The idea of dignity seems indissociable from that of humanity, whether in its universal dimension of ‘human dignity’, or in the individual ‘dignity of the person’. This paper provides an outlook on the ethics governing the sciences and technology, in particular the biological sciences and biotechnology, and recalls the notion of ‘glory’, both human and divine, as it infuses a great part of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance cultures, just before the scientific revolution in Europe.

An important argument in favour of recognising the cultural relativism and against universality of dignity and human rights, is the claim that the concept of dignity is a genuinely modern one. An analysis of a passage from the Demiurge’s speech in Timaeus reveals that Plato devoted time to reflecting on the question of what determines the qualitative difference between certain beings (gods and human being) and the world of things, and what forms the basis for the special (...) treatment of these beings – issues that using the language of today can be described reasonably as dignity. The attributes of this form of dignity seem to overlap with the nature of dignity as we know it today. Moreover, Plato proposes a response both to the question of what dignity is like, as well as the question of what dignity is. It is existential perfection, rooted in a perfect manner of existence, based on a specific internal unity of being. Dignity is therefore primordial in regard to particular features and independent of their acquisition or loss. Plato’s approach allows him to postulate that people be treated as ends in themselves; an approach therefore that prohibits the treatment of people as objects. Both the state and law are ultimately subordinated to the good of the individual, rather than the individual to the good of the state. -/- Istotny argument na rzecz relatywizmu kulturowego i przeciwko powszechności godności i wynikających z niej praw człowieka, oparty jest na poglądzie, że godność uznana została dopiero w czasach nowożytnych. Analiza fragmentu mowy Demiurga z Platońskiego dialogu Timajos ujawnia, że Platon rozwinął refleksję nad czymś, co stanowi o jakościowej różnicy między pewnymi istotami (bogami i ludźmi) a światem rzeczy, i co jest podstawą szczególnego traktowania tych istot, a co językiem współczesnym zasadnie można określić jako godność. Zbieżna jest charakterystyka tej godności z charakterystyką przyjmowaną współcześnie. Co więcej, Platon daje propozycję odpowiedzi nie tylko na pytanie, jaka jest godność, ale także na pytanie, czym jest godność. Jest ona doskonałością egzystencjalną, ugruntowanym w szczególnie doskonałym sposobie istnienia, opartym na szczególnej wewnętrznej jedności bytu. Jako doskonałość istnienia ogarnia ona cały byt, wszystkie jego cechy; jest nieoddzielalna od bytu (jest przyrodzona i niezbywalna). Jako pierwotna wobec partykularnych cech, jest niezależna od ich nabywania lub utraty. Platońskie ujęcie pozwala w oparciu o ujęcie godności formułować postulaty zbieżne z formułowanymi dziś dyrektywami nakazującymi traktować osoby jako cele same w sobie i zakazującymi traktowania osób w sposób czysto instrumentalny, przedmiotowy. Okazuje się, że – zdaniem Platona – jednostki nie wolno traktować czysto instrumentalnie dla dobra państwa; zarówno państwo, jak i prawo są podporządkowane dobru jednostki. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Biomedicine: Convention on Human Rights and BiomedicineCouncil of EuropePreambleThe Member States of the Council of Europe, the other States and the European Community signatories hereto,Bearing in mind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948;Bearing in mind (...) the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950;Bearing in mind the European Social Charter of 18 October 1961;Bearing in mind the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966;Bearing in mind the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981;Bearing also in mind the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989;Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of a greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms;Conscious of the accelerating developments in biology and medicine;Convinced of the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human species and recognising the importance of ensuring the dignity of the human being; [End Page 277]Conscious that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering human dignity;Affirming that progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present and future generations;Stressing the need for international co-operation so that all humanity may enjoy the benefits of biology and medicine;Recognising the importance of promoting a public debate on the questions posed by the application of biology and medicine and the responses to be given thereto;Wishing to remind all members of society of their rights and responsibilities;Taking account of the work of the Parliamentary Assembly in this field, including Recommendation 1160 (1991) on the preparation of a Convention on bioethics;Resolving to take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of biology and medicine;Have agreed as follows:Chapter IGeneral provisionsArticle 1. (Purpose and object)Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine.Each Party shall take in its internal law the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.Article 2. (Primacy of the human being)The interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science.Article 3. (Equitable access to health care)Parties, taking into account health needs and available resources, shall take appropriate measures with a view to providing, within their jurisdiction, equitable access to health care of appropriate quality. [End Page 278]Article 4. (Professional standards)Any intervention in the health field, including research, must be carried out in accordance with relevant professional obligations and standards.Chapter IIConsentArticle 5. (General rule)An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it.This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks.The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time.Article 6. (Protection of persons not able to consent)1. Subject to Articles 17 and 20 below, an intervention may only be carried out on a person who does not have the capacity to consent, for his or her direct benefit.2. Where, according to law, a minor does not have the capacity to consent to an intervention, the intervention may only be carried out with the authorisation of his or her representative or an authority or a person or... (shrink)

This essay examines the function of the concept of human dignity (both as an inherent feature of human existence and as an ideal achievement) in the United Nations's 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It explains why the key framers of the document affirmed an inherent human dignity in order to provide an explanatory basis for the validity of universal human rights while eschewing any religious or metaphysical justification for this affirmation. It argues that the key framers, while (...) aware of the Christian anthropology informing the modern Western concept of the dignity of the person, grasped (1) that the Declaration, to be ratifiable, would need to be free of religious reference, and also (2) that the notion of inherency suffices to suggest heuristically not only a universal human nature but also, crucially, a transcendent reality in which all persons participate. (shrink)

This paper defends human dignity in two ways. First, by confronting the criticism that human dignity does not serve an important function in contemporary moral discourse and that its function can be sufficiently performed by other moral terms. It is argued that this criticism invites a danger of moral reductionism, which impoverishes moral discourse. The authority of moral philosophy to correct widely shared moral intuitions, rooted in experiences of grave injustices and wrongs, is questioned. Secondly, dignity is (...) defended by showing what is needed to uphold it, both in theory and practice. It is argued, and demonstrated through examples, that human dignity as a universal value ascribed to human beings and the virtue of dignified action are intimately related. This is fleshed out in terms of Kant’s analysis of respect in the practical sense and of virtue as a commitment to the value of dignity as a constitutive end of our moral order. It is furthermore argued that theoretical attempts to ground respect for dignity in human capacities lead to a moral impasse. It is necessary to act as if every human being is worthy of respect. This practical approach requires institutions and specified moral obligations that are integral to the democratic ethos and the rule of law, which guarantees the equal status of human beings. This practical task requires that we consistently tease out and act on the implications of these principles rather than seek deeper justification for the equal worth of humans, articulated in the term human dignity. (shrink)

As a part of a research project on Dignity and Older Europeans Programme) I explore in this paper a set of notions of human dignity. The general concept of dignity is introduced and characterized as a position on a value scale and it is further specified through its relations to the notions of right, respect and self-respect. I present four kinds of dignity and spell out their differences: the dignity of merit, the dignity of (...) moral or existential stature, the dignity of identity and the universal human dignity. Menschenwürde pertains to all human beings to the same extent and cannot be lost as long as the persons exist. The dignity of merit depends on social rank and position. There are many species of this kind of dignity and it is very unevenly distributed among human beings. The dignity of merit exists in degrees and it can come and go. The dignity of moral stature is the result of the moral deeds of the subject; likewise it can be reduced or lost through his or her immoral deeds. This kind of dignity is tied to the idea of a dignified character and of dignity as a virtue. The dignity of moral stature is a dignity of degree and it is also unevenly distributed. The dignity of identity is tied to the integrity of the subject's body and mind, and in many instances, although not always, also dependent on the subject's self-image. This dignity can come and go as a result of the deeds of fellow human beings and also as a result of changes in the subject's body and mind. (shrink)

After discussing the nature of toleration, giving a brief history of the emergence of religious toleration in the West, and presenting my understanding of religion, I develop what I call ‘the dignity argument’ for religious toleration: to fail to tolerate a person’s religion is to treat that person in a way that does not befit their dignity. And to treat them in a way that does not befit their dignity is to wrong them, to treat them unjustly.

Background: Dignified care is one of the main objectives of holistic care. Furthermore, paying attention to dignity as one of the fundamental rights of patients is extremely important. However, in many cases, the dignity of hospitalized patients is not considered. Dignity is an abstract concept, and comprehensive studies of the dignity of Iranian patients hospitalized in general hospital settings are limited. Objective: The aim of this study was to explore the concept of dignity from the (...) perspective of patients hospitalized in general hospital settings in Iran. Research design: This study takes a qualitative approach. Data were gathered using individual, semi-structured interviews. Qualitative content analysis was the method used to analyse and interpret the data. The criteria suggested by Guba and Lincoln were used ensure the trustworthiness of the study. Participants and research context: A total of 14 hospitalized patients in general hospital settings in Shiraz participated in this study. Ethical considerations: The Research Ethics Committee of the Shiraz University of Medical Sciences approved the protocol of the study and the ethical principles were followed throughout. Findings: The findings of this study revealed four main themes – ‘respectful atmosphere’, ‘patient privacy’, ‘preservation of authority’ and ‘receiving attention’ – and 10 categories. Discussion: Patients need to be hospitalized in a respectable environment in which their privacy is preserved and paid attention, providing them with sufficient authority in terms of medical decisions and their life-related issues. The dignity of hospitalized patients will be preserved under these conditions. Conclusion: Patients hospitalized in general hospital settings need to retain their dignity. This can contribute to the optimal therapeutic outcomes for them. Therefore, it is suggested that a cultural, professional and institutional background, in which all components of the patient’s dignity are protected and emphasized, should be provided. (shrink)

Background:Protecting the dignity of elderly residents of facilities and providing dignified care can be difficult. Although attempts have been made from several aspects, dignity is considered an area in which less real impact has been made in both theory and practice.Objective:The objective of this study is to characterize the concept of dignity in care for elderly subjects in residential facilities from a practical perspective through concept synthesis.Research design:This study includes in-depth interviews with residents of elderly facilities and (...) a literature review.Participants and research context:A total of 12 residents of seven facilities in three prefectures in Japan were recruited via purposive sampling, and 27 interviews were conducted. Each digitally recorded interview was transcribed verbatim. The interview data were analyzed based on hermeneutic phenomenological research. The literature was searched using PubMed, CINAHL, and Web of Science with combinations of terms such as dignity, elderly, and residential facilities and then selected according to the predefined inclusion criteria. The descriptions about dignity in the included studies were divided into codes and compared with the results of the interviews.Ethical considerations:This study was approved by the institutional review board of Nagoya University’s Graduate School of Medicine.Findings and discussion:There were 1728 data codes for the interviews from which four themes were generated. In the literature review, 3716 titles were searched, and 28 articles were selected. Combining these results, five following themes and a conceptual matrix were obtained: individual dignity not affected by others; dignified care in a narrow sense; elements of the staff side; dignity in relation to family members, friends, society, and other residents; and dignity in relation to nursing care facilities and the nursing care system.Conclusion:According to the established matrix, we must consider the role of the care system, facility, family, and society in providing care with dignity and the individual dignity to residents and dignity in daily care. (shrink)

Background The principle of human dignity is woven into the ethical principles of the midwifery profession, noted as both an obligation and a human right. Research Objectives The aim of this study is to explore the experiences of midwifery students regarding threats to women's dignity during childbirth. Research Design This is a qualitative study with explorative design. Participants and Research Context: The research was carried out in 2022 at Kermanshah University of Medical Sciences, involving 32 midwifery students in (...) individual interviews that lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. These participants aged 21 to 28 years, with an average age of 23.5 years, provided their perspectives on the matter. Results Four key themes described the threats to women’s dignity during childbirth: 1) professional incompetence, 2) abuse of power imbalance, 3) caring only for physical and not mental health, and 4) structural issues within the healthcare system. Professional incompetence was characterized by outdated practices and lack of adherence to evidence-based medicine. Abuse of power imbalance was demonstrated in instances where the authoritative position of healthcare providers was misused, thereby disrupting the respectful care that women are entitled to receive. The disproportionate emphasis on physical health over mental health was evidenced by the disregard for mothers' psychological well-being during childbirth. Lastly, systemic structural issues emerged as significant impediments, revealing the need for system-wide changes. Ethical considerations: This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Research Deputy at Kermanshah University. Participation was voluntary and the confidentiality were maintained. Conclusion The findings underscore the role that unprofessional behavior, ethical lapses in medical practices, and systemic challenges play in undermining maternal dignity during childbirth. These threats necessitate urgent attention and must be adequately addressed in policy development and program implementation to safeguard the dignity of mothers during childbirth. (shrink)

Introduction: Maintaining dignity is one of patients is one of the main ethical responsibilities of caregivers. However, in many cases, the dignity of patients, especially autistic teenagers is not maintained. The extent to which dignity needs are met for this group within the Iranian care system is difficult to determine as dignity is an abstract concept, and there are few related research studies reported. Objectives: The objective of this study is to find out caregivers perspectives on (...) dignity in teenagers with autistic spectrum disorder. Research design: This study uses a qualitative research design. The data were collected through individual, semi-structured interviews and field notes developed during the interviews. In order to analyze the data, qualitative conventional content analysis was used. Participants and research context: In all, 16 professional caregivers for autistic teenagers working in public hospitals were recruited based on a targeted sampling method to reach data saturation from February 2016 to July 2017. Findings: The findings of this study were presented in three main themes, “privacy,” “respecting individual identity,” and “comprehensive support,” and 11 categories. Ethical consideration: This study’s protocol was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of medical universities located in Southeast of Iran and the required ethical principles were followed throughout. Discussion and conclusion: Based on the findings of this study from the perspective of caregivers, autistic teenagers need to be cared for and educated in a respectful environment where their privacy is maintained, their individual identities are respected, and they receive comprehensive familial, social, and financial support. These conditions would maintain the dignity of such teenagers and would result in appropriate behavioral outcomes. Therefore, it is suggested that a cultural, professional and institutional background in which all components of the autistic teenager’s dignity are protected and emphasized be provided. (shrink)

Background Maintaining the dignity of patients who attempted suicide is one of the caregivers’ main ethical duties. Yet, in many cases, these patients are not treated with dignity. The concept of dignity is abstract, and there is no research on the dignity of suicidal patients. So, the present study is done to investigate psychiatric nurses’ perception of dignity in patients who attempted suicide. Objective The present study explores the concept of dignity in patients who (...) attempted suicide from the perspective of psychiatric nurses. Research design The present study is a qualitative, descriptive work of research Participants and research context A total of 20 psychiatric nurses from 2 hospitals affiliated with a university of medical sciences in the southeast of Iran were selected via purposeful sampling. Ethical considerations The Research Ethics Committee of the Hamadan University of Medical Sciences approved the study’s protocol, and ethical principles were followed in general. Findings From the findings of the study, three main themes, namely “ respect for personal; identity,” “management of psychological tension,” and “compassion-focused therapy,” with 12 sub-themes were extracted. Discussion and conclusion In the perspective of caregivers, patients who attempted suicide need to be cared for in supportive environments with compassionate and respectful behaviors to control their psychological tensions. These conditions would maintain such patients’ dignity and result in appropriate behavioral outcomes. Policy-makers and administrators can use the present study’s findings to create an appropriate clinical environment in which the dignity of patients who attempted suicide is properly maintained. (shrink)

Questions about the dignity of the human person give rise to many of the most central and hotly disputed topics in bioethics. In _A Defense of Dignity: Creating Life, Destroying Life, and Protecting the Rights of Conscience_, Christopher Kaczor investigates whether each human being has intrinsic dignity and whether the very concept of "dignity" has a useful place in contemporary ethical debates. Kaczor explores a broad range of issues addressed in contemporary bioethics, including whether there is (...) a duty of "procreative beneficence," the ethics of ectopic pregnancy, and the possibility of "rescuing" human embryos with human wombs or artificial wombs. _A Defense of Dignity_ also treats issues relevant to the end of life, including physician-assisted suicide, provision of food and water to patients in a persistent vegetative state, and how to proceed with organ donation following death. Finally, what are the duties and prerogatives of health care professionals who refuse in conscience to take part in activities that they regard as degrading to human dignity? Should they be forced to do what they consider to be violations of the patient's well being, or does patient autonomy always trump the conscience of a health care professional? Grounded in the Catholic intellectual and moral tradition, _A Defense of Dignity_ argues that all human beings from the beginning to the end of their lives should be treated with respect and considers how this belief should be applied in controversial cases. "_A Defense of Dignity_ provides a skillful, informed, and clear philosophical analysis, from a natural law perspective, of a range of controversial, and sometimes complex, bioethical questions concerning the beginning and end of life. Few authors approach bioethics from a natural law perspective, and few do it as well as Christopher Kaczor. The book should be of interest not only to natural law philosophers and their students, but also to anyone interested in bioethics." —_John Keown, Georgetown University__ "Moral questions at the beginning and ending of life and controversies over liberty of conscience are among the most vexing and important issues of our day. Christopher Kaczor brings his characteristic moral seriousness and philosophical good sense to his treatment of these issues, all of which implicate the key concept of human dignity. This eminently readable collection will provide an invaluable resource for educators and students alike." — Christopher Tollefsen, University of South Carolina_ “Indispensable. Kaczor untangles the various meanings of human dignity to undertake a reexamination of the most serious and difficult issues in medical ethics. The book combines clarity with philosophical precision, faithfulness to Catholic teaching with a thorough engagement with critics." —_J. Budziszewski, University of Texas at Austin_. (shrink)

I respond to Lennart Nordenfelt's analysis of dignity by questioning his attempt to establish an objective standard by which dignity can be determined. I approach this by considering the way in which claims to dignity may be contested and defended. This leads, in the cases of dignity of merit and dignity of moral status, to an apparent relativism. This relativism is checked by further consideration of dignity of identity, and in particular by consideration of (...) the nature of the processes that serve to humiliate people. It is suggested that acts of humiliation attack certain competences that human beings develop as embodied, social beings. Menschenwürde may then be articulated as an account of human nature, in terms of the human potential to develop a series of core competences. This account of human nature aspires to universality, and as such offers an objective ground to dignity. This paper is a product of the research project on Dignity and Older Europeans Programme, Contract No QLG6, 2001, 00888). (shrink)

It is difficult to understand the meaning of ‘dignity’ in human rights, bioethics and nursing literature because the word is used so vaguely. Unless dignity’s meaning is spelt out it can disappear beneath more tangible priorities. In this article we define dignity and show how this can help health workers to maintain the dignity of people in their care.

Frederick Douglass (1817?–1875) is a monumental American figure. As a runaway slave and leading black thinker, speaker, and writer in the abolitionist movement and during Reconstruction and its tragic collapse, his legacy in American history is singular. His ideals and scorching criticisms have marked American political thought about democracy, religion, race, racism, liberty, and equality. American political parties claim him, especially the Republican Party, with which he has an early connection and which has used his figure as cover for their (...) less than egalitarian projects, as do different ideological camps. One can find accounts of Douglass as an existentialist, revolutionary, proto-libertarian, liberal, civic republican thinker. His North Star continues to guide those who welcome its light, although it may lead them down different political-ideological paths.In all of this, one can imagine that those not familiar with the details of Douglass’s narratives and deeds might, in the context of all of that national hagiography, lose track of the fact that he was a black man. Frederick Douglass was a black man born into slavery, survived that brutal regime for twenty-one years, and then escaped and became a principal leader of the American abolition movement and leading black political thinker. Shortly after escaping slavery, he wrote his first famous autobiography, The Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, and subsequently two more, in addition to volumes of speeches, articles, and a novel. It is as if his monumentality, like marble, alabaster, or bronze—the stuff of civic memorials—would obscure that irreducible fact in its grand monotones.Nick Brommell’s The Powers of Dignity: The Black Political Philosophy of Frederick Douglass reminds readers that that irreducible fact is a nontrivial, essential element of Douglass’s life and work. Bromell argues that this includes the political theory, a product of Douglass’s black political philosophy that runs through it all. He contends that Douglass argued for an inclusive conception of personhood and active citizenship, which America’s founding public philosophy, distorted by white supremacy, purposefully did not. Its elements include a defense of the moral personhood of blacks and their full and equal citizenship and a view of political community enlivened by group solidarities and active citizenship in defense of justice.In the course of his analysis, Bromell, a literary theorist, draws on an assortment of contemporary philosophical, rhetorical, and political theories, all of which have a critical theoretical bent, to explicate Douglass’s ideas. This method bears fruit in an instructive analysis of the rhetorical structure of Douglass’ his arguments. Brommell’s analysis of Douglass’s My Bondage and My Freedom usefully explains how it stands out, not only in terms of updated autobiographical details, but also style and analytical and argumentative intent. This is a reading that other scholars have pioneered, but his rhetorical analysis fleshes out, for example, the role of moral sentiments, care, and intimate and social relations in Douglass’s narrative.A central feature of Bromell’s analysis is that Douglass employs what he and others call a “fugitive rhetoric” that comprises an emphasis on the perspective of his and other black Americans’ standpoints, the holding of opposite ideas in tension, and the use of the rhetorical technique “chiasmus,” where a statement is repeated in reverse order in successive phrases or clauses. It is an illuminating analysis, but Bromell goes further by claiming that Douglass was committed to the tenets of contemporary standpoint epistemology. Douglass certainly referenced and employed his experience and viewpoint as a black man and former slave in his work, just as he directly addressed the viewpoints and interests of black Americans. However, whether this means that Douglass was committed to the set of ideas that we now call standpoint epistemology is another matter. This concern applies to Bromell’s reading of Douglass’s method of holding seemingly contrasting ideas in tension and his use of chiasmus. Contemporary philosophical theories of chiasmus carry particular metaphysical and epistemological implications, and those theories might shed light on Douglass’s political projects. However, their incidental utility does not mean they definitively describe Douglass’s intent or public philosophy. This is a specifically important point because those theories lead to subjective conceptions of truth, especially relating to ethics and politics, while Douglass, as Bromell recognizes, repeatedly and emphatically endorsed what he took to be universal normative truths.In the same vein, Bromell makes several additional claims regarding the conceptual distinctiveness of Douglass’s view of power, dignity, rights, and citizenship. Douglass employed conceptions of each and other important ideas specific to his style, approach, and ends. As other black political thinkers did before him, he used these concepts to condemn slavery, racism, and the hypocrisy of American Republicanism and Christianity to assert the equal moral personhood and dignity of blacks and demand equal rights and citizenship. Bromell rightly emphasizes the role of “power,“ as an individual capability, in Douglass’s view of natural rights, moral dignity, and citizenship. It is an emphasis that is in keeping with both Douglass’s personal narrative and his national political projects. Douglass did not think that Americans—that Black Americans or abolitionists—should passively wait for deliverance from either God or national political leadership. Likewise, Bromell is correct to push back on reductions of Douglass’s views to Lockean, Rousseauian, or Kantian interpretations. Douglass is more than an incarnation of standard deontological, liberal, or civic republican philosophy. As a nineteenth-century black radical thinker, he stood in relation and contributed to those moral and political philosophical traditions. However, Bromell’s claim that Douglass’s conceptions of power, natural rights, and citizenship are conceptually distinct from the large host of major philosophical, theological, and political theoretical accounts that preceded him and influenced those ideas in his time is suggestive but not decisive.Like other writers and theorists before him, Bromell offers us another Douglass—as a black critical political theorist. This is a testament to the fecundity of Douglass’s black political-philosophical legacy. It is a legacy that leads to competing interpretations of him; all the same and for all their differences, his scorching prophetic vision of liberty, equality, citizenship, and progress unites them all. (shrink)

The idea of expressing an opinion on the difficult issue of relating to the anthropological basis of human dignity, arose in response to writings coming from two ideologically very different philosophical positions. The first of these is to be found in the author's academic neighborhood, namely school of Christian personalist philosophy associated with the Catholic University of Lublin. The second, on the other hand, originates from the sphere of libertarian humanist philosophy and expresses itself in a secular concept of (...) human moral autonomy. Ideas coming from these two diametrically opposed standpoints provoke critical reflection; the latter will form the basis on which an alternative concept of human dignity will be outlined. With this aim in mind, analysis of this subject will consist of two parts: the first will take the form of a commentary-style critique, while the second will consist of proposals and clarifications. (shrink)

The idea of expressing an opinion on the difficult issue of relating to the anthropological basis of human dignity, arose in response to writings coming from two ideologically very different philosophical positions. The first of these is to be found in the author's academic neighborhood, namely school of Christian personalist philosophy associated with the Catholic University of Lublin. The second, on the other hand, originates from the sphere of libertarian humanist philosophy and expresses itself in a secular concept of (...) human moral autonomy. Ideas coming from these two diametrically opposed standpoints provoke critical reflection; the latter will form the basis on which an alternative concept of human dignity will be outlined. With this aim in mind, analysis of this subject will consist of two parts: the first will take the form of a commentary-style critique, while the second will consist of proposals and clarifications. (shrink)

This paper explores the problem of universalism and particularism in contemporary ethics, and its relationship to Christian bioethics in particular. An ethic of human dignity is outlined, which, it is argued, constrains moral discourse in the broad sense – thus meeting the demands of universalism – but which is at the same time amenable to a variety of particularist interpretations – thus acknowledging the current shift toward historicism, traditionalism, and culture. The particularist interpretations that are of central concern here (...) are those provided by historic Christianity. The eventual goal is to indicate how a Christian conception of human dignity can have universal normative relevance both as a standard against which to assess competing particularist conceptions, and as a practical guide for everyday living. A Christian conception of dignity will in turn have significant implications when addressing contemporary issues in bioethics. These are ambitious goals, and a full explication of the ideas presented will not be possible in this context. Nevertheless, there is value in getting a bird's-eye view of the landscape before one goes about scaling the mountains and exploring the valleys. The present essay is intended as a general geography of the moral terrain in which an ethic of dignity in general, and a Christian perspective on dignity in particular, can provide normative guidance. (shrink)

This paper examines how the intercultural conception of human rights, fueled by the modes of reciprocal recognition associated with Hegel’s social philosophy, draws on traditional understandings of human dignity while avoiding the essentialism associated with those understandings. Part 1 summarizes core elements of an intercultural theory of human rights while addressing the general question of how that theory accommodates an understanding of the relationship of human dignity and human rights. Part 2 presents the intercultural approach as committed to (...) a view of human dignity focused on the intrinsic worth of individuals, but understood, not—with Kant—as an anthropologically inherent property, but as one forged in relations of intersubjective recognition. Part 3, critically engaging arguments of C Beitz and J Habermas, claims that an intercultural approach entails a status-based conception of human dignity, one that construes the latter, not as a metaphysically conceived inherent quality, but as a function of membership in a social order supportive of both liberal right claims and a republican commitment to rights systems generally. Drawing on the work of Hegel and critically engaging the position of A Sangiovanni, Part 4 construes human dignity in terms of a doctrine of human rights expressive of a common humanity, one understood, however, not as an essential attribute of human beings, but in terms of a globally realized legal-political order whose members are dispositionally committed to the worth of all members of the human community and the value of human community itself. Critically appropriating the work of H Arendt for the intercultural theory, Part 5 considers the centrality of actual politics to a dignitarian account of human rights. Part 6 construes human dignity, again with Kant, in terms of the principle of autonomy, but one understood, not abstractly, but—engaging Pico della Mirandola—as the fallibilistically conceived process of social learning on the part the members of the human community. Part 7 considers how the intercultural view, with the idea of social practice expressive of collective human agency, accommodates a concept of human dignity understood as the “foundation”—nuanced and variegated—of human rights. Part 8 details the specific normativity of an intercultural conception, asserting that despite and even because of its attention to the empirical realities of social, historical, and political life, that conception remains committed, as with essentialist views, to context-transcending norms capable of calling into question actual practices and policies. Here, recourse is had to a concept of recognition understood both as a principle of evaluation and as a social practice encompassing the activity of individuals and groups engaged in the discourse on human rights. (shrink)

In October 2005, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization adopted the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights . A concept of central importance in the declaration is that of “human dignity”. However, there is lack of clarity about its scope, especially concerning the question of whether prenatal human life has the same dignity and rights as born human beings. This ambiguity has implications for the interpretation of important articles of the delcaration, including 2, 4, 8, (...) 10 and 11. The paper applies relevant provisions of the UDBHR to specific cases, addresses problems of internal consistency and considers attempts at clarifying the scope of “human dignity” by the negotiating parties. An analysis of the important relationship between the UDBHR and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the UDBHR refers in its title and elsewhere, shows that because of a crucial emphatic asymmetry, a broad reading according to which the UDBHR must be understood to ascribe human rights and dignity to prenatal life is untenable. However, the view that the UDBHR confers human rights and dignity on humans from the moment of birth onwards is robust and defensible. This conclusion is important for a proper understanding of the declaration and its use, as stated in Articles 1 and 22, the latter urging states “… to give effect to the principles … in this declaration”. Similarly, it has implications for the use of the declaration in the wider context of bioethics-related law and policy, as well as in academic and other discussions where increasing reference to the UDBHR is likely. (shrink)

The desire for dignity informs an individual’s daily activities. Human beings, driven by a universal desire to be recognised and to be seen as dignified people within a society, conduct their actions according to values that are considered dignified. Society informs our disposition toward the dignity of one another. This evokes the question of the true nature of dignity: what is dignity? This chapter seeks to explore and engage with the question of the nature of (...) class='Hi'>dignity in African society, drawing on African philosophers’ conceptions of human dignity in personhood within moderate and strict communitarian positions. Is dignity an intrinsic or an instrumental value? Can dignity be both an instrumental and an intrinsic value? These distinctions are very important in moral theory. Is dignity value in itself (an end in itself) or instrumental value (means to an end) or both? Responses to these questions shed light on African conceptions of dignity. (shrink)

The claim that human dignity is universal is challenged by the particular experience of the horrible things people do to others. If dignity is just a ‘vacuous concept’ then the notion of universal human rights and the claim of cosmopolitism that all human beings for a single moral community are also called into question. A close reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and an analysis the historical development of the text reveals a complex conception of human (...) dignity expressed by the Component Dimensions of Human Dignity model. The model conceives of human dignity in terms of four Component Dimensions – existential, behavioral, cognitive-affective and social- each consisting of a Complementary Duality comprising two facets held in tension along an axis of the Already and the Not Yet. Consequently, human dignity can be understood both as Already a universal truth, and as Not Yet realized in every particular life. (shrink)

The concept of human dignity, despite its growing importance in legal texts and declarations in the last decades, is notoriously contested in moral philosophy and legal theory. There is no agreement either on what human dignity is or whether one should care much about it. We will show how these questions could be answered given the assumption that the expression ‘human dignity’ is to be read literally, as dignity of humans, where ‘dignity’ is understood as (...) dignity proper, i.e. dignity as it is usually ascribed outside of legal contexts. Dignity proper has played an important role in the history of mankind. It is sometimes also called ‘social dignity’ because it is bound to social relations, or ‘contingent dignity’, on the assumption that having dignity proper is due to contingencies of life and one's own behaviour (in contrast to human dignity as an essential feature of humankind). Dignity proper therefore depends on being treated with respect by others and on being able to present oneself as being of equal dignity in various practical contexts. Dignity proper is part of an extended conceptual space of evaluative terms which are important in moral life, including, among others, decency, nobility, rank, honour, respect, esteem, grace, decorum, merit, self-respect, coolness, offence, humiliation, degradation, shame. It is obvious, historically, that the concept of dignity proper must have played some role in the development of the concept of human dignity. (shrink)

With almost unmatched sociocultural diversity, South Africa is an ideal melting pot for the great unity-in-diversity experiment of Universal Dignity. If the disparate people of planet earth have any fighting chance of averting the looming dystopian existential crisis inherent in unsustainable development, the hopes thereof begin in the South. Identity-based polarisation and its attendant torment of destructive strife must be exchanged for a mutually beneficial ethos of fulfillment, that truly 'leaves no one behind.' This volume offers meaningful pathways to (...) this haven of 'Ubuntu'. (shrink)

In the past few decades, political theorists have attempted to articulate a nontheological basis for a special human place in the moral universe. These attempts, I argue, generally fall into two groups, one centered around the concept of “dignity” and the other around ideas of “difference.” Both of these attempts ultimately fail, I maintain, but their failures are instructive and help us along a path toward a better kind of relationship with nature and the earth as well as one (...) another. In the face of increased scientific knowledge about the environment, animals, and our own species, we have every reason to recalibrate our stance toward nature as a whole. But in doing so we must acknowledge that the human relationship with nature is ultimately a representative one that can therefore never achieve the kind of reciprocity available in human society. Whatever form our respect for nature takes, it will always be distinct from the relationships we have with those we consider co-citizens. (shrink)

Background: Dignity is a multidimensional construct that includes perception, knowledge, and emotions related to competence or respect. Attitudes to aging are a comprehensive personal view of the experience of aging over the course of life, which can be influenced by various factors, such as the levels of health and self-sufficiency and social, psychological, or demographic factors. Aim: The purpose of this study was to explore the attitudes to aging of home-dwelling and inpatient older adults, and whether dignity and (...) other selected factors belong among the predictors influencing attitudes to aging in these two different groups of older adults. Research design: Cross-sectional study using a set of questionnaires: Patient Dignity Inventory, Attitudes to Aging Questionnaire, and Barthel Index. Pearson and Spearman correlation analyses and multivariable linear regression were used for statistical processing. Participants and research context: 233 inpatients and 237 home-dwelling older adults participated in the research in two regions of the Czech Republic. Ethical considerations: Institutional Review Board approval was received from the authors’ university. Findings: The inpatients had more negative attitudes to aging. The predictors of their attitudes to aging were gender and dignity. Women and inpatients with poor dignity ratings had more negative attitudes to aging. The predictors for home-dwelling older adults were education, living arrangement, and dignity. More negative attitudes to aging were found in older adults with lower levels of education who lived alone and rated their dignity as low. Discussion and Conclusions: The results of this study add to the understanding that a sense of dignity is an important predictor of attitudes to aging for both home-dwelling older adults and inpatients. (shrink)

This article presents qualitative research conducted in an Israeli ova `extraction' clinic in Romania. Following on from a piece written by Jyotsna Gupta and published in this journal in February 2006, this article asks what kinds of feminist alliances can or should be made in the arena of reproductive technologies. In conversation with Gupta, the author asks whether `an ethic of universal human dignity' is possible or desirable. This article looks to the voices of Romanian egg sellers themselves as (...) a source of theoretical and political direction for transnational feminists who try to think about responses to reproductive technologies. (shrink)

Introduction: Maintaining patient dignity in a caregiving environment is one of the most important moral responsibilities for caregivers. Nonetheless, there are vulnerable groups, specifically teenagers, who in their final stages of life are prone to their dignity being threatened. Moreover, dignity is an abstract concept and there is no studies done on teenagers’ dignity in the final stages of life available in Iran.Purpose: The purpose of this study is to describe the caregivers’ experiences regarding teenagers’ (...) class='Hi'>dignity in the final stages of life.Research design: This study is a descriptive phenomenological qualitative research project. The data was collected using deep individual and semi-structured interviews as well as taking notes. The Colaizzi analysis method was used to analyze the data.Participants and research context: 22 caregivers working with teenagers in the final stages of life in a public health centers in Iran who had the criteria to enter the study were selected using a purposeful sampling method and invited to join the study from August 2018 to June 2019. The sampling continued until data saturation.Findings: The findings of the present study were presented in the form of three main themes including “private,” “respecting individual identity,” and “attention to teenagers’ needs” and an additional eight categories.Ethical Considerations: The study’s protocol was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Shiraz University of Medical Sciences and all ethical principles were followed throughout the study.Discussion and conclusion: Based on the present study from the caregivers’ point of view, teenagers in their final stages of life required to be cared for and taught in an environment that their privacy was maintained and their individual identity was respected as well as getting attention from the caregivers and companions. In such situations, the teenagers felt calm and their dignity was maintained; therefore, providing a cultural, professional, and organizational setting where all the components of maintaining dignity in teenagers are supported and prioritized is necessary. (shrink)

This handbook provides a systematic overview of the legal concept and the meaning of human dignity for each European state and the European Union. For each of these 43 countries and the EU, it scrutinizes three main aspects: the constitution, legislation, and application of law. The book addresses and presents answers to important questions relating to the concept of human dignity. These questions include the following: What is the meaning of human dignity? What is the legal status (...) of the respective human dignity norms? Are human dignity norms of a programmatic nature, or do they establish an individual right which can be invoked before court? Is human dignity inviolable? The volume answers these questions from the perspectives of all European countries. As a reaction to the barbaric events during World War II, human dignity found its way into international law. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” The starting point for developing the concept on a national level was the codification of human dignity in article 1, paragraph 1 of the German Grundgesetz. Consequently, the concept of human dignity spread throughout Europe and, in the context of human rights, became a fundamental legal concept. (shrink)

Background There is a high incidence of burns in China and the sequelae of post-burn scar growth, disfigurement, and other body image disorders can cause serious psychological distress to burns patients, and negatively affecting the patient’s dignity. However, there is limited knowledge relating to the dignity of burns patients. Aim To investigate the factors that affect dignity in burns patients. Design Cross-sectional study. Participants and research context We recruited 323 burn patients from the burn unit of a (...) tertiary care hospital. The Patient Dignity Scale, Burn Specific Health Scale-Brief, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale were used to assess burn patients’ dignity, quality of life, anxiety, and depression, respectively. 18 sociodemographic variables were included in the questionnaire. Ethical considerations Before the data were collected, the study protocol was reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee of the Guangzhou Red Cross Hospital of Jinan University (Reference: 2022-149-02) and all patients provided and signed informed consent forms. Findings This study included 323 burns patients; of these, 26 (8%) had a mild loss of dignity, 94 (29.1%) had a moderate loss of dignity, 125 (38.7%) had a severe loss of dignity, and 78 (24.1%) had a very severe loss of dignity. The main factors that influence the loss of dignity in burns patients, including the department in which the patient was treated after their burns, gender, the clinical stage of the burn, quality-of-life, depression, resident medical insurance, the cause of the burn, and the burn site. Conclusions In most cases, the loss of dignity after burn injury is serious. Clinical health care professionals can provide personalized whole-life dignity care for patients by considering the factors that affect the dignity of burns patients, developing targeted dignity management programs, and implementing individualized interventions to maintain dignity, thus helping burns injury patients return to social life and work. (shrink)

This book is the first comprehensive study of Plato’s conception of justice. The universality of human rights and the universality of human dignity, which is recognised as their source, are among the crucial philosophical problems in modern-day legal orders and in contemporary culture in general. If dignity is genuinely universal, then human beings also possessed it in ancient times. Plato not only perceived human dignity, but a recognition of dignity is also visible in his (...) conception of justice, which forms the core of his philosophy. Plato’s Republic is consistently interpreted here as a treatise on justice, relating to an individual and not to the state. The famous myth of the cave is a story about education taking place in the world here and now. The best activity is not contemplation, but acting for the benefit of others. Not ideas, but individuals are the proper objects of love. Plato’s philosophy may provide foundations for modern-day human rights protection rather than for totalitarian orders. (shrink)