Results for 'the inverted spectrum'

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  1.  53
    The inverted spectrum.Sydney Shoemaker - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (July):357-381.
  2.  6
    The inverted spectrum.Bredo C. Johnsen - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4):471-6.
  3.  16
    Black and white and the inverted spectrum.Justin Broackes - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):161-175.
    To the familiar idea of an undetectable spectrum inversion some have added the idea of inverted earth. This new combination of ideas is even harder to make coherent, particularly as it applies to a supposed inversion of black and white counteracted by an environmental switch of these. Black and white exhibit asymmetries in their connections with illumination, shadow and visibility, which rule out their being reversed. And since the most saturated yellow is light and the most saturated blue (...)
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  4.  12
    Ned Block, Wittgenstein, and the inverted spectrum.John V. Canfield - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (4):691-712.
    In ‘Wittgenstein and Qualia’ Ned Block argues for the existence of inverted spectra and those ineffable things, qualia. The essence of his discussion is a would-be proof, presented through a series of pictures, of the possible existence of an inverted spectrum. His argument appeals to some remarks by Wittgenstein which, Block holds, commit the former to a certain ‘dangerous scenario’ wherein inverted spectra, and consequently qualia live and breath. I hold that a key premise of this (...)
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  5.  19
    Tye-dyed teleology and the inverted spectrum.Jason Ford - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):267-281.
    Michael Tye’s considered position on visual experience combines representationalism with externalism about color, so when considering spectrum inversion, he needs a principled reason to claim that a person with inverted color vision is seeing things incorrectly. Tye’s responses to the problem of the inverted spectrum ( 2000 , in: Consciousness, color, and content, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and 2002a , in: Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, Oxford) rely on (...)
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  6. Color and the inverted spectrum.David R. Hilbert & Mark Eli Kalderon - 2000 - In Steven Davis (ed.), Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-214.
    If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on for other colors, still he would not yet be describing objects by their colors. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description. A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance).
     
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  7.  18
    Functionalism, qualia, and the inverted spectrum.Terence Horgan - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.
  8.  11
    Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum.Michael Tye - 1994 - Noûs 28 (2):159-183.
  9.  20
    Qualia, content, and the inverted spectrum.Michael Tye - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):159-183.
  10. Color and the inverted spectrum.Mark Kalderon - manuscript
    If you trained someone to emit a particular sound at the sight of something red, another at the sight of something yellow, and so on for other colors, still he would not yet be describing objects by their colors. Though he might be a help to us in giving a description. A description is a representation of a distribution in a space (in that of time, for instance).
     
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  11.  6
    Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum.Michael Watkins - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.
    Intentionalism holds that two experiences differ in their representational content if and only if they differ in phenomenal character. It is generally held that Intentionalism cannot allow for the possibility of spectrum inversion without systematic error, unless it abandons the idea that, for example, the qualitative character of color experience is inherited from the qualitative character of colors. The paper argues that the conjunction of all three -- the possibility of spectrum inversion, Intentionalism, and the inheritance thesis -- (...)
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  12.  56
    Subjectivity, Multiple Drafts and the Inconceivability of Zombies and the Inverted Spectrum in this World.Elizabeth Schier - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):845-853.
    Proponents of the hard problem of consciousness argue that the zombie and inverted spectrum thought experiments demonstrate that consciousness cannot be physical. They present scenarios designed to demonstrate that it is conceivable that a physical replica of someone can have radically different or no conscious experiences, that such an experience-less replica is possible and therefore that materialism is false. I will argue that once one understands the limitations that the physics of this world puts on cognitive systems, zombies (...)
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  13.  14
    Subjectivity, Multiple Drafts and the Inconceivability of Zombies and the Inverted Spectrum in this World.Elizabeth Schier - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):845-853.
    Proponents of the hard problem of consciousness argue that the zombie and inverted spectrum thought experiments demonstrate that consciousness cannot be physical. They present scenarios designed to demonstrate that it is conceivable that a physical replica of someone can have radically different or no conscious experiences, that such an experience-less replica is possible and therefore that materialism is false. I will argue that once one understands the limitations that the physics of this world puts on cognitive systems, zombies (...)
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  14. Wittgenstein on the Inverted Spectrum.David G. Stern - 2010 - In Volker Munz, Klaus Puhl & Joseph Wang (eds.), Language and World Part Two: Signs, Minds, and Actions. Proceedings of the 32nd International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium. Ontos Verlag.
  15. Wittgenstein, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum.David G. Stern - 2010 - In Arley Moreno (ed.), Wittgenstein: Certeza? UNICAMP, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência.
  16.  15
    How I learned to stop worrying and love the inverted spectrum.Timothy Schoettle - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):98-115.
    It is possible for a person and their environment to be physically identical each day and yet the representational content of their beliefs about color are inverted. Each day they utter the same words, ‘Wow! The colors of everything have switched again today.’ In uttering these words, they express a different proposition each day. This supports the view held by Reichenbach and Carnap that when it comes to representations of colored objects, relations of similarity and difference are fundamental. There (...)
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  17. Inverted spectrum arguments.David J. Cole - 2000
    Formerly a spectral apparition that haunted behaviorism and provided a puzzle about our knowledge of other minds, the inverted spectrum possibility has emerged as an important challenge to functionalist accounts of qualia. The inverted spectrum hypothesis raises the possibility that two individuals might think and behave in the same way yet have different qualia. The traditional supposition is of an individual who has a subjective color spectrum that is inverted with regard to that had (...)
     
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  18.  16
    Intentionalism and the imaginability of the inverted spectrum.Eric Marcus - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):321-339.
    There has been much written in recent years about whether a pair of subjects could have visual experiences that represented the colors of objects in their environment in precisely the same way, despite differing significantly in what it was like to undergo them, differing that is, in their qualitative character. The possibility of spectrum inversion has been so much debated1 in large part because of the threat that it would pose to the more general doctrine of Intentionalism, according to (...)
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  19. Sydney shoemaker on transparency and the inverted spectrum.Ned Block - 2019 - In Adam Pautz & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness. new york: MIT Press.
     
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  20.  2
    Asymmetry among Hering primaries thwarts the inverted spectrum argument.Robert E. MacLaury - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):960-961.
    Purest points of Hering's six primary colors reside at different levels of lightness such that inversion of each hue pair would be detectable in subjects' choice of foci on the Munsell array. An inverted spectrum would not impose the isomorphism constraint on a contrast of red-green or yellow-blue, whatever we conclude about inference in functionalism.
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  21.  11
    Color, content, and Fred: On a proposed reductio of the inverted spectrum hypothesis.Jonathan Cohen - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (2):121-144.
  22.  37
    A new inverted spectrum thought experiment.Richard Montgomery - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1963-1983.
    A version of the inverted spectrum thought experiment that disconfirms functionalism for the case of humans’ color experiences has typically been thought to require a certain kind of balancing act. What one needs, it has typically been thought, is a mapping of color experiences onto other color experiences that preserves the similarity and difference relationships among those experiences and the aspects of perceived colors underlying those similarities and differences. However, there are good reasons for being suspicious about whether (...)
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  23. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Critical Analysis of Knowledge Argument Inverted Spectrum Argument and Conceivability Argument.Manas Kumar Sahu - 2020 - Journal of Advances in Education and Philosophy 4 (4):160-166.
    The objective of this paper is to defend the non-reductive thesis of phenomenal consciousness. This paper will give an overview of the arguments for the non-reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness and justify why the reductionist approach is implausible in the context of explaining phenomenal subjective experience. The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist on the project of demystifying and mystifying phenomenal consciousness is driven by two fundamental assumptions-1) Reductive-Naturalistic Objectivism, 2) Phenomenal Realism. There are several arguments for the irreducibility of phenomenal (...)
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  24.  76
    Clarifying ostensible definition by the logical possibility of inverted spectrum.C. Lu - 1989 - Modern Philosophy 2.
    How "red", "green" were defined? Through analyzing how two children with congenitally inverted color sensations corresponding to red flags and green grass accept their grand mothers’ teaching about colors, the paper get opposite conclusions against logical empiricism. The “red” and “green” and other names of properties of objects were defined by objective physical properties (or together with behavior, such as in defining “beauty”), instead our sensations. So language directly points to things in themselves passing through sensations and presentative world. (...)
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  25.  12
    The inverted colour space of vampires.Karel Kranda - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):959-959.
    Palmer's attempt to dust off Locke's construct of “inverted spectrum” is discussed here to examine its plausibility. Perceptual inversion could be fulfilled by adopting the notion of “inverted trichromacy” rather than by the proposed existence of “red-green reversed trichromats.” Although the former alternative conforms to a hypothetical world of vampires, it fails to conform to the realities of genetics and neuroscience.
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  26. Spectrum Inversion.Peter W. Ross - 2021 - In Derek H. Brown & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. New York: Routledge.
    This chapter examines the spectrum inversion hypothesis as an argument against certain kinds of account of what it’s like to be conscious of color. The hypothesis aims to provide a counterexample to accounts of what it’s like to be conscious of color in non-qualitative terms, as well as to accounts of what it’s like to be conscious of color in terms of the representational content of conscious visual states (which, according to some philosophers, is in turn given an account (...)
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  27.  13
    Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - In Steven D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 137–158.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Relativistic Content The Argument from Primitive Colors The Argument from the Inverted Spectrum The Argument from Dual Looks The Argument from Duplication Conclusion References.
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  28.  19
    The Intelligibility of Spectrum Inversion.Bredo C. Johnsen - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):631-636.
    Christopher Peacocke has recently made an important and insightful effort to fashion a non-verificationist method for distinguishing sense from nonsense. The argument is subtle and complex, and varies somewhat with each of his three target ‘spurious hypotheses’: that if a perfect fission of one person into two were to occur, one and only one of the resulting persons would be identical with the original; that another person’s visual experience can be qualitatively different from your own when you are both seeing (...)
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  29.  26
    Hoffman’s “proof” of the possibility of spectrum inversion.Alex Byrne & David Hilbert - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):48-50.
    Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple mathematical result.
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  30.  20
    Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra.Brad Thompson - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):203-213.
    Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content—content that supervenes on phenomenal character—have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism. According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties. In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker [Shoemaker, S. (1994). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 249–314], I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion. One defense (...)
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  31.  83
    From Inverted Spectra to Colorless Qualia: A Wittgensteinian Critique.William H. Brenner - 2014 - Philosophical Investigations 38 (4):360-381.
    This is terribly hard, Thouless, I'm sorry. I have thought over all this for years. … It is now as if we had ploughed furrows in different parts of a field. There is a lot left to do. Judging from their writings, most contemporary analytic philosophers have not been persuaded that “the inverted spectrum problem” is – as Wittgenstein maintained – really a conceptual puzzle calling for dissolution, rather than a straight problem calling for a solution. In this (...)
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  32.  6
    The intelligibility of spectrum inversion.Bredo C. Johnsen - 1993 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):631-6.
    Christopher Peacocke has recently made an important and insightful effort to fashion a non-verificationist method for distinguishing sense from nonsense. The argument is subtle and complex, and varies somewhat with each of his three target ‘spurious hypotheses’: that if a perfect fission of one person into two were to occur, one and only one of the resulting persons would be identical with the original; that another person’s visual experience can be qualitatively different from your own when you are both seeing (...)
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  33.  8
    Inverting intentional content.R. Takenaga - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.
    Critics of wide functionalism have traditionally sought to attack the theory by exposing weaknesses in its account of the qualitative content of experience. Wide functionalist theories of intentional content, however, were spared philosophical scrutiny. I propose that wide functionalist accounts of the intentional content are equally susceptible to attack. I will attempt to demonstrate this by enlisting the functionalist's old foe from the qualia wars - the inverted spectrum hypothesis - in a new way. If the argument is (...)
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  34. The Functional Mapping Hypothesis.Michael Pauen - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):107-118.
    Dissociation thought experiments like Zombie and Inverted Spectrum cases play an essential role in the qualia debate. Critics have long since argued that these cases raise serious epistemic issues, undermining first person access to phenomenal states also in normal subjects. Proponents have denied this because, due to their phenomenal experience, normal subjects have epistemic abilities that Zombies don’t have. Here I will present a modified version of these thought experiments: Part-time Zombies and Part-time Inverts switch between normal and (...)
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  35.  19
    Functionalism and inverted spectra.David J. Cole - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):207-22.
    Functionalism, a philosophical theory, has empirical consequences. Functionalism predicts that where systematic transformations of sensory input occur and are followed by behavioral accommodation in which normal function of the organism is restored such that the causes and effects of the subject's psychological states return to those of the period prior to the transformation, there will be a return of qualia or subjective experiences to those present prior to the transform. A transformation of this type that has long been of philosophical (...)
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  36.  7
    Philosophical Problems of Consciousness.Michael Tye - 2017 - In Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Chichester, UK: Wiley. pp. 17–31.
    Mental states that are inherently conscious are said to be “phenomenally conscious” by philosophers. If phenomenal consciousness is a natural phenomenon, a part of the physical world, we can reasonably suppose that there should be a mechanism which provides an explanatory link between the subjective and the objective. Philosophical zombies pose a serious threat to any sort of physicalist view of phenomenal consciousness. They are microphysical duplicates that lack phenomenal consciousness. The problem of the inverted spectrum is sometimes (...)
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  37. Locke and the Nature of Ideas.Keith Allen - 2010 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 92 (3):236-255.
    What, according to Locke, are ideas? I argue that Locke does not give an account of the nature of ideas. In the Essay, the question is simply set to one side, as recommended by the “Historical, plain Method” that Locke employs. This is exemplified by his characterization of ‘ideas’ in E I.i.8, and the discussion of the inverted spectrum hypothesis in E II.xxxii. In this respect, Locke's attitude towards the nature of ideas in the Essay is reminiscent of (...)
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  38. Invisible disagreement: an inverted qualia argument for realism.Justin Donhauser - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):593-606.
    Scientific realists argue that a good track record of multi-agent, and multiple method, validation of empirical claims is itself evidence that those claims, at least partially and approximately, reflect ways nature actually is independent of the ways we conceptualize it. Constructivists contend that successes in validating empirical claims only suffice to establish that our ways of modelling the world, our “constructions,” are useful and adequate for beings like us. This essay presents a thought experiment in which beings like us intersubjectively (...)
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  39.  17
    Magic realism and the limits of intelligibility: What makes us conscious.Alva Noë - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):457–474.
    In the “Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience‘ and “Sense Data‘", Wittgenstein endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected. I will attempt to explicate the difference between the innocuous and dangerous scenarios, to give arguments in favor of (...)
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  40. Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, And Affective States.Neil Campbell - 2000 - Synthese 124 (2):239-255.
    I argue that the inverted spectrum hypothesis is nota possibility we should take seriously. The principlereason is that if someone's qualia were inverted inthe specified manner there is reason to believe thephenomenal difference would manifest itself inbehaviour. This is so for two reasons. First, Isuggest that qualia, including phenomenal colours, arepartly constituted by an affective component whichwould be inverted along with the connected qualia. Theresulting affective inversions will, given theintimate connections that exist between emotions andbehaviour, likely (...)
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  41. Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem, 2nd edition.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co..
    In this introductory work, Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem, 2nd edition, Gennaro updates and expands the work to reflect current topics and discussions. The dialogue provides a clear and compelling overview of the mind-body problem suitable for both introductory students and those who have some background in the philosophy of mind. Topics include: Immortality, Materialism, Descartes' "Divisibility Argument" for substance dualism, The "Argument from Introspection" for substance dualism, The main objections to dualism, The interaction between mind (...)
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  42.  8
    Emotion and the function of consciousness.Craig DeLancey - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):492-99.
    Certain arguments that phenomenal conscious states play no role, or play a role that could be different, depend upon the seeming plausibility of thought experiments such as the inverted spectrum or phenomenal zombie. These thought experiments are always run for perceptual states like colour vision. Run for affective states like emotions, they become absurd, because the prior intension of our concepts of emotional states are that the phenomenal experience is inseparable from their motivational aspects. Our growing scientific understanding (...)
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  43.  21
    The indexical nature of sensory concepts.John O'Dea - 2002 - Philosophical Papers 32 (2):169-181.
    This paper advances the thesis that sensory concepts have as a semantic component the first-person indexical. It is argued that the private nature of our access to our own sensations forces, in our talking about them, an indexical reference to the inner states of the speaker in lieu of publicly accessible properties by which reference is usually fixed. Indexicals, such as ‘here’, can be understood despite ignorance of their referent. Such is the case with sensory terms. Furthermore, the thesis that (...)
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  44.  3
    Color and the duplication assumption.Erik Myin - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):61-77.
    Susan Hurley has attacked the ''Duplication Assumption'', the assumption thatcreatures with exactly the same internal states could function exactly alike inenvironments that are systematically distorted. She argues that the dynamicalinterdependence of action and perception is highly problematic for the DuplicationAssumption when it involves spatial states and capacities, whereas no such problemsarise when it involves color states and capacities. I will try to establish that theDuplication Assumption makes even less sense for lightness than for some ofthe spatial cases. This is due (...)
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  45.  9
    The last philosophical behaviorist: Content and consciousness explained away.Mark Crooks - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):50-121.
    Rejoinders to Robert Bishop, John Smythies, and Edmond Wright concerning my paper Phenomenology in Absentia: Dennett's Philosophy of Mind. The untoward social and moral consequences of Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenology are documented. Rhetorical methodology, fallacious reasoning, and lack of empirical support for a philosophical abolition of consciousness and phenomenology are exposed. Consciousness denial by Dennett is shown to proceed by the same fallacious method involved in his phenomenological nihilism. Additional arguments are adduced against the presumed nonexistence of veridical and non-veridical percepts, (...)
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  46.  1
    Comparing Qualia across Persons.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2007 - In Robert Stalnaker (ed.), Ways a World Might Be. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Sydney Shoemaker has reconciled a broadly functionalist and materialist conception of the mind with what he calls “the common-sense view” of the inverted spectrum. This paper explores Shoemaker’s articulation and defence of the common sense view, and the conception of the content of qualitative experience the lies behind it. It examines the Frege-Schlick view, and a counterargument that Shoemaker uses to raise a prima facie problem for the view he is defending. It is argued that when Shoemaker’s account (...)
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  47.  11
    Comparing qualia across persons.Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2):385-406.
    Sydney Shoemaker has reconciled a broadly functionalist and materialist conception of the mind with what he calls “the common-sense view‘ of the inverted spectrum. This paper explores Shoemaker’s articulation and defence of the common sense view, and the conception of the content of qualitative experience the lies behind it. It examines the Frege-Schlick view, and a counterargument that Shoemaker uses to raise a prima facie problem for the view he is defending. It is argued that when Shoemaker’s account (...)
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  48.  26
    Color, consciousness, and the isomorphism constraint.Stephen E. Palmer - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):923-943.
    The relations among consciousness, brain, behavior, and scientific explanation are explored in the domain of color perception. Current scientific knowledge about color similarity, color composition, dimensional structure, unique colors, and color categories is used to assess Locke.
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  49. Physicalism, Qualia and Mental Concepts.Diana I. Perez - 2002 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 17 (2):359-379.
    In this paper I shall carefully examine some recent arguments for dualism. These arguments presuppose a strong version of physicalism that I consider inappropriate. I shall try to show that, if we reformulate the thesis of physicalism according to Kim's view of physicalism (in terms of the supervenience relation), there is a third option, a version of type physicalism, where physicalism and quaiia could be conciliated. In order to sketch this option, I shall consider the main argument against type physicalism: (...)
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  50.  81
    How Colour Qualia Became a Problem.Z. Adams & J. Browning - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):14-25.
    The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have problem intuitions about consciousness, why we intuitively think that conscious experience cannot be scientifically explained. In his discussion of this problem, David Chalmers briefly considers the possibility of giving a 'genealogical' solution, according to which problem intuitions are 'accidents of cultural history' (2018, p. 33). Chalmers' response to this solution is largely dismissive. In this paper, we defend the viability of a genealogical solution. Our strategy is to focus (...)
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