The privation theory of evil (PTE) states that evil is the absence of some good that is supposed to be present. For example, if vision is an intrinsic good, and if human beings are supposed to have vision, then PTE implies that a human being’s lacking vision is an evil, or a bad state of affairs. The mere-difference view of disability (MDD) states that disabilities like blindness are not inherently bad. Therefore, it would seem that lacking (...) sight is not a bad state of affairs. Thus PTE and MDD seem to be in tension. This essay discusses that apparent tension and explains how it might be resolved without doing violence to either view. Given the prominence of PTE in the history of Christian theology, and the wide support for MDD among disability theorists, it is worth finding a way to harmonize these two views. (shrink)

The Bad-Difference View of disability says, roughly, that disability makes one worse off. The Mere-Difference View of disability says, roughly, that it doesn’t. In recent work, Barnes – a MDV proponent – offers a detailed exposition of the MDV. No BDV proponent has done the same. While many thinkers make it clear that they endorse a BDV, they don’t carefully articulate their view. In this paper, I clarify the nature of the (...) BDV. I argue that its best interpretation is probabilistic and comparative: it is the view that a person is likely to be, all things considered, worse off with a disability than without. As such, Barnes – who criticises the version of the BDV that disability by itself, intrinsically or automatically makes a person worse off – misses an opportunity to attack the most plausible and relevant version of the BDV, and the best version remains unchallenged. (shrink)

Some disability activists argue that disability is merely a difference. It is often objected that this view has unacceptable implications, implying, for example, that it is permissible to cause disability. In reply, Elizabeth Barnes argues that viewing disability as a difference needn’t entail such implications and that seeing such implications as unacceptable is question-begging. We argue that Barnes misconstrues this objection to the mere difference view of disability: it’s not (...) question-begging to regard its implications as unacceptable, and the grounds that Barnes offers for potentially blocking some of these implications fail to explain our conviction that it’s impermissible to cause disability. (shrink)

While some philosophers believe disabilities constitute a “bad-difference,” others think they constitute a “mere-difference” (Barnes 2016). On this latter view, while disabilities may create certain hardships, having a disability is not bad in itself. I argue that chronic pain problematizes this disability-neutral view. In doing so, I first survey the literature on chronic pain (§1). Then, I argue that Barnes’s mere-difference view cannot adequately accommodate the lived experiences of many people (...) who suffer from chronic pain (§2). Next, I consider two ways Barnes might respond and I explain why these responses are not workable (§3). Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of disability variantism, the view that just as some disabilities can be neutral or even positive for some individuals, other disabilities like chronic pain can understandably make some people’s lives miserable not because society has failed them but simply because some conditions can openly conflict with well-being (§4). (shrink)

While some philosophers believe disabilities constitute a “bad-difference,” others think they constitute a “mere-difference” (Barnes 2016). On this latter view, while disabilities may create certain hardships, having a disability is not bad in itself. I argue that chronic pain problematizes this disability-neutral view. In doing so, I first survey the literature on chronic pain (§1). Then, I argue that Barnes’s mere-difference view cannot adequately accommodate the lived experiences of many people (...) who suffer from chronic pain (§2). Next, I consider two ways Barnes might respond and I explain why these responses are not workable (§3). Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of disability variantism, the view that just as some disabilities can be neutral or even positive for some individuals, other disabilities like chronic pain can understandably make some people’s lives miserable not because society has failed them but simply because some conditions can openly conflict with well-being (§4). (shrink)

The mere difference view, endorsed by some philosophers and Christian scholars, claims that disability by itself does not make a person worse off on balance—any negative impacts on overall welfare are due to social injustice. This article defends the bad difference view—some disability is bad not simply because of social arrangements but because of biological deficits that, by themselves, make a person worse off. It argues that the mere difference view (...) contradicts core doctrines of Christian faith. The analysis focuses on intellectual rather than physical or sensory disabilities. (shrink)

The mere difference view, endorsed by some philosophers and Christian scholars, claims that disability by itself does not make a person worse off on balance—any negative impacts on overall welfare are due to social injustice. This article defends the bad difference view—some disability is bad not simply because of social arrangements but because of biological deficits that, by themselves, make a person worse off. It argues that the mere difference view (...) contradicts core doctrines of Christian faith. The analysis focuses on intellectual rather than physical or sensory disabilities. (shrink)

A key question in disability studies, philosophy, and bioethics concerns the relationship between disability and well-being. The mere difference view, endorsed by Elizabeth Barnes, claims that physical and sensory disabilities by themselves do not make a person worse off overall—any negative impacts on welfare are due to social injustice. This article argues that Barnes’s Value Neutral Model does not extend to intellectual disability. Intellectual disability is (1) intrinsically bad—by itself it makes a person (...) worse off, apart from a non-accommodating environment; (2) universally bad—it lowers quality of life for every intellectually disabled person; and (3) globally bad—it reduces a person’s overall well-being. While people with intellectual disabilities are functionally disadvantaged, this does not imply that they are morally inferior—lower quality of life does not mean lesser moral status. No clinical implications concerning disability-based selective abortion, denial of life-saving treatment, or rationing of scarce resources follow from the claim that intellectual disability is bad difference. (shrink)

Drawing upon the life and work of S. Kay Toombs, I explore the impact and import of phenomenological accounts of disability for the existentialist tradition. Through the case of multiple sclerosis, a noncongenital, late-onset, and degenerative disability, I show how the general structures that emerge from its lived experience largely support a mere-difference view of disability and highlight the need for an equitably habitable world. I further argue that phenomenological accounts of disability demonstrate (...) accessibility to be the defining feature of what it means to be embodied as we are. I conclude with a discussion of the more general philosophical relationship between disability, embodiment, and existentialism. (shrink)

This paper examines the impact of disability on wellbeing and presents arguments against the mere-difference view of disability. According to the mere-difference view, disability does not by itself make disabled people worse off on balance. Rather, if disability has a negative impact on wellbeing overall, this is only so because society is not treating disabled people the way it ought to treat them. In objection to the mere-difference (...) class='Hi'>view, it has been argued, roughly, that the view licenses the permissibility of causing disability and the impermissibility of causing nondisability. In her recent article, “Valuing Disability, Causing Disability”, Elizabeth Barnes attempts to show that this causation-based objection does not succeed. We disagree and argue why. We begin by explaining that in order to defeat the causation-based objection it does not suffice to show that it is not always true that the mere-difference view licenses causing disability. Rather, license in some cases, in a way that undermines the plausibility of the mere-difference view, would be sufficient for the causation-based objection to succeed. Then our discussion turns to an important challenge for proponents of the causation-based objection: Some defenders of the mere-difference view are prepared to simply accept the counterintuitive implications of their position. A dialogue with such proponents of the mere-difference view requires arguments with independent traction. We present several such arguments to the effect that the mere-difference view needs to be significantly reduced in scope – and may turn out to be false altogether. (shrink)

The question of how disability affects wellbeing has occupied a number of philosophers in recent years. However, this literature has proceeded without a careful examination of the fairly vast empirical research on the topic. In this paper, I review the scholarly literature and discuss some philosophically-relevant aspects of it. On average, those with disabilities have a significantly lower level of wellbeing than those without disabilities. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that this reduction in wellbeing is not due entirely to (...) ableist factors. Hence, I argue that it shows that the Mere Difference View of disability is most likely false. However, the literature indeed shows that disabled people typically live good lives. Thus, despite its rejection of the Mere Difference View, it still upholds a disability-affirmative view. These findings allow for a measured critique of some of Peter Singer’s writings on disability. (shrink)

Many endorse the Bad-Difference View of disability which says that disability makes one likely to be worse off even in the absence of discrimination against the disabled. Others defend the Mere-Difference View of disability which says that, discounting discrimination, disability does not make one likely to be worse off. A common motivation for the BDV is the Options Argument which identifies reduction in valuable options as a harm of disability. Some (...) reject this argument, arguing that disabled people's prospects aren't hindered by having fewer options. In this article, I defend the Options Argument by arguing that, in disability cases, possessing a greater number of valuable options seems to overall improve well-being prospects. As such, the Options Argument appears to be sound and – although it doesn't establish the BDV – it lends plausibility to the BDV by identifying a potentially significant cost of disability. (shrink)

This thesis is an evaluation of the badness of disability and equality. It argues that disability poses a problem for equality and that, given the new advances in reproductive and gene technologies, egalitarians should strive to give an answer to how we should best reduce the inequality between disabled and non-disabled individuals of future generations. To support the claim that disabilities pose a problem for equality, I argue against the recently proposed Mere Difference View of (...) disability. Firstly, the view is not successful in responding to why, if disabilities are neutral, inflicting disability is still impermissible. Secondly, some intellectual disabilities, for example, do not bring about positive features capable of compensating for the negative features that they also bring about. If some disabilities are bad states of being, some disabled individuals will be worse off than non-disabled individuals other things being equal. Given that disabled individuals are subject to inequality due to their disability, I analyse how able traditional compensatory accounts of egalitarian justice are when it comes to improving this inequality. I conclude that given the existence of intellectual disabilities, traditional compensatory accounts are not fully satisfactory and that egalitarians should look at whether other means, like enhancements and preventive techniques, would do this job better. Paradoxically, techniques that lead to the reduction in the incidence of disabilities make things worse with respect to one new aspect of inequality, namely the concentration of inequality. In scenarios of disability reduction, where there are only a few remaining disabled individuals and a great number of non-disabled individuals, disabled individuals would be worse off than a great number of non-disabled individuals. This situation can potentially also have a negative impact in the wellbeing of the few remaining disabled individuals if the fact that disabled individuals become a very small minority puts less pressure in society to accommodate them. I conclude that reducing the incidence of disabilities can make things worse for inequality in at least one respect. This conclusion has crucial consequences for policy making. I recognise that the question remains about how this aspect should be weighed against the fact that scenarios of disability reduction promote utility - they contain more individuals with higher wellbeing - and against the fact that, under views that ascribe positive value to relations of equality, scenarios of disability reduction would also be, in one way, promoters of equality. (shrink)

Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu respond to my paper “Valuing Disability, Causing Disability” by arguing that my assessment of objections to the mere-difference view of disability is unconvincing and fails to explain their conviction that it is impermissible to cause disability. In reply, I argue that their response misconstrues, somewhat radically, both what I say in my paper and the commitments of the mere-difference view more generally. It also fails to (...) adequately appreciate the unique epistemic factors present in philosophical discussions of disability. (shrink)

This article develops a detailed, empirically driven analysis of the nature of the transition costs incurred in becoming disabled. Our analysis of the complex nature of these costs supports the claim that it can be wrong to cause disability, even if disability is just one way of being different. We also argue that close attention to the nature of transition costs gives us reason to doubt that well-being, including transitory impacts on well-being, is the only thing that should (...) determine the wrongness of causing or removing disability. Non-welfare considerations also defeat the claim that it is always wrong to cause disability. The upshot of these conclusions is that closer attention to the nature of transition costs supports disabled people who strenuously contest the assumption that their well-being is lower than nondisabled people. It also suggests that, in addition, disabled people should contest their opponents’ narrow account of how we should make ethical decisions regarding causing or failing to prevent disability. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a version of the medical model of disability, which defines disability as an enduring biological dysfunction that causes its bearer a significant degree of impairment. We should accept the medical model, I argue, because it succeeds in capturing our judgments about what conditions do and do not qualify as disabilities, because it offers a compelling explanation for what makes a condition count as a disability, and because it justifies why the federal government (...) should spend hundreds of billions of dollars, annually, on aid and accommodations for disabled people. After responding to a pair of objections Elizabeth Barnes has raised against the medical model, I contrast it with Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu's welfarist account of disability, and with Barnes's own mere-difference view. Both of these accounts face serious challenges, although elements of Barnes's view can—and, in my opinion, should—be adopted by proponents of the medical model. (shrink)

This thesis has three aims. Firstly, to make the case for considering disability and enhancement in parallel. There is an ethical need for debates on enhancement to incorporate disability perspectives, concepts of enhancement depend on concepts of disability, and drawing the two together can help us avoid biases. Secondly, to investigate which views on disability are consistent with which views on enhancement. It is difficult to oppose enhancement while holding that it is bad to be disabled. (...) While some accounts that take a more positive view of disability or impairment, such as the strong social model, might imply that we should change society rather than using enhancements, other disability-positive views, such as the value-neutral model, leave room for the possibility that enhancement is beneficial for some people. Support for enhancement can thus be accompanied by a nuanced understanding of the relationship between disability and well-being, and enhancement need not be in conflict with disability justice. Third, to develop a substantive view on disability and enhancement. Disability, understood as socially salient limitation, is somewhat bad in general or on average, but the position defended leaves room for many cases in which disability is neutral or desirable. This view can thus capture what is right in both bad-difference and mere-difference views. Enhancements, understood as capacity-increasing technologies, are likely to be beneficial to many people, and are important to develop and make widely available. Nevertheless, individuals are not obligated to use them. Developments in these technologies should therefore be accompanied by concrete steps to ensure that society remains as accessible as possible for those who do not use them, just as we should promote accessibility for people considered disabled now. (shrink)

The common belief is that disability is bad for the person who is disabled, that it has a negative effect on well-being. Some disability rights activists and philosophers, however, assert that disability has little or no impact on how well a person’s life goes, that it is neutral with respect to flourishing. In recent articles Stephen Campbell and Joseph Stramondo, while rejecting both views, claim that we cannot make any broad generalizations about the effect of disability (...) on well-being. Whether they are right about physical and sensory disabilities, I do not know, but I argue that they are wrong about intellectual disabilities. A broad generalization about intellectual disabilities is justified: it always has a negative impact on quality of life, even though there is no single negative impact. The disadvantages of ID are plain but complicated. (shrink)

Some philosophers and disability advocates argue that disability is not bad for you. Rather than treated as a harm, it should be considered and even celebrated as just another manifestation of human diversity. Disability is mere difference. To most of us, these are extraordinary claims. Can they be defended?

Assuming that theological anthropologies are put to work for particular historical projects, this essay examines recent contributions in this area in view of the project of inclusion. It claims that theological arguments in support of both the end and means of inclusion neglect the fact that from the perspective of creation, inclusion is the default position, and therefore requires no argument. Disability experience is not merely something that needs to be overcome. An alternative strategy is to consider an (...) ecological view on disability by looking at the notion of ‘weeds’ as a conceptual byproduct of human design. The essay concludes that this perspective generates different questions that enable us to think about disability in terms of the goodness of being. (shrink)

The idea that human beings have a distinct moral worth—a moral significance over and above any moral worth, such as that may be, possessed by other animals—has a long history and has traditionally been taken for granted by philosophers and theologians. However, in a variety of quarters in recent philosophy, this idea has come into disrepute, seeming to indicate a mere prejudice in favour of our own species. For example, Peter Singer has argued that such a position is (...) class='Hi'>mere speciesism, a prejudice of a kind with racism and sexism in that it involves making moral distinctions between our own and other species that cannot be morally justified. What on such views is needed to justify any such distinction is a difference in terms of the morally relevant properties possessed by our own species as compared with other species. I will call this view the moral property view. Insofar as other species share with us morally relevant properties, for example the capacity to suffer cognitive ability and so on, it is mere prejudice not to accept moral requirements with respect to them as we do with respect to our own species. While on the surface such a view may seem morally enlightened, it indicates what will seem to many problematic moral judgments with respect to severely disabled human beings. In this paper, I will respond to these concerns by suggesting a different basis for the idea of human moral distinctiveness, one that draws on recent work by Wittgensteinian moral philosophers and which denies what I called above the property view. According to this view, while our shared life with other animals involves the recognition of their moral significance, our shared life with other human beings involves recognising that human beings as human beings have a distinctive moral value. (shrink)

In recent years there has been increased focus on supporting the safety and wellbeing of children and young people with disability. This paper reports on a study that asked children and young people with disability and adults who work with them about practices that support their wellbeing and safety, including barriers and enablers to ethical practice. We used the theory of practice architectures to unpack the practices. Findings point to a range of practices that both young people and (...) adults regarded as important in creating the cultural conditions for young people to feel happy, safe and well, albeit placing different emphases on particular practices. Several tensions within and between these practices and the evolving requirements of disability and safeguarding policy environments were also apparent. While often not well articulated, the inherent tensions have implications when considering what children and young people need, particularly those with higher support needs. Findings suggest closer attention needs to be given to the intersection between individual and systemic factors in shaping ethical practice aimed at supporting the wellbeing and safety of children and young people with disability. (shrink)

There are different views of the logic of plurals that are now in circulation, two of which we will compare in this paper. One of these is based on a two-place relation of being among, as in ‘Peter is among the juveniles arrested’. This approach seems to be the one that is discussed the most in philosophical journals today. The other is based on Bertrand Russell’s early notion of a class as many, by which is meant not a class as (...) one, i.e., as a single entity, but merely a plurality of things. It was this notion that Russell used to explain plurals in his 1903 Principles of Mathematics; and it was this notion that I was able to develop as a consistent system that contains not only a logic of plurals but also a logic of mass nouns as well. We compare these two logics here and then show that the logic of the Among relation is reducible to the logic of classes as many. (shrink)

Madeleine Simms begins her article by saying that it will attempt to `redress the balance' of views on the conflicting rights of handicapped children and their parents. I, on the other hand, will argue that no semblance of a balance has yet been achieved, and that her questions and conclusions merely serve to tip the scales further away from a genuine rights-based theory to a pragmatic utilitarian assessment of individual `worth'.

This paper is an attempt to provide a critical evaluation of the theory of disability put forward by Lennart Nordenfelt. The paper is in five sections. The first sets out the main elements of Nordenfelt's theory. The second section elaborates the theory further, identifies a tension in the theory, and three kinds of problems for it. The tension derives from Nordenfelt's attempt to respect two important but conflicting constraints on a theory of health. The problems derive from characterisation of (...) the goals of persons; the difficulty which Nordenfelt has in respecting the plausible view that there is a distinction between illness and disability; and the presence in the theory of other strongly counter-intuitive implications. In section three a defence of Nordenfelt is attempted from within the resources available within his own theory. This defence seeks to exploit his distinctions between a person who is ill and one who is generally disabled and that between first- and second-order disabilities. However, it is concluded that there are insufficient resources within Nordenfelt's theory to fend off the criticisms developed in section two. The fourth section of the paper attempts a defence of Nordenfelt. It is claimed that introduction of the concept of capacity helps to explain differences between problem cases in the theory. Finally, it is shown that at least two important constraints on any theory of disability emerge from the preceding discussion. (shrink)

In the United States and elsewhere in the world, disabilities are being studied by two different schools of thought: special education and disability studies. In the field of special education, analyses are often pragmatic and instrumental. In contrast, analyses in the field of disability studies are often historical and cultural, explaining disabilities as constructed by social value. This lack of agreement about disabilities leads us to ask: How can practitioners and researchers begin to address the issue of which (...) students might need intensive interventions for their disabilities through the response to intervention (RTI) approach when disabilities are viewed so differently by scholars in the field? In this article I compare and contrast the philosophical foundations of disabilities in special education and disability studies and conclude that the dimensions of pragmatic, instrumental, historical, and cultural factors must be taken into account in order to achieve both the macro and micro levels of RTI implementation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical and Qualitative Assessment in Music Education ed. by David J. Elliott, Marissa Silverman and Gary E. McPhersonCara Faith BernardDavid J. Elliott, Marissa Silverman, and Gary E. McPherson, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical and Qualitative Assessment in Music Education (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019)Three leading voices in music education, David J. Elliott, Marissa Silverman, and Gary E. McPherson, consistently work to (...) reconceive how music educators create and challenge the discourses of music learning and the ways in which people engage with music. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical and Qualitative Assessment in Music Education furthers their contributions and serves as a break from the familiar and common “default philosophy of assessment” of tests, standards, regimens, and rankings to invite new ways of approaching music assessment.1 They, along with their coauthors, apply their theoretical, research, and teaching experience to examine music assessment through social praxis and how individuals and communities “deepen their growth as knowing and compassionate human beings.”2 In short, this Handbook is an invitation for music educators of all levels to reengage with their values and name them in their current and future practices.Using the current neoliberal state of education as a backdrop, Elliott, Silverman, and McPherson portray schools as spaces that yield corporate types of learning practices and assessments which “place little value on arts education.”3 Countering these realities, the diverse cadre of authors examines assessment [End Page 123] from different settings, roles, policies, and practices, organized around four themes. The first theme examines assessment through theoretical ideas including critical pedagogy, pragmatism, and Deleuzean frameworks. Next, in methodological practices, new ideas for assessment are considered through teacher evaluation, working with students with disabilities, and incorporating habits of mind. Creativity explores assessment through technological possibilities, popular music, and drawing, among others. Closing with international perspectives, the authors explore assessment through German and Scandinavian bildung/bildning, care as a driving force of assessment in South Africa, and an Iranian non-regulated perspective of assessment.Alexandra Kertz-Welzel asks: “Who decides what is assessed? How it is assessed? By whom is it assessed?”4 These questions are embraced and challenged throughout the Handbook. Instead of conceiving of assessment as something diagnostic—reaching musical benchmarks and aptitudes deemed by outside authorities—the authors welcome an epistemological shift of assessment. What might happen when music educators replace written self-assessments, quizzes, and playing tests in favor of, say, habits of mind (as Jillian Hogan and Ellen Winner describe in their chapter5) such as listening, noticing, being part of a community, persisting, expressing oneself, imagining, and making decisions? These changes might transform a community, one where students and teachers embrace music making beyond mere replication.6 The authors suggest ways of engaging in acts of subversion, resistance, care, and pragmatism to push past the product-driven view of assessment dictated by neoliberal and for-profit discourses.Historically, assessment has been contextualized, discussed, and critiqued through its practices; its purpose has been to gain information which aids in making decisions about teaching. In many contexts, particularly in the U.S., assessment practices stem from current educational policies, namely those noted in teacher evaluation systems.7 Such practices are intended to show student growth and drive instruction, to better label teaching quality and student success.8 In my own research on teacher evaluation, I found that music educators struggle with definitions and strategies of assessment; as a result, they defer to assessments based on hierarchies of musical skill and technique.9 Yet, Charlotte Danielson, a creator of many U.S. teacher evaluation frameworks, reminds that teaching “is not simply a matter of following a script of carrying out other people’s instructional designs.”10 Having to uphold the demands of assessment and evaluation forced many of the participants in my research to become compliant, even when they knew their teaching strategies were ancillary to who the students were and what they needed. They fabricated their assessments— often in the form of exit slips and inauthentic writing and musical compositional activities—to comply with policies. As a result, teachers’ values for music [End Page 124] teaching and learning were omitted from... (shrink)

From the standpoint of disability advocacy, further exploration of the concept of well-being stands to be availing. The notion that “welfarism” about disability, which Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane debuted, qualifies as helpful is encouraged by their claim that welfarism shares important commitments with that advocacy. As becomes clear when they apply their welfarist frame to procreative decisions, endorsing welfarism would, in fact, sharply undermine it. Savulescu and Kahane's Principle of Procreative Beneficence—which reflects transhumanism, or advocacy of radical (...) bioenhancement—morally requires parents to choose the child who will, in all probability, have “the best life.” Assuming the emergence of potent biotechnologies, procreative decision-making would be highly standardized, for prospective parents would be morally obliged to maximize select capacities, including intelligence, self-control, and hedonic set-point, in their children. Welfarism, applied to reproduction, is staunchly objectivist about what course is incumbent on decision-makers, giving no credence to first-personal values, aspirations, and experiences. Though this dismissal of individual perspectives applies to everyone, its implications for disability advocacy are especially severe. With that advocacy in view, greater attention to “well-being” should, therefore, be severed from the welfarism of Savulescu and Kahane. (shrink)

This chapter seeks to advance two central claims: 1) that the therapy-enhancement distinction is not an absolute one; and 2) that the social model of disability can be applied as at least one possible criterion for evaluating the ethics of enhancement. First, I address the limits of the therapy-enhancement distinction by showing that some accepted forms of therapy are indeed enhancements in their own right. The line between enhancement and therapy in medicine is therefore not clear-cut, but nor is (...) the difference between enhancement and disability straightforward either, as I argue. I discuss how some forms of apparent enhancement may in fact make people disabled from a social point-of-view, for they would not be able to function well in a society “fine-tuned” towards the current average range of abilities. Enhancement is therefore a slippery notion, and one that brings into relief questions of equity and of oppression. If enhancement is meant to be a key stepping stone on the path towards a posthuman condition, as some claim, then the ambiguous nature of enhancement surely throws into the question the coherence of the “post” in “posthuman.”. (shrink)

Consider two cases. In Case 1, you must decide whether you save the life of a disabled person or you save the life of a person with no disability. In Case 2, you must decide whether you save the life of a disabled person who would remain disabled, or you save the life of another disabled person who, in contrast, would also be cured as a result of your intervention. It seems that most people agree that you should give (...) equal chances in Case 1: saving the life of the person with no disability would be unfair discrimination against the person with disability. Yet, in Case 2, it appears that many people believe that you are at least permitted to save straightaway the person who would have no disability after your intervention. There would be no unfair discrimination against the other person. I argue that these judgments present a puzzle for theories of resource allocation in normative ethics. The puzzle is straightforward for consequentialists: the two cases have the same outcomes, but the judgments are different. But the puzzle also presents a problem for nonconsequentialist views. After introducing the cases, I show this by reviewing a number of proposals for solving the puzzle. I argue that none of these proposals are successful. I then make my own proposal and conclude by spelling out its implications. (shrink)

: This paper examines the ethical status of animals and nature within the thought of Mary Whiton Calkins. Though Calkins held that her self-psychology and absolute personalistic idealism were compatible in many ways, the two schools of thought offer different conceptions of personhood with respect to animals and nature. On the one hand, Calkins's self-psychology classified animals and nature as non-persons, due to the fact that self-psychology viewed animals and nature as physical entities bereft of the psychical qualities necessary for (...) personhood. On the other hand, Calkins's absolute personalistic idealism classified animals and nature as persons, due to the absolute personalistic idealist understanding of the universe as ultimately mental and personal. Because Calkins's ethics requires the ethical individual to will for the benefit of all human beings, an ethics that adopts Calkins's psychological conception of personhood promotes an anthropocentrism that views animals and nature as possessing merely instrumental value, while an ethics that adopts Calkins's philosophical conception of personhood views animals and nature as possessing intrinsic value. (shrink)

It may seem obvious that causing disability in another person is morally problematic in a way that removing or preventing a disability is not. This suggests that there is a moral asymmetry between causing disability and causing non-disability. This chapter investigates whether there are any differences between these two types of actions that might explain the existence of a general moral asymmetry. After setting aside the possibility that having a disability is almost always bad or (...) harmful for a person (a view that we have critiqued at length elsewhere), seven putative differences are considered. Ultimately, it is concluded that none of these seven factors can ground a general moral asymmetry between causing disability and causing non-disability, though each factor can provide some moral reason to avoid causing disability in certain particular cases. (shrink)

The world of disability theory is currently divided between those who insist it reflects a physical fact affecting life quality and those who believe disability is defined by social prejudice. Despite a dialogue spanning bioethical, medical and social scientific literatures the differences between opposing views remains persistent. The result is similar to a figure-ground paradox in which one can see only part of a picture at any moment. This paper attempts to find areas of commonality between the opposing (...) camps, and thus to rearrange the figures of the paradox at a fundamental level. The purpose is first to identify areas in which common ground can be achieved, and secondarily, to clarify the areas in which disagreement continues. While a general and unified theory of physical difference/disability is beyond the scope of this paper the result may advance that general goal. (shrink)

IT IS fairly well known that the problem of motion or, more generally, that of change is one of the oldest philosophical problems which can be traced to the very dawn of Western thought. It was inseparable from the basic problem which the Presocratics faced: that of the primary stuff underlying the phenomenal diversity of our sensory experience. Once the sensory diversity is viewed as merely apparent, one cannot avoid the question how such an appearance is generated by the underlying (...) single principle; in other words, one faces the problem of the origin of things, i.e., the problem of change. Hence the monism which in various forms underlies the majority of the early cosmogonic or protocosmogonic speculations. But already then three different theses are discernible: a) one rather extreme view which upholds rigorously the strict oneness of the underlying substance and from its immutability infers the impossibility of change; this was the view of Parmenides and his disciples; b) the second view which, while retaining the Eleatic principle of the singleness and immutability of the basic stuff, admits its existence in a plural form. This is atomism which reduces change to a change of position. In other words, diversity is retained only in the form of numerical diversity, and change only in the form of spatial displacement. All apparently qualitative changes are thus explainable in terms of combination and recombination of the homogeneous and immutable elements. Such are the basic premises not only of ancient Greek atomism, but very nearly of all forms of atomism in all different periods of history. Its basic inspiration has always remained Eleatic, although a very important concession has been made to sensory perception in the sense that the reality of change has been admitted. But it is admitted in its most innocuous form—in the form of displacement of the unchanging units of Being. (shrink)

Aquinas’s analyses of akrasia can be divided into two: the discussions in his theological works and his Ethics commentary. The latter has sometimes been regarded as merely repetitive of Aristotle and unrepresentative of Aquinas’s own thoughts. As such, little attention has been paid to the specific, and sometimes significant, differences between the two treatments and to what those differences might mean. This paper remedies this situation by focusing on four such differences. I ultimately provide rationales for these differences, thereby arguing (...) for the consistency of the two treatments and the importance of consulting Aquinas’s Ethics commentary to gain a full appreciation of his view of akrasia. Using this strategy, the paper concludes with a controversial suggestion regarding the structure of the weak akratic’s reasoning. (shrink)

What is the relation of the biological to the social sciences? Fierce battles are being currently fought over this question and much hangs on the answer. If society (or culture) is taken as an irreducible category which can only be understood in its own terms, the social sciences can feel safe from the sinister designs of other disciplines. Yet it is a commonplace that cultures vary, and we humans are prone to look at the differences rather than the similarities between (...) them. The result can be a thoroughgoing relativism. If culture cannot be understood by means of any non-cultural categories, cultural differences themselves can be accepted as the ultimate truth about man. When everything is cultural, even the notion of a non-cultural category can seem to be a ludicrous contradiction in terms. The categories with which we think are the product of our culture, or so we are told. Instead of our being able to understand culture in terms of anything beyond itself, our understanding appears totally moulded by the society to which we belong. Any theory can thus be seen as merely the expression of the beliefs of a particular society. (shrink)

What is the relation of the biological to the social sciences? Fierce battles are being currently fought over this question and much hangs on the answer. If society (or culture) is taken as an irreducible category which can only be understood in its own terms, the social sciences can feel safe from the sinister designs of other disciplines. Yet it is a commonplace that cultures vary, and we humans are prone to look at the differences rather than the similarities between (...) them. The result can be a thoroughgoing relativism. If culture cannot be understood by means of any non-cultural categories, cultural differences themselves can be accepted as the ultimate truth about man. When everything is cultural, even the notion of a non-cultural category can seem to be a ludicrous contradiction in terms. The categories with which we think are the product of our culture, or so we are told. Instead of our being able to understand culture in terms of anything beyond itself, our understanding appears totally moulded by the society to which we belong. Any theory can thus be seen as merely the expression of the beliefs of a particular society. (shrink)

At a time when different groups in society are achieving notable gains in respect and rights, activists in mental health and proponents of mad positive approaches, such as Mad Pride, are coming up against considerable challenges. A particular issue is the commonly held view that madness is inherently disabling and cannot form the grounds for identity or culture. This paper responds to the challenge by developing two bulwarks against the tendency to assume too readily the view that madness (...) is inherently disabling: the first arises from the normative nature of disability judgements, and the second from the implications of political activism in terms of being a social subject. In the process of arguing for these two bulwarks, the paper explores the basic structure of the social model of disability in the context of debates on naturalism and normativism; the applicability of the social model to madness; and the difference between physical and mental disabilities in terms of the unintelligibility often attributed to the latter. (shrink)

According to the consencus of Muslim world, al-Aqsā Mosque is located in the land of al-Quds (Jerusalem). In this matter, especially the old Sunnite sources are in agreement with each other. However, there are recently some different views regarding the location of al-Aqsā Mosque. It has been argued that al-Aqsā Mosque most likley was built in a location differnet from Jerusalem. One of the defenders of this opinion is Muhammad Hamīdullah, who is a prominent scholar of Islamic studies and considered (...) to be a reliable authority among contemporary Islāmic historians. He claims that al-Aqsā Mosque, which was also mentioned in the Qur’ān, cannot be the Mosque that is present in Jerusalem. Rather, it must be searched in heavens. If this claim is accepted, then numerous reports informing that the mosque is located in Jerusalem and many interpretations based on these reports, will become problematic and controversial. Therefore, it is necessary to examine those claims and the relevant evidence in detail. Following this pueporse, we aim to examine and evaluate those views with a critical approach in this study. In this regard, we will argue that the comments and approaches that have been argued so far, are not consistent. Rather, relevant claims do not rely on strong evidence but only unsatisfactory interpretations. Summary: Muhammad Hamīdullah who is a prominent researcher and well-known for his studies on History of Islām, has individual opinions on some issues, different from classical scholars of Ahlu’s-Sunnah (branch of Islām that accepts the first four caliphs as rightful successors to Muhammad). One of his distinctive views is the original place of Masjid al-Aqsā (al-Aqsā Mosque). He claims that al-Aqsā Mosque was likely located, not in al-Quds (Jerusalem), but in heavens. In this article, our purpose is to examine this matter by evaluating his arguments regarding the place of al-Aqsā Mosque. Hamīdullah’s argument is based on several reasons which are as follows:Miʻrāc (The Ascension) is a journey from the earth to beyond the heavens. According to Hamīdullah, it is illogical to say that, in relation to such a magnificient occurrence, the Holy Qur’ān only mentions the journey from Mecca to Bayt al-Maqdis/al-Quds.Hamīdullah maintains that the expression “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in the first verse of Sūrah al-Isrā means “the remotest Mosque.” However, the Palestinian lands are described as “Adna’l-Arḍ/Nearest Country” in the third verse of Sūrah ar-Rūm. Thus, “the remotest Mosque” should not be “the nearest country”; rather it should be a Mosque in heavens.He also argues that in some Hadith texts, the mosque in question is mentioned as “Masjid al-Aqsā”, but there is a grammatical difference between the phrases of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” and “Masjid al-Aqsā”, which means that the mosque mentioned as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in the Qur’ānic verse does not have a connection with al-Quds (Jerusalem). In his opinion, the expression of “Masjid al-Aqsā” which appears in some Hadith texts is in the form of a noun clause, while the quranic expression “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” is in the form of an adjective clause. Accordingly, “Masjid al-Aqsā” and “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” refer to different places. The noun clause -as in the Hadith texts- of “Masjid al-Aqsā” must be in al-Quds, whereas the Qur’ānic expression in the form of an adjective clause of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” must be a mosque in the heavens.According to his other claim, Abu’l-Yemān, the teacher of the teacher of Bukhārī, when narrating the hadith about mosques, he mentions this mosque, not as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”, but as Īliyā’. That is, according to him, early sources of hadith do not mention the phrase of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”, but instead, the phrase of Īliyā’ was used. Hamīdullah also states “... while narrating this hadith, Muslim does not use the phrases “Masjid al-Aqsā” or “al-Masjid al-Aqsā.” Instead, he uses the phrase Īliyā’.”He also states that the term al-masjid (the mosque) which appears in the seventh verse of Sūrah al-Isrā, was used to refer to that Īliyā’, not to refer to “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”. Likewise, the Umayyad Caliph Abdulmelik (26-86 h.c./646-705 g.c.) built the Dome of the Rock (Masjid al-Saḥra) in al-Quds and named it “Masjid al-Aqsā”. This name became so widespread at the times of Imam al-Bukhārī (194-256 h.c./810/870 g.c.) so that the old name Īliyā’ had been totally forgotten. Because of this reason, some hadith narrators were using this more common name “Masjid al-Aqsā” to express and describe this forgotten name.When we critically evaluate the information and approaches explained above, we come to the conclusion that they are not consistent. First of all, the claim that Masjid al-Aqsā is in the heavens, is in disagreement with the Qur’ānic verses implying that “Masjid al-Aqsā” is in al-Quds, and with many authentic hadith texts that indicate its existence on those lands. Also, the sources of Qur’ānic interpretations (exegeses) and historical narrations refute this claim. On the other hand, there is no Qur’ānic verse or tradition (hadith) that state that Masjid al-Aqsā is in the heavens.We argue that Hamīdullah’s claim “...It is illogical to say that, in relation to such a magnificient occurrence, the Holy Qur’ān only mentions the journey from Mecca to al-Aqsā Mosque in al-Quds” is not very appropriate. Because, it is beyond the human judgment to decide which part of this magnificient journey is more important or which part of it should take place in the Holy Qur’ān. Only Allah has the authority to decide for this. Moreover, we should remember that-as mentioned in the conveyed knowledge- the incident mentioned in the first verse of Sūrah al-Isrā is merely the magnificient journey from Mecca to Masjid al-Aqsā, which was clearly stated in the authentic hadith sources. As for the third verse of Sūrah al-Rūm, it is not correct to claim that Masjid al-Aqsā is not in al-Quds but in the heavens, by reading the text of the verse. Because, the phrase al-arḍ (the earth) has several meanings. Moreover, the phrase al-aqsā (the remotest) in the first verse of Sūrah al-Isrā, refers to distance between the two mosques, not between two countries.In some hadith texts, Masjid al-Aqsā was mentioned as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in the form of a noun clause, but this does not require that the masjid in question should be in the heavens. Because, many hadith texts mention it in the form of an adjective clause. Besides, some hadith texts mention Masjid al-Harām (Great Mosque of Mecca) in the form of a noun clause (Masjid al-Harām), not in the form of an adjective clause (al-Masjid al-Harām). If we consider Hamīdullah’s claim, we should look for the Masjid al-Harām in the heavens, but not on earth. So far, neither he nor anybody else made such a claim.Hamīdullah argues that Abu’l Yemān mentioned this mosque as Īliyā’, but not as al-Masjid al-Aqsā, and claimed that early religious sources do not use the term al-Masjid al-Aqsā. However, this is not a sound argument. Because, the authorities of hadith and history, who lived both before Abu’l Yemān and also at the same era, used the term “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in their works and narrated that this term refers to al-Quds or Bayt al-Maqdis (Masjid al-Aqsā). Moreover, Hamīdullah’s claim that Muslim (a senior hadith scholar) did not use the terms “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” or “Masjid al-Aqsā” but instead he used the name “Īliyā’” is incorrect. Because, while narrating this hadith, the hadith scholar (Muslim) used all three names. As for the term “al-Masjid (the Mosque)” mentioned in Q 17.7, it is a groundless comment to claim that it does not refer to “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” in Q 17.1. Because the context of the verses and grammatical rules of Arabic language explicitly prove that the mosque mentioned in the seventh verse refers to “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” which is also mentioned in the first verse.His claim that “the Umayyads named the temple that they built in Jerusalem as “Masjid al-Aqsā” and following the era of Umayyads, in the period of Bukhārī, this naming became widespread” is highly vulnerable and disputable. Because in those times, the temple used to be named as “al-Masjid al-Jami (the Gathering Mosque)”, not as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”. Nearly three centuries after the Umayyads reign, the naming of the said temple was first introduced to be as “al-Masjid al-Aqsā”. As for the expression of “al-Masjid al-Aqsā” appearing in the early sources of hadith, it was not used for the mosque built by the Umayyads, but was used to mean the entire haram (sacred, respected) region taking place in the south east corner of Jerusalem. In the light of arguments and explanations critically analysed above, we are in a position to argue that Muhammad Hamīdullah’s argument that “Masjid al-Aqsā is in the heavens”, does not rely on sound evidence, but rather, they are only some unsatisfactory interpretations. (shrink)

This paper examines the movement for independent living among the Japanese with disabilities from the perspective of multiculturalism and human rights. The IL movement questions the conventional idea, widely held by Japanese without disabilities, that disabled people are in need of special care and cannot live independently in ordinary communities. The IL movement advocates: 1) the reinterpretation of “disability” as mere “difference”, 2) the equal right to autonomy and social participation for the disabled, and 3) the unique (...) right to care and support that enable the disabled to be autonomous. The IL movement thus projects a new “disability culture” that assigns different meanings to disability and calls for radical change in social relationships. The IL movement then is one of many forces that celebrates diversity and advocates pluralism in Japanese society in defiance of the myth of a “homogeneous monocultural” Japan. The IL movement highlights the right to care as a basic human right which is a precondition for the right to autonomy. Consequently, the IL movement reinterprets the notion of autonomy and enriches the concept of “human rights.”. (shrink)

Interest in philosophy of management continues to grow. Growth of the philosophy of management might result from the consideration of man's potential as viewed by two different men, an industrialist and a philosopher. James Finney Lincoln was president and board chairman of The Lincoln Electric Company for 37 years. During that time, and for 14 previous years when he was the firm's general manager, he developed a philosophy basic to a practice of business management that gained national and international attention. (...) Wilhelm von Humboldt was a very gifted person with many accomplishments including those as a Prussian statesman, a humanist, and a linguistics scholar. A comparison of both men's philosophies reveals the following: In each view man's potentiality was approached by the dynamic, on-going process of developing his latent abilities or powers. Both views stressed freedom as being critical to the development of man's latent abilities or powers. For Lincoln the individual must gain satisfaction from the recognition of developing his latent abilities. For Humboldt the individual must enjoy the 'freedom of developing himself.' Lincoln warned against custom as being a barrier to development since it places man in situations which are without variation, forcing him merely to follow precedent. Humboldt, in addition to freedom, stated that "a variety of situations" is essential for development. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIV, Number 2, November 1998, pp. 295-311 Hume's Wide View of the Virtues: An Analysis of his Early Critics JAMES FIESER Hume discusses about 70 different virtues in his moral theory. Many of these are traditional virtues and have clear moral significance, such as benevolence, charity, honesty, wisdom, and honor. However, Hume also includes in his list of virtues some character traits whose moral significance (...) is not immediately obvious, such as wit, good manners, and dialogue. Mid-eighteenth century critics of Hume's moral theory almost unanimously felt that his notion of virtue was too broad and that Hume should have distinguished between genuine moral virtues, on the one hand, and mere intellectual abilities on the other. According to the critics, grouping the two together devalues the true virtues. Hume was aware that his broad understanding of the virtues was controversial and we know from his letters that he read at least some of these critiques. He nevertheless vigorously defended his position. Although Hume sees this as an issue worthy of defending, contemporary Hume scholarship has neither discussed the nature of the eighteenth century criticisms nor given adequate attention to the success or failure of Hume's position. I address these issues here. I begin by presenting Hume's defense of his wide view of the virtues as it appears in both the Treatise and the Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.1 Then I chronologically present early criticisms of Hume's view, including those by Francis Hutcheson, James Balfour, John Leland, and James Beattie. From these early discussions I suggest that we find three criteria to distinguish between genuine moral virtues, such as justice, and James Fieser is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Tennessee at Martin, Martin TN 38238 USA. email: [email protected] 296 James Fieser less morally urgent intellectual abilities, such as industriousness. The three criteria are: (1) moral virtues are a matter of choice and intellectual abilities are not; (2) moral virtues by themsleves aim at a good end and intellectual abilities by themselves do not necessarily do so; and (3) moral virtues are such that the failure to obtain them incites blame, whereas the failure to obtain intellectual abilities does not incite blame. Although I believe that the first criterion fails, I argue that the second and third criteria provide reasonable ways of distinguishing moral virtues from intellectual abilities. Hume's Argument Hume's first account of the wide scope of the virtues appears in Book III, Part iii, of the Treatise, published in 1740. His main criterion in determining the virtue of an agent's character trait is whether the action it produces has consequences that trigger symapthetic feelings of moral pleasure2 in the minds of spectators (T 574-575). In Section 4, entitled "Of Natural Abilities," he argues that the distinction between natural abilities and moral virtues is unfounded since both groups of mental qualities bring forth the same sympathetic moral feelings in the spectator (T 606-614). Anticipating objections, Hume considers several possible points of distinction between natural abilities and moral virtues, but then rejects them all. First, he considers that the precise feelings elicited in the spectator designate two separate classes. Hume's reply is that the precise feelings elicited by each virtue (for example, benevolence, charity, justice) are also distinct in minute ways. Nevertheless, we still classify all such elicited responses as feelings of moral approval. Second, he considers that natural abilities are involuntary whereas moral virtues are the result of free will. Hume's reply is that many involuntary abilities, such as fortitude, have classically been catalogued as virtues. He adds that there is no conceivable reason why any involuntary quality of an agent mazy not produce sympathetic pleasure in the spectator. Third, Hume considers that habits relevant to moral virtues can be altered through reward and punishment, whereas habits relevant to natural abilities are more fixed and cannot be altered by these means. Hume's reply is that if we are not biased by such moral systems, then this distinction would not even arise. In An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), published eleven years later, Hume presents the broad... (shrink)

It’s often said that relational view of experience can’t provide an explanation of mode of presentation phenomena: the idea is that if experience is characterized merely as a relation to an object, then we can’t make sense of the idea that one and the same object can be given in perception in many different ways. I show that we can address this problem by looking at the causal structure in relational experience. Experience of an object is caused by experience (...) of particular properties it has, such as its color and location, and experience of the object is in turn a cause of experience of its properties as characteristics of that object. We can explain mode of presentation phenomena as a matter of there being different sets of properties that can cause perception of one and the same object. I discuss how experiments in vision science and computational models of vision can underwrite this way of finding the causal structure in experience, relationally conceived. I look at an alternative, internalist approach to mode of presentation phenomena, in terms of ‘mental paint’, and suggest that the internalist approach is simply incoherent. Finally, I point out that we have mode of presentation phenomena for the spatial aspects of vision, such as perception of spatial relations and spatial location, but that these phenomena resist analysis in any of the terms proposed so far.On a relational view, visual experience is a relation between the perceiver and the scene observed. It’s often said, quite wrongly, that relational views of experience cannot reckon with mode-of-presentation phenomena. I begin by explaining how a relational view of experience can make sense of the idea of the ‘way’ in which an object is given to the perceiver, in terms of the properties used to single out the object. I explain why relational views are to be preferred to approaches in terms of ‘mental paint’. I then sketch the problem posed by spatial perception. Spatial perception is peculiarly difficult to characterize on a relational view, because it’s difficult to characterize the way in which spatial locations and layouts are given to the subject. (shrink)

Events such as industrialization, population growth and old age have made the disability more visible. We think that the disabled people's attitude towards being disabled and religion is an important issue to be investigated in terms of formation of the social sensitivity about the learning of the thoughts of disabled people. In this context, it is aimed to investigate the function of the religion in terms of how the disabled identify, understand and overcome the problems related to being disabled. (...) The sample of the study consisted of 58 people, 20 (34.5%) female and 38 (65.5%) male. Semi-structured interview technique was used as the research qualitative research method and descriptive analysis technique was used in the analysis of the data. In the article, the relation between disability and religion has been tried to be understood in terms of sociology of religion in the context of functionalist approach. In general, disabled people evaluate disability (81.1%) as "examination", (10.3%) as "problem" and (8.6%) as "difference”. It is concluded that religion affects the thoughts of disabled person in a positive way to understand and accept the disability. It has been seen that the disabled people have applied to the state, social support systems and spiritual values ​​to overcome their problems. However, it is the duty of all social institutions to increase the social sensitivity to the disabled people.Summary: Events such as industrialization, population growth and old age have further increased disability. It is important that the social sensitivity towards disabled people and disabled people’s thoughts about disability should be learned. We think that the disabled people's attitude towards being disabled and towards religion is an important issue to be investigated. In this study, the functions of religion to overcome the problems related to the disability and the way how the disabled people define and understand the disability will be investigated. In this context, we think that an individual's overcoming the problems related to disability is an important issue that should be examined in terms of religion-referenced behavior.The sample of the study consisted of 58 people, 20 (34.5 %) female and 38 (65.5 %) male. Semi-structured interview technique was used as the research qualitative research method and descriptive analysis technique was used in the analysis of the data. In the article, the relation between disability and religion has been tried to be perceived in terms of sociology of religion in the context of functionalist approach.It is a fact that various approaches to disability in various societies have been made during the historical process. These approaches are known as moral, medicinal/medical, social, human rights and limitative models. Each of these approaches points to a specific direction and problems of disability. In other words, each model handles and predicts a different dimension of the subject.According to the Qur’ân, disability means not to be in a bodily sense, but to stay away from the truth and expressed in the way of not seeing the truth, not grasping and not hearing, that is, figuratively meaningful. Again from the point of view of the Qur’ân, the first cause of disability comes to people through the divine will and test. The others are due to people's own mistakes.The changing paradigm shift with the enlightenment process has changed the way people view each other. In this context, with the thought and modernization of enlightenment, people's view of human beings and environment has changed. The body which is thought as the trust of God has turned into a body in which one is his proprietor. Therefore, this situation brought the contest, the debate, the comparison and the alienation together.Today, people with disabilities face many financial, spiritual, social and cultural problems. Poverty arising from unemployment, livelihood, accommodation constitute financial problems that are the first to come to mind; access to places of worship, instruction of worship, fulfillment of worship, lack of spiritual care and support constitute spiritual problems; education, health, access and social exclusion constitute social and cultural problems.Disabled people ask themselves these questions related to disability: Why did it happen to me? If it is a test, why do not I start the test on equal conditions with healthy people? Here the disabled person consults the religion to understand and find an answer to the situation that he is in. Because religion is an important factor that responds to the search for meaning, it reduces the feeling of deprivation, and fulfills the task of compensation mechanism. In addition to this, religion gives life a goal and power to the person to overcome the problems he encounters with.In our research on the relationship between disability and religion, religion as in many subjects has contributed positively to the individual’s view towards the fact of disability and to overcome some problems. For example, as a result of the research, the participants evaluated "disability" (81.1 %) as ‘test’ (10.3%) as ‘problem’ and (8.6 %) as ‘difference’.They answered the question ‘How has the disability affected your religious thoughts?’, 71% of the participants expressed that it has affected in a positive way (as a test, made me closer to God, increased my loyalty to God, a motivation source). Besides, 23 % of the participants expressed that it hasn't caused any changes (already believed, fate, disability isn't an obstruct to worship) and 6 % of the participants expressed that it has affected in a negative way (my life is upside down, I am questioning this situation).In addition to those who answered the question ‘Has the disability affected your life?’ in a ‘positive’ way, there is a considerable amount of people who said that the entrances of the mosques are not suitable for the disabled people. In addition, the disabled people stated that they have problems with the way of worshipping (orthopedically disabled), listening to the Qur’ân, hearing the azan (hearing impaired), and cannot go to the mosques and cannot fast because of the health problems, all of which have affected their religious life in a ‘negative’ way. We can gather the answers given to the question in three categories about what kind of behaviors the disabled people do to overcome/eliminate problems. The first is that they receive a variety of services and assistance by applying to the state for material support in order to overcome the problems related to disability and the second is that the social support services are mainly given within the family and friends, and the third is they worship, pray and fast, which are must of Islam, to eliminate the spiritual distress.The rate of people, whose answers are ‘positive’ to this question ‘Does your religious belief have an effect to deal with the disability?’ because they believe the afterlife and who say they feel relieved by praying and worshipping, is very high (95%). Moreover, it is remarkable that the ones say they are ‘not positive’ still explain this with religious concepts such as test and examination which require patience. In short, religion relieves disabled people by fulfilling the task of compensation mechanism with understanding disability and overcoming problems.Almost half of the participants (45%) said no to the following question: Is there any kind of material/spiritual support given to you by the religious officials or religious people in your community? Some factors affecting this situation are that religious officials have no knowledge and education about how to treat disabled people and how to help them.As a result, disabled people face various financial and spiritual problems. They consult religion to solve some of these problems. The vast majority of the disabled consider disability as a test and a fate. Therefore, religion plays an important role for disabled people to understand disability and cope with it. Besides, disabled people have stated that they face various problems in fulfilling their worship and in accessing the places of worship. In this context, physically disabled people also need the supportive power of religion just like other disabled people. (shrink)

Many people believe that all human life is of equal value. Most of them also believe that all human beings have a moral status superior to that of nonhuman animals. But how are these beliefs to be defended? The mere difference of species cannot in itself determine moral status. The most obvious candidate for regarding human beings as having a higher moral status than animals is the superior cognitive capacity of humans. People with profound mental retardation pose a (...) problem for this set of beliefs, because their cognitive capacities are not superior to those of many animals. I argue that we should drop the belief in the equal value of human life, replacing it with a graduated view that applies to animals as well as to humans. (shrink)

Philosophers often enroll disabled bodies and minds as objects of thought in their arguments from marginal cases and in thought experiments: for example, arguments for animal ethics use cognitively disabled people as a contrast case, and Merleau-Ponty uses a blind man with a cane as an exemplar of the relationship of technology to the human, of how technology mediates. However, these philosophers enroll disabled people without engaging significantly in any way with disabled people themselves. Instead, disabled people are treated in (...) philosophy as literal objects—and in many cases, as less than human. (This sense of a categorical difference between disabled and nondisabled people is becoming especially clear during the Covid-19 pandemic, as I write this article.) Philosophical reflection thus makes assumptions—often wrong—about disabled people’s lives, experiences, and relationships to technology. Outside of philosophy as well as in, disabled people are not regarded as experts about our own experiences and lives; our testimony is paternalistically written over. We need better consideration of disabled people as people as we consider the future. Lack of disabled people’s points of view in philosophy colors—and sometimes invalidates—views of technological change. (shrink)

Conflicts between bioethicists and disability theorists often arise over the permissibility of euthanasia and physician assisted suicide. Where mainstream bioethicists propose universalist guidelines that will direct action across a range of effectively disembodied situations, and take for granted that moral agency requires autonomy, feminist bioethicists demand a contextualisation of the circumstances under which moral decision making is conducted, and stress a more relational view of autonomy that does not require strict standards of independent agency. Nonetheless, neither traditional nor (...) feminist perspectives have fully engaged with the critique of disabled people that they are consistently subjected to discriminatory, even life-threatening, practice and policy in biomedical and health care. The paper revisits some of the issues that drive the often highly polarised debate between bioethicists and disability theorists around the question of end of life decisions involving disabled people. While many bioethicists have doubtless been indifferent to the difference that disability makes, I am also concerned that the very proper demand of disability activists and theorists to scrutinise all end of life decisions for signs of discrimination and even violence has segued into something damagingly restrictive that silences internal dissension and stifles external debate. Given that euthanasia and physician assisted suicide may be issues where conventional argument on either side will founder on deeply felt convictions, I make the radical move to speculate on an entirely different, quasi-Deleuzian, approach to the value of life in order to shake up entrenched positions, and begin to think differently. (shrink)

The medical and social model of disability is discussed and debated among researchers, scholars, activists, and people in general. It is common to hold a mixed view and believe that some disabled people suffer more from social obstacles and others more from medical problems inherent in their bodies or minds. Rachel Cooper discusses possible ‘test environments’, making explicit an idea which likely plays an implicit part in many disability discussions. We place or imagine placing the disabled person (...) in a range of different environments. If there is a relevant test environment in which they do fine, their problem was societal/external; if there is not, it was medical/internal. Cooper admits that deciding on the appropriate range of test environments is an ethical and political question. In this chapter, I argue that we often ought to widen our scope when discussing psychiatric disabilities. (shrink)