Epistemic reasons are meant to provide justification for beliefs. In this paper, I will be concerned with the requirements that have to be met if reasons are to discharge this function. It is widely recognized, however, that only possessed reasons can justify beliefs and actions. But what are the conditions that have to be satisfied in order for one to possess reasons? I shall begin by motivating a particular condition, namely, the ‘treating’ requirement that has been deemed to be necessary (...) for possessing reasons. In Sect. 1, I explain and criticize some of the existing accounts of the treating requirement for reason-possession. In Sect. 2, I will suggest a dispositional account of reason-possession in which the treating condition features prominently. Section 3 will deal with the some of the consequences of this account for such issues as the structure of epistemic defeat, the immediacy of perceptual justification and logical knowledge. (shrink)

We relate the theory of presupposition accommodation to a computational framework for reasoning in conversation. We understand presuppositions as private commitments the speaker makes in using an utterance but expects the listener to recognize based on mutual information. On this understanding, the conversation can move forward not just through the positive effects of interlocutors’ utterances but also from the retrospective insight interlocutors gain about one anothers’ mental states from observing what they do. Our title, ENLIGHTENED UPDATE, highlights such cases. Our (...) approach fleshes out two key principles: that interpretation is a form of intention recognition; and that intentions are complex informational structures, which specify commitments to conditions and to outcomes as well as to actions. We present a formalization and implementation of these principles for a simple conversational agent, and draw on this case study to argue that pragmatic reasoning is holistic in character, continuous with common-sense reasoning about collaborative activities, and most effectively characterized by associating specific, reliable interpretive constraints directly with grammatical forms. In showing how to make such claims precise and to develop theories that respect them, we illustrate the general place of computation in the cognitive science of language. (shrink)

Interspecific comparisons reveal remarkable diversity in patterns of gene expression, even among closely related species. Combinatorial regulatory mechanisms could facilitate the evolution of this diversity. However, the high degree of interdependence characteristic of combinatorial networks would represent a major constraint on evolution and might generate many features that have no direct adaptive value.

Letter-position tolerance varies across languages. This observation suggests that the neural code for letter strings may also be subtly different. Although language-specific models remain useful, we should endeavor to develop a universal model of reading acquisition which incorporates crucial neurobiological constraints. Such a model, through a progressive internalization of phonological and lexical regularities, could perhaps converge onto the language-specific properties outlined by Frost.

Philosophers of language inspired by Grice have long sought to show how facts about reference boil down to facts about speakers’ communicative intentions. I focus on a recent attempt by Stephen Neale (2016), who argues that referring with an expression requires having a special kind of communicative intention—one that involves representing an occurrence of the expression as standing in some particular relation to its referent. Neale raises a problem for this account: because some referring expressions are unpronounced, most language users (...) don’t realize they exist, and so seemingly don’t have intentions about them. Neale suggests that we might solve this problem by supposing that speakers have nonconscious or “tacit” intentions. I argue that this solution can’t work by arguing that our representations of unpronounced bits of language all occur within a modular component of the mind, and so we can’t have intentions about them. From this line of thought, I draw several conclusions. (i) The semantic value of a referring expression is not its referent, but rather a piece of partial and defeasible evidence about what a speaker refers to when using it literally. (ii) There is no interesting sense in which speakers refer with expressions; referring expressions are used to give evidence about the sort of singular proposition one intends to communicate. (iii) The semantics–pragmatics interface is coincident with the interface between the language module and central cognition. (shrink)

In The Aesthetics of Architecture, Roger Scruton makes at least four claims about rightness of architectural proportion. The present paper lists those claims, briefly discusses the way they are related, and, finally, selects one as the topic of discussion: the claim that there cannot be an exact, mathematical definition of rightness of proportion. Scruton’s arguments for this claim are reviewed. The first is found to be substantially correct, whereas the second is found to rely on a mistaken assumption, namely (...) the assumption that rightness of proportion is relative to a point of view. The paper ends by arguing that either the real or the apparent proportions of a building have to be definitely right, and that neither can be allowed to be definitely wrong. (shrink)

Le lecteur moderne demeure dérouté par les ekphraseis de bâtiments des textes byzantins. Il est en effet difficile de les considérer comme des sources pour l'archéologie ou l'Histoire de l'art, et la recherche tend à leur égard à adopter deux approches : l'une, plutôt liée à l'Histoire et à l'Histoire de l'art, s'emploie à retrouver des éléments réels de bâtiments ou d'œuvres d'art dans ces textes ; l'autre, plutôt philologique, cherche à considérer ces textes en eux-mêmes pour leur valeur littéraire. (...) Serait-il cependant possible de chercher une voie médiane? Une voie qui accepterait qu'une part de l'étrangeté de ces textes, nécessairement due à la langue et à l'époque, le soit également parce que l'expérience de lecture entre Moyen Âge et époque moderne a radicalement changé. Il manquerait au lecteur moderne, non l'imagination, mais les mécanismes et les résultats de l'imagination médiévale. Les échos lexicaux et thématiques qui balisent le texte et qui en dessinent l'architecture en seraient la clef aboutiraient à un texte en 3D, c'est-à-dire une projection mentale de l'objet décrit non pas comme simple image donnée par l'information contenue dans le texte, mais comme image construite par la composition du discours. Ainsi, au fur et à mesure qu'un auteur décrit un bâtiment, le texte le construit en mots et in fine en a épousé la forme. (shrink)

Combining all four distinct volumes in the series, this compilation explores the philosophical reasons behind the existence of humanity. The first volume investigates the concept of relations, revealing that unique, complex relationships come into being simultaneously and exponentially through the combination of multiple elements. The second volume focuses on intellect, probing the most obscure corners of comprehension and conducting a fascinating tour of the human psyche. The third volume addresses volition, analyzing the extent to which human judgment, decisions, and actions (...) impact future prospects for mankind and deflect the course of nature. The fourth and final volume delves into affections, dispassionately highlighting the merits and shortcomings of man’s most ethereal faculties. (shrink)

A study on minimalist syntax develops an empirical argument for a crash-proof computational system. A crash-proof system is obtained if syntactic dependencies are strictly local (i.e. there is no long-distance Agree). Apparent long-distance dependencies turn out to be the outcome of a recursive chain on local complex dependencies. This framework allows for novel analyses of quirky subjects in Icelandic and Spanish, indefinite SE in Spanish and different types of expletive constructions in English, French, German, Spanish, Italian, and Icelandic.