The ideas of creatio ex nihilo of the universe and creatio continua of new matter out of nothing entered the arena of natural science with the advent of the Big Bang and the steady-state theories in the mid-twentieth century. Adolf Grünbaum has tried to interpret the steady-state theory in such a way, to show that the continuous formation of new matter out of nothing in this theory can be explained purely physically. In this paper, (...) however, it will be shown that Grünbaum's interpretation encounters at least three problems: not distinguishing between material and efficient causes, inconsistency, and misconceiving the law of density conservation. (shrink)

Philosophical considerations have been essentially involved in the origin and development of the steady-state cosmological theory. These considerations include an explicit uniformitarian methodology and implicit metaphysical views concerning the status of natural laws in a changing universe. I shall examine the foundations of SST by reconstructing its early history. Whereas the strong uniformitarian methodology of SST found no support in the subsequent development of cosmology, the idea of a possible influence the global structure of the universe may (...) have on the laws of physics operative in it has been assimilated by the standard big bang theory as it made its remarkable progress in recent decades. (shrink)

Heyman's target article contributes to our understanding of addictions by offering solutions to several paradoxes and by recognizing the stable nature of addictive behavior. Previous classical and operant conditioning models have emphasized molecular processes, such as acquisition and extinction, and have failed to address the aggregate effects of long-term exposure to the contingencies of drug and alcohol use.

Modern standard big bang cosmology was preceded by a 15-year controversy with the rival steady-state theory of the universe. At a time when cosmologically relevant observations were scarce and cosmology was widely regarded as an immature science, or not a science at all, much of the debate took place by means of arguments that were essentially philosophical. Remarkably, professional philosophers, including some of the key figures of Anglo-American philosophy of science, took an active part in the debate; (...) no less remarkably, the involved astronomers and physicists sometimes listened to them. This article reviews the controversy over the steady-state theory as seen from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of science and offers an appraisal of how and to what extent philosophers and scientists entered a dialogue. -/- . (shrink)

The creation-of-matter hypothesis of the Bondi-Gold-Hoyle steady-state cosmology requires that in an infinite time to which the first transfinite number may be assigned the number of atoms of matter produced would be equal to the cardinal number of the set of mathematical points in the continuum. The existence of a set of finite atoms with that cardinal number is physically unacceptable. The argument for the production of a non-denumerable set of atoms, in infinite time, is given in terms (...) of a model which is shown to be isomorphic with the original Cantor "diagonal" proof for the existence of a non-denumerable infinity. An alternative model which meets the requirements of the steady-state theory is presented; in this model, the number of atoms is explicitly no greater than countably infinite, and remains countably infinite as long as the past time of the universe is restricted to the unlimited set of finite unit-time intervals. If the origin of the steady-state universe is taken as being within that infinite set, expressed by the negative natural numbers, the contradiction of an atom at every mathematical point does not arise. The contradiction does arise if the origin is not within the set of finite numbers, and accordingly there is a restriction as to which concept of infinite past may properly be maintained in the steady-state theory. (shrink)

The question posed is whether the optimization methods of calculus that are often used in social and scientific analyses offer an appropriate analytical approach to analyze problems that are immersed in systemic complexity and its consequences. This paper refers to the portfolio of such complex problems belonging to social and scientific forces. We refer to such a complex combination by the term ‘socio-scientific’. In the study of socio-scientific complexity, dynamic preferences, intricate decisions, and uncertain behavior, endogenous relations and systemic perturbations (...) abound. The arguments presented in this paper establish that the methodological approach of optimization and steady-state equilibrium turns out to be nicety rather than objectivity in the presence of complexity. Complex situations of the socio-scientific universe cause perturbations in the variables; there explaining complexity formed by the social embedding of variables. Indeed, human individuals, institutions and governments, and society at large are complex interrelated entities. Therefore, complex interrelations caused by social embedding remain submerged in social perturbations. However, interactions arising from social embedding also generate endogenous and complex relations. The contribution of this paper is in the area of endogenous learning in the wellbeing objective criterion function. The interrelationships between the emergent cognitive variables now cause interactive embedding, complexity, and social perturbations. Yet such perturbations are not altogether uncontrollable. They can be and need to be controlled for the purposes of social explanation—hence demanding predictability—even as the complex nature of evolutionary systemic learning proceeds. The controllability problem of extreme perturbations leads us to formalize a mathematical methodology to study controllable perturbations while avoiding extreme forms of perturbations in socio-scientific theory. (shrink)

Are theories judged on the basis of empirical tests of their predictions, as proposed by Karl Popper and others, or are new theories adopted by younger scientists while old theories fade away when their advocates die, as Max Planck suggested? A famous historical episode, the rejection of steady state cosmology and the revival of the big bang cosmology following the 1965 discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation, is examined to determine whether the scientific community followed Popper’s or (...) Planck’s principle. It is found that by 1975 almost all supporters of the steady state had either switched to the big bang or stopped publishing on cosmology. This case therefore seems to exemplify Popper’s principle, although it should be noted that two of the founders of steady state cosmology had strongly proclaimed their adherence to that principle. The case does not support the Popperian claim that successful novel predictions provide better evidence for a theory than deductions of known facts. (shrink)

In earlier writings, I argued that neither of the two major physical cosmologies of the 20th century support divine creation, so that atheism has nothing to fear from the explanations required by these cosmologies. Yet theists ranging from Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Leibniz to Richard Swinburne and Philip Quinn have maintained that, at every instant anew, the existence of the world requires divine creation ex nihilo as its cause. Indeed, according to some such theists, for any given moment t. God's (...) volition that the-world-should-exist-at-t supposedly brings about its actual existence at t. In an effort to reestablish the current viability of this doctrine of perpetual divine conservation. Philip Quinn argued (1993) that it is entirely compatible with physical energy conservation in the Big Bang cosmology, as well as with the physics of the steady-state theories. But I now contend that instead, there is a logical incompatibility on both counts. Besides, the stated tenet of divine conservation has an additional defect: It speciously purchases plausibility by trading on the multiply disanalogous volitional explanations of human actions. (shrink)

Short review of Helge Kragh's excellent book on the contest between big bang and steady state theories of the universe.

Educators advocate that science education can help the development of more responsible worldviews when students learn not only scientific concepts, but also about science, or “nature of science”. Cosmology can help the formation of worldviews because this topic is embedded in socio-cultural and religious issues. Indeed, during the Cold War period, the cosmological controversy between Big Bang and Steady State theory was tied up with political and religious arguments. The present paper discusses a didactic sequence developed for (...) and applied in a pre-service science teacher-training course on history of science. After studying the historical case, pre-service science teachers discussed how to deal with possible conflicts between scientific views and students’ personal worldviews related to religion. The course focused on the study of primary and secondary sources about cosmology and religion written by cosmologists such as Georges Lemaître, Fred Hoyle and the Pope Pius XII. We used didactic strategies such as short seminars given by groups of pre-service teachers, videos, computer simulations, role-play, debates and preparation of written essays. Along the course, most pre-service teachers emphasized differences between science and religion and pointed out that they do not feel prepared to conduct classroom discussions about this topic. Discussing the relations between science and religion using the history of cosmology turned into an effective way to teach not only science concepts but also to stimulate reflections about nature of science. This topic may contribute to increasing students’ critical stance on controversial issues, without the need to explicitly defend certain positions, or disapprove students’ cultural traditions. Moreover, pre-service teachers practiced didactic strategies to deal with this kind of unusual content. (shrink)

Mental fatigue (MF) jeopardizes performance and safety through a variety of cognitive impairments and according to the complexity loss theory, should represent “complexity loss” in electroencephalogram (EEG). However, the studies are few and inconsistent concerning the relationship between MF and loss of complexity, probably because of the susceptibility of brain waves to noise. In this study, MF was induced in thirteen male college students by a simulated flight task. Before and at the end of the task, spontaneous EEG and (...) auditory steady-state response (ASSR) were recorded and instantaneous frequency variation (IFV) in alpha rhythm was extracted and analyzed by multiscale entropy (MSE) analysis. The results show that there were significant differences in IFV in alpha rhythm either from spontaneous EEG or from ASSR for all subjects. Therefore, the proposed method can be effective in revealing the complexity loss caused by MF in spontaneous EEG and ASSR, which may serve as a promising analyzing method to mark mild mental impairments. (shrink)

Musical rhythm abilities—the perception of and coordinated action to the rhythmic structure of music—undergo remarkable change over human development. In the current paper, we introduce a theoretical framework for modeling the development of musical rhythm. The framework, based on Neural Resonance Theory, explains rhythm development in terms of resonance and attunement, which are formalized using a general theory that includes non-linear resonance and Hebbian plasticity. First, we review the developmental literature on musical rhythm, highlighting several developmental processes related (...) to rhythm perception and action. Next, we offer an exposition of Neural Resonance Theory and argue that elements of the theory are consistent with dynamical, radically embodied and ecological approaches to cognition and development. We then discuss how dynamical models, implemented as self-organizing networks of neural oscillations with Hebbian plasticity, predict key features of music development. We conclude by illustrating how the notions of dynamical embodiment, resonance, and attunement provide a conceptual language for characterizing musical rhythm development, and, when formalized in physiologically informed dynamical models, provide a theoretical framework for generating testable empirical predictions about musical rhythm development, such as the kinds of native and non-native rhythmic structures infants and children can learn, steady-state evoked potentials to native and non-native musical rhythms, and the effects of short-term, long-term, and very-long term learning on music perception-action. (shrink)

According to some cosmologists, the big bang cosmogony and even the (now largely defunct) steady-state theory pose a scientifically insoluble problem of matter-energy creation. But I argue that the genuine problem of the origin of matter-energy or of the universe has been fallaciously transmuted into the pseudo-problem of creation by an external cause. A fortiori, it emerges that the initial "true" and "false" vacuum states of quantum cosmology do not vindicate biblical divine creation ex nihilo at all.

In earlier writings, I argued that neither of the two major physical cosmologies of the twentieth century support divine creation, so that atheism has nothing to fear from the explanations required by these cosmologies. Yet theists ranging from Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, and Leibniz to Richard Swinburne and Philip Quinn have maintained that, at every instant anew, the existence of the world requires divine creation ex nihilo as its cause. Indeed, according to some such theists, for any given moment t, God’s (...) volition thatthe-world-should-exist-at-t supposedly brings about its actual existence at t.In an effort to establish the current viability of this doctrine of perpetual divine conservation. Philip Quinn I argued that it is entirely compatible with physical energy-conservation in the Big Rang cosmology, as well as with the physics of the steady-state theories.But I now contend that instead, there is a logical incompatibility on both counts. Resides, the stated tenet of divine conservation has an additional defect: It speciously purchases plausibility by trading on the multiply disanalogous volitional explanations of human actions. (shrink)

Problems of scientific cosmology only rarely occur in the works of Karl Popper. Nevertheless, it was a subject that interested him and which he occasionally commented on. What is more important, his general claim of falsifiability as a criterion that demarcates science from non-science has played a significant role in periods of the development of modern physical cosmology. The paper examines the historical contexts of the interaction between cosmology and Popperian philosophy of science. Apart from covering Popper’s inspiration from Einstein (...) and his views on questions of cosmology, it focuses on the impact of his thoughts in two periods of controversy of modern cosmology, the one related to the steady state theory and the other to the recent multiverse proposal. It turns out that the impact has been considerable, and continues to be so, but also that the versions of Popperian methodology discussed by cosmologists are sometimes far from what Popper actually thought and wrote. (shrink)

Background and purpose: The functional understanding and examination of competitive anxiety responses as temporal events that unfold as time-to-competition moves closer has emerged as a topical research area within the domains of sport psychology. However, little is known from an inclusive and interaction oriented perspective. Using the multidimensional anxiety theory as a framework, the present study examined the temporal patterning of competitive anxiety, focusing on the dimensions of intensity, direction, and frequency of intrusions in athletes across gender and skill (...) level. Methods: Elite and semi-elite Table Tennis athletes from the Ghanaian league (N= 90) completed a modified version of Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2) with the inclusion of the directional and frequency of intrusion scales at three temporal phases (7 days, two days and 1 hour) prior to a competitive fixture. Results: MANOVA repeated measures with follow-up analyses revealed significant interactions for between-subjects factors on all anxiety dimensions (intensity, direction and frequency). Notably, elite (international) female athletes were less cognitively anxious, showed more facilitative interpretation towards somatic anxiety symptoms and experienced less frequency of somatic anxiety symptoms than their male counterparts. However, both elite groups displayed appreciable level of self-confidence. For time-to-event effects, both cognitive and somatic anxiety intensity fluctuated whereas self-confidence showed a steady rise as competition neared. Somatic anxiety debilitative interpretation slightly improved 1 hour before competition whereas cognitive anxiety frequencies also increased progressively during the entire preparatory phase. Conclusions: Findings suggest a more dynamic image of elite athletes’ pre-competitive anxiety responses than suggested by former studies, potentially influenced by cultural differences. The use of psychological skills interventions that require effective structure, content, and timing in a composite manner is suggested. (shrink)

Cohen states in the last sentence of his book that his analysis in no way presupposes the controversial labor theory of value. For him, the contradictions of capitalist production result from the fact that its function is to create exchange value. The statements themselves and the fact that they come very late in the book illustrate two distinctive characteristics of the work. First, Cohen espouses what he calls a technological interpretation of Marx. For him, the driving force of history (...) is the steady increase in the capacity of productive forces. Capitalism supersedes feudalism because of its ability to produce more. This technological interpretation of Marx is a theory of history because only certain production relations allow for the development and expansion of productive forces. For example, the levels of production attained by capitalism would be unthinkable within the context of lord and serf. Secondly, it is not really clear that Cohen is defending a theory of history until he formulates the primacy thesis in chapter 6 and elaborates upon it and the rise of capitalism in chapter 7. The primacy thesis states that the production relations of society are explained by the level of development of its productive forces. Cohen seems to dispense with what is often thought of as the philosophy of history in his discussion of the Hegelian roots of Marxism in the first chapter. He proceeds to analyze the distinction between productive forces and production relations and its consequences for the phenomenon of fetishism in chapters 2-5. These first chapters, and some later ones as well, seem to have the property of belaboring at great length elementary problems raised by the preface to the Critique of Political Economy, and Capital as well. For example, in his distinction between productive forces and production relations, Cohen says that the two must not be confused because relations hold between objects while forces are properties of objects. He says that a soldier who guards peasants tilling the soil is not part of the labor power because he fulfills a social rather than an economic need. Then he presents and elaborates upon a list of production relations. Cohen might have avoided the need for such involved analysis if he had clearly delineated the methodological import of his work in the introduction or the first chapter. I refer to his theory of functional explanation. It is, however, only after he has discussed the problem of base and superstructure in chapter 8 that he comes to examine functional analysis in chapters 9 and 10. Since functional explanation is the crux of his defence of Marxism as a theory of history, the reader deserves a more thorough preparation for it in an introduction. (shrink)

Introduction: How hard is the "hard core" of a scientific program? / Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini -- pt. 1. The debate: 1. Opening the debate: The psychogenesis of knowledge and its epistemological significance / Jean Piaget -- On cognitive structures and their development: a reply to Piaget / Noam Chomsky -- 2. About the fixed nucleus and its innateness: Introductory remarks / Jean Piaget -- Cognitive strategies in problem solving / Guy Cellerier -- Some clarifications on innatism and constructivism / Guy Cellerier (...) -- 3. Artificial intelligence and general development mechanisms: The role of artificial intelligence in psychology / Seymour Papert -- 4. Initial states and steady states: The linguistic approach / Noam Chomsky -- 5. Cognitive schemes and their possible relations to language acquisition: Language and knowledge in a constructivist framework / Bäé́ Thom -- Appendix C: Localist hypothesis and theory of catastrophes: note on the debate / Jean Petitot. (shrink)

The free energy principle says that any self-organising system that is at nonequilibrium steady-state with its environment must minimize its free energy. It is proposed as a grand unifying principle for cognitive science and biology. The principle can appear cryptic, esoteric, too ambitious, and unfalsifiable—suggesting it would be best to suspend any belief in the principle, and instead focus on individual, more concrete and falsifiable ‘process theories’ for particular biological processes and phenomena like perception, decision and action. Here, (...) I explain the free energy principle, and I argue that it is best understood as offering a conceptual and mathematical analysis of the concept of existence of self-organising systems. This analysis offers a new type of solution to long-standing problems in neurobiology, cognitive science, machine learning and philosophy concerning the possibility of normatively constrained, self-supervised learning and inference. The principle can therefore uniquely serve as a regulatory principle for process theories, to ensure that process theories conforming to it enable self-supervision. This is, at least for those who believe self-supervision is a foundational explanatory task, good reason to believe the free energy principle. (shrink)

Several authors have made claims about the compatibility between the Free Energy Principle and theories of autopoiesis and enaction. Many see these theories as natural partners or as making similar statements about the nature of biological and cognitive systems. We critically examine these claims and identify a series of misreadings and misinterpretations of key enactive concepts. In particular, we notice a tendency to disregard the operational definition of autopoiesis and the distinction between a system’s structure and its organization. Other misreadings (...) concern the conflation of processes of self-distinction in operationally closed systems and Markov blankets. Deeper theoretical tensions underlie some of these misinterpretations. FEP assumes systems that reach a non-equilibrium steady state and are enveloped by a Markov blanket. We argue that these assumptions contradict the historicity of sense-making that is explicit in the enactive approach. Enactive concepts such as adaptivity and agency are defined in terms of the modulation of parameters and constraints of the agent-environment coupling, which entail the possibility of changes in variable and parameter sets, constraints, and in the dynamical laws affecting the system. This allows enaction to address the path-dependent diversity of human bodies and minds. We argue that these ideas are incompatible with the time invariance of non-equilibrium steady states assumed by the FEP. In addition, the enactive perspective foregrounds the enabling and constitutive roles played by the world in sense-making, agency, development. We argue that this view of transactional and constitutive relations between organisms and environments is a challenge to the FEP. Once we move beyond superficial similarities, identify misreadings, and examine the theoretical commitments of the two approaches, we reach the conclusion that far from being easily integrated, the FEP, as it stands formulated today, is in tension with the theories of autopoiesis and enaction. (shrink)

In this much-anticipated revision and translation of Scienza e Retorica, Marcello Pera argues that rhetoric is central to the making of scientific knowledge. Pera begins with an attack of what he calls the "Cartesian syndrome"--the fixation on method common to both defenders of traditional philosophy of science and its detractors. He argues that in assuming the primacy of methodological rules, both sides get it wrong. Scientific knowledge is neither the simple mirror of nature nor a cultural construct imposed by contingent (...) interests, thus we must replace the idea of the scientific method with that of scientific rhetoric. Pera proposes a new dialectics of science to overcome the tension between normative and descriptive philosophies of science by focusing on the rhetoric in the proposition, defense, and argumentation of theories. Examining the uses of rhetoric in debates drawn from Galileo’s Dialogues, Darwin’s Origins, and the Big Bang-Steady State controversy in cosmology, Pera shows how the conduct of science involves not just nature and the inquiring mind, but nature, the inquiring mind, and a questioning community which, through the process of attack, defense, and dispute, determines what is science. Rhetoric, then, is an essential element in the constitution of science as the practice of persuasive argumentation through which results gain acceptance. (shrink)

In the nearly 30 years since Premack and Woodruff famously asked, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?”, the question of exactly how much non-human primates understand about the mental lives of others has had an unusually dramatic history. As little as ten years ago it appeared that the answer would be a simple one, with early investigations of non-human primates’ mentalistic abilities yielding a steady stream of negative findings. Indeed, by the mid-1990s even very cautious researchers (...) were ready to flatly assert that Theory of Mind was a uniquely human capacity. Recently, however, an exciting new theoretical perspective on primate social cognition has arisen, and with it the distinct possibility that our evolutionary relatives may understand far more of the social world than we previously believed. In this paper we review new theory and evidence suggesting that non-human primates may indeed represent the mental states of others, at least within the domains for which their distinctive social ecology has prepared them. Having asserted that Premack and Woodruff's original question can be answered with a qualified yes, we then consider the new questions that arise in its place, particularly how and why our own Theory of Mind became more domain-general than that of other primates. (shrink)

For a large proportion of our daily lives, spontaneously occurring thoughts tend to disengage our minds from goal-directed thinking. Previous studies showed that EEG features such as the P3 and alpha oscillations can predict mind-wandering to some extent, but only with accuracies of around 60%. A potential candidate for improving prediction accuracy is the Steady-State Visual Evoked Potential, which is used frequently in single-trial contexts such as brain-computer interfaces as a marker of the direction of attention. In this (...) study, we modified the sustained attention to response task that is usually employed to measure spontaneous thought to incorporate the SSVEP elicited by a 12.5-Hz flicker. We then examined whether the SSVEP could track and allow for the prediction of the stickiness and task-relatedness dimensions of spontaneous thought. Our results show that the SSVEP evoked by flickering words was able to distinguish between more and less sticky thinking but not between whether a participant was on- or off-task. This suggests that the SSVEP is able to track spontaneous thinking when it is strongly disengaged from the task but not off-task thought in general. Future research should determine the exact dimensions of spontaneous thought to which the SSVEP is most sensitive. (shrink)

Two of the most influential evaluations of Charles Lyell's geological ideas were those of the philosophers of science, John F. W. Herschel and William Whewell. In this paper I shall argue that the great difference between these evaluations—whereas Herschel was fundamentally sympathetic to Lyell's geologizing, Whewell was fundamentally opposed—is a function of the fact that Herschel was an empiricist and Whewell a rationalist. For convenience, I shall structure the discussion around the three key elements in Lyell's approach to geology. First, (...) he was anactualist: he wanted to explain past geological phenomena in terms of causes of the kind that are operating at present. Second, he was auniformitarian: he wanted to explain only in terms of causes of the degree operating at present; that is, he wanted to avoid ‘catastrophes’. Third, as a geologist he saw the earth as being in asteady-state, in which all periods are essentially similar to one another. Because they will prove important, I draw attention also to two major features of Lyell's programme. First, there is his theory of climate, which suggests, ‘without help from a comet’, that earthly temperature fluctuations are primarily a function of the constantly changing distribution of land and sea. Clearly this theory is actualistic, for it is based on such present phenomena as the Gulf Stream; it is also uniformitarian and supports a steady-state world picture. Second, there is Lyell's denial that the fossil record is progressive, his criticism of Lamarckian evolutionism, ostensibly on the grounds that modern evidence is against it (i.e. it fails actualistically), and his rather veiled claim that the origins of species will nevertheless prove in some way natural, that is, subject to causes falling beneath lawlike regularities in principle discernible by us. (shrink)

Prevailing theories of the neural basis of at least a subset of individuals with autism spectrum disorder include an imbalance of excitatory and inhibitory neurotransmission. These circuitry imbalances are commonly probed in adults using auditory steady-state responses to elicit coherent electrophysiological responses from intact circuitry. Challenges to the ASSR methodology occur during development, where the optimal ASSR driving frequency may be unknown. An alternative approach is the amplitude-modulated sweep in which the amplitude of a tone is modulated as (...) a sweep from 10 to 100 Hz over the course of ∼15 s. Phase synchrony of evoked responses, measured via intra-trial coherence, is recorded as a function of frequency. We applied such AM sweep stimuli bilaterally to 40 typically developing and 80 children with ASD, aged 6–18 years. Diagnoses were confirmed by DSM-5 criteria as well as autism diagnostic observation schedule observational assessment. Stimuli were presented binaurally during MEG recording and consisted of 20 AM swept stimuli with a duration of ∼30 s each. Peak intra-trial coherence values and peak response frequencies of source modeled responses were examined. First, the phase synchrony or inter-trial coherence of the ASSR is diminished in ASD; second, hemispheric bias in the ASSR, observed in typical development, is maintained in ASD, and third, that the frequency at which the peak response is obtained varies on an individual basis, in part dependent on age, and with altered developmental trajectories in ASD vs. TD. Finally, there appears an association between auditory steady-state phase synchrony and clinical assessment of language ability/impairment. We concluded that the AM sweep stimulus provides a mechanism for probing ASSR in an unbiased fashion, during developmental maturation of peak response frequency, peak frequencies vary, in part due to developmental age, and importantly, ITC at this peak frequency is diminished in ASD, with the degree of ITC disturbance related to clinically assessed language impairment. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the implications of a Rawlsian theory for intergenerational issues. First, we confront Rawls's way of locating his `just savings' principle in his Theory of Justice with an alternative way of doing so. We argue that both sides of his intergenerational principle, as they apply to the accumulation phase and the steady-state stage, can be dealt with on the bases, respectively, of the principle of equal liberty and of the difference principle. We (...) then proceed by focusing on the implications of applying maximin to his steady-state stage. One central claim is that, in principle, Rawlsians should consider not only generational dissavings, but also generational savings, as unfair. This principle suffers a series of exceptions on which we focus in the fourth section of the article. In some cases, growth can be maximin compatible. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to compare various methods for the quantification of metabolic pathways dynamics. A Yates-Pardee metabolic pathway with enzyme organization, i.e. with spatial localization of the enzymes in a specific cellular compartment, was studied using: (i) the classical Henri-Michaelis-Menten (HMM) equations, (ii) linearization of the HMM equations in the vicinity of a steady state (linearized formalism), and (iii) Biochemical Systems Theory formalism (BST formalism). It is shown that transient solutions computed via either the (...) linearized formalism or the BST formalism can greatly differ from transient solutions computed with the HMM equations. However, in the studied example, results remain qualitatively the same for the three formalisms. This suggests that the study of the topology of the system may give useful insights into the metabolic pathways dynamics. (shrink)

In the nearly 30 years since Premack and Woodruff famously asked, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?”, the question of exactly how much non‐human primates understand about the mental lives of others has had an unusually dramatic history. As little as ten years ago it appeared that the answer would be a simple one, with early investigations of non‐human primates’ mentalistic abilities yielding a steady stream of negative findings. Indeed, by the mid‐1990s even very cautious researchers (...) were ready to flatly assert that Theory of Mind was a uniquely human capacity. Recently, however, an exciting new theoretical perspective on primate social cognition has arisen, and with it the distinct possibility that our evolutionary relatives may understand far more of the social world than we previously believed. In this paper we review new theory and evidence suggesting that non‐human primates may indeed represent the mental states of others, at least within the domains for which their distinctive social ecology has prepared them. Having asserted that Premack and Woodruff's original question can be answered with a qualified yes, we then consider the new questions that arise in its place, particularly how and why our own Theory of Mind became more domain‐general than that of other primates. (shrink)

Are the laws of nature real? Do they belong to the world or merely reflect the way we speak about it? If they are real, what sort of entity are they? This study contributes to the ongoing discussion of these questions by emphasizing the importance of a cosmological perspective on them. I argue that the evidence coming from modern evolutionary cosmology presents difficulties for certain currently fashionable philosophical accounts of laws, in particular, for the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory. I defend, in (...) light of this evidence, the idea of laws as grounded in irreducible nomic properties of basic objects and examine its cosmological implications and consequences for the philosophy of modality. ;If the laws of nature are real, they must represent an integral aspect of the universe as a whole. From a cosmological point of view, these two totalities, the laws of nature and the universe, may be related. I begin by showing that a concern about the consequences of such possible relationship was an important factor in the historical rivalry between the steady-state and big bang cosmologies . ;The cosmological perspective on laws has still more striking implications in the context of the contemporary interplay between big-bang cosmology and high energy physics in the effort to understand the processes at work during the first moments of cosmic evolution. In a sense, the evolution of the physical state of the universe as a whole may have "carried" with it the evolution of certain nomic properties of matter. I contend that this poses problems for some nomic ontologies, such as the relations-between-universals theory, and favors the view of laws as grounded in causal powers of particulars. I show how the universe of causally powerful basic substances provides a natural framework for an interesting sense of modality characteristic of laws and how this illuminates the notoriously difficult problems of essential properties and natural kinds. (shrink)

The theoretical system Lyell presented in 1830 was composed of three requirements or principles: 1) the Uniformity Principle which states that past geological events must be explained by the same causes now in operation; 2) the Uniformity of Rate Principle which states that geological laws operate with the same force as at present; 3) the Steady-state Principle which states that the earth does not undergo any directional change. The three principles form a single thesis called uniformitarianism which has (...) been repeatedly questioned and which has been reputed to be unable to face the competing directional synthesis based on the theory of the earth's cooling down. As a result, the significance of Lyell's system has been reduced to a simple actualism which admits the validity of the only Uniformity Principle. I believe that the only way to understand Lyell's role in the history of science is to maintain the unity of his synthesis. To show the Newtonian roots of this synthesis I will compare Lyell's principles and Newton's Rules of Reasoning. I will conclude with an analysis of the methodological function of principles in Lyell's scientific endeavour. (shrink)

This paper is a sequel to my 'Theological Misinterpretations of Current Physical Cosmology' (Foundations of Physics [1996], 26 (4); revised in Philo [1998], 1 (1)). There I argued that the Big Bang models of (classical) general relativity theory, as well as the original 1948 versions of the steady state cosmology, are each logically incompatible with the time-honored theological doctrine that perpetual divine creation ('creatio continuans') is required in each of these two theorized worlds. Furthermore, I challenged the (...) perennial theological doctrine that there must be a divine creative cause (as distinct from a transformative one) for the very existence of the world, a ratio essendi. This doctrine is the theistic reply to the question: 'Why is there something, rather than just nothing?' I begin my present paper by arguing against the response by the contemporary Oxford theist Richard Swinburne and by Leibniz to what is, in effect, my counter-question: 'But why should there be just nothing, rather than something?' Their response takes the form of claiming that the a priori probability of there being just nothing, vis-à-vis the existence of alternative states, is maximal, because the non-existence of the world is conceptually the simplest. On the basis of an analysis of the role of simplicity in scientific explanations, I show that this response is multiply flawed, and thus provides no basis for their three contentions that (i) if there is a world at all, then its 'normal', natural, spontaneous state is one of utter nothingness or total non-existence, so that (ii) the very existence of matter, energy and living beings constitutes a deviation from the allegedly 'normal', spontaneous state of 'nothingness', and (iii) that deviation must thus have a suitably potent (external) divine cause. Related defects turn out to vitiate the medieval Kalam Argument for the existence of God, as espoused by William Craig. Next I argue against the contention by such theists as Richard Swinburne and Philip L. Quinn that (i) the specific content of the scientifically most fundamental laws of nature, including the constants they contain, requires supra-scientific explanation, and (ii) a satisfactory explanation is provided by the hypothesis that the God of theism willed them to be exactly what they are. Furthermore, I contend that the theistic teleological gloss on the 'Anthropic Principle' is incoherent and explanatorily unavailing. Finally, I offer an array of considerations against Swinburne's attempt to show, via Bayes's theorem, that the existence of God is more probable than not. (shrink)

In this article, we explore the implications of a Rawlsian theory for intergenerational issues. First, we confront Rawls's way of locating his `just savings' principle in his Theory of Justice with an alternative way of doing so. We argue that both sides of his intergenerational principle, as they apply to the accumulation phase and the steady-state stage, can be dealt with on the bases, respectively, of the principle of equal liberty (and its priority) and of the (...) difference principle. We then proceed by focusing on the implications of applying maximin to his steady-state stage. One central claim is that, in principle, Rawlsians should consider not only generational dissavings, but also generational savings, as unfair. This principle suffers a series of exceptions on which we focus in the fourth section of the article. In some cases, growth can be maximin compatible. Key Words: generations • egalitarianism • maximin • sustainability • growth • difference principle • John Rawls. (shrink)

We obtained an exact solution for a uniformly accelerated Unruh–DeWitt detector interacting with a massless scalar field in (3 + 1) dimensions which enables us to study the entire evolution of the total system, from the initial transient to late-time steady state. We find that the conventional transition probability of the detector from its initial ground state to excited states, as derived from time-dependent perturbation theory over an infinitely long duration of interaction, is valid only in (...) the transient stage and is invalid for cases with proper acceleration smaller than the damping constant. We also found that, unlike in (1 + 1)D results, the (3 + 1)D uniformly accelerated Unruh– DeWitt detector in a steady state does emit a positive radiated power of quantum nature at late-times, but it is not connected to the thermal radiance experienced by the detector in the Unruh effect proper. (shrink)

This paper deals with designing a harvesting control strategy for a predator–prey dynamical system, with parametric uncertainties and exogenous disturbances. A feedback control law for the harvesting rate of the predator is formulated such that the population dynamics is asymptotically stabilized at a positive operating point, while maintaining a positive, steady state harvesting rate. The hierarchical block strict feedback structure of the dynamics is exploited in designing a backstepping control law, based on Lyapunov theory. In order to (...) account for unknown parameters, an adaptive control strategy has been proposed in which the control law depends on an adaptive variable which tracks the unknown parameter. Further, a switching component has been incorporated to robustify the control performance against bounded disturbances. Proofs have been provided to show that the proposed adaptive control strategy ensures asymptotic stability of the dynamics at a desired operating point, as well as exact parameter learning in the disturbance-free case and learning with bounded error in the disturbance prone case. The dynamics, with uncertainty in the death rate of the predator, subjected to a bounded disturbance has been simulated with the proposed control strategy. (shrink)

In the words of Robert M. Solow traverse analysis "is the easiest part of skiing, but the hardest part of economics". The aim of this volume is to assess the state and scope of modern traverse analysis as it had been initiated by John Hicks in his pioneering contribution Capital and Time. The analysis of an economy which originally had been in a growth equilibrium which was disturbed by technical progress is one of the most challenging problems in economics. (...) This book takes Hicks’ work as the point of departure for theoretical work on the macroeconomic theory of capital dynamics along transition non-steady state paths The original contributions in this volume explore the manifold theoretical roots of traverse analysis in classical and post-classical literature, its features as a specific method of economic dynamics, and its applications in a variety of fields from monetary economics to development and international economics. The essays thereby focus on the ways ahead from Capital and Time that have been suggested and actively pursued by a number of scholars in recent years. Its central theme is the role of capital structures as critical factors in determining the actual dynamics of any given economic system. This volume is inspired by the belief that this state of affairs is not a satisfactory one, and outlines a new agenda for capital theory. Contributors include Edwin Burmeister, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Heinz Kurz. (shrink)

In the words of Robert M. Solow traverse analysis "is the easiest part of skiing, but the hardest part of economics". The aim of this volume is to assess the state and scope of modern traverse analysis as it had been initiated by John Hicks in his pioneering contribution Capital and Time. The analysis of an economy which originally had been in a growth equilibrium which was disturbed by technical progress is one of the most challenging problems in economics. (...) This book takes Hicks’ work as the point of departure for theoretical work on the macroeconomic theory of capital dynamics along transition non-steady state paths The original contributions in this volume explore the manifold theoretical roots of traverse analysis in classical and post-classical literature, its features as a specific method of economic dynamics, and its applications in a variety of fields from monetary economics to development and international economics. The essays thereby focus on the ways ahead from Capital and Time that have been suggested and actively pursued by a number of scholars in recent years. Its central theme is the role of capital structures as critical factors in determining the actual dynamics of any given economic system. This volume is inspired by the belief that this state of affairs is not a satisfactory one, and outlines a new agenda for capital theory. Contributors include Edwin Burmeister, Jean-Luc Gaffard and Heinz Kurz. (shrink)

This paper proposes an adaptive formation tracking control algorithm optimized by Q-learning scheme for multiple mobile robots. In order to handle the model uncertainties and external disturbances, a desired linear extended state observer is designed to develop an adaptive formation tracking control strategy. Then an adaptive method of sliding mode control parameters optimized by Q-learning scheme is employed, which can avoid the complex parameter tuning process. Furthermore, the stability of the closed-loop control system is rigorously proved by means of (...) matrix properties of graph theory and Lyapunov theory, and the formation tracking errors can be guaranteed to be uniformly ultimately bounded. Finally, simulations are presented to show the proposed algorithm has the advantages of faster convergence rate, higher tracking accuracy, and better steady-state performance. (shrink)

This chapter situates John Rawls’ just savings principle in a discussion about how much a nation-state should save. The main question addressed is whether this principle is a viable alternative to the dominant utilitarian theory of optimal growth. Rawls certainly gives savings a different aim (i.e., to create and maintain just institutions) and introduces additional permissibility conditions on reaching this goal (i.e., the necessary burdens should be fairly shared between generations). He thereby gives rise to the field of (...) research now known as intergenerational justice. To assess the relative merits of the just savings principle, however, more details are needed; and this chapter aims to supply some of them. First, the principle of just savings is given a more determinate form whereby it is understood as a two-stage combination of a priority principle at the stage of institutional development and a difference principle at the maintenance stage. Second, some of its practical bearings are explored (i.e., its implications for real-life savings decisions). Among other things, the idea that the principle leads to a steady-state economy is problematized, and its relevance to concrete problems, such as climate change and the design of pension schemes, is assessed. (shrink)

This concluding section applies the results of the previous part to some important thermodynamical systems. Even if time reversibility is allowed, it is shown that the flow vectors used to derive Onsager reciprocity from time translational invariance is of questionable validity. The fundamental fluctuation dissipation theorem of Callen, Welton, Green and Kubo which underpin descriptions of irreversibility, insofar as they are derived from time translational invariance, is also questioned; from Part I, they cannot be derived properly from time reversal symmetry. (...) The common view of entropy as some type of caloric fluid flow is critiqued as not conforming to the Kelvin Clausius Planck definition. An example of developing reciprocal relations to any order in the coupling indices based on the peculiar physical and defining characteristics of conductive heat is given for the steady state whenever a temperature gradient is present, free from time reversible and translation assumptions. A major challenge in the theory is to extend it to isothermal states. It is concluded that other more deterministic views mediated by authentic work anamnesis may be needed for long term coherence. (shrink)

A diffusive predator-prey system with both the additive Allee effect and the fear effect in the prey subject to Neumann boundary conditions is considered in this paper. Firstly, non-negative and non-trivial solution a priori estimations are shown. Furthermore, for specific parameter ranges, the absence of non-constant positive solutions is demonstrated. Secondly, we use the linearized theory to investigate the stability of non-negative constant solutions. The spatially homogeneous and non-homogeneous periodic solutions, as well as non-constant steady state solutions, (...) are next investigated by using Allee effect parameters as the bifurcation parameter. Finally, numerical simulation is used to illustrate some theoretical results. (shrink)

We consider a chain of metabolic reactions catalyzed by enzymes, of reversible Michaelis-Menten type with full dynamics, i.e. not reduced with any quasi-steady state approximations. We study the corresponding dynamical system and show its global stability if the equilibrium exists. If the system is open, the equilibrium may not exist. The main tool is monotone systems theory. Finally we study the implications of these results for the study of coupled genetic-metabolic systems.

The goal of synthetic biology is to create artificial organisms. To achieve this it is essential to understand what life is. Metabolism-replacement systems, or (M, R)-systems, constitute a theory of life developed by Robert Rosen, characterized in the statement that organisms are closed to efficient causation, which means that they must themselves produce all the catalysts they need. This theory overlaps in part with other current theories, including autopoiesis, the chemoton, and autocatalytic sets, all of them invoking some (...) idea of closure. A simple model of an (M, R)-system has been implemented in the computer, and behaves in ways that may shed light on the requirements for a prebiotic self-organizing system. In addition to a trivial steady state in which nothing happens, it can establish a non-trivial steady state in which all intermediates have finite concentrations, with their rates of degradation balanced by their rates of synthesis. The system can be regenerated from the set of food components plus a single intermediate, and maintain itself in that state indefinitely, despite continuous degradation. At the very low compartment volumes that may have existed in prebiotic conditions, for example in cavities in minerals, or in micelles formed by simple amphiphiles, statistical fluctuations in the numbers of molecules need to be taken into account. With the stochastic approach there is no non-trivial steady state in strict mathematical terms, because the system will always collapse to the trivial state after sufficient time. However, the average time before collapse is so long for volumes greater than $10^{-19}\;{\textsc{l}}$ (much smaller than the volume of the order of $10^{-15}\;{\textsc{l}}$ for a typical bacterial cell) that for practical purposes the self-maintaining state of non-null concentrations becomes significant, recalling the situation of bistability that is observed in deterministic analysis. In turn, there exists a minimum size below which the self-organizing system cannot maintain itself on chemically relevant time scales. The value of the critical volume depends on the particular concentrations and rate constants assumed, but the principle could apply generally. (shrink)

This paper investigates the diffusive predator-prey system with nonmonotonic functional response and fear effect. Firstly, we discussed the stability of the equilibrium solution for a corresponding ODE system. Secondly, we established a priori positive upper and lower bounds for the positive solutions of the PDE system. Thirdly, sufficient conditions for the local asymptotical stability of two positive equilibrium solutions of the system are given by using the method of eigenvalue spectrum analysis of linearization operator. Finally, the existence and nonexistence of (...) nonconstant positive steady states of this reaction-diffusion system are established by the Leray–Schauder degree theory and Poincaré inequality. (shrink)

Individuals, groups, or nations — if rational and self-interested — will be balancing on the margin between two alternative ways of generating income: peaceful production and exchange, versus appropriative efforts designed to seize resources previously controlled by others. Both production and appropriation, on the assumption here, are entirely normal lines of activity engaged in to the extent that doing so seems profitable.The general-equilibrium steady-state model involves a resource partition function, a social production function, a combat power function, and (...) an income distribution equation. Solutions were obtained under thesymmetrical Cournot protocol and two alternativeasymmetrical assumptions: the familiar Stackelberg condition and a more novel hierarchical protocol called Threat-and-Promise. The analysis demonstrates that, in contrast with the harmonistic bias of orthodox economic theory, a general-equilibrium model can also encompass the hostile and destructive interactions that characterize real-world social relations. (shrink)

The developing academic field of machine ethics seeks to make artificial agents safer as they become more pervasive throughout society. In contrast to computer ethics, machine ethics is concerned with the behavior of machines toward human users and other machines. This study aims to use an action-based ethical theory founded on the combinational aspects of deontological and teleological theories of ethics in the construction of an artificial moral agent (AMA).,The decision results derived by the AMA are acquired via fuzzy (...) logic interpretation of the relative values of the steady-state simulations of the corresponding rule-based fuzzy cognitive map (RBFCM).,Through the use of RBFCMs, the following paper illustrates the possibility of incorporating ethical components into machines, where latent semantic analysis (LSA) and RBFCMs can be used to model dynamic and complex situations, and to provide abilities in acquiring causal knowledge.,This approach is especially appropriate for data-poor and uncertain situations common in ethics. Nonetheless, to ensure that a machine with an ethical component can function autonomously in the world, research in artificial intelligence will need to further investigate the representation and determination of ethical principles, the incorporation of these ethical principles into a system’s decision procedure, ethical decision-making with incomplete and uncertain knowledge, the explanation for decisions made using ethical principles and the evaluation of systems that act based upon ethical principles.,To date, the conducted research has contributed to a theoretical foundation for machine ethics through exploration of the rationale and the feasibility of adding an ethical dimension to machines. Further, the constructed AMA illustrates the possibility of utilizing an action-based ethical theory that provides guidance in ethical decision-making according to the precepts of its respective duties. The use of LSA illustrates their powerful capabilities in understanding text and their potential application as information retrieval systems in AMAs. The use of cognitive maps provides an approach and a decision procedure for resolving conflicts between different duties.,This paper suggests that cognitive maps could be used in AMAs as tools for meta-analysis, where comparisons regarding multiple ethical principles and duties can be examined and considered. With cognitive mapping, complex and abstract variables that cannot easily be measured but are important to decision-making can be modeled. This approach is especially appropriate for data-poor and uncertain situations common in ethics. (shrink)

System analyses deal with interrelationships between different variables that keep the system in balance. In many analysis of complex thinking, a system is viewed as a complex unit in which the ‘whole’ is not reduced to the ‘sum’ of its parts; the system becomes an ambiguous item because it consists of several entities that interact with unforeseen results or, in other words, it is situated at a transdisciplinary level, it is impossible for an area to have a complete reading of (...) its complexity. It was also mentioned that the concept of the open system best describes complexity by stating that ‘the laws of the organization are not equilibrium, but an imbalance that is restored or compensated for by stabilized dynamics’. This idea originated from the field of thermodynamics and the second law, in which the imbalance that it maintains allows the system for an apparent balance. This fragile steady state has something of a paradox, since the structures remain the same, but their constituents are changeable. The concept of open system undoes the door to a theory of evolution that can only derive from the interactions between a system and its ecosystem. Within this systemic approach, the focus of the analysis takes into account the ambiguity, multidisciplinary and complexity associated with system adjustment, i.e. it is intended to qualify an employee job based on their experience and knowledge as a measure of their impact on the organization performance. (shrink)