I distinguish temptation to do what we think we shouldn't, temptation not to do what we think we should, and the difficulties we experience in customary religious practices like prayer. I ask whether temptation requires a tempter, also whether the phenomena we call ‘weakness of will’ can be explained without postulating a non-cognitive faculty of will. I look at Plato's claim that training the emotions is the main function of education. Finally I consider how obstacles to prayer can be understood (...) consistently with seeing a continuous development from the natural to the supernatural. (shrink)
abstract I first summarise Martha Nussbaum's theory of emotion and place it against its historical background. Borrowing distinctions from Plato I then argue that the emotions discussed in Hiding From Humanity affect us primarily as social beings, not as individuals, and suggest modifying and educating them by social means.
It is often held that movement can be defined in terms of places and times. Thus Russell says: We must entirely reject the notion of a state of motion. Motion consists merely in the occupation of different places at different times, subject to continuity as explained in Part V.
The paper presents goodness and truth as analogous formal concepts. I first argue that saying something is true of something and saying it is false of it are basic ways of speaking truly or falsely. I then consider thinking a property a good one for something to acquire and thinking it a bad, equate this with having something as a positive or negative objective, an object of desire or aversion, and argue that these are basic ways of thinking rightly or (...) wrongly. Finally I discuss the notions of a way of speaking or thinking, making special reference to Frege’s ‘Negation’ and ‘The Thought.’. (shrink)
From the way we speak it appears that we think changes do not merely come about but are brought about. Can we really think this? Have we any idea of the bringing or being brought about of a change distinct from our idea of its coming about? In the first part of this paper I shall try to describe some of the forms of causal thinking which are reflected in our ordinary causal judgments. In the second, having criticized two current (...) analyses of the notion of change, I shall argue that to think of a change as something which comes about is to think of it as a causal explanandum, and to think of a change as a coming about of something is to think of it as a causal explanans. (shrink)
The starting in 1960 of the British Journal of Aesthetics was a courageous act. In those days people liked to call aesthetics a ‘dreary’ intellectual region, and high-flying philosophers seldom descended into it. But when in the decade that followed new philosophy departments were created and old ones expanded, aesthetics took up some of the spare capacity. Courses were laid on, and books and articles appeared which could match the quality of work in better established branches of philosophy like ethics (...) and epistemology. The question now is whether the lean years which have begun will eat up the fat years of the sixties and seventies. As courses are cut and vacancies left unfilled, aesthetics is likely to be the first branch of philosophy to suffer. (shrink)