The extent to which God grounds normativity within natural law theory is analyzed. I examine Hugo Grotius’s understanding of natural law and human nature and show that Grotius makes few explicit metaphysical commitments which makes his view open to development in at least two different ways. Then a Thomistic view of natural law and human nature is developed. It is shown that Grotius’s position could be developed as a proto-new natural law theory, but this leaves it (...) open to powerful objections from Fulvio Di Blasi and other Thomistic philosophers. Finally, I argue that a view can be developed in such a way as to take on certain elements of the Thomistic view, particularly its metaphysics, but still maintain the famous Grotian claim that human nature can establish normativity without God. The key to this is the distinction between the order of knowing and the order of being. (shrink)

Humean Laws for Human Agents presents cutting-edge research by leading experts on the Humean account of laws, chance, possibility, and necessity. A central question in metaphysics and philosophy of science is: What are laws of nature? Humeans hold that laws are not sui generis metaphysical entities but merely particularly effective summaries of what actually happens. The most discussed recent work on Humeanism emphasizes the laws' usefulness for limited agents and uses pragmatic considerations to address fundamental and long-standing problems. The current (...) volume develops and critically examines pragmatic Humean accounts, with innovative new work on the epistemology of laws and chance, the problem of induction, counterfactuals, special science laws, and a Humean account of essence. Taken together, the papers provide a roadmap for developing pragmatic Humeanism and connate views, setting the agenda for future research. (shrink)

Humean reductionism about laws of nature is the view that the laws reduce to the total distribution of non-modal or categorical properties in spacetime. A worry about Humean reductionism is that it cannot motivate the characteristic modal resilience of laws under counterfactual suppositions and that it thus generates wrong verdicts about certain nested counterfactuals. In this paper, we defend Humean reductionism by motivating an account of the modal resilience of Humean laws that gets nested counterfactuals right.

Philosophers have argued about the nature and the very existence of free will for centuries. Today, many scientists and scientifically minded commentators are skeptical that it exists, especially when it is understood to require the ability to choose between alternative possibilities. If the laws of physics govern everything that happens, they argue, then how can our choices be free? Believers in free will must be misled by habit, sentiment, or religious doctrine. Why Free Will Is Real defies scientific orthodoxy and (...) presents a bold new defense of free will in the same naturalistic terms that are usually deployed against it. -/- Unlike those who defend free will by giving up the idea that it requires alternative possibilities to choose from, Christian List retains this idea as central, resisting the tendency to defend free will by watering it down. He concedes that free will and its prerequisites—intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control over our actions—cannot be found among the fundamental physical features of the natural world. But, he argues, that’s not where we should be looking. Free will is a “higher-level” phenomenon found at the level of psychology. It is like other phenomena that emerge from physical processes but are autonomous from them and not best understood in fundamental physical terms—like an ecosystem or the economy. When we discover it in its proper context, acknowledging that free will is real is not just scientifically respectable; it is indispensable for explaining our world. (shrink)

Humean reductionism about laws of nature appears to leave a central aspect of scientific practice unmotivated: If the world’s fundamental structure is exhausted by the actual distribution of non-modal properties and the laws of nature are merely efficient summaries of this distribution, then why does science posit laws that cover a wide range of non-actual circumstances? In this paper, we develop a new version of the Humean best systems account of laws based on the idea that laws need to organize (...) information in a way that maximizes their cognitive usefulness for creature like us. We argue that this account motivates scientific practice because the laws’ applicability to non-actual circumstances falls right out of their cognitive usefulness. (shrink)

Humeans about laws maintain that laws of nature are nothing over and above the complete distribution of non-modal, categorical properties in spacetime. ‘Humean compatibilists’ argue that if Humeanism about laws is true, then agents in a deterministic world can do otherwise than they are lawfully determined to do because of the distinctive nature of Humean laws. More specifically, they reject a central premise of the Consequence argument by maintaining that deterministic laws of nature are ‘up to us’. In this paper, (...) we present a new argument for Humean compatibilism. We argue that Humeans about laws indeed have resources for defending compatibilism that non-Humeans lack. Moreover, we show that utilizing these resources does not lead to objectionable consequences. Humeans about laws should thus embrace Humean compatibilism. (shrink)

The Bavarian and the Indian constitutions were developed in almost the same period of time. Because of historic experiences the prospect of legal certainty was the determining factor for the representatives of the people in India and Bavaria. They elaborated functioning constitutions and integrated their fundamental ideological principles quite naturally. The Indian and the Bavarian constitution are characterized by their aspirations to balance social injustice, particularly by striking a balance between individual liberty and social need.The history of political economy demonstrates (...) a broad variety of interpretations regarding the meaning and function of value concepts. When we review all these value concepts we identify two poles of the value-concept that still lack compatibility with each other in economical and philosophical schools to this day. Value systems have to be applied situation-sensitive and are in need of a frequent critical reflection; they need to be refused or changed if necessary.Examining some examples of the Bavarian Constitution, we indicate some concordances with regard to contents of the Indian Constitutional Law. The equivalences in the Bavarian and the Indian Constitution incorporate entitlements which should protect citizens against an unjustified economical assault upon their existence. The social value conflicts that occur more and more because of the hiatus to the constitutionally warranted values, and that cannot be solved simply by law or political adjustment, are therefore up for discussion. We then examine the disparity between entitlements and reality and discuss the hierarchy of our values. (shrink)

Fifty years of debate have strengthened Germain Grisez’s 1965 interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas’s famous article on the natural law in Summa theologiae I-II.94.2. Revisiting Grisez’s argument in light of these developments reveals that his “gerundive interpretation” of the first principle of practical reason is not only Thomistic, but essentially Aquinas’s interpretation.

The aim of this expository paper is to give an informal overview of a plausible naturalistic case for free will. I will describe what I take to be the main naturalistically motivated challenges for free will and respond to them by presenting an indispensability argument for free will. The argument supports the reality of free will as an emergent higher-level phenomenon. I will also explain why the resulting picture of free will does not conflict with the possibility that the fundamental (...) laws of nature are deterministic, and I will address some common objections. (shrink)

The Humean best systems account identifies laws of nature with the regularities in a system of truths that, as a whole, best conforms to scientific standards for theory-choice. A principled problem for the BSA is that it returns the wrong verdicts about laws in cases where multiple systems, containing different regularities, satisfy these standards equally well. This problem affects every version of the BSA because it arises regardless of which standards for theory-choice Humeans adopt. In this paper, we propose a (...) Humean response to the problem. We invoke pragmatic aspects of Humean laws to show that the BSA, despite violating some of our intuitive judgements, can capture everything that is relevant for scientific practice. (shrink)

With his book, the author presents a nuanced and critical-constructive study of the "New Natural Law Theory", which has received little attention in German-speaking philosophy. However, it is certainly worthy of discussion, because it is not only systematically very demanding and interesting, but also controversial and polarizing, especially with regard to its restrictive sexual ethics.The aim of this book is to defend the "New Natural Law Theory" in its core. At the same time - based on its own (...) natural law premises – it shall argue for a less restrictive, but much more liberal sexual ethics. (shrink)

Is it allowable for your government, or anyone else, to influence or coerce you 'for your own sake'? This is a question about paternalism, or interference with a person's liberty or autonomy with the intention of promoting their good or averting harm, which has created considerable controversy at least since John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. Mill famously decried paternalism of any kind, whether carried out by private individuals or the state. In this volume of new essays, leading moral, political and (...) legal philosophers address how to define paternalism, its justification, and the implications for public policy, professional ethics and criminal law. So-called 'libertarian' or non-coercive paternalism receives considerable attention. The discussion addresses the nature of freedom and autonomy and the relation of individuals to law, policy and the state. The volume will interest a wide range of readers in political philosophy, public policy and the philosophy of law. (shrink)

Nos sociétés recherchent des principes d'action, en particulier de législation, dont la justice ne soit pas fondée uniquement sur le fait qu'ils sont énoncés dans un code. Où chercher cette légitimité qui échappe à l'arbitraire du moment? L'histoire a décliné ses références: le consentement populaire, la tradition, le génie du peuple, la décision, l'idéal commun, la raison, la religion... L'expression droit naturel a souvent cristallisé cet enseignement du passé, mais la formule a-t-elle encore un sens aujourd'hui? En d'autres termes, faut-il (...) en relancer l'histoire? "Il s'agit donc de signifier une exigence peu commune, quelque chose comme une normativité pure. J'y verrais volontiers une entreprise pluriséculaire et, de ce point de vue, les contributions ici offertes au titre d'une histoire du concept vaudraient pour nous aussi bien comme la mise en scène d'un travail du concept.". Le comité éditorial, réuni aux Facultés universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix, a sollicité, de part et d'autre de l'Atlantique, la contribution de quinze auteurs afin qu'ils exposent ici le sens et la portée que les grandes figures de la philosophie du droit, de l'Antiquité à la Modernité, attribuent au concept de droit naturel. Précédés d'un Grand angle qui les resitue sur la ligne du temps, ces différents Focus sont suivis de quatre Contre-jours qui les synthétisent dans une relecture chaque fois particulière. Après Platon, Aristote, Cicéron, Augustin, al Fârâbî, Maïmonide, Thomas d'Aquin, Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, et Hegel, nous voici invités, juristes et philosophes, à affronter les mêmes questions qu'eux. (shrink)

We ordinarily think that we human beings have agency: we have control over our choices and make a difference to our environments. Yet it is not obvious how agency can fit into a physical world that is governed by exceptionless laws of nature. In particular, it is unclear how agency is possible if those laws are deterministic and the universe functions like a mechanical clockwork. In this short paper, I first explain the apparent conflict between agency and physical determinism (referring (...) to recent work by Helen Steward on "agency incompatibilism"), then review some salient responses one might give to this conflict, and finally sketch a response that rests on a distinction between “physical” and “agential possibilities.” Agency, I suggest, is a higher-level phenomenon, which comes with its own level-specific notion of possibility, and it cannot be adequately analyzed in physical terms alone or just through the lens of physical possibility. (The paper was written as an informal position paper for a symposium on "Possibilities".). (shrink)

This article contributes to the debate among just war theorists about the ethics of using armed drones in the war on terror. If violence of this kind is to be effectively restrained, it is necessary first to establish an understanding of its nature. Because it is difficult to conceptualize drone-based violence as war, there is concern that such violence is thus not captured by the traditional jus ad bellum framework. Drone strikes probably do not constitute a law enforcement practice, so (...) the peacetime ethics of criminal justice do not apply either. One possible solution is to develop and apply a legitimization framework of jus ad vim in which vim is “force short of war,” although this depends upon a vim–bellum distinction being a sustainable one. Moving beyond discussion of these three alternative concepts of drone-based violence, the article suggests a fourth—vis perpetua —and explores the ethical implications thereof. As a form of violence that presents no physical risk to individual users of force, a program of drone strikes poses a moral problem if it is intended to continue indefinitely, leading to the systematic endangerment of innocents without the eventual promise of peace. (shrink)

This article discusses Archibald Campbell’s (1691-1756) early writings on religion, and the reactions they provoked from conservative orthodox Presbyterians. Purportedly against the Deist Matthew Tindal, Campbell crucially argued for two claims, namely (i) for the reality of immutable moral laws of nature, and (ii) for the incapacity of natural reason, or the light of nature, to discover the fundamental truths of religion, in particular the existence and perfections of God, and the immortality of the soul. In an episode that (...) had its peak in 1735 and 1736, a Committee for Purity of Doctrine of the Church of Scotland scrutinised Campbell’s writings. It attacked the second claim as contradicting Calvinist doctrines concerning the universal guilt of mankind after the Fall, and the first claim as contradicting doctrines concerning justification and salvation, and as supporting Deism. The study of this episode reveals new aspects of how the struggle to define orthodoxy crystallised in philosophical and theological debates in Scotland at the dawn of the Enlightenment, and before the rise of the Moderates. (shrink)

Resumen En el Leviatán Hobbes implementa la ley de naturaleza como la condición de posibilidad del desarrollo epistemológico que convierte al animal en humano, en el estado de naturaleza. De acuerdo con esta fórmula, la moral se desarrolla cuando los hombres empiezan a comportarse de acuerdo con el contenido no explícito de las leyes de naturaleza, comportamiento posibilitado por su sujeción a un hombre fuerte, quien tiene la función moral de administrar justicia. Esta doble función moral de las leyes de (...) naturaleza entre quien manda y quien obedece implica una experiencia de la justicia como comunicación de postulados racionales compartidos que condicionan el libre accionar de los hombres, manteniéndolos unidos en el tiempo.In the Leviathan, Hobbes employs the law of nature as the condition of possibility of the epistemological development that transforms the animal into a human in the state of nature. According to this formula, morality develops when men behave according to the non-explicit content of the laws of nature, behavior enabled by their subjection to a strong man who has the moral function of administrating justice. The moral function of the laws of nature is double, those who rule and those who obey, and implies an experience of justice as communication of shared rational postulates that conditions the free actions of men, keeping them united in time. (shrink)

On the standard analysis, a counterfactual conditional such as “If P had been the case, then Q would have been the case” is true in the actual world if, in all nearest possible worlds in which its antecedent (P) is true, its consequent (Q) is also true. Despite its elegance, this analysis faces a difficulty if the laws of nature are deterministic. Then the antecedent could not have been true, given prior conditions. So, it is unclear what the relevant “nearest (...) possible worlds” are. David Lewis suggested that they are ones in which a local breach of the laws occurred: a “small miracle”. Others have suggested that they are ones in which the initial conditions were different (“backtracking”). I propose another response. It builds on the idea that the special sciences, where counterfactual reasoning is most common, operate at a higher level of description from fundamental physics, and that the world may behave indeterministically at higher levels even if it behaves deterministically at the fundamental physical one. The challenge from determinism can then be bypassed for many special-science counterfactuals. (shrink)

In the rapidly growing literature on comparative citizenship, a dominant assumption is that the nationality laws in Western states are converging on liberal norms of equality and inclusiveness. However, especially since the onset of the new millennium and an apparent failure of integrating Muslim immigrants there has been a remarkable counter-trend toward more restrictiveness. This paper reviews the causes and features of restrictiveness in the heartland of previous liberalization, north-west Europe. It is argued that even where it seems to be (...) strongest: with respect to the rules of naturalization, the restrictive trend is embedded within an overall liberal, sometimes even liberalizing framework. The notion of a wholesale “restrictive turn in Europe” therefore has to be rejected. (shrink)

The article examines how Reimarus reorients concepts borrowed from Leibniz and Wolff – the principles of perfection, harmony and continuity – in order to feed his own natural religion project. Teleology is understood as a doctrine aiming at proving not only God’s perfections, but also the effects of the divine wisdom on creatures. Consequently, recourse to final causes in natural philosophy cannot remain at the level of general reasons, as Maupertuis’s principle of least action does, but rather ought (...) to be used in the explanation of the specific purpose of beings. (shrink)

This paper revisits the strained yet ubiquitous notion of sustainability to see where and how it can make a contribution to improved agricultural and natural resource management and policy making. The case of a three-year EU network on farm animal breeding and reproduction is used as a practical illustration. In this network, commercial breeders and breeding scientists were required, with professional assistance from philosophers and social scientists, to develop a definition of sustainable farm animal breeding. The word ‘sustainability’ does (...) not define a unique ethical perspective. At best it indicates a willingness to open an ethical agenda. However if the agenda is not specified in some detail, there is a real danger that necessary ethical discussion will be swept under the carpet. Even worse, the word may be used as a fig leaf in an attempt to legitimise projects which are ethically dubious. Used conscientiously, the framework of sustainability has two benefits: First, it invites parties involved in the planning of future activities in a company or sector to take a comprehensive look at potentially conflicting concerns and to face any difficult trade-offs. Second, it encourages concerns to be presented within a framework that is endorsed by society as a whole, and this enables the stakeholders to make room for communication to, and dialogue with, a broader audience than the rather narrow group of people directly involved. Adapting the definition of sustainability to specific conditions and circumstances is more than a technical or scientific task. It requires us to address carefully underlying questions about values. The fundamental dilemmas that emerge when the notion of sustainability is considered have no easy solutions, but they can be addressed by taking into account four key characteristics of sustainability discussed in this paper. (shrink)

Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) gehort neben Grotius und Pufendorf zu den bedeutendsten Vertretern des Naturrechts. Seine Geschichte des Naturrechts ist bis heute ein wertvolles Dokument naturrechtlichen Denkens und eine Fundgrube literaturgeschichtlichen Materials.

Book synopsis: Held every five years under the auspices of the Kant-Gesellschaft, the International Kant Congress is the world’s largest philosophy conference devoted to the work and legacy of a single thinker. The five-volume set Kant and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense contains the proceedings of the Eleventh International Kant Congress, which took place in Pisa in 2010. The proceedings consist of 25 plenary talks and 341 papers selected by a team of international referees from over 700 submissions. The contributions (...) span 14 sections: Kant’s Concept of Philosophy; Theory of Cognition and Logic; Ontology and Metaphysics; Ethics; Law and Justice; Religion and Theology; Aesthetics; Anthropology and Psychology; Politics and History; Science, Mathematics, and the Philosophy of Nature; Kant and the Leibnizian Tradition; Kant and the Philosophical Tradition; Kant and Schopenhauer; and Kant’s Heritage. Thanks to cooperation from the Schopenhauer Gesellschaft, the 2010 conference was the first in the history of the International Kant Congress to include a session on Kant and Schopenhauer. (shrink)

The formation of citizenship as a concept to define the rights of participation in the formation processes of modern territorial states is well known. But the transnational dimensions of defining citizenship and how to combine national legislations with enlightened universal and natural law rules in the mid-19th century is not very well known. The article aims to explore the transnational discourses on the political, economic and moral rights and duties of the citizen in the pan—European liberal Association Internationale pour (...) le Progrès des Sciences Sociales. During the 1860s, its congresses should serve as a vast commission of enquiry and should eventually lead to a general definition of citizenship in Europe which could be implemented in national legislations. The article shows how the Association Internationale tried to deduce universal moral rules from national legislations and peculiarities by the means of moral or positive social science. In combining moral unity with national and regional diversities, the Association Internationale tried to give an elastic framework for a European civil society in which national subjects should become active citizens. (shrink)

This book seeks to explain why different systems of sovereign states have built different types of fundamental institutions to govern interstate relations. Why, for example, did the ancient Greeks operate a successful system of third-party arbitration, while international society today rests on a combination of international law and multilateral diplomacy? Why did the city-states of Renaissance Italy develop a system of oratorical diplomacy, while the states of absolutist Europe relied on naturalist international law and "old diplomacy"? Conventional explanations of basic (...) institutional practices have difficulty accounting for such variation. Christian Reus-Smit addresses this problem by presenting an alternative, "constructivist" theory of international institutional development, one that emphasizes the relationship between the social identity of the state and the nature and origin of basic institutional practices. Reus-Smit argues that international societies are shaped by deep constitutional structures that are based on prevailing beliefs about the moral purpose of the state, the organizing principle of sovereignty, and the norm of procedural justice. These structures inform the imaginations of institutional architects as they develop and adjust institutional arrangements between states. As he shows with detailed reference to ancient Greece, Renaissance Italy, absolutist Europe, and the modern world, different cultural and historical contexts lead to profoundly different constitutional structures and institutional practices. The first major study of its kind, this book is a significant addition to our theoretical and empirical understanding of international relations, past and present. (shrink)

Codes are a well known and popular but weak form of ethical regulation in medical practice. There is, however, a lack of research on the relations between moral judgments and ethical Codes, or on the possibility of morally justifying these Codes. Our analysis begins by showing, given the Nuremberg Code, how a typical reference to natural law has historically served as moral justification. We then indicate, following the analyses of H. T. Engelhardt, Jr., and A. MacIntyre, why such general (...) moral justifications of codes must necessarily fail in a society of ‘’moral strangers’ Going beyond Engelhardt we argue, that after the genealogical suspicion in morals raised by Nietzsche, not even Engelhardt's "principle of permission" can be rationally justified in a strong sense – a problem of transcendental argumentation in morals already realized by I. Kant. Therefore, we propose to abandon the project of providing general justifications for moral judgements and to replace it with a hermeneutical analysis of ethical meanings in real-world situations, starting with the archetypal ethical situation, the encounter with the Other (E. Levinas). (shrink)

In this paper I want to reconnect the theoretical debate on the concept of law and the relationship between law and morality with legal issues constituted by highly unjust norms. Proceeding from a critique of more or less emphatic positivist attempts at ethical purification of legal thought, I shall roughly sketch a Davidsonian-Dworkinian framework which seems to provide us with a more appropriate background for dealing with immoral norms than positivist and natural law accounts. This claim will be substantiated (...) by way of an analysis of three different cases: (1) immoral norms of a past system of civil law; (2) immoral norms of a past system of criminal law; (3) immoral norms of the present legal system. (shrink)

An in-depth study of Kierkegaard's thinking on Christology, emphasising the radical nature of his approach to the incarnation, with an emphasis on the call of the Christian believer to a life of 'kenotic' (self-emptying) discipleship in imitation of Christ.

Exploring a variety of ways of thinking ethically about drone violence. The violent use of armed, unmanned aircraft is increasing worldwide, but uncertainty persists about the moral status of remote-control killing and why it should be restrained. Practitioners, observers and potential victims of such violence often struggle to reconcile it with traditional expectations about the nature of war and the risk to combatants. Addressing the ongoing policy concern that state use of drone violence is sometimes poorly understood and inadequately governed, (...) the book's ethical assessments are not restricted to the application of traditional Just War principles, but also consider the ethics of artificial intelligence, virtue ethics, and guiding principles for forceful law-enforcement. This edited collection brings together nine original contributions by established and emerging scholars, incorporating expertise in military ethics, critical military studies, gender, history, international law and international relations, in order to better assess the multi-faceted relationship between drone violence and justice. Christian Enemark is Professor of International Relations in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Southampton. (shrink)

Quantum gravity’s suggestion that spacetime may be emergent and so only exist contingently would force a radical reconception of extant analyses of laws of nature. Humeanism presupposes a spatiotemporal mosaic of particular matters of fact on which laws supervene; primitivism and dispositionalism conceive of the action of primitive laws or of dispositions as a process of ‘nomic production’ unfolding over time. We show how the Humean supervenience basis of non-modal facts and primitivist or dispositionalist accounts of nomic production can be (...) reconceived, avoiding a reliance on fundamental spacetime. However, it is unclear that naturalistic forms of Humeanism can maintain their commitment to there being no necessary connections among distinct entities. Furthermore, non-temporal conceptions of production render this central concept more elusive than before. In fact, the challenges run so deep that the survival of the investigated analyses into the era of quantum gravity is questionable. (shrink)

Denis Diderot’s ideas about war and peace crystalize many of the contradictions in the world that he identified. On the one hand, war is a natural product of contradictions between natural law and human developments. On the other hand, it can and should always be subject to moral judgment based on a wide-ranging knowledge of history and context. War can be good if it eliminates tyranny, and bad if it limits freedom, equality, and prosperity. Peace can be good (...) if it cultivates the latter, and bad if it freezes inequality. Diderot never allows himself to rest on universal judgments for all times and all places, but insists upon never-ending comparisons and contrasts between the moral world and the natural world. Philosophical materialism provides the basis for his understanding of the world, but morals provide the instruments of judgment. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the Consequence Argument relies on empirical premises. In particular, we show how the argument depends upon assumptions about the character of the laws of nature.

1. Th. Die Grundlage des Naturrechts.--2. Th., 1. Stück. Abhandlungen zur Grundlage des Naturrechts. 2. Stück. Das reine Sachenrecht.--3. Th., 1. Stück. Das Personenrecht.

Codes are a well known and popular but weak form of ethical regulation in medical practice. There is, however, a lack of research on the relations between moral judgments and ethical Codes, or on the possibility of morally justifying these Codes. Our analysis begins by showing, given the Nuremberg Code, how a typical reference to natural law has historically served as moral justification. We then indicate, following the analyses of H. T. Engelhardt, Jr., and A. MacIntyre, why such general (...) moral justifications of codes must necessarily fail in a society of ‘’moral strangers’ Going beyond Engelhardt we argue, that after the genealogical suspicion in morals raised by Nietzsche, not even Engelhardt's "principle of permission" can be rationally justified in a strong sense – a problem of transcendental argumentation in morals already realized by I. Kant. Therefore, we propose to abandon the project of providing general justifications for moral judgements and to replace it with a hermeneutical analysis of ethical meanings in real-world situations, starting with the archetypal ethical situation, the encounter with the Other (E. Levinas). (shrink)

It is well known that Hegel’s Philosophy of Right initiated, when it first appeared, a dispute about his philosophy in general that has not abated to the present day. The initial grounds for this dispute included: Hegel’s often virulent attacks, in the Philosophy of Right, on contemporaries such as Fries, Hugo, and von Haller; the question of his political stance within Prussia, which was then rapidly developing into a reactionary, authoritarian state; in other words, the question of Hegel’s political accommodation, (...) the question of his attitude to natural law, and so on. For a long time, therefore, the philosophical dispute was shaped by the political interests of the day. The struggle against Hegel’s philosophical system as a whole even resorted to personal defamation of the philosopher, so that, by revealing personal weakness, his system and the influential school of followers he had attracted could be discredited. Likewise, the diverse attempts at an adequate assessment of the historical influence of Hegel’s philosophy have come to a head. The two main questions, also deriving their inspiration from differing interpretations of the Philosophy of Right, are: How legitimate are the various Marxist references to Hegel as either the forerunner of Marxism or its principal opponent? How legitimate is the accusation that Hegel, by developing a totalitarian theory of the state, prepared the ground for twentieth century fascism, especially National Socialism? As previous research has pointed out, an adequate assessment of such relations will have to deal very carefully with Hegel’s position in his own day. For example, apart from his attitude to the situation in Prussia, his attitude to the most important event of the age, the French Revolution, must be examined. Furthermore, comparative perspectives must be established, so that the distinctive shape of Hegel’s philosophy of right can be seen clearly, against the background of the European constitutional debates of the day. In the last analysis, however, the essence of the disagreement still stems from the problem of the proper political classification of Hegel’s philosophy of right. (shrink)

"Das Rechtssystem geht davon aus, dass der Mensch – und nur der Mensch – eine natürliche Person ist. Das sei ein Irrtum, argumentiert Malte-Christian Gruber, denn die Rechtssubjektivität wird keineswegs alleine mit dem bloßen Menschsein begründet. Es ist die sittliche Autonomie, die den Menschen zu einem »Subjekt, dessen Handlungen einer Zurechnung fähig sind« (Kant) und mithin zur Person macht. Personen werden nicht mit dem Menschsein als solchem identifiziert, sondern durch die Zuschreibung von Handlungs- und Rechtsträgerschaft. Eine solche funktionale Vorstellung von (...) Rechtssubjektivität ist prinzipiell auch dazu imstande, neben Menschen noch weitere autonome Agenten als Träger von Rechten und Pflichten ein- zusetzen, z.B. technische Artefakte und andere nicht-menschliche Agenten. Christoph Menke macht dagegen darauf aufmerksam, dass die Erfindung neuer Rechte das eigentliche Bewegungsgesetz der politischen Emanzipation in der Moderne war. Das begann mit den bürgerlichen Revolutionen und ist immer noch das generelle Modell, mit dem Politik und Theorie operieren, die neue Rechte für nicht-menschliche Lebewesen und Artefakte einfordern. So wie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert die rechtliche Emanzipation zunächst über die Grenzen bürgerlicher Subjektivität hinausgeführt hat und soziale und kulturelle Rechte erfand, so sollen wir nun den weiteren, konsequenten Schritt tun und auch noch die Bindung der juridischen Anerkennung an die Kategorie menschlicher Subjektivität aufbrechen. Auch Bio- und Artefakte sollen als eigenständige Rechtssubjekte rekonstruiert werden. Es fehlt ihnen allerdings etwas, das in den emanzipatorischen Kämpfen der Vergangenheit schlechthin grundlegend war: Ein Träger von Rechten zu sein, hieß, ein Fordernder von Rechten, ja, ein Kämpfer für Rechte gewesen zu sein. Man konnte keine rechtliche Person als Träger von Rechten sein, ohne ein politisches Subjekt als Kämpfer und Denker von Rechten gewesen zu sein. Wenn die Bindung der rechtlichen Personalität an die menschliche Subjektivität aufgelöst wird, damit es Bio- und Artefakt-Rechte geben kann, löst sich zugleich auch diese Einheit von rechtlicher Personalität und politischer Subjektivität auf, die die moderne Idee der Rechte definiert hatte. The legal system assumes that human beings – and only human beings – are natural persons. That is erroneous, argues Malte-Christian Gruber, because legal subjectivity isn’t founded in humanity alone. It is moral autonomy that makes man into a “subject whose actions are capable of attribution” (Kant) and thus into a person. Personhood is not identified with being human as such, but by the attribution of actions and legal ownership. Besides human beings, such a functional concept of legal subjectivity can in principle also be applied to other autonomous agents as holder of rights and obligations, e.g. techno- logical artifacts and other non-human agents. Christoph Menke in turn points out that the invention of new rights was the actual law of motion of political emancipation in modern times. This began with the bourgeois revolutions and is still the general model with which politics and theory operate to claim new rights for non-human creatures and artifacts. Just as in the 19th and 20th centuries, the legal emancipation initially led beyond the limits of bourgeois subjectivity and in- vented social and cultural rights, so should we make a further consequent step and break with the dependence of juridical recognition on the category of human subjectivity. Also bio- and artifacts are to be reconstructed as independent legal entities. However, they lack something that was absolutely fundamental in the emancipatory struggles of the past: to be a subject of rights meant to have demanded rights, indeed, to have been a fighter for rights. One could not be a legal person and holder of rights without having been a political subject as fighter and thinker of rights. To suspend the dependence of legal personhood on human subjectivity so that there may be bio- and artifact-rights also means to dissolve the unity between legal personality and political subjectivity that once defined the modern idea of rights. ". (shrink)

This book offers a collection of contributions on medieval, early modern, and contemporary perspectives on social ontology. Since the 1990s, social ontology has emerged as a vibrant research area in contemporary analytical philosophy. Questions concerning the nature and properties of social groups, institutions, facts, and objects like money and marriage, have been thoroughly discussed. However, the historical perspective has been largely neglected. One of the central aims of this volume is to show that relevant views on social ontology can be (...) found in medieval and early modern philosophy (ca. 1200-1700 C.E.), when, for example, the ontological status of money, law, and the sacraments was hotly debated. We see, furthermore, diverging positions between Aristotelian-inspired authors, who resort to a more naturalistic view of the emergence of the social realm, and authors like Olivi and Ockham, who emphasize the role of human free will and contractualist agreements. This book is the very first to address historical and contemporary social ontologies. Both historians of philosophy and philosophers will benefit from this juxtaposition, which fosters a better understanding of historical positions and approaches by using today’s conceptual and analytical tools, and allows the contemporary debate to gain new perspectives by confronting its own medieval and early modern history. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 116-118 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics Richard Bett. Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. x + 264. Cloth, $60.00. Charles Brittain. Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. xii (...) + 406. Cloth, $60.00. These two books demonstrate once again that the ancient skeptics could indeed live their skepticism. In recent decades Myles Burnyeat, Benson Mates, and too many others have retailed the old canard that the skeptic cannot live his skepticism, but here we have two branches of ancient skepticism that sound quite liveable. Both books are subtle and brilliant examples of the genre of reconstructing philosophy from meager and fragmentary evidence.Bett's book follows up on the case he made in his 1997 translation of Sextus Empiricus's Against the Ethicists for three stages in ancient Pyrrhonism. The first is that of Pyrrho (ca. 360-ca. 270 B.C.), a dogmatist who held what Bett labels the indeterminacy thesis: we do not know anything because the world is indeterminate and thus we cannot know it. The second is a similarly dogmatic stage under Aenesidemus (first century B.C.), also followed by Sextus in Against the Ethicists. The third is the more thoroughly skeptical suspension of judgment of the mature Sextus of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (second century A.D.). Bett points out that it would indeed be odd if Pyrrhonism had not evolved in any way in five hundred years. What was unique throughout the tradition was the connection drawn between indeterminacy or suspension of judgment and the goal of ataraxia or tranquility (179, 220).Bett tries to avoid reading later concerns back into the earlier materials, and reevaluates the later materials based on his new reading of the earlier. He argues that Pyrrho's indeterminacy thesis was a metaphysical claim, not an epistemological one. One benefit of [End Page 116] understanding Pyrrho this way is that he does not make a self-refuting exception to his epistemological skepticism for his own claims. Rather, he can just admit to being a kind of dogmatist. Then, Pyrrho's ethical dogmatism is also perfectly consistent. Bett draws a picture of Pyrrho's practical life that rejects the walking-off-of-cliffs apocrypha, but accepts evidence of a quasi-Cynic, anti-theoretical lifestyle. Pyrrho's rejection of social norms puts him at odds with Sextus's later use of laws and customs as guides to behavior. There are still further questions here: why was Pyrrho in particular such a hero to philosophers, if most (or at least many) people are resolutely non-theoretical?Bett points out that Pyrrho gives us no reason to think that the abandonment of theories and opinions must always lead to tranquility (81). But in another connection, he recognizes that temperament may be decisive (111), and that may be the deciding factor here, too. There is no answer to people who say that abandoning theories makes them nervous: the Pyrrhonians simply say that it makes them tranquil. Irreducible differences in temperament may also explain why Pyrrho did not bother with theoretical controversy and Sextus revelled in it.Among other points, Bett discourages all but the most general case for an influence from India on Pyrrho. Bett's thumbnail comparisons between Pyrrho and each of Aristotle, Plato, the Eleatics, Xenophanes, and others show that Pyrrho's philosophy was not at all extraordinary for its time and place. Most philosophers expected claims about nature to be invariable and without qualification (118). Bett says this is odd by modern standards (197), but even today scientific laws are said to apply to all times and all places.The title of Bett's book will mislead some readers. If you are a specialist and your world revolves around ancient philosophy, you will be satisfied that Pyrrho's "legacy" includes Aenesidemus and ends... (shrink)

A central question in the philosophy of science is: What is a law of nature? Different answers to this question define an important schism: Humeans, in the wake of David Hume, hold that the laws of nature are nothing over and above what actually happens and reject irreducible facts about natural modality (Lewis, 1983, 1994; cf. Miller, 2015). According to Non-Humeans, by contrast, the laws are metaphysically fundamental (Maudlin, 2007) or grounded in primitive modal structures, such as dispositional essences (...) of powerful properties (Bird, 2007), necessitation relations (Armstrong, 1983), or primitive subjunctive facts (Lange, 2009). This volume focuses on recent developments in the discussion of Humeanism, specifically on pragmatic versions of the view that put the needs of limited agents like us front and center. (shrink)

With the passing of disputations between Jewish and Christian thinkers as to whose tradition has a more universal ethics, the task of Jewish and Christian ethicists is to constitute a universal horizon for their respective bodies of ethics, both of which are essentially particularistic being rooted in special revelation. This parallel project must avoid relativism that is essentially anti-ethical, and triumphalism that proposes an imperialist ethos. A retrieval of the idea of natural law in each respective tradition enables the (...) constitution of some intelligent common ground for ethical cooperation in both theory and practice between the traditions. This essay also suggests how the constitution of this common ground could include Muslims as well. The constitution of this common ground enables religious ethicists to present more cogent ethical arguments in secular space, but only of course, when those who now control secular space are open to arguments from members of any religious tradition. (shrink)

We argue for the existence of a state constitutional legal right to language. Our purpose here is to develop a legal framework for protecting the civil rights of the deaf child, with the ultimate goal of calling for legislation that requires all levels of government to fund programs for deaf children and their families to learn a fully accessible language: a sign language. While our discussion regards the United States, the argument we make is based on human rights and the (...) nature of law itself, and can likely be adapted to any country.We begin with an introduction to the biological facts surrounding language acquisition and how these facts impact the deaf child, where lack of language has devastating effects on individuals and negative effects on society in general. (shrink)