There can be no possible quarrel with the assertion that the phenomena of value are amenable to scientific treatment if the statement is taken in an obvious sense, for the act of valuation is a fact of human experience, empirically observable in the same way as any other fact. There is therefore no reason why we should not deal with certain aspects of the phenomena of value as we deal with other empirical phenomena. To deny this would be to deny (...) scientific status to sociology, anthropology, and psychology. Sometimes one encounters such denials, but they need not be taken seriously, for they are obviously grounded on a very arbitrary and narrow definition of science. (shrink)

In our everyday lives we struggle with the notions of why we do what we do and the need to assign values to our actions. Somehow, it seems possible through experience and life to gain knowledge and understanding of such matters. Yet once we start delving deeper into the concepts that underwrite these domains of thought and actions, we face a philosophical disappointment. In contrast to the world of facts, values and morality seem insecure, uncomfortably situated, easily (...) influenced by illusion or ideology. How can we apply this same objectivity and accuracy to the spheres of value and morality? In the essays included in this collection, Peter Railton shows how a fairly sober, naturalistically informed view of the world might nonetheless incorporate objective values and moral knowledge. This book will be of interest to professionals and students working in philosophy and ethics. (shrink)

The notion of value neutrality has been a contentious issue within the human and social sciences for some time. In this paper, some of the philosophical and scientific bases for the confusion surrounding the fact-value dichotomy are covered and the discrepancy between how psychology studies values and expresses them is noted. The sense of value neutrality is clarified historically and the clarified meaning of the term applied to some qualitative data demonstrating in what sense values may be expressed (...) in psychology. The position is upheld that psychology as a human science intentionally should not be absolutely value free in the sense that human reality has to be studied in a non-reductionistic manner and thus methods of study must be respectful of the full ethical sense of humanness. This is simply meeting the phenomenological requirement of "fidelity to the phenomenon". However, psychology can be value free in the historical sense of the term properly understood because it refers to the fact that the personal values of the scientists ought not to be conflated with scientific findings. The discussion of values takes place primarily within the context of science, where the problem of value neutrality emerged, but it is acknowledged that non-scientific approaches to value have merit and can also be compelling. (shrink)

The notion of value neutrality has been a contentious issue within the human and social sciences for some time. In this paper, some of the philosophical and scientific bases for the confusion surrounding the fact-value dichotomy are covered and the discrepancy between how psychology studies values and expresses them is noted. The sense of value neutrality is clarified historically and the clarified meaning of the term applied to some qualitative data demonstrating in what sense values may be expressed (...) in psychology. The position is upheld that psychology as a human science intentionally should not be absolutely value free in the sense that human reality has to be studied in a non-reductionistic manner and thus methods of study must be respectful of the full ethical sense of humanness. This is simply meeting the phenomenological requirement of “fidelity to the phenomenon”. However, psychology can be value free in the historical sense of the term properly understood because it refers to the fact that the personal values of the scientists ought not to be conflated with scientific findings. The discussion of values takes place primarily within the context of science, where the problem of value neutrality emerged, but it is acknowledged that non-scientific approaches to value have merit and can also be compelling. (shrink)

Science is not value-free and ethics is not fact-free. Science and ethics should be similar, but they are not. The author indicates how research in ethics is to change in the face of this. Ethicists should accommodate empirical work in their programs and they should take heed of methodologies developed in science and philosophy of science. They should abandon the search for a single overarching theory of morality. Controversies in ethics are often spurious for lack of articulate methodological key concepts. (...) For example, disagreements over the value of general theories are misguided since disputants implicitly use different notions of generality and different notions of theory. An appropriate methodology does not suffice for the resolution of controversies but it is indispensable for consensus. The book argues these theses in a general way and applies them to the subject of egoism and altruism in ethics. Further case studies concern the environment and psychiatric disorders. (shrink)

In Fact, value and philosophy education I tried to show how philosophy can help to overcome the fact-value divide that continues to plague education. In attempting this, I applied John Dewey’s suggestion that philosophy may help to integrate beliefs about matters of fact with values in society at large, to the curricular division between subjects that deal with knowledge of matters of fact and those that are largely devoted to subjective understanding and personal expression. The paper centres on the (...) claim that philosophical dialogue about what we should believe and value can help to effect a mutual adjustment between our reason and our sentiments and bring us to think as whole human beings. It argues the case by first looking at the use of reflective practical reason to effect a change in our desires and conduct when we deem them to be undesirable. The use of reason to provide us with courses of action and other practical remedies to deal with what we see as defects in our character suggests that our cognitive and affective powers are capable of working together through mutual adjustment. By extension, I argue that reason can help us to examine the moral dimension of problems and issues in various areas of study, while making our understanding of them responsive to our feelings. The introduction of an educational means to give effect to this mutual adjustment brings us back to the role of philosophy. Philosophy provides the opportunity for reasoned dialogue that brings the factual material that students encounter into connection with what they are learning to value. It brings a normative cast to the study of history, society, literature, art, science and technology and enables the knowledge that students gain through their studies to be applied to matters of value. In general, it brings moral sensitivity to all kinds of subject matter and enables students to apply their knowledge and intelligence to the formation of values. In the years since I wrote this piece, I had the privilege to assist with the initial draft of documents on ethical understanding as a general competence in the Australian national curriculum and of constructing and implementing a pilot program for ethical inquiry in New South Wales primary schools, which led to ethics becoming an option for students who do not attend religious instruction. In different ways, both experiences brought home to me the importance of incorporating considerations of value throughout the curriculum and the value of philosophical inquiry as a means of doing so. Reflection on these experiences resulted in my book Teaching Ethics in Schools. (shrink)

Since it is Hume who famously asked how an "ought" can ever possibly be deduced from an "is," it is Hume who is typically cast as the representative of empiricism's inadequacy for doing the work of ethics. Yet, as I will show, in his description of the proper functioning of the passions that necessarily involve other persons and their evaluations of us, Hume provides a naturalistic description that is not reductive of value, but rather incorporates values into the very (...) ground of empirical description. Contemporary moral philosophers who dismiss Hume's complex account of the passions as unnecessary for understanding his account of morals, and then fault the account of morals for its failure to move beyond mere description to any kind of normative assessment, ignore how the detail of Hume's own account of the passions suggests a way that an empirical account can in fact be value-laden, as we shall see. (shrink)

There are important consequences for ethics following from conclusions of metaethical theories. Although these theories are based upon the investigation of the language of morals and ethics, their starting points are different. There are many conceptions of meaning of moral and value judgements and many ways how to understand relation between facts and values. Are these conceptions really investiga_ting the language of ethics, or are they only alternative theories of ethics?

Science is not value-free and ethics is not fact-free. Science and ethics should be similar, but they are not. The author indicates how research in ethics is to change in the face of this. Ethicists should accommodate empirical work in their programs and they should take heed of methodologies developed in science and philosophy of science. They should abandon the search for a single overarching theory of morality. Controversies in ethics are often spurious for lack of articulate methodological key concepts. (...) For example, disagreements over the value of general theories are misguided since disputants implicitly use different notions of generality and different notions of theory. An appropriate methodology does not suffice for the resolution of controversies but it is indispensable for consensus. The book argues these theses in a general way and applies them to the subject of egoism and altruism in ethics. Further case studies concern the environment and psychiatric disorders. (shrink)

Is Economics an ‘objective’ or ‘positive’ science, independent of ethical and political positions? The financial crisis that began in 2007 gave rise to renewed doubts regarding the ‘objectivity’ of economics and brought into the public arena a debate that was previously confined to academia. A remarkable feature of the public debate on the value neutrality of economics since then was that it not only involved indictments of ideological biases in economic theory, but also the attribution of the crisis itself to (...) the unethical orientation of economic agents, of economists acting as experts and of ‘economic science’ itself. The contributors to this volume believe that economists of all persuasions are once again compelled to probe the normative foundations of their discipline and give a public account of their doubts and conclusions. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory (at least so far as the empirical predictions are concerned). It follows that, if one wants to properly understand quantum mechanics, it is essential to clearly understand the meaning of probability statements. The interpretation of probability has excited nearly as much philosophical controversy as the interpretation of quantum mechanics. 20th century physicists have mostly adopted a frequentist conception. In this paper it is argued that we ought, instead, to adopt a logical or Bayesian (...) conception. The paper includes a comparison of the orthodox and Bayesian theories of statistical inference. It concludes with a few remarks concerning the implications for the concept of physical reality. (shrink)

Richard Brandt is one of the most influential moral philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century. He is especially important in the field of ethics for his lucid and systematic exposition of utilitarianism. This new book represents in some ways a summation of his views and includes many useful applications of his theory. The focus of the book is how value judgments and moral belief can be justified. More generally, the book assesses different moral systems and theories of (...) justice, and considers specific problems such as the optimal level of charity and the moral tenability of the criminal law. This book will be essential reading for all professional philosophers concerned with ethics, and will prove helpful to students as well. (shrink)

While the Value-Free Ideal of science has suffered compelling criticism, some advocates like Gregor Betz continue to argue that science policy advisors should avoid value judgments by hedging their hypotheses. This approach depends on a mistaken understanding of the relations between facts and values in regulatory science. My case study involves the morning-after pill Plan B and the “Drug Fact” that it “may” prevent implantation. I analyze the operative values, which I call zygote-centrism, responsible for this hedged (...) drug label. Then, I explain my twofold account of value-ladenness, involving the constitutive role of value judgments in science and the social function of facts as political tools. Because this drug fact is ineliminably value-laden in both senses, I conclude that hedged hypotheses are not necessarily value-free. (shrink)

At a time of fake news, hacks, leaks, and unverified reports, many people are unsure whom to believe. How can we communicate in ways that make individuals question their assumptions and learn? My colleagues at The Hastings Center and many journalists and scientists are grappling with this question and have, independently, reached the same first step: recognize that facts can't be fully understood without probing their connection to values. “Explaining the basics is important, of course, but we also (...) need to diversify our approach to the coverage of science—particularly as it intersects with the matrix of cultural, religious, social, and political values of our readers,” said an article in Undark, an online magazine of science journalism. An editorial in Nature called for scientists to engage directly with citizens in debates over climate change and genome editing, noting that “the ethical issues can be critically dependent on the science, for example, in understanding where the boundaries between non-heritable and heritable genome modifications might be.” We're here to help. (shrink)

In recent times the tenab.ility of a "value neutral" conception of social inquiry has come under increasing scrutiny. The critique of the traditional model is grounded in a reappraisal of the relationship of facts and values on the levels of both methodology and lived experience. The present essay reviews some major elements in the critique of value neutrality, and on the basis of a reappraisal of the fact/value relationship, argues for an alternative conception of the objectivity of the (...) complex process of social inquiry. (shrink)

From the foregoing discussion we can note that whilst Marx transcends the fact-value distinction he embraces neither a scientistic approach nor a moral theory. Rather he gives a sociological account of morality, illustrating that description and evaluation cannot be separated and that juridical conceptions need to be understood in relation to the mode of production in which they arise.30 In the absence of an absolute notion of justice it is mistaken to see Marx as offering a critique of capitalism based (...) on moral principles. Of course Marx had reasons for attacking capitalism but these are contained within his account of the capitalist mode of production. Yet whilst this theory is not a moral theory it cannot be described as a descriptive theory either. In Marx's work description and evaluation cannot be meaningfully separated.In portraying Communist society as the solution to problems generated within capitalist society Marx is not sketching out a picture of a morally superior society but rather considering the possibilities of an alternative way of life with its own moral and judicial standards. Indeed the fact that Marx did not provide blueprints for future Communist society is itself symptomatic of his awareness of the difficulties involved in the attempt to describe in detail a form of social life based upon principles different from our own. (shrink)

Clark, R. L. Facts, fact-correlates, and fact-surrogates.--Heintz, J. The real subject-predicate asymmetry.--Stenius, E. All men are mortal.--Wilson, N. L. Notes on the form of certain elementary facts.--Binkley, R. The ultimate justification of moral rules.--Castañeda, H. Goodness, intentions, and propositions.--Patterson, R. L. An analysis of faith.--Simpson, E. Discrimination as an example of moral irrationality.--Welsh, P. Osborne on the art of appreciation.--Lachs, J. The omnicolored sky: Baylis on perception.--Strawson, P. F. Causation in perception.--Reid, C. L. Charles A. Baylis: a bibliography.

Richard Brandt's last book discusses foundational questions in metaethics and normative ethics. Many of the central views expressed, as well as the topics taken up, will be familiar to those who know Brandt's earlier works, although some parts of the book represent new and welcome additions to his corpus. Brandt was very much a systematic moral philosopher, a theory builder. I can here only sketch the outlines of the theory he developed in the book, and suggest some points at which (...) one might wish to demur. (shrink)

Reacting to contemporary thinkers who celebrate a liberation from absolute truth, Arthur Holmes explores historical ways of grounding moral values objectively in the nature of reality and reconnecting to objective and universal moral norms.

Mary Midgley asserts that my argument concerning the problem of child-abuse was inappropriately framed in the language of rights, and neglected certain pertinent natural facts. I defend the view that the use of rights-talk was both apposite and did not misrepresent the moral problem in question. I assess the status and character of the natural facts Midgley adduces in criticism of my case, concluding that they do not obviously establish the conclusions she believes they do. Finally I briefly (...) respond to the charge that my suggestions were illiberal. (shrink)

It is often assumed that there is a necessary relationship between historical value and irreplaceability, and that this is an essential feature of historical value’s distinctive character. Contrary to this assumption, I argue that it is a merely contingent fact that some historically valuable things are irreplaceable, and that irreplaceability is not a distinctive feature of historical value at all. Rather, historically significant objects, from heirlooms to artifacts, offer us an otherwise impossible connection with the past, a value that persists (...) even in the face of suitable replacements. (shrink)

According to T. M. Scanlon's buck‐passing account, the normative realm of reasons is in some sense prior to the domain of value. Intrinsic value is not itself a property that provides us with reasons; rather, to be good is to have some other reason‐giving property, so that facts about intrinsic value amount to facts about how we have reason to act and to respond. The paper offers an interpretation and defense of this approach to the relation between reasons (...) and values. I start by acknowledging the role that substantive values play in specifications of our reasons, noting that this poses an apparent challenge to the buck‐passing account. The challenge can be met, however, if we adopt a deliberative understanding of substantive value, an interpretation that I proceed to develop and defend. In conclusion I consider recent attempts to capture the agent‐relativity of reasons within a teleological framework for thinking about the relation between reasons and values. I argue that these approaches rest on a deliberative understanding of value; the teleological framework thus turns out to illustrate the basic insight of the buck‐passing approach, rather than offering an alternative to it. (shrink)

As a young lecturer in philosophy and the eldest son of a prominent Jewish family, Alan Montefiore faced two very different understandings of his identity: the more traditional view that an identity such as his carried with it, as a matter of given fact, certain duties and obligations, and an opposing view, emphasized by his studies in philosophy, according to which there can be no rationally compelling move from statements of fact—whatever the alleged facts may be—to "judgments of value." (...) According to this second view, individuals must in the end take responsibility for determining their own values and obligations. In this book, Montefiore looks back on his attempts to understand the nature of this conflict and the misunderstandings it may engender. In the process, he illustrates through personal experience the practical implications of a characteristically philosophical issue. Montefiore finally settles on the following: while everyone has to accept that facts, including those of their own situation, are whatever they may be, both the "traditional" assumption that individuals must recognize certain values and obligations as rooted in those very facts, and the contrary view that individuals are ultimately responsible for determining their own values, are deeply embedded in differing conceptions of society and its relation to its members. Montefiore then examines the misunderstandings between those for whom identity constitutes in effect a conceptual bridge connecting the facts of who and what a person may be to the value commitments incumbent upon them, and those for whom the very idea of such a bridge can be nothing but a confusion. Using key examples from the notoriously vexed case of Jewish identity and from his own encounters with its conflicting meanings and implications, Montefiore depicts the practical significance of the differences between these worldviews, particularly for those who hove to negotiate them. (shrink)

Olthuis makes a singular contribution in bringing the "Philosophy of the Law-Idea" to the attention of philosophers who lack other access to this development in contemporary Dutch thought. His presentation concentrates on applications to ethics. He begins with a thorough exposition of G. E. Moore's ethical theory, to which he applies "history's critique"--a resumé of Ayer and Stevenson, of Oxford meta-ethics, and of the "new wave" of naturalism set in motion by Anscombe and Foot in 1958. Olthuis finds that neither (...) Moore nor the subsequent philosophers could long stave off the irreconcilable extreme of absolute value or absolute relativism. "... the main source of difficulty in the constrictive nature of the... ontological schema," and, underlying that, in the claim that theoretical thought is neutral. In a valuable final chapter, he presents a "perspective for a way out" based on work by H. Dooyeweerd and D. H. Th. Vollenhoven. One key to their Philosophy of the Law-Idea lies in "norm-laws." Like "natural" laws, what is subject to them cannot withdraw. Unlike "natural" laws, they demand human acknowledgment to be fulfilled. He rejects both "ought" and "goodness" as adequate primitive concepts for ethics in favor of stress upon its irreducible "sphere-sovereignty." The cosmos stands under a structural law-order, made up of many modal laws determining the many modalities of reality. Within the normative, ethics is only one special modal science. Its job is to investigate the ethical norm-law, that which is subject to it, and the correlations between these two.--M. B. M. (shrink)

The twelve essays by Kendall Walton in this volume address a broad range of issues concerning the arts. Walton introduces an innovative account of aesthetic value, and explores relations between aesthetic value and values of other kinds. His classic 'Categories of Art' is included, as is 'Transparent Pictures', his controversial account of what is special about photographs. A new essay investigates the fact that still pictures are still, although some of them depict motion. New postscripts have been added to (...) several of the reprinted essays. (shrink)