This paper aims to describe and defend a Pluralistic Kantian, as opposed to a Tractarian, version of realism vis-à-vis the ontological basis of truthmaking relations. One underlying assumption of my position is that propositional truth is a robust property and, consequently, is normatively distinct from epistemic justification. Still, it does not follow from this realist contention that truth is generated ontologically, viz., independently of cognitive and intensional contributions of human agents. This point brings my view notably close to H. Putnam’s (...) peculiar blend of certain Wittgensteinian and Kantian themes. However, I argue that Putnam’s apparent denial of the in-itself reality with an intrinsic structure gives rise to a rather un-Kantian and problematic metaphysical picture. I suggest that the solution to the puzzle may be found in a synthesis of the best intuitions of Armstrong’s Tractarian realism and Putnam’s quasi-Kantianism. (shrink)

This paper presents a position called Scheme-based Alethic Realism, which reconciles a realist position on the nature of truth with a pluralistic Kantian perspective that allows for multiple environments in which truthmaking relationships are established. We argue that truthmaking functions are constrained by a stable phenomenal world and a stable cognitive architecture. This account takes truth as normatively distinct from epistemic justification while relativizing the truth conditions of our statements to what we call Frameworks. The pluralistic aspect allows that these (...) stable elements, while constraining representational and linguistic schemes, do not define a single framework for truthmaking relations. We strengthen this position by considering themes on situated rational agency from cognitive science and artificial intelligence, arguing that whatever enables or supports rational action within a particular environment must figure into some account of truth and truthmaking, and vice versa. (shrink)

A significant and interesting part of the post-Gettier literature regarding the analysis of propositional knowledge is the attempt to supplement the traditional tripartite analysis by employing a fourth condition regarding the defeasibility of evidence and thus to preclude the counterexamples displayed in Gettier’s original article. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the sort of externalism that accompanies the most promising of the proposed fourth conditions, due to Pollock, in order to offer some fresh insights on this old (...) epistemological issue. I argue that Pollock’s paradigmatic treatment of the matter gives rise to a critical problem with regard to the exact role of the fourth condition and its relation with the onto-semantic or alethic condition of propositional knowledge, to wit, truth. In the light of this discussion, I draw certain conclusions about epistemic externalism and point out some of its theoretical shortcomings. (shrink)

In this paper I present Pluralistic Kantianism as a viable alternative to other prominent accounts of the determination of the truth conditions of our ordinary empirical statements. I further claim that this sort of Kantianism is capable of handling certain theoretical difficulties faced by any scheme-based semantics. Moreover, Pluralistic Kantianism can shed some light on such crucial issues as cross-cultural communication and understanding. As a result, if the account offered here is on the right track, we may get a palatable (...) alternative to both restrictive monism and apathetic relativism, both of which ultimately fail to explicate or enlighten the successful and unsuccessful instances of cross-cultural understanding. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that the putatively non-epistemic nature of propositional truth presents an interesting problem for those who reasonably believe that truth is normatively distinct from warrant or evidence and that such truth is an irreducible condition on propositional knowledge. After arguing that McDowell’s direct realist approach is rather inadequate to deal with the issue I am raising here, I introduce the notion of ‘epistemic gradient’ to show that even if one may plausibly maintain that a significant portion (...) of our empirical beliefs are presumably true in the alethic realist sense, there is no unproblematic transition from conceding that point to making the realist truth a panepistemic condition of propositional knowledge. (shrink)

Realists typically suppose that nonepistemic truth is an independent condition on propositional knowledge. Few philosophers, however, have seriously questioned the meta-epistemic consequences of combining alethic and epistemic variants of realism. In this paper I aim to show that the truth condition in the customary definition of knowledge presents an important problem for the realist at higher epistemic levels. According to my argument, traditional epistemic-logical analyses of metaknowledge fail because of their extensionalism and certain presuppositions they have about the satisfaction of (...) the truth condition. I further suggest that we need a different approach to metaknowledge if (1) we want to retain alethic realism, and (2) we want our epistemological accounts to adequately explicate the meta-epistemic states of actual, evidence-bound cognitive agents. (shrink)

In this paper I present Pluralistic Kantianism as a viable alternative to other prominent accounts of the determination of the truth conditions of our ordinary empirical statements. I further claim that this sort of Kantianism is capable of handling certain theoretical difficulties faced by any scheme-based semantics. Moreover, Pluralistic Kantianism can shed some light on such crucial issues as cross-cultural communication and understanding. As a result, if the account offered here is on the right track, we may get a palatable (...) alternative to both restrictive monism and apathetic relativism, both of which ultimately fail to explicate or enlighten the successful and unsuccessful instances of cross-cultural understanding. (shrink)

In this paper I present Pluralistic Kantianism as a viable alternative to other prominent accounts of the determination of the truth conditions of our ordinary empirical statements. I further claim that this sort of Kantianism is capable of handling certain theoretical difficulties faced by any scheme-based semantics. Moreover, Pluralistic Kantianism can shed some light on such crucial issues as cross-cultural communication and understanding. As a result, if the account offered here is on the right track, we may get a palatable (...) alternative to both restrictive monism and apathetic relativism, both of which ultimately fail to explicate or enlighten the successful and unsuccessful instances of cross-cultural understanding. (shrink)

Öz: Teknoloji felsefesi görece olarak genç bir akademik alt-alan olmakla birlikte, ontoloji, epistemoloji, siyaset felsefesi, etik ve estetik gibi felsefe disiplininin daha köklü alt-alanlarıyla önemli bir kavramsal ilişki ağı içinde bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca bu dalın temel bazı meselelerinin derinlemesine incelenmesinin sosyoloji, antropoloji, psikoloji ve siyasi bilimler gibi disiplinlerin birikimlerinden ve yaklaşımlarından yararlanmayı da gerekli kıldığını belirtebiliriz. Bu yazımda teknoloji felsefesi alanını genel hatlarıyla ve güncel olgular ışığında kısaca tanıttıktan sonra, bu alanda ilginç ve kuramsal yönden değerli bulduğum iki sorunsalı sergileyip irdeliyorum. (...) İlki toplumsal bir gerçek olarak teknolojinin nasıl bir doğası, karakteri veya kendini ileri taşıma itkisi olduğunun sorgulanmasıdır. Bu çerçevede, söz konusu literatüre 20. yüzyılda önemli katkılar yapmış olan Jacques Ellul, Hans Jonas ve Arnold Gehlen’in antropolojik-felsefi boyuttaki önemli bazı düşüncelerini açıklayıp tartışıyorum. İkinci olarak, Albert Borgmann’ın Heidegger’in fikirlerinden ilham alarak ürettiği “odaklı pratikler” kavramını betimleyerek onun görüşlerine gelen tepkilerden bazılarını ele alarak inceliyorum. Yazının son kısmında, çağdaş teknolojinin çoğulculuk, değişkenlik ve geçişkenlik kavramları üzerinden oluşan yeni felsefi kimliğine ilişkin bazı görüngübilimsel düşünceler sunuyorum. (shrink)

The perennial problem of the exact nature of epistemic justification has recently become even more interesting upon Laurence BonJour's openly converting himself to foundationalism following a long and successful career built mainly around a strong defense of coherentism cum internalism. Even though the famous debate between foundationalism and coherentism is often associated with the "technical" issues of epistemic regress, basic beliefs, and so on, in this paper I will approach the debate from the standpoint of the post-Wittgensteinian literature and try (...) to provide some useful insights about the justification of those beliefs alleged by the foundationalist to constitute our ultimate touch with reality. More specifically, I will offer a neo-Kantian interpretation of the subvenient basis of supervenience relations believed to take place between the world and our basic cognitive states, and claim that such an approach has a better chance of combining the strengths of the traditional rivals in epistemology and coming up with a viable synthesis on this matter. (shrink)

Although the notion of agency presents itself as an attractive solution to the puzzle of free will, itfaces a problem vis-à-vis the nature of reasons that are purported to lie behind actions. In this paper,I first point out the significance of a paradigm shift that emerges with the agency view. Then I arguethat the agency theories nonetheless fail in general to give a satisfactory account of various sorts ofreasons underlying our actions and choices. In trying to enlighten the multi-faceted nature (...) of actionsand agency, I define a novel concept, “substantive autonomy,” and claim that it is a basic fact valid forall animals, not only humans, that are capable of initiating action. Reasons may indeed be lying behind our actions in a non-deterministic and ubiquitous manner, but agency often works in the absenceof sophisticated reasons which are evidently characteristic of humans.Keywords: agency, event causation, free will, reasons, substantive autonomy. (shrink)

There are good reasons to reject absolutism about truth not only for theoretical purposes but also in connection with the issues of cross-cultural communication and understanding. In explaining the neorealist approach, an analogy given by Alvin Goldman is employed and it is maintained that despite its difficulties Goldman's account is on the right track vis-à-vis truth and the ontological matters related to it.

The traditional tripartite and tetrapartite analyses describe the conceptual components of propositional knowledge from a universal epistemic point of view. According to the classical analysis, since truth is a necessary condition of knowledge, it does not make sense to talk about “false knowledge” or “knowing wrongly.” There are nonetheless some natural languages in which speakers ordinarily make statements about a person’s knowing a given subject matter wrongly. In this paper, we first provide a brief analysis of “knowing wrongly” in Turkish. (...) Then, taking Allan Hazlett’s recent account of the gap between traditional analyses of knowledge and actual epistemic practices of real cognitive agents as a point of departure, we spell out a non-universalist and non-extensionalist perspective on the value of “knowing wrongly.”. (shrink)

Barry Allen defends a highly unorthodox and compact account of humans and their evolutionary adventure, which comprises inter alia epistemological, alethic, technological, and artistic aspects. His anthropocentric view distinguishes itself from traditional forms of realism and anti-realism by virtue of its dynamic and non-reductionist character. Allen adopts a certain perspective of techno-artistic and onto-epistemic construction, which we dub “panartifactualism,” claiming principally that nothing at all escapes the artifactualizing power of human beings. We maintain that, under closer scrutiny, various dimensions of (...) Allen’s account conflict and that his philosophical approach to “being” and “making” ultimately gives rise to a rather problematic ontological picture. Having pointed out its shortcomings and untenable results, we spell out the conceptual contours of a contemporary and far more attractive version of realism which suffers neither from the issues faced by views like panartifactualism nor from the obvious difficulties of noumenalist realism justifiably opposed by Allen. (shrink)

In the end of the nineteenth century, there was a remarkable ‘empiricist attitude’ found among certain philosopher-scientists, an attitude which arguably emerged in the main as a reaction to the anti-scientific mood prevalent in the culture that time. Those philosopher-scientists, such as Mach and Hertz, were particularly anxious to emphasize and laud the privileged status of the empirical dimension ofour scientific knowledge, distinguishing it carefully from the theoretical constructions and hypothetical entities that are ordinarily posited by scientists. Yet, as I (...) exhibit in this article, there were certain crucial philosophical differences between these two thinkers with respect to their general conception of scientific theories and scientific norms guiding the activity. I suggest further that the most central difference in this context between Mach and Hertz can justifiably (and, perhaps, more fruitfully) be articulated and reckoned in traditional andcontemporary epistemological terms. (shrink)

Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, critically (...) compare and contrast them. In particular, we want to examine how they handle the reason-giving power of affective states. We will look into two representationalist proposals (Evaluativism and Imperativism) and a functionalist proposal, and argue that, contrary to their own advertisements, the representationalist proposals don’t have good accounts of why and how sensory affect can motivate, rationalize, and justify subsequent behavior and intentional mental activity. We will show that our own functionalist proposal does a much better job in this regard, and that when the representationalist proposals are modified to do a better job, they fare better not because of their representationalist credentials but due to their functionalist ones. (shrink)

The current debate that surrounds the issue of patient rights and the transformation of health care, social insurance, and reimbursement systems has put the topic of patient responsibility on both the public and health care sectors' agenda. This climate of debate and transition provides an ideal time to rethink patient responsibilities, together with their underlying rationale, and to determine if they are properly represented when being called `patient' responsibilities. In this article we analyze the various types of patient responsibilities, identify (...) the underlying motivations behind their creation, and conclude upon their sensibleness and merit. The range of patient responsibilities that have been proposed and implemented can be reclassified and placed into one of four groups, which are more accurate descriptors of the nature of these responsibilities. We suggest that, within the framework of a free-market system, where health care services are provided based on the ability to pay for them, none of these can properly be justified as a patient responsibility. (shrink)

This article analyses the relationship between deduction and induction by focusing on Aristotle's knowledge acquisition processes. The deductive and inductive processes in Aristotelian science are analysed in depth, and it is emphasised that these two processes are, in fact, interrelated. It is claimed that induction and deduction use logical inference but are not themselves an inference. The structure of inductive inference is determined, and the deductive inference and the inferential part of the scientific process are given. Furthermore, the article addresses (...) the reliability of the inductive process, emphasising the difficulties in obtaining accurate results. In conclusion, it is shown that Aristotelian science has a fundamentally intuition-based part and plays an important role in the scientific process. (shrink)

Introductory Chapter to the _Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition_ (CUP, 2009).

A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of (...) phenomenology but by a common mental, usually some sort of conative, attitude toward the sensation. Here I criticize both views and offer an alternative framework that combines what is right in both while avoiding their unintuitive commitments. The result is the reductive (psychofunctionalist) adverbial sensory modification view of pleasure and displeasure. (shrink)

This book represents the author's view of humanity.

I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the transparency datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the transparency datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some other (...) similar experiences like itches, tickles, orgasms, hedonic valence, etc., are not transparent in this strong sense. Hence they constitute empirical counterexamples to representationalism. Given that representationalism is a general metaphysical doctrine about all experiential phenomenology for good reasons, I conclude that representationalism about phenomenal consciousness is false. Then, I outline a general framework about how the introspection of phenomenal qualities in perceptual experience works in light of the transparency datum, but consistent with the rejection of strong transparency. The result is a form of qualia realism that is naturalist and intentionalist, and has close affinities to the adverbialist views developed in the latter part of the last century. I then apply this framework to pain experiences and their bodily locations. (shrink)

According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine the (...) relationship between perceptual views and two (weak and strong) forms of representationalism about experience. I will argue that pains pose very serious problems for strong representationalism as well. (shrink)

This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely (...) tie them to the brain states realizing conscious qualitative experiences. We then develop an account of introspection which exploits this special nature of sensory concepts. The result is a new class of concepts, which, following recent terminology, we call phenomenal concepts: these concepts refer to phenomenal experience itself and are the vehicles used in introspection. On our account, the connection between sensory and phenomenal concepts is very tight: it consists in different semantic uses of the same cognitive structures underlying the sensory concepts, such as the concept of red. Contrary to widespread opinion, we show that information theory contains all the resources to satisfy internalist intuitions about phenomenal consciousness, while not offending externalist ones. A consequence of this account is that it explains and predicts the so-called conceivability arguments against physicalism on the basis of the special nature of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Thus we not only show why physicalism is not threatened by such arguments, but also demonstrate its strength in virtue of its ability to predict and explain away such arguments in a principled way. However, we take the main contribution of this work to be what it provides in addition to a response to those conceivability arguments, namely, a substantive account of the interface between sensory and conceptual systems and the mechanisms of introspection as based on the special nature of the information flow between them. (shrink)

Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.

In the history of Islam after the martyrdom of Hz.Uthman, serious problems emerged among the Muslims, and two great wars took place between the Companions. While these events are called strife, this time is called the time of strife. The enemies of Islam who wanted to take advantage of this confused situation of the Islamic ummah, they engaged in various activities that they thought could harm Muslims in order to grow the seeds of strife among Muslims more. Zindīḳs are the (...) leading enemies of Islam. It was necessary for Muslims to recognize the zindīḳs, who were said to have made thousands of narrations on almost every subject. Therefore, Islamic scholars wrote many works about them. In fact the authors of tabaḳāt and ridjāl many of whom were hadith scholars, also mentioned zindīḳs in their works, such that these works were extremely useful in terms of knowing zindīḳs. In this article it was determined for whom the term zindīḳ was used in the works of tabaḳāt and ridjāl and also the situation of hadith transmitters who lived in the first three centuries of the hijri who are alleged to be zindīḳ are discussed. (shrink)

From the Symbolist period to the inter-war years, and in works ever more numerous as time went by, literature and medicine, both together and separately, constructed a discourse progressively focused on the enigma of the ‘third sex’. But how perceived? As an aberration, a mere legend, a mirage, a mental defect, a mistake of nature? The ‘third sex’ came to designate the sex of the indistinct, that which has no name, drawing within its sphere the primordial Adam, the angel, the (...) ephebe, the androgyne, the hermaphrodite, the transvestite, the effeminate male, the mannish woman, the pederast, the sodomite, the tribade, the Sapphist, the transsexual, the degenerate. Around 1900, to this unsettling tribe was even added the working woman who, as a result, was thought to have ‘abandoned her true condition’, and who thus had become ‘desexualized’ or ‘asexual’. In his preface to Willy's treatise on the Third Sex (1927), describing the Paris of Sodom and Gomorrah, Louis Estève drew attention to the part played by a now totally forgotten novel of the same name, The Third Sex by Ernst Ludwig von Wolzogen (1902), in the creation, handing down and popularization of this term. But contrary to what this title might suggest, Wolzogen does not focus on homosexuals in his book, but rather on those independent women, without husbands but with jobs, whom he refers to as ‘the neuters’. Neutrality conceived of as the effacement of the masculine and the feminine, perhaps as an effect of modern life? The theme has now come full circle in the corpus of reflection on the third sex, though it seems to have been applied more specifically to emancipated women, and singularly to lesbians. (shrink)

This research paper aims to investigate. the impact of inflation. on financial sector performance in Western. Balkan. countries. The topic was chosen considering the financial sector’s fundamental role and its. impact on sustainable economic growth. This impact is measured through the effect that macroeconomic determinants of financial. performance such. as inflation, GDP. growth, general government final consumption expenditure, trade, and the lending interest rate have on credit to private sector as a share of GDP and broad definition of money as (...) a ratio of GDP, which were used to proxy financial sector development. The data are provided by the World Bank as well as the Central. Banks. of the respective countries, for the period 2002–2021. The research methodology consists of different panel regression models such as OLS, OLS robust, Fixed effects, Random effects, and Generalized method of moments (GMM). Findings indicate that domestic credit to the private sector and inflation are positively correlated, whereas broad money and inflation are negatively correlated. (shrink)

The official definition of ‘pain’ by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) hasn’t seen much revision since its publication in 1979. There have been various criticisms of the definition in the literature from different quarters: that the definition implies a dubious metaphysical dualism, that it requires a strong form of consciousness as well as linguistic abilities, that it excludes many vulnerable groups that are otherwise perfectly capable of experiencing pain, that it has therefore unacceptable practical as well (...) as ethical consequences, that it is unhelpful to the health-care professional as an operational definition, that it is too narrow, and many others. In my view, most of these criticisms depend on misunderstandings or on uncharitable interpretations. My aim is to go over the definition, clarify some potential ambiguities, and argue that these criticisms don’t cut much ice. At the end, I will present a few slightly reworded versions of the definition that I claim are more felicitous and capture the original intended meaning by the members of the taxonomic committee in a much better and transparent way that avoids all the major extant criticisms in the literature. (Written for interdisciplinary audiences.). (shrink)

A healthy and robust public political culture is generally regarded as being of utmost necessity for the maintenance of a stable democratic environment. Especially when a country is facing significant challenges and is in the process of devising and implementing radical reforms, the presence of satisfactory collective deliberation can ensure durability and stability. This article will focus on one type of argumentation that stands in the way of such healthy deliberation. It will explore the various forms that ad hominem arguments (...) take and consider the harmful consequences of their wide prominence in the political culture of the country. (shrink)

As a result of its failure to embrace the increasingly visible social and political diversity in the country, Kemalism, the founding ideology of modern Turkey, is currently facing its severest legitimacy crisis. Through interviews with representatives of leading voluntary Kemalist associations, this article inquires whether there are attempts to reinterpret the doctrine in order to offer an alternative, credible vision in harmony with the existing social, political and economic realities of Turkey.

This article seeks to address the increasingly pertinent concern of how to form a satisfactory liberal stance in the face of certain democratically mandated policies of non-liberal and even sometimes illiberal governments. To that end, a close analysis is provided of a particular debate that generated controversy in certain liberal circles in Turkey during the run-up to the referendum on constitutional amendments in 2010. Identifying and evaluating 5 factors which seemed to have influenced the opposing positions in the debate, the (...) article tries to demonstrate how disagreement over the ‘correct’ liberal position entails differences in overall judgement of the political situation and assessment of the circumstances. (shrink)

In this article, recent attempts by the Justice and Development Party to address the problems of Alevi citizens in Turkey are analysed. After briefly outlining the sources of Alevi revitalization in the 1990s, the article critically discusses different aspects of the Alevi Opening process. It concludes by arguing that the Alevi question reveals many aspects of the problematic nature of secularism in Turkey.

Born as φαντασία in Greek philosophy, the concept of imagination that today we understand from has a different meaning and contains different functions. This study attempts to reveal the conceptual contents and functions by examining the conceptual transformation of the concept in Ancient Greece and Aristotle’s terminology and epistemological function.

There is a strong association between reliance on the promotional activities of pharmaceutical companies and a generally less appropriate use of prescription drugs. Pharmaceutical companies direct some of their promotion towards health workers who do not have the authority to prescribe medicines, such as nurses in certain countries. The aim of this study was to determine the impact that exposure to the marketing methods of pharmaceutical companies has on judgments made by nursing students about health worker—pharmaceutical company relationships. A cross-sectional (...) survey was carried out with 442 nursing students in Istanbul, Turkey. The exposure of students to the marketing methods of pharmaceutical companies, whether it be indirectly through observation or directly by first-hand experience, increases the probability that students will adopt rationales that underlie affirmative judgments of health worker—pharmaceutical company relationships. Based on the pervasiveness and ability of drug promotion to influence the perceptions of students, it is imperative that attempts be made to reduce its negative impact. (shrink)

In this paper I reflect critically on the concept of pragmatism as it is used in Ottoman historiography. Pragmatism has gained increasing currency over the last ten to fifteen years as one of the defining features of the Ottoman polity. I argue that unless it is properly defined from a theoretical-philosophical perspective, and carefully contextualized from a historical perspective, pragmatism cannot be used as an explanatory or comparative category. When used as a framework of explanation for historical change, pragmatism blurs (...) more than it clarifies an essential aspect of the Ottoman polity that it seeks to define, namely, the political. It is essential to reflect on the difference between the political and politics because whereas the political refers to the configuration of the power relations that organize a society as a legitimate entity, politics refers to the strategies, practices, institutions, or discourses whose purpose is to construct and retain hegemony within a polity. Through an analysis of the concept of pragmatism in Ottoman historiography, I show that for most proponents of Ottoman pragmatism, pragmatism pertains to politics rather than to the political. From a perspective rigorously confined to political theory, I argue that much like the discourse of modern tolerance, pragmatism in Ottoman historiography posits a problematic periodization, relegates the political to the background, and depoliticizes essential power relations. (shrink)