BackgroundStudies conducted in the health sector have determined a positive relationship between job satisfaction and work engagement. However, this paper reveals that this relationship turns into a negative or non-significant relationship during the COVID-19 pandemic. We explore the reasons for inconsistency in research findings in this critical period through a meta-analysis.MethodsThis study was conducted according to the PRISMA guidelines and PICO framework. Online databases including Web of Science, Scopus, PubMed, ProQuest, Google Scholar, and additional records from other databases were searched (...) without any time limitation, and all studies published in English that reported the correlation between work engagement and job satisfaction were included in the analysis. In total, 36 individual correlation coefficients were synthesized. R statistical language was used to analyze the data.ResultA total of 36 studies with a sample size of 16,087 were synthesized. The overall effect size was found as r = 0.57. While the moderating effect of national culture was not statistically significant, presence of COVID-19 as the significant moderator explained 37.08% of effect size heterogeneity. Such that the presence of COVID-19 has transformed the positive relationship between work engagement and job satisfaction into a negative but statistically non-significant relationship.ConclusionThis study empirically challenges the existing assumptions about the positive link between work engagement and job satisfaction. The results of the research can be a guide for managers and policymakers. Specifically, based on these results, different mechanisms can be put in place to support work engagement and, in turn, job satisfaction in the COVID-19 process. (shrink)

Davidson (in: LePore (ed), pp 433–46, 1986) uses the existence of malapropisms to motivate a model of linguistic communication where communication succeeds between conversational partners without their having to rely on conventional meanings. Davidson uses this model to then claim that there is no such thing as a conventional language shared by a linguistic community which must be known in advance for linguistic communication to succeed. However, for many cases, Davidson relies on there being standard lines of interpretation for communication (...) to be successful according to his model. Dummett (in: LePore (ed), pp 459–76, 1986) calls out Davidson on his reliance on the notion of standard lines, but does not clearly spell out why that is a problem for Davidson’s claim. I, taking cue from Dummett’s complaint, argue that the reliance on standard lines of interpretation is unavoidable for Davidson’s model and yet detrimental for Davidson’s claim. (shrink)

"This article is analysing the legal perspective on whistleblowing, at European and national level, focusing on the scientific studies’ results and theories, emphasizing nuances which worth discussing in order to a better understanding of the social phenomenon and of individual psychological decision process for reporting a wrongdoing or the suspicion of a possible breach. We are also arguing that current whistleblower regulations must take into account both the European directive and recent research in this field, pointing out some question which (...) are raising from the lack of the ethical and cultural focused research of Romanian society perspective on whistleblowing, considering also the recent past experiences of Romanians with ‘political police’ actions in years of communism. We are establishing a few research direction which we conclude that could bring the knowledge to drawing a more relevant and applicable whistleblowing law. Keywords: whistleblower, EU directive, Romanian law, whistleblower protection, normative conduct theories. ". (shrink)

Technical Novel by Andrei Platonovich Platonov shows the process of organizing and constructing a technological utopia. Technological utopianism, according to Howard P. Segal, is defined as "the use of hardware and of knowledge to create and preserve an intendedly perfect society."1 Segal emphasizes that the extent to which technology shapes a society's values, institutions, techniques, and way of life is what distinguishes a technological society from previous societies. In Technical Novel, the main characters strive toward building an ideal society by (...) laying down basic... (shrink)

We consider the extension of a (strict) preference over a set to its power set. Elements of the power set are non-resolute outcomes. The final outcome is determined by an “(external) chooser” which is a resolute choice function. The individual whose preference is under consideration confronts a set of resolute choice functions which reflects the possible behaviors of the chooser. Every such set naturally induces an extension axiom (i.e., a rule that determines how an individual with a given preference over (...) alternatives is required to rank certain sets). Our model allows to revisit various extension axioms of the literature. Interestingly, the Gärdenfors (1976) and Kelly (1977) principles are singled-out as the only two extension axioms compatible with the non-resolute outcome interpretation. (shrink)

Technology assessment (TA) is an important instrument for the regulation of innovation. From the perspective of sociology of knowledge, the regulatory process can be understood as a complex interplay between different forms of knowledge. The prevailing instruments of TA, expertise and participation, are both facing difficulties in dealing with the limits and impasses of regulatory knowledge in the realm of innovation. Nevertheless, as is argued in this article, reflexive forms of TA offer a good, if not the only, answer to (...) the question of how we can deal with the contradictions and paradoxes involved in the regulation of innovation. (shrink)

Ever since Kripke’s influential arguments against descriptivism philosophers have attempted to provide solutions to Frege’s puzzle of substitution failure that adhere to Naïve Semantics—the view that names contribute their referents and referents alone to propositions expressed by sentences containing them. Recently, philosophers have also appealed to psychological objects called mental files, which are used to represent and store information on individuals, in solving the puzzle. Combining the two promises to revive a simple commonsensical theory while, at least prima facie, doing (...) away with the need to rely on Fregean senses. Though I welcome the combined approach, I argue that the only plausible version of it is a pretense-based one. (shrink)

Jeshion (New essays on singular thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010b) believes that singular thought is implemented by the tokening of mental files (MFC). She also believes that an individual’s being significant to the agent is necessary and sufficient for the agent’s having singular thought about the individual (Cognitivism). Goodman (Rev Philos Psychol 7(2):437–461, 2016a, Philos Q 66:236–260, 2016b) argues that mental files created under a description lead to descriptive not singular thought. She uses this to criticize Cognitivism’s sufficiency claim (...) and MFC. I show that this criticism rests on a faulty conception of the singular thought versus descriptive thought distinction and such files indeed lead to singular thought. This in turn shows that Cognitivism’s necessity claim is false. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Jahrbuch für Wissenschaft und Ethik Jahrgang: 18 Heft: 1 Seiten: 281-318.

Participation of a broad variety of actors in decision-making processes has become an important issue in science and technology policy. Many authors claim the involvement of stakeholders and of the general public to be a core condition for legitimate and sustainable decision making. In the last decades, a wide spectrum of procedures has been developed to realize biotechnological citizenship. These procedures, composed of multiactor arenas, are either located in close relation to the system of politics, or, as in the case (...) of administrative decision making, more closely to the system of law. In the latter case, a problematic constellation arises. Here, law and science can build a technoscientific normativity that systematically excludes political discourse. The law, although intending to provide for political freedom and citizenship rights, at the end appears to be an ‘‘iron cage’’ for political communication. (shrink)

With this article, Paige Patterson identifies six events in the life of Martin Luther that shaped the Reformer and ultimately affected the entire Reformation. By surveying Luther’s journey to Rome, his friendship with Johann von Staupitz, the Leipzig Disputation, the Diet of Worms, his year in Wartburg Castle, and his marriage to Katharina von Bora, Patterson’s goal is for his readers to gain a greater understanding of Martin Luther. In so doing, Patterson encourages his readers to consider the contribution (...) of these events and the people involved to their own lives still today. (shrink)

Is Europe's continuing crisis merely a financial one? Tackling issues ranging from Europe's legal, institutional and cultural identity to its border, citizenship and integration policies, and looking forward to its legacy for the future, the contributors to this volume interrogate the various dimensions and contours of the European crisis. By revisiting Derrida's diagnosis of the crisis of European identity, they simultaneously propose a new direction for Europe, and an alternative response to today's crisis.

Proponents of Veritism believe that truth is the sole non-instrumental epistemic good. This view is often taken to entail that all truths should be of equal epistemic value. Hence, it is put under stress by the presence of trivial truths: truths to which we attach relatively little or no epistemic value. Pritchard, in the defense of Veritism, has tried to argue that the best way to understand the implications of Veritism is to think in terms of how an intellectually virtuous (...) inquirer would pursue truth. Furthermore, he thinks that such an inquirer would prefer weighty truths and set aside trivial ones. As such, he thinks that our epistemic disregard for trivial truths is just to be expected given Veritism. We argue that Pritchard’s defense of Veritism fails, and the problem of trivial truths remains a significant challenge for Veritism. (shrink)

We consider the problem of extending a (complete) order over a set to its power set. The extension axioms we consider generate orderings over sets according to their expected utilities induced by some assignment of utilities over alternatives and probability distributions over sets. The model we propose gives a general and unified exposition of expected utility consistent extensions whilst it allows to emphasize various subtleties, the effects of which seem to be underestimated – particularly in the literature on strategy-proof social (...) choice correspondences. (shrink)

The Dignity of the Children according to the New Testament teaching should be a landmark for modern era. New Testament raised the dignity of the unborn child, from a simple mass of cells to a child who has the right to be born and live. The child born has the value of a person that to enjoy family and society not only for economic potential but for the soul value as they bear the image of God. Children of different ages (...) have the right to be baptized, have access to the grace of the Sacraments and become saints. In fact the true dignity of man is his power to become a saint. And the child is the image of the saint, heir of the Heaven. (shrink)

Care Ethics needs to make clear and defensible normative claims. Michael Slote’s work shows how accounts taking care as a sentimental motive can do the needful. Such motive accounts of care can also provide a way to capture the important distinction between care and justice approaches to morality. However, it is important for Care Ethics to establish harmony between caring motives and acting rightly. Slote’s account does so at the cost of an unintuitive account of obligation. We propose another way (...) to capture this harmony. (shrink)

Comparative study of the aesthetic ideas of Ram Chandra Shukla, 1884-1941, Hindi critic, Benedictus de Spinoza, 1632-1677, and Bertrand Russell, 1872-1970, philosophers.

Der Produktionsfaktor Wissen produziert nicht nur Wissen, sondern zugleich auch Unwissen. Die Wissensgesellschaft ist auch eine Risikogesellschaft, in der die Normalität von Unfällen ebenso zu akzeptieren ist, wie das Fungieren der Gesellschaft als Labor neuer Technologien. Vor diesem Hintergrund der Gesellschaft als Wissensgesellschaft mit ihren beiden Seiten der Innovation und des Risikos ist die Frage zu sehen, wie die moderne Gesellschaft die ihr spezifische Problematik bearbeitet, mehr denn je von einem nicht auf seine positive Seite festlegbaren Wissen abhängig zu sein.

Priyanshu Prabal Upadhyaya, b. 1919, Sanskrit scholar; contributed articles on various aspects of Indic philosophy, Vedic and Sanskrit literature.

Bilim felsefesinin en temel problemlerinden biri olan sınırlandırma problemi belirli bir ölçüt vasıtası ile bilimi, bilimsel olmayan ya da sahte/sözde bilim olan etkinliklerden ayırt edip edemeyeceğimizi konu edinmektedir. Literatüre baktığımızda felsefeciler –özellikle bilim felsefecileri– bilimin doğasını karakterize etme girişiminde bulunurken bilim dilinin mantıksal yapısına ya da bilimin tarihsel süreçlerine odaklanarak, bilimi bilimsel olmayan ya da sahte-bilim olan etkinliklerden ayırt etmişlerdir. Bu çalışma ise farklı bir yaklaşım benimseyerek sınırlandırma problemine, felsefecilerin değil, bilim insanlarının perspektifi ile bakmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu sebeple alanında deneyimli (...) ve çeşitli bilim dallarında profesör olan otuz bilim insanı ile niteliksel araştırma yöntemlerinden biri olan yapılandırılmış görüşme tekniği uygulanmıştır. Bu görüşmeler aracılığıyla bilim insanlarının sınırlandırma problemi hususunda öne sürdükleri görüşler açığa çıkartılıp değerlendirilmiştir. Değerlendirme neticesinde üç temel bulguya ulaşılmıştır. İlki, sınırlandırma problemine ilişkin sorularımıza bilim insanları tarafından getirilen yanıtların birçoğu temel felsefi yaklaşımlarla uyuşmaktadır. Elde ettiğimiz verileri farklı temalar altında analiz ettiğimiz bu çalışmada, sınırlandırma problemine dair yaygın felsefi görüşlerin, bilim insanlarının görüşleri ile anlamlı benzerlikler taşıdığı kısımlar vurgulanmıştır. İkincisi, sınırlandırma problemi ve bu problemlerle ilişkili diğer meseleler üzerinde felsefi olarak sağlanamayan uzlaşma, bilim insanları arasında da mevcuttur. Ne var ki bu ihtilaf dengeli bir biçimdedir, öyle ki benzer yanıtlara sahip olan bilim insanları baskın bir grup sayısına ulaşmamıştır. Üçüncü ve son olarak, bilim insanlarının bilim felsefesinin temel problemlerine yüksek oranda yabancı olduğu görülmektedir. Bu bulgu, her ne kadar nicel olmayan bir yolla ölçülmüşse de verilerin dikkatli analizi durumun bu yönde olduğunu göstermektedir. Tüm bu temel bulgular ışığında, genel değerlendirmemiz, farklı türden yapılandırılmış görüşmelerin çok daha detaylı sonuçlar temin edebileceğidir. (shrink)

This book exhibits deep philosophical quandaries and intricacies of the historical development of science lying behind a simple and fundamental item of common sense in modern science, namely the composition of water as H2O. Three main phases of development are critically re-examined, covering the historical period from the 1760s to the 1860s: the Chemical Revolution, early electrochemistry, and early atomic chemistry. In each case, the author concludes that the empirical evidence available at the time was not decisive in settling the (...) central debates and therefore the consensus that was reached was unjustified or at least premature. This leads to a significant re-examination of the realism question in the philosophy of science and a unique new advocacy for pluralism in science. Each chapter contains three layers, allowing readers to follow various parts of the book at their chosen level of depth and detail. The second major study in "complementary science", this book offers a rare combination of philosophy, history and science in a bid to improve scientific knowledge through history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

This book presents the concept of “complementary science” which contributes to scientific knowledge through historical and philosophical investigations. It emphasizes the fact that many simple items of knowledge that we take for granted were actually spectacular achievements obtained only after a great deal of innovative thinking, painstaking experiments, bold conjectures, and serious controversies. Each chapter in the book consists of two parts: a narrative part that states the philosophical puzzle and gives a problem-centred narrative on the historical attempts to solve (...) the puzzle; and the analysis part which provides in-depth analyses of certain scientific, historical, and philosophical aspects of the story. (shrink)

Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.".

In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...) question of a normative ground, 2) examines one or two of the most difficult problems for each, proposing along the way a new objection to one, and 3) argues that a particular hybrid view about normative grounds –‘hybrid voluntarism’ – avoids each of the main problems faced by the three leading ‘pure’ views. (shrink)

Mevcut literatüre odaklanarak alandaki ilerlemeyi, yönünü ve güncel eğilimleri tespit etmeye çalışan araştırmalar öz yansıtıcı çalışmalar olarak adlandırılmaktadır. İletişim alanına yönelen öz yansıtıcı bir çalışma olarak bu araştırmada Türkiye’de yayınlanan ve ESCI indeksinde taranan Connectist: Istanbul University Journal of Communication Sciences, İlef Dergisi ve Türkiye İletişim Araştırmaları Dergisi ele alınarak 2020-2022 yılları arasında yayınlanan araştırma makaleleri önce bibliyometrik analiz, ardından içerik analizi tekniği ile iki aşamada incelemiştir. Böylece 2023 Şubat-Nisan tarihleri arasında gerçekleşen bu araştırmada Türkiye’nin iletişim alanında önde gelen dergileri (...) üzerinden alanın güncel bir görünümü elde edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu kapsamda toplam 210 makale araştırmanın örneklemi olarak belirlenmiştir. İletişim alanında yapılan çalışmalar göz önüne alındığında, ilgili dergilerdeki araştırma makalelerine yönelik karşılaştırmalı olarak gerçekleşen bibliyometrik analiz ve içerik analizine rastlanmaması araştırmanın özgünlüğünü ifade eder. Gerçekleştirilen analizler neticesinde; (1) sosyal medya ve COVID-19 anahtar kelimelerinin ön plana çıktığı; blockchain, yapay zekâ, pandemi iletişimi, dezenformasyon, sürdürülebilirlik, sürdürülebilir iletişim, sivil toplum ile kullanımlar ve doyumlar anahtar kelimelerinin dikkat çektiği, (2) çoğunlukla dijital medyaya odaklanıldığı, (3) fon kullanan makale sayısının oldukça az olduğu, (4) makalelerin çoğunlukla Türkiye menşeli olduğu ve Türkçe yazıldığı, (5) büyük çoğunluğun İletişim Çalışmaları alanına ait olduğu, (6) makalelerin neredeyse tamama yakınının tek bir araştırmadan oluştuğu, (7) nitel araştırma yöntemi ile içerik analizi araştırma tekniğinin ve (8) örneklem bağlamında ise ikincil verilerin ve amaçlı örnekleme yönteminin daha sık tercih edildiği bulgulanmıştır. (shrink)

This paper is the introduction to the volume. It gives an argumentative view of the philosophical landscape concerning incommensurability and incomparability. It argues that incomparability, not incommensurability, is the important phenomenon on which philosophers should be focusing and that the arguments for the existence of incomparability are so far not compelling.

Why do some epistemic objects persist despite undergoing serious changes, while others go extinct in similar situations? Scientists have often been careless in deciding which epistemic objects to retain and which ones to eliminate; historians and philosophers of science have been on the whole much too unreflective in accepting the scientists’ decisions in this regard. Through a re-examination of the history of oxygen and phlogiston, I will illustrate the benefits to be gained from challenging and disturbing the commonly accepted continuities (...) and discontinuities in the lives of epistemic objects. I will also outline two key consequences of such re-thinking. First, a fresh view on the (dis)continuities in key epistemic objects is apt to lead to informative revisions in recognized periods and trends in the history of science. Second, recognizing sources of continuity leads to a sympathetic view on extinct objects, which in turn problematizes the common monistic tendency in science and philosophy; this epistemological reorientation allows room for more pluralism in scientific practice itself. (shrink)

This article explores the main similarities and differences between Derek Parfit’s notion of imprecise comparability and a related notion I have proposed of parity. I argue that the main difference between imprecise comparability and parity can be understood by reference to ‘the standard view’. The standard view claims that 1) differences between cardinally ranked items can always be measured by a scale of units of the relevant value, and 2) all rankings proceed in terms of the trichotomy of ‘better than’, (...) ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. Imprecise comparability, which can be understood in terms of the more familiar notions of cardinality and incommensurability, rejects only the first claim while parity rejects both claims of the standard view. -/- I then argue that insofar as those attracted to imprecise comparability assume that all rankings are trichotomous, as Parfit appears to, the view should be rejected. This is because imprecise equality is not a form of equality but is a sui generis ‘fourth’ basic way in which items can be ranked. We should, I argue, understand imprecise equality as parity, and imprecise comparability as entailing ‘tetrachotomy’ – that if two items are comparable, one must better than, worse than, equal to, or on a par with the other. Thus those attracted to the idea that cardinality can be imprecise should abandon trichotomy and accept parity and tetrachotomy instead. -/- Finally, I illustrate the difference between Parfit’s trichotomous notion of imprecise comparability and parity by examining how each notion might be employed in different solutions to the problem posed by the Repugnant Conclusion in population ethics. I suggest that parity provides the arguably more ecumenical solution to the problem. (shrink)

This chapter argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model—as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you make a (...) promise to x, then you have a reason to x’. Instead, internal commitments are that in virtue of which one has the special reasons of committed relationships; they are the grounds of such reasons. In this way, the will is a source of practical normativity. (shrink)

One of the most common judgments of normative life takes the following form: With respect to some things that matter, one item is better than the other, with respect to other things that matter, the other item is better, but all things considered – that is, taking into account all the things that matter – the one item is better than the other. In this paper, I explore how all-things-considered judgments are possible, assuming that they are. In particular, I examine (...) the question of how the different considerations relevant to an all-things-considered judgment come together in a way that gives each relevant consideration its proper due. I propose an answer which provides a unified account of all-things-considered judgments and highlights a deep connection between value and reason. My suggestion is that ‘all things considered’ is, in effect, a placeholder for a more comprehensive, sometimes nameless, value that includes the things considered as parts, and that this more comprehensive value determines how the things considered normatively relate. (shrink)

This paper investigates two puzzles in practical reason and proposes a solution to them. First, sometimes, when we are practically certain that neither of two alternatives is better than or as good as the other with respect to what matters in the choice between them, it nevertheless seems perfectly rational to continue to deliberate, and sometimes the result of that deliberation is a conclusion that one alternative is better, where there is no error in one’s previous judgment. Second, there are (...) striking differences between rational agents – some rational agents have most reason to pursue careers on Wall Street while others have most reason to take up a career in teaching, or scuba diving, or working for political causes. These differences aren’t plausibly explained by ‘passive’ facts about our psychology or their causal interaction with our environment; instead, these facts seem in some sense to ‘express who we are’. But what is this sense? These puzzles disappear if we adopt a novel view about the source of the normativity of reasons – some reasons are given to us and others are reasons in virtue of an act of will. We make certain considerations reasons through an act of will and thus sometimes make it true through an act of agency that we have most reason to do one thing rather than another. (shrink)

This introductory article describes the phenomena of incommensurability and incomparability, how they are related, and why they are important. Since incomparability is the more significant phenomenon, the paper takes that as its focus. It gives a detailed account of what incomparability is, investigates the relation between the incomparability of values and the incomparability of alternatives for choice, distinguishes incomparability from the related phenomena of parity, indeterminacy, and noncomparability, and, finally, defends a view about practical justification that vindicates the importance of (...) incomparability — assuming it exists — for practical reason. (shrink)