The article is an overview of the VI Scientific and Practical Conference «Internet beyond 2020» (April 22-24, 2021) organized by the online school of Internet research with the support of the Higher School of Economics. The conference program included workshop reports and round tables on the role of the global network, the evolution of art and education during the COVID-19 pandemic. The conference brought together representatives of social sciences and humanities (sociologists, cultural scientists, linguists), artists, designers, and specialists in the (...) field of Internet studies. The organizers and participants of the conference tried to answer various questions, including the following. Is a modern person witnessing the emergence of fundamentally new anthropological practices? Is it possible to obtain a comprehensive picture of digital realities from single events of Internet studies, as well as predict the emergence and development of yet unknown social and anthropological transformations? Is it possible for a post-pandemic narrative conceptualizing the heterogeneous eventuality of our time to emerge? (shrink)

The article is aimed at studying the use of philosophical practices in the educational process and everyday life. The author proceeds from the idea that ancient philosophy provides rich material for understanding a person’s lifestyle, on the basis of which anyone can create a set of spiritual exercises, philosophical practices for self-knowledge and selfdevelopment. In the research, the author describes the experience of role-playing, participating, in which students independently developed philosophical practices, based on the ideas and value principles of ancient (...) schools. The author conducts a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of using these practices for the processes of self-knowledge and self-development. (shrink)

In the article, the author analyzes the conditions for a subject’s existence in the post-informational society, which lead to forming a new style of thinking in the younger generation, functioning outside the textocentric paradigm. The author raises the actual problem of the education system, since it is impossible to build a successful learning process without meeting the demands of the time, without taking into account the peculiarities of perceiving the world by modern people. In the youth environment, the screen (clip) (...) style of thinking has long prevailed, which in the process of cognition is based on visual images. In the course of the study, the author comes to the conclusion that, responding to the new style of thinking, it is necessary to strive for a combination of methods of working with linear text and visual sources of information, to which a modern person is so receptive. This harmonious combination is provided by a comic strip with rich didactic potential. The article describes the positive aspects of using comics in the educational process and examines an example of using comics in philosophy classes. (shrink)

The article is a description of Rimas Kociunas’ seminar “The picture of human life and the therapeutic process: the introduction of an existential psychotherapist”, held in Moscow from February 13 to 16, 2020. The seminar was devoted to the study of the basic philosophical principles of existential psychotherapy on which work with a client is based. A specificity of existential therapy is the lack of specific technical methods and methods of working with a client, therefore the content of therapeutic work (...) is determined by a particular vision of a person and his problems. From the point of view of existential therapists, the personality is in constant interaction with the world, the result of which is continuous formation; therefore, instead of studying the qualities and structures of the personality, one should study its life world and ways of building relationships with reality. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the application of the hermeneutic approach in philosophy classes. The author proposes a technique for understand- ing a visual text, which allows one to move from the figurative perception of a work of art to the conceptual and structural level. In her study, the author describes the experience of using this technique while interpreting R. Magritte’s painting “Song of Love”. As a result of analyzing the group and individual work of students, the author comes to (...) the conclusion that the technique does not only contribute to the discovery of the subjective mean- ing of a work of art, but is effective for the process of self-knowledge. (shrink)

Studie s pznanm nzvem "O Planckov ve, nejen v soulad vdy s nboenstvm" se zabv pedevm otzkou, zda je reln mon bezesporn fungovn vdy a nboenstv. Max Planck tomuto problmu vnoval celou pednku, je se stala zdrojem tto studie, jejm clem je kriticky posoudit Planckovy jednoznan vyznvajc zvry, toti e vzjemn fungovn vdy s nboenstvm nen ani neme bt nim narueno. Strun je nastnno i historick pozad, je provzelo Planckv ivot, nebo i to se jist podlelo na Planckov postoji ke (...) kontroverzn otzce "nboenstv a vda". (shrink)

Oliver Sacks MD, Clinical Professor of Neurology at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in New York, talked with Anthony Freeman during his visit to London in January 1995 to publicize his recently published book An Anthropologist on Mars. The interview is preceded by an overview of the book.

In this collection of essays Onora O'Neill explores and argues for an account of justice that is fundamentally cosmopolitan rather than civic, yet takes serious account of institutions and boundaries, and of human diversity and vulnerability. Starting from conceptions that are central to any account of justice - those of reason, action, judgement, coercion, obligations and rights - she discusses whether and how culturally or politically specific concepts and views, which limit the claims and scope of justice, can be avoided. (...) She then examines the demands and scope of just institutions, arguing that there are good reasons for taking the claims of distant strangers seriously, but that doing so points not to a world without boundaries but to one of porous boundaries and dispersed power. Bounds of Justice will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy, politics and international relations. (shrink)

This paper canvasses the various dimensions along which theories of truth may disagree about the extent to which truth is minimal.

This paper describes the corner-stones of a means-ends approach to the philosophy of inductive inference. I begin with a fallibilist ideal of convergence to the truth in the long run, or in the 'limit of inquiry'. I determine which methods are optimal for attaining additional epistemic aims (notably fast and steady convergence to the truth). Means-ends vindications of (a version of) Occam's Razor and the natural generalizations in a Goodmanian Riddle of Induction illustrate the power of this approach. The paper (...) establishes a hierarchy of means-ends notions of empirical success, and discusses a number of issues, results and applications of means-ends epistemology. (shrink)

Kant's ethics, like others, has unavoidable anthropocentric starting points: only humans, or other 'rational natures', can hold obligations. Seemingly this should not make speciesist conclusions unavoidable: might not rational natures have obligations to the non-rational? However, Kant's argument for the unconditional value of rational natures cannot readily be extended to show that all non-human animals have unconditional value, or rights. Nevertheless Kant's speciesism is not thoroughgoing. He does not view non-rational animals as mere items for use. He allows for indirect (...) duties 'with regard to' them which afford welfare but not rights, and can allow for indirect duties 'with regard to' abstract and dispersed aspects of nature, such as biodiversity, species and habitats. (shrink)

Deliberative or discursive models of democracy have recently enjoyed a revival in both political theory and policy practice. Against the picture of democracy as a procedure for aggregating and effectively meeting the given preference of individuals, deliberative theory offers a model of democracy as a forum through which judgements and preferences are formed and altered through reasoned dialogue between free and equal citizens. Much in the recent revival of deliberative democracy, especially that which comes through Habermas and Rawls, has Kantian (...) roots. Deliberative institutions are embodiments of the free public use of reason that Kant takes to define the enlightenment project. Within the Kantian model the public use of reason is incompatible with the use of rhetoric. While this paper rejects strong rhetorical criticisms of deliberative democracy which render all communication strategic, it argues that rhetorical studies of deliberation have highlighted features of deliberation which point to significant weaknesses in Kantian approaches to it. Two features are of particular importance: the role of testimony and judgements of credibility in deliberation; and the role of appeal to emotions in public discourse. Both from the Kantian perspective are potential sources of heteronomy. However, the appeal to testimony and emotion are features of public deliberation that cannot and should not be eliminated. For those committed to the enlightenment values that underlie the deliberative model of democracy the question is whether these rhetorical features of deliberation are incompatible with those values. The paper argues that they are compatible. It does so by defending an Aristotelian account of rhetoric in public deliberation which denies the Platonic contrast between reasoned discourse and rhetoric which the Kantian model inherits. (shrink)

This paper argues that Gareth Evans' treatment of first person reference based on the myriad ways we have of receiving information about our bodies and location, cannot secure the guaranteed reference exhibited by first person reference. It faces a problem both when a subject fails to receive such information about herself, and when she receives misinformation.

In certain situations, lies can be used to pass on knowledge. The kinds of cases I focus on are those involving a speaker's devious manipulation of the hearer's irrational or prejudiced thought. These cases show that sometimes a speaker's knowledge of a hearer's mind is necessary for the testimonial transmission of knowledge. They also support a 'seeding' model of knowledge transmission, rather than one that is akin to the postal delivery of complete parcels of information.

Why did the omnipotent, omniscient, unsurpassably, and perfectly good being who is necessary in Himself, and having a supremely rational will, contingently create ex nihilo? What motivation could account for such freely undertaken activity, displaying it as neither necessary nor less than fully rational? The chapter considers and criticizes answers recently offered by Mark Johnston and Alex Pruss. It is argued that creation of some contingent reality or other is necessary, and that plausible reflections on the ordered complexity in God’s (...) motivations indicate that the scope of contingency regarding what to create is highly constricted—though not to the point of complete modal collapse. A perfect creator would create either an infinite and richly varied multiverse or an infinitely improving universe realizing a wide array of kinds of goods. Finally, a rebuttal is given to the contention that any element of contingency in a divine choice entails a rational-explanatory deficiency. (shrink)

In this classic, exciting, and thoughtful text, Metaphysics , Peter van Inwagen examines three profound questions: What are the most general features of the world? Why is there a world? and What is the place of human beings in the world? Metaphysics introduces to readers the curious notion that is metaphysics, how it is conceived both historically and currently. The author's work can serve either as a textbook in a university course on metaphysics or as an introduction to metaphysical thinking (...) for the interested reader. This second edition, revised though not fundamentally changed, includes the basis of the first edition with a new chapter on the nature of time. (shrink)

Ned O'Gorman's Politics for Everybody is, at its core, a defense of politics for our polarized times. In an accessible and impassioned style, O'Gorman argues for a political middle ground, which is not aligned with any particular party or ideology, but which embraces the worth, value, and importance of politics itself. Inspired by Hannah Arendt, O'Gorman shows how political thinking is rooted in common sense and everyday experiences, and is rooted in all of us, even and especially when politics is (...) the last thing we want to talk about. Resisting the deadening of political experience by the bombast of contemporary media, the impoverishment of public discourse, and the low-minded violence of smear campaigns, O'Gorman calls for a purer, simpler relation to politics, one that does justice to the virtues of open, honest exchange, which can be critical without being hateful. Politics for Everybody is, in short, a defense of the dignity of politics in the age of its infamy, and a plea for the notion that to give politics a thinking chance, we must take it more seriously, not write it off. (shrink)

Self, Language, and World: Problems from Kant, Sellars, and Rosenberg Edited by James R. O'Shea and Eric M. Rubenstein Introduction KANT Willem deVries, Kant, Rosenberg, and the Mirror of Philosophy David Landy, The Premise That Even Hume Must Accept LANGUAGE AND MIND William G. Lycan, Rosenberg On Proper Names Douglas Long, Why Life is Necessary for Mind: The Significance of Animate Behavior Dorit Bar-On and Mitchell Green, Lionspeak: Communication, Expression, and Meaning David Rosenthal, The Mind and Its Expression MIND AND (...) KNOWLEDGE Jeffrey Sicha, The Manifest Image: the Sensory and the Mental Bruce Aune, Rosenberg on Knowing Joseph C. Pitt, Sellarsian Antifoundationalism and Scientific Realism Matthew Chrisman, The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth: Reflections on Rosenberg James O’Shea, Conceptual Thinking and Nonconceptual Content: A Sellarsian Divide ONTOLOGY Anton Koch, Persons as Mirroring the World Eric M. Rubenstein, Form and Content, Substance and Stuff Ralf Stoecker, On Being a Realist About Death William G. Lycan, Biographical Remarks on Jay F. Rosenberg Scholarly Publications of Jay F. Rosenberg. (shrink)

Our comments focus on the ACMCode of Ethics and situate the Code within ageneral ethical decision-making process tospecify the five steps which logically precedehuman action in ethical matters and determinethat action, and the individual differencetraits in these five steps which bear upon theresolution of an ethical problem and lead tomorally responsible action. Our main purpose isto present a cognitive moral processing modelwhich computing professionals can use to betterunderstand their professional rights andduties. It is clear that the Code providessubstantial guidance in (...) the areas ofintellectual property rights, unauthorizedentry into computing systems, and privacy. Inother areas, such as obscenity onbulletin-board systems, the Code is silent. Aninteractive software program which allows theuser to see the ways in which the Code isintegrated and instructive in the six-stepmoral decision-making process is accessible viathe internet. Our secondary purpose is toreformulate the Code as a set of questionswhich allow the computing professional to seepractices which diminish the human person asunethical and those which enhance the humanperson as ethical. (shrink)

What is one who takes normativity seriously to do if normativity can neither be discovered lurking out there in the world independently of us nor can it be sufficiently grasped from a merely explanatory perspective? One option is to accept that the normative challenge cannot be met and to retreat to some form of moral skepticism. Another possibility has recently been proposed by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity where she aims to develop an account of normativity which is (...) grounded in autonomy. Furthermore, she argues that on her account reasons are "essentially public" and that this captures how it is that we can obligate one another. In this paper I argue that there is a serious tension between her account of normativity and the publicity of reasons-namely, that if reasons are essentially public, then it is not possible for individuals to legislate laws for themselves. However, I then argue that if we revise her conception of normativity such that it is understood to involve collective rather than individual legislation that it may then be possible to account for interpersonal reasons. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper suggests a much more serious purpose for an education in music-making than play or pleasure or even the training of professional musicians. It presents and explicates a possible connection between musical performance training and the development of practical wisdom. Music in performance constitutes in effect a form of virtuous conduct, where one learns through doing and thereafter comes to love and to be capable of wise practical judgement. Excellence in this field requires the exercise of a species (...) of reasoning and judgement analogous to Aristotelian practical wisdom, and develops the distinctive qualities of character and vision of the practically wise person. (shrink)

In this commentary, John O'Neill concentrates upon three themes in the goal Merleau-Ponty set for himself, namely "to restore to things their concrete physiognomy, to organisms their individual ways of dealing with the world, and to subjectivity its inherence in history." O'Neill considers the three objectives in their original order: first, the study of animal and human psychology; then, the phenomenology of perception; and finally, certain extensions of these perspectives in the historical and social sciences.

Philosophers of biology, along with everyone else, generally perceive life to fall into two broad categories, the microbes and macrobes, and then pay most of their attention to the latter. ‘Macrobe’ is the word we propose for larger life forms, and we use it as part of an argument for microbial equality. We suggest that taking more notice of microbes – the dominant life form on the planet, both now and throughout evolutionary history – will transform some of the philosophy (...) of biology’s standard ideas on ontology, evolution, taxonomy and biodiversity. We set out a number of recent developments in microbiology – including biofilm formation, chemotaxis, quorum sensing and gene transfer – that highlight microbial capacities for cooperation and communication and break down conventional thinking that microbes are solely or primarily single-celled organisms. These insights also bring new perspectives to the levels of selection debate, as well as to discussions of the evolution and nature of multicellularity, and to neo-Darwinian understandings of evolutionary mechanisms. We show how these revisions lead to further complications for microbial classification and the philosophies of systematics and biodiversity. Incorporating microbial insights into the philosophy of biology will challenge many of its assumptions, but also give greater scope and depth to its investigations. (shrink)

Urbach (1985) has concluded that the use of randomization in the design of clinical and agricultural trials is both inappropriate and ineffective. It is argued here that it is appropriate, as it eliminates the dependence of inference on the unknown precise physical model that underlies a set of observations, and effective, in that it is relatively simple to apply in practice compared with any competing method. Furthermore, it has been proven in practice.