Dealing with the reform of the Transplantation Law, the first issue of the new rubric “Philosophie aktuell” met with strong and lively interest from our readers. Subsequent to this discussion a growing number of reports were published dealing with violations of mandatory rules of conduct in transplantation medicine. Therefore the topic is revisited here from the slightly different vantage point “organ transplantation II: elucidation and confidence”.

Sommario. Prima che di definire un modello della coscienza e comprendere che cosa sia un fenomeno soggettivo, è necessario sviluppare una teoria della prospettiva in prima persona. Questa teoria deve essere concettualmente con- vincente, empiricamente plausibile e, soprattutto, aperta a nuovi sviluppi. Il quadro di riferimento concettuale deve essere coerente con il progresso scienti- fico. Le sue ipotesi fondamentali devono essere adattabili in modo da permette- re a nuovi risultati sperimentali di essere inseriti nel modello teorico. Questo ar- ticolo tenta (...) di definire le linee generali di una teoria in grado di offrire un’analisi rappresentazionale della prospettiva in prima persona. Tre proprietà fenomeniche sono centrali a quest’analisi: “egoicità” (la proprietà fenomenica; il senso di possesso di una sensazione), “selfhood” (l’esperienza cosciente di essere qualcuno) e la prospetticità (una caratteristica strutturale: il fatto che lo spazio fenomenico appaia organizzato attorno a un centro, una prospettiva su- per-modale). Questo articolo analizza queste proprietà da un punto di vista sia rappresentazionale che funzionale. Introdurrò nuovi vincoli concettuali per le rappresentazioni fenomeniche e due entità teoriche necessarie per capire che cosa sia la prospettiva in prima persona: “il modello fenomenico del sé” (PSM: phenomenal self model) e il “modello fenomenico della relazione intenzionale” (PMIR: phenomenal model of intentional relation). Un modello fenomenico del sé è una struttura rappresentazionale plurimodale, il cui contenuto costituisce il contenuto dell’esperienza del sé cosciente. Ha due caratteristiche importanti. Primo, è l’unica struttura rappresentazionale ancorata nel cervello da un colle- gamento funzionale permanente. Secondo, parti consistenti del PSM sono fe- nomenicamente trasparenti: non posso essere identificate come rappresentazioni all’interno del sistema. Sono intrappolate in quello che è stato definito un “in- genuo realismo auto-ingannevole”.. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty: From Perspective to the Chiasm,the Epistemic Rigor of an AnalogyHere, we wish to take up the discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm in light of the question of its status. Is it a matter of a metaphor without any cognitive value resulting from an analogical and arbitrary transfer from one domain to another, or is it a matter of a rigorous concept susceptible of being experimented upon, taken up again, or improved? If the latter is the case, what is (...) the nature of this concept? Is it descriptive, heuristic, or even logical? The question is worth asking insofar as it is not only the most orthodox positivists who may be likely to see, in this transfer of concept, nothing more than poetic license. Indeed, the most careful commentators authorized by Merleau-Ponty are in lockstep with the critics of his supposedly “literary” style. “Ambiguous” is thus the term, which more often describes Merleau-Ponty’s notions of encroachment, of reversibility, or even chiasm. First, we shall examine the function and the role of the concept of chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. We shall then establish its scope in order to be able to determine its exact status. It is only at the conclusion of this study that we will be able to show how this notion sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s main concern, namely, to produce a counter-model of perspective and to promote a newcategory of relation – a concern which organizes the seemingly unrelated elements in his philosophy.Merleau-Ponty: dalla prospettiva al chiasma,il rigore epistemico di un’analogiaIntendiamo riprendere, in questa sede, la discussione sulla nozione di chiasma in Merleau-Ponty, alla luce di una domanda circa il suo statuto: si tratta di una metafora, priva di ogni valore cognitivo perché nata da un trasferimento analogico ed arbitrario da un campo semantico ad un altro, o si tratta di un concetto rigoroso, suscettibile di essere messo alla prova dell’esperienza e via via perfezionato? In tal caso, qual è la natura di questo concetto? È descrittiva, euristica, oppure logica? È interessante porre questa domanda dato che non sono solamente i positivisti più ortodossi, a vedere in questo trasferimento una semplice licenza poetica. In effetti, molti tra i commentatori più autorevoli di Merleau-Ponty aderiscono alle diverse critiche sollevate intorno alla presunta natura «letteraria» di questa espressione, e ritengono che il chiasma sia una semplice metafora. Interrogheremo innanzitutto la funzione e il ruolo di questo concetto nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty al fine di determinarne l’esatto statuto. Solo al termine di questo studio preliminare potremo mostrare come questa nozione possa gettare nuova luce sulla preoccupazione principale di Merleau-Ponty, vero e proprio filo rosso che organizza in profondità tutti gli elementi apparentemente eterogenei della sua filosofia: vale a dire, il tentativo di produrre un contro-modello della prospettiva e una nuova categoria di relazione. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty: From Perspective to the Chiasm,the Epistemic Rigor of an AnalogyHere, we wish to take up the discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm in light of the question of its status. Is it a matter of a metaphor without any cognitive value resulting from an analogical and arbitrary transfer from one domain to another, or is it a matter of a rigorous concept susceptible of being experimented upon, taken up again, or improved? If the latter is the case, what is (...) the nature of this concept? Is it descriptive, heuristic, or even logical? The question is worth asking insofar as it is not only the most orthodox positivists who may be likely to see, in this transfer of concept, nothing more than poetic license. Indeed, the most careful commentators authorized by Merleau-Ponty are in lockstep with the critics of his supposedly “literary” style. “Ambiguous” is thus the term, which more often describes Merleau-Ponty’s notions of encroachment, of reversibility, or even chiasm. First, we shall examine the function and the role of the concept of chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. We shall then establish its scope in order to be able to determine its exact status. It is only at the conclusion of this study that we will be able to show how this notion sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s main concern, namely, to produce a counter-model of perspective and to promote a newcategory of relation – a concern which organizes the seemingly unrelated elements in his philosophy.Merleau-Ponty: dalla prospettiva al chiasma,il rigore epistemico di un’analogiaIntendiamo riprendere, in questa sede, la discussione sulla nozione di chiasma in Merleau-Ponty, alla luce di una domanda circa il suo statuto: si tratta di una metafora, priva di ogni valore cognitivo perché nata da un trasferimento analogico ed arbitrario da un campo semantico ad un altro, o si tratta di un concetto rigoroso, suscettibile di essere messo alla prova dell’esperienza e via via perfezionato? In tal caso, qual è la natura di questo concetto? È descrittiva, euristica, oppure logica? È interessante porre questa domanda dato che non sono solamente i positivisti più ortodossi, a vedere in questo trasferimento una semplice licenza poetica. In effetti, molti tra i commentatori più autorevoli di Merleau-Ponty aderiscono alle diverse critiche sollevate intorno alla presunta natura «letteraria» di questa espressione, e ritengono che il chiasma sia una semplice metafora. Interrogheremo innanzitutto la funzione e il ruolo di questo concetto nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty al fine di determinarne l’esatto statuto. Solo al termine di questo studio preliminare potremo mostrare come questa nozione possa gettare nuova luce sulla preoccupazione principale di Merleau-Ponty, vero e proprio filo rosso che organizza in profondità tutti gli elementi apparentemente eterogenei della sua filosofia: vale a dire, il tentativo di produrre un contro-modello della prospettiva e una nuova categoria di relazione. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty: From Perspective to the Chiasm,the Epistemic Rigor of an AnalogyHere, we wish to take up the discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm in light of the question of its status. Is it a matter of a metaphor without any cognitive value resulting from an analogical and arbitrary transfer from one domain to another, or is it a matter of a rigorous concept susceptible of being experimented upon, taken up again, or improved? If the latter is the case, what is (...) the nature of this concept? Is it descriptive, heuristic, or even logical? The question is worth asking insofar as it is not only the most orthodox positivists who may be likely to see, in this transfer of concept, nothing more than poetic license. Indeed, the most careful commentators authorized by Merleau-Ponty are in lockstep with the critics of his supposedly “literary” style. “Ambiguous” is thus the term, which more often describes Merleau-Ponty’s notions of encroachment, of reversibility, or even chiasm. First, we shall examine the function and the role of the concept of chiasm in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. We shall then establish its scope in order to be able to determine its exact status. It is only at the conclusion of this study that we will be able to show how this notion sheds light on Merleau-Ponty’s main concern, namely, to produce a counter-model of perspective and to promote a newcategory of relation – a concern which organizes the seemingly unrelated elements in his philosophy.Merleau-Ponty: dalla prospettiva al chiasma,il rigore epistemico di un’analogiaIntendiamo riprendere, in questa sede, la discussione sulla nozione di chiasma in Merleau-Ponty, alla luce di una domanda circa il suo statuto: si tratta di una metafora, priva di ogni valore cognitivo perché nata da un trasferimento analogico ed arbitrario da un campo semantico ad un altro, o si tratta di un concetto rigoroso, suscettibile di essere messo alla prova dell’esperienza e via via perfezionato? In tal caso, qual è la natura di questo concetto? È descrittiva, euristica, oppure logica? È interessante porre questa domanda dato che non sono solamente i positivisti più ortodossi, a vedere in questo trasferimento una semplice licenza poetica. In effetti, molti tra i commentatori più autorevoli di Merleau-Ponty aderiscono alle diverse critiche sollevate intorno alla presunta natura «letteraria» di questa espressione, e ritengono che il chiasma sia una semplice metafora. Interrogheremo innanzitutto la funzione e il ruolo di questo concetto nella filosofia di Merleau-Ponty al fine di determinarne l’esatto statuto. Solo al termine di questo studio preliminare potremo mostrare come questa nozione possa gettare nuova luce sulla preoccupazione principale di Merleau-Ponty, vero e proprio filo rosso che organizza in profondità tutti gli elementi apparentemente eterogenei della sua filosofia: vale a dire, il tentativo di produrre un contro-modello della prospettiva e una nuova categoria di relazione. (shrink)

Issues of reliability are claiming center-stage in the epistemology of machine learning. This paper unifies different branches in the literature and points to promising research directions, whilst also providing an accessible introduction to key concepts in statistics and machine learning – as far as they are concerned with reliability.

Big Ideas for Little Kids includes everything a teacher, a parent, or a college student needs to teach philosophy to elementary school children from picture books. Written in a clear and accessible style, the book explains why it is important to allow young children access to philosophy during primary-school education. Wartenberg also gives advice on how to construct a "learner-centered" classroom, in which children discuss philosophical issues with one another as they respond to open-ended questions by saying whether they agree (...) or disagree with what others have said. (shrink)

After a short summary of the interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’ conception of being given by E. Gilson, according which the actus essendi is existence, the article sets out the criticisms addressed to this conception by P.T. Geach and A. Kenny, showing that they converge with the criticism developed by the author himself in an article of 1979 on Aristotle. In the author’s view, the best reply to this criticism given by the Thomists is the reply of S.L. Brocks, who (...) has shown that the actus essendi is the perfect way of being which belongs only to God. The author shows that this conception is confirmed by some passages of Thomas’ De ente et essentia. (shrink)

This immense investigation, covering logic, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, aesthetics, religion, ethics, politics, and pedagogy, rests mainly on two notions: 1) that of syneteric judgments, which make a realist epistemology and ontology possible; and 2) that of partial being: a finite individual is only partially, being in space and time; becoming is a transmission of quantity of being and is a descending process. This thesis leads to a reformulation of St. Thomas' Fourth Way, and, inter alia, to a (...) liberal, non-optimistic, anti-utopian moral and political viewpoint.--R. N. S. (shrink)

Cette étude essaye d’établir qu’il y a deux notions très différentes de « fondation » à l’œuvre dans les Recherches logiques de Husserl. Dans la IIIème Recherche, où le terme est formellement introduit, lorsqu’il se demande quels sont les contenus qui peuvent exister d’une manière autonome (indépendants) et lesquels peuvent exister uniquement en tant que moments d’autre chose (dépendants), Husserl suit ce que j’appelle un « modèle ontologique ». Selon ce modèle, le concret possède une priorité sur à l’abstrait qui (...) est fondé en lui. Dans la VIème Recherche, en revanche, Husserl s’oriente principalement sur un « modèle gnoséologique » qui voit le complexe comme fondé sur ce qui est relativement simple, étant donné que les expériences d’ordre supérieur (telles les perceptions de types d’objets plus complexes) sont « fondées sur » des expériences plus simples, bien qu’elles ne puissent pas y être réduites. L’exemple principal ici est celui des intuitions catégoriales : fondées sur les intuitions sensibles, elles n’y sont pas réductibles. Mais cette distinction entre deux sens différents du terme de « fondation » peut également nous aider à mieux comprendre de nombreuses thèses husserliennes plutôt controversées. Par exemple, elle peut nous permettre de mieux comprendre dans quelle mesure faire l’expérience d’un être humain comme un tout se fonde sur l’expérience d’un corps physique, et cela même si l’étant que nous rencontrons inclut à la fois des aspects corporels et des aspects spirituels – les deux étant vus, d’une manière essentielle, comme des moments de cette unique personne qui fait l’objet de notre expérience. (shrink)

v. 1. Editorial introduction -- v. 2. The English and Latin texts (i) -- v. 3. The English and Latin texts (ii).

Taking its cue from the famous articles in which the Jesuit Marcel Chossat, in the early decades of the last century, was the first to suggest that the doctrine of the real distinction between being and essence should be attributed to Giles of Rome, and not to Thomas Aquinas, the article proposes to consider the Neoplatonic matrix of Giles’ distinction, and to re-examine in more detail the doctrine of participation, which is the real trigger of the controversy between Giles (...) and Henry of Ghent. It suggests that Thomas Aquinas, Henry and Giles all three draw on the Proclean tradition, but each choosing different elements, as attested especially by the different readings of the fourth and ninth proposition of the De causis. Finally, it points out that the purpose of the distinction between being and essence is not at all, in Aquinas, to account for the contingency of creation, but to highlight the superiority of God not only with respect to all that possesses matter, but also to all that possesses only a form, even if intrinsically necessary. The distance between Giles and Aquinas could not be greater in this respect: the Dominican Master is not at all interested in showing the radical contingency of all creatures, including separate substances. On the contrary, insofar as he defends the idea that separate substances, as pure forms, are inseparable from their being, it remains true that one could legitimately speak, with regard to this aspect, of “St Thomas’ Averroism”, as Chossat wanted. (shrink)

Taking its cue from the famous articles in which the Jesuit Marcel Chossat, in the early decades of the last century, was the first to suggest that the doctrine of the real distinction between being and essence should be attributed to Giles of Rome, and not to Thomas Aquinas, the article proposes to consider the Neoplatonic matrix of Giles’ distinction, and to re-examine in more detail the doctrine of participation, which is the real trigger of the controversy between Giles (...) and Henry of Ghent. It suggests that Thomas Aquinas, Henry and Giles all three draw on the Proclean tradition, but each choosing different elements, as attested especially by the different readings of the fourth and ninth proposition of the De causis. Finally, it points out that the purpose of the distinction between being and essence is not at all, in Aquinas, to account for the contingency of creation, but to highlight the superiority of God not only with respect to all that possesses matter, but also to all that possesses only a form, even if intrinsically necessary. The distance between Giles and Aquinas could not be greater in this respect: the Dominican Master is not at all interested in showing the radical contingency of all creatures, including separate substances. On the contrary, insofar as he defends the idea that separate substances, as pure forms, are inseparable from their being, it remains true that one could legitimately speak, with regard to this aspect, of “St Thomas’ Averroism”, as Chossat wanted. (shrink)

In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other.

This paper is an exposition and evaluation of the Agustín Rayo's views about the epistemology and metaphysics of mathematics, as they are presented in his book The Construction of Logical Space.

In recent years an increasing number of psychologists have begun to explore the prevalence, causes and effects of ordinary people’s intuitions about moral realism. Many of these studies have lacked in construct validity, i.e., they have failed to measure moral realism. My aim in this paper accordingly is to motivate and guide methodological improvements. In analysis of prominent existing measures, I develop general recommendations for overcoming ten prima facie serious worries about research on folk moral realism. G1 and G2 require (...) studies’ answer choices to be as metaethically comprehensive as methodologically feasible. G3 and G4 prevent fallacious inferences from intuitions about related debates. G5 and G6 limit first-order moral and epistemic influences. G7 address studies’ instructions. And G8 and G9 suggest tests of important psychological presuppositions. (shrink)

This volume is a study of the influence of Timaeus on the development of Western cosmology in three axial periods of European culture: Late Antiquity, Middle Ages and Renaissance.

The idea of the positive theory is to avoid the Russell's paradox by postulating an axiom scheme of comprehension for formulas without "too much" negations. In this paper, we show that the axiom of choice is inconsistent with the positive theory $GPK^+ \infty$.

In recent years, a plethora of high-profile scientific publications has been reporting about machine learning algorithms outperforming clinicians in medical diagnosis or treatment recommendations. This has spiked interest in deploying relevant algorithms with the aim of enhancing decision-making in healthcare. In this paper, we argue that instead of straightforwardly enhancing the decision-making capabilities of clinicians and healthcare institutions, deploying machines learning algorithms entails trade-offs at the epistemic and the normative level. Whereas involving machine learning might improve the accuracy of medical (...) diagnosis, it comes at the expense of opacity when trying to assess the reliability of given diagnosis. Drawing on literature in social epistemology and moral responsibility, we argue that the uncertainty in question potentially undermines the epistemic authority of clinicians. Furthermore, we elucidate potential pitfalls of involving machine learning in healthcare with respect to paternalism, moral responsibility and fairness. At last, we discuss how the deployment of machine learning algorithms might shift the evidentiary norms of medical diagnosis. In this regard, we hope to lay the grounds for further ethical reflection of the opportunities and pitfalls of machine learning for enhancing decision-making in healthcare. (shrink)

Thomas Reid is now recognized as one of the towering figures of the Enlightenment. Best known for his published writings on epistemology and moral theory, he was also an accomplished mathematician and natural philosopher, as an earlier volume of his manuscripts edited by Paul Wood for the Edinburgh Reid Edition, Thomas Reid on the Animate Creation, has shown. The Correspondence of Thomas Reid collects all of the known letters to and from Reid in a fully annotated form. (...) Letters already published by Sir William Hamilton and others have been reedited, and roughly half of the letters included appear in print for the first time. Writing in 1802, Reid's disciple and biographer Dugald Stewart doubted that Reid's correspondence &"would be generally interesting.&" This collection proves otherwise, for the letters illuminate virtually every aspect of Reid's life and career and, in some instances, provide us with invaluable evidence about activities otherwise undocumented in his manuscripts or published works. Through his correspondence we can trace Reid's relations with contemporaries such as David Hume and his colleagues at both King's College, Aberdeen, and the University of Glasgow, as well as his engagement with the most controversial philosophical, scientific, and political issues of his day. If anything, the letters assembled here serve as the starting point for understanding Reid and his place in the Enlightenment. (shrink)

Ein sicheres Kriterium für den menschlichen Tod gibt es nicht. Die neu entfachte Diskussion über den Hirntod zeigt, dass allein aus einem medizinisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Verständnis heraus keine angemessene Bestimmung des Todes zu gewinnen ist. Die Beiträge des Bandes verdeutlichen: Um den Tod begrifflich angemessen zu fassen, muss die personale Dimension des menschlichen Lebens berücksichtigt werden.

Feeling good: four ways -- Finding that feeling -- The place of pleasure -- Knowing what's what -- Making things happen -- Being good -- Love and friendship -- Putting it together.

Conciliatory theories of disagreement require that one lower one’s confidence in a belief in the face of disagreement from an epistemic peer. One question about which people might disagree is who should qualify as an epistemic peer and who should not. But when putative epistemic peers disagree about epistemic peerhood itself, then Conciliationism makes contradictory demands and paradoxes arise.

Existing research suggests that people's judgments of actual causation can be influenced by the degree to which they regard certain events as normal. We develop an explanation for this phenomenon that draws on standard tools from the literature on graphical causal models and, in particular, on the idea of probabilistic sampling. Using these tools, we propose a new measure of actual causal strength. This measure accurately captures three effects of normality on causal judgment that have been observed in existing studies. (...) More importantly, the measure predicts a new effect ("abnormal deflation"). Two studies show that people's judgments do, in fact, show this new effect. Taken together, the patterns of people's causal judgments thereby provide support for the proposed explanation. (shrink)

A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf of other people. Are we permitted to implement any (...) of the rationally permissible risk attitudes, is there some specific risk attitude that is required when choosing for others, or are we required to defer to the risk attitudes of the people on whose behalf we are choosing? This article elaborates on this question, explains its wider practical and theoretical significance, provides an overview of existing answers, and explores how to go about providing a more systematic account of how to choose on behalf of others in risky contexts. (shrink)

Cet essai présente une description de plusieurs travaux inédits de Jacques Derrida au sujet de Marx et d'Althusser datant des années 1960 et 1970. Au-delà du travail philologique, il s'agit aussi d'une étude théorique de notions telles que 'idéologie', 'fétichisme', 'reproduction', 'division du travail', 'différence sexuelle', 'domination', 'économie politique', 'matérialisme dialectique', ou 'production culturelle' — tout autant à travers les textes marxistes que dans les lectures déconstructives qu'en propose alors Derrida. Durant les années 1970, dans le cadre de son séminaire, (...) Derrida s'efforce de penser une autre économie politique, au-delà de l'économie du propre qu'il identifie aussi bien chez les économistes classiques que chez leurs critiques marxistes. Ces lectures détaillées et combattives de textes marxistes restent aujourd'hui inédites. Leur prise en compte contribue à redéfinir l'image de Derrida et de la déconstruction, en témoignant de ses discussions très avancées de Marx, d'Althusser, et de la pensée marxiste — et ce dès la fin des années 1960 et le début des années 1970, plus de 20 ans avant la publication de Spectres de Marx (1993). -/- Une version plus courte de cet article fut traduite en espagnol par Ramiro Parodi, et publiée en 2019 dans le numéro 7 de la revue Demarcaciones — numéro consacré au 25ème anniversaire de la publication de Spectres de Marx. (shrink)

L’articolo esamina il rapporto fra individuo e comunità nel pensiero politico di Tommaso d’Aquino. In particolare, il problema filosofico qui discusso può es­sere presentato nel modo seguente: secondo Tommaso, l’essere di un singolo in­­dividuo è determinato dalla sua appartenenza a una data comunità politica o, vice­versa, l’essere di una comunità dipende da quello di ciascuno dei suoi mem­bri? L’articolo argomenta che Tommaso ha alcune ragioni filosofiche per an­teporre la comunità all’individuo, ma anche alcune ragioni teologiche per porre al centro l’individuo. (...) Alla fine, l’interpretazione è che, nonostante al­cu­ne possibili oscillazioni, Tommaso assuma che essere parte di una comunità po­litica, o essere cittadini, sia una proprietà necessaria ma non essenziale per definire l’essere uomo.This paper aims to reconstruct the relationship between individual and com­munity in Thomas Aquinas’s political thought. The philosophical problem I discuss is the following: On Aquinas’s writings, is the metaphysical value of an individual man finally expressed by its belonging to a certain political com­munity or, vice versa, the value of a community ensue from that of its mem­berships? I show that Aquinas has some philosophical arguments to put the community before the individual, but also some theological reasons to prefer the individual. At the end of the day, my interpretation is that, except for some hesitations that can be found in his writings, Aquinas subscribes to the view that the property of being a member of a political community, namely being a citizen, is a necessary but not an essential property for being a man. (shrink)