN S u m m a r y The paper presents a little-known episode in the reception of Plato’s dialogues in Polish culture in the interwar period, namely the radio adaptation of the dialogues. The adaptation was based on four dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, all of them translated by WMadysMaw Witwicki. This radio drama was very popular (...) and was broadcasted several times. Its popularity followed the fact that the forefront of the Polish actors interpreted the outstanding Polish texts delivered by Witwicki. The paper presents the reception of the four mentioned above dialogues by the professional readers, philologists and the classic languages’ teachers. The radio drama constitutes entirely separate field of the influence of Plato’s works. Radio made Plato’s Socrates accessible to the unprofessional wide audience. There was, however, a peculiar case of reception of the radio drama among the listeners. It was applied for the didactic purposes by Henryk Jakubanis at his philosophical seminar which was carried in the interwar period in the Catholic University of Lublin. (shrink)

Discussion of Iris Murdoch recalls Socrates' plea that he be allowed a crabwise approach to the Good. What his audience want of a direct approach is an explanation of precisely what sort of thing the Good is, where the demand for precision carries the force of: Tell me now, in which of the categories of thing I already allow to exist is the Good to be found? This is just what academia has done with the obscure singularity of Murdoch (...) – and the comedy of the exercise is the same. (shrink)

What makes Carlo Michelstaedter’s life and work worthy of a reflection on Italian aesthetics is his erratic attitude when taking a stance in the ancient discord between Philosophy and Poetry. This, since Plato’s times, as an original item, expects and transcends each historical chapter of the literary critique and each kind of philosophy of history. Michelstaedter justapoxes names such as Parmenides, Sophocles, Socrates, Christ and the Ecclesiastes in an anti-genealogical manner, that is against fathers and masters as well as sons (...) and disciples. Everything that, in his short life, he could read and study in Latin, Greek, German and Italian, was bound to death against institutions and codes, against the family and the University, against the audience and every literary genre attended by the world in which he was born. Michelstaedter reads Parmenides’ Carminum reliquiae as a poetic emergency and sees in Socrates the one who becomes this poetry. The bold link between Parmenides’ ontology and Socrates’ dialectics constitutes the climax of an iconoclastic and anti-mimetic poiesis. Rhadamanthus’ justice, results bitter to Michelstaedter. It discerns, that is, the original relationship of Socrates with death from that which was superimposed by Plato ; he distinguishes Socrates’ beautiful death from that which was enticed by Hegesias, the death-persuader, in the naive; he places Socrates next to Sophocles and the Ecclesiastes, against the mortal event of the birth. Socrates, in case, did not die because of the “cicuta” which parted him from the pain of living, nor because of the eternal idea that he’s been contemplating ever since with his immortal soul. He died, instead, after having become something divine and devilish, something that distracts him since his childhood from everything he is about to do, every time, and eventually leads him nowhere. From this anti-contemplative perspective, Michelstaedter acknowledges in every philosophy intended to reconcile the absolute and relative, the rhetoric artifice aimed at concealing an original aporia which can only be dishonestly swayed, rather than overcome. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction New Beginnings, or Continuity? Contrasting Readings of the Republic Plato and his Audience, Plato and Socrates.

Chaim Perelman invokes the idea of “universal audience” for explaining the nature of philosophical argumentation as rational rhetoric. As opposed to this view, centuries before Perelman, Socrates argues that philosophy should be conducted as a dialogue between concrete individuals with very specific qualities. The paper presents these different views in order to claim that the philosopher addresses neither a universal audience nor a particular other, but mainly and essentially the philosopher herself/himself. This brings to light the problem of (...) self-deception as a central problem of philosophical thinking. In posing this view the paper uses Nietzsche’s definition of “the will to truth” as the will not to deceive, not even myself. (shrink)

The article analyzes J. Gaarder’s s book «Sophie’s world» and defines its place in philosophy for children as a shpere of humanities. Philosophy for children in the «classical» model is presented as a method of P4C (author – M. Lipman). The author presents the audience the main thesises and methods of the P4C method and compares «Sophie’s world» with classic works of M. Lipman. The same moments of these works are: the target audience (partly), «socratic dialogue», the presence (...) of creative imagination. However, the book by Y. Gaarder differs in the literary form of presentation (unlike the methodical works of M. Lipman) and issues («Sophie’s world» analyzes the history of philosophical systems; M. Lipman analyzes philosophical problems without reference to names and periods). «Sophie’s world» has the following features of P4C: philosophical guidance, «socratic dialogue», critical thinking, the formation of responses to questions, interactive interaction, self-reflection. As a result, the author provides recommendations to teachers on the peculiarities of teaching the work «World of Sophia» at school and identifies the competencies that the book can develop in students. «Sophie’s world» can be introduced into the school programm. However, teachers need to follow special recommendations. Children must express their opinions themselves and be a «Сommunity of researchers». Everyone сan to tell their own opinion. To interest students, the teacher can offer: video scribing, team collage, artistic reproduction of the atmosphere (for e[ample decoration), role play. «Sophie’s world» is a relevant work for philosophy for children. Y. Gaarder's book can form the reflective thinking and non-standard view of the world. The novel also develops communication skills, the ability to work in a team and ability to work with a large amount of information. «Sophie’s world» is very important and actual book for modern philosophy for children. (shrink)

Plato’s Protagoras plays off the genre of Greek comedy in its expression of its philosophical meaning. This dialogue at points invites us to re-envision Socrates against the backdrop of Aristophanes’ criticisms of Socrates and the sophists. The Protagoras follows some of the conventions of Greek comedy but interrupts its form with moments of lengthier rational discussion absent in Greek comedy. The dialogue’s logos and antilogos lead to aporia, but this aporia shows a limit to reason that recognizes human incompleteness without (...) leading to misology. In contrast to performed drama, the written form of the dialogue both engages its audience’s emotions while allowing the reader to return to the text and to continue their rational assessment of the arguments. (shrink)

In the Lysis, Socrates claims to be looking for an account of what kind of quality in another person or object stimulates friendship or love (philia). He goes through a series of proposals, refuting each in turn. In the end, he throws us back to the point from where the arguments started, declaring an aporetic outcome. What is the purpose of this apparently futile and circular inquiry? Most interpreters try to reconstruct a theory of friendship or love from the arguments (...) of this dialogue. Against such a doctrinal reading, this essay defends an “aporetic reading” of the dialogue and connects it to its protreptic function. Starting with a preliminary discussion of what defines an aporetic dialogue and what distinguishes indirect protreptic from explicit protreptic discourse, the essay then analyzes the aporetic method of the Lysis, distinguishing it from aporetic discourse in some of his earlier dialogues. Finally, it analyzes how, and for what kind of audience, the Lysisfunctions as an indirect protreptic. This includes a comparison with the protreptic use of aporetic argumentation in the Euthydemus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Piety, Justice, and the Unity of VirtueMark L. McPherranNo doubt the Socrates of the Euthyphro would be delighted to encounter many of its readers, offering as they do an audience of piety-seeking interlocutors, eager to mend the dialogical breach created by Euthyphro’s sudden departure. Socrates’ enthusiasm for this pursuit is at least as intense and comprehensible as theirs. We are told, after all, that he will never abandon (...) his quest for knowledge of “what the pious is” (15c–16a), since not only is this enterprise both pious and “inconceivably happy” (cf. Ap. 41c3–4) in itself,1 but coming to understand piety would allow one to “live better the rest of one’s life,” (15e7–16a4), especially should its continuation be threatened by a charge of impiety (3b–d, 5a–c, 12e, 15e–16a).2 My own search here is no less happy and ambitious, since I wish to uncover Socrates’ own, implicit understanding of piety and its relation to his claim elsewhere that “the virtues are one.”3 The account of this I shall provide will also touch on Platonic piety, although this notion obviously rests on a tendentious distinction. Nevertheless, there do seem to be some interesting differences between the way piety is treated in elenctic dialogues such as the Euthyphro and Protagoras, and the more explicitly theory-laden, constructive works such as the Republic and Laws. I shall later characterize [End Page 299] these differences, primarily in terms of the more carefully articulated, internalist moral psychology of the Republic.42. SOCRATIC PIETYThe distinct phenomena the term “religion” popularly designates for us were for the Greeks seamlessly integrated into everyday life. Thus, it is natural that the term “piety”—εὐσέβεια—carried a wider sense than our English equivalent commonly does: it concerned not only one’s immediate relation to the gods—emphasizing proper religious conduct and carrying a sense of respect and fear towards divinity (concomitant with a grasp of one’s own mortal limits)—but also often designated appropriate behavior towards parents, native land, and the dead.5 It is to this rough, inclusive conception of piety that Euthyphro appeals when confronted by Socrates on the Porch of the King (2a–6a). Moreover, and despite his own shockingly irreverent attempt at father-bashing and the subsequent elenctic drubbing he then receives from Socrates, toward the close of the dialogue Euthyphro still manages to envision piety in the quasi-traditionalist fashion with which he began—as “a knowledge of how to ensure the preservation of families and states by gratifying the gods through proper prayer and sacrifice” (14b; cf. 14c–15c).6 It is, however, precisely [End Page 300] at this dramatic juncture (14a–c) that we find—arguably—the final elements of a Socratically-acceptable conception of piety; one that builds upon Euthyphro’s initial concession to Socrates that piety and “human justice” are to be distinguished from one another (11e–12e). This, in turn, is a move that in principle forces Euthyphro to disengage from those aspects of the traditional conception of piety which would—from Socrates’ perspective—conflate the two.7 Recent challenges to this reading, however, have seen in Euthyphro’s initial holism not the heterogeneous presumptions of popular thought, but a semi-sophisticated grasp of the Socratic unity of the virtues.8 And since it does appear that the character Euthyphro is designed to serve not only as a hubristically-inflated, Homeric “fundamentalist,” but as an odd and Sophistically-influenced doppelgänger of Socrates as well—a lesson, that is, in what Socrates both is and is not—it now seems worthwhile to reexamine the view that Socratic piety is but a part and not the whole of justice.9Turning to our text, then, we discover that following the failure of Euthyphro’s initial definitional attempts to specify the nature of pious action and the resulting aporetic interlude, Socrates is willing to offer Euthyphro renewed assistance (11e1–4). This he does by asking whether all the just is pious, or whether justice is broader than piety such that piety is then merely a “part” (μóϱιον) of justice (11e4–12e5). Subsequent to his explanation of these alternatives, Socrates... (shrink)

This book makes the case for Marsilio Ficino, a Renaissance philosopher and priest, as a canonical thinker, and provides an introduction for a broad audience. Sophia Howlett examines him as part of the milieu of Renaissance Florence, part of a history of Platonic philosophy, and as a key figure in the ongoing crisis between classical revivalism and Christian belief. The author discusses Ficino's vision of a Platonic Christian universe with multiple worlds inhabited by angels, daemons and pagan gods, as (...) well as our own distinctive role within that universe - climbing the heights to talk with angels yet constantly confused by the evidence of our own senses. Ficino as the "new Socrates" suggests to us that by changing ourselves, we can change our world. (shrink)