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John R. Searle [148]John Rogers Searle [5]
  1. John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
    What psychological and philosophical significance should we attach to recent efforts at computer simulations of human cognitive capacities? In answering this question, I find it useful to distinguish what I will call "strong" AI from "weak" or "cautious" AI. According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous and precise fashion. (...)
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  2. John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    John Searle 's Speech Acts and Expression and Meaning developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though (...)
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  3. John R. Searle (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
    Written in an outstandingly clear and lively style, it provokes its readers to rethink issues they may have regarded as long since settled.
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  4. John R. Searle (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. MIT Press.
    The title of The Rediscovery of the Mind suggests the question "When was the mind lost?" Since most people may not be aware that it ever was lost, we must also then ask "Who lost it?" It was lost, of course, only by philosophers, by certain philosophers. This passed unnoticed by society at large. The "rediscovery" is also likely to pass unnoticed. But has the mind been rediscovered by the same philosophers who "lost" it? Probably not. John Searle is an (...)
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  5.  91
    John R. Searle (2009). Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford University Press.
    The purpose of this book -- Intentionality -- Collective intentionality and the assignment of function -- Language as biological and social -- The general theory of institutions and institutional facts: -- Language and social reality -- Free will, rationality, and institutional facts -- Power : deontic, background, political, and other -- Human rights -- Concluding remarks : the ontological foundations of the social sciences.
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  6.  5
    John R. Searle (1984). Minds, Brains and Science. Harvard University Press.
  7.  79
    John R. Searle (1990). Consciousness, Explanatory Inversion and Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (1):585-642.
    Cognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point is that (...)
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  8. John R. Searle, Barry Smith, Leo Zaibert & Josef Moural (2001). Rationality in Action: A Symposium. Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66 – 94.
    John Searle's forthcoming book 'Rationality in Action' presents a sophisticated and innovative account of the rationality of action. In the book Searle argues against what he calls the classical model of rationality. In the debate that follows Barry Smith challenges some implications of Searle's account. In particular, Smith suggests that Searle's distinction between observer-relative and observer-independent facts of the world is ill suited to accommodate moral concepts. Leo Zaibert takes on Searle's notion of the gap. The gap exists between the (...)
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  9. John R. Searle (2003). Rationality in Action. MIT Press.
    The study of rationality and practical reason, or rationality in action, has been central to Western intellectual culture. In this invigorating book, John Searle lays out six claims of what he calls the Classical Model of rationality and shows why they are false. He then presents an alternative theory of the role of rationality in thought and action. -/- A central point of Searle's theory is that only irrational actions are directly caused by beliefs and desires—for example, the actions of (...)
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  10.  11
    John R. Searle (forthcoming). Insight and Error in Wittgenstein. Philosophy of the Social Sciences:0048393116649969.
    For me, personally, Wittgenstein’s philosophy poses the greatest challenge: if he is right, the sort of philosophy I am attempting to do is impossible. Wittgenstein argued powerfully that there can be no such thing as a general philosophical theory of language, mind, consciousness, society, and so on. I wanted and still do want to do precisely that: to present a general philosophical theory of language, mind, consciousness, society, and so on.
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  11. John R. Searle (2004). Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford University Press.
    "The philosophy of mind is unique among contemporary philosophical subjects," writes John Searle, "in that all of the most famous and influential theories are false." In Mind, Searle dismantles these famous and influential theories as he presents a vividly written, comprehensive introduction to the mind. Here readers will find one of the world's most eminent thinkers shedding light on the central concern of modern philosophy. Searle begins with a look at the twelve problems of philosophy of mind--which he calls "Descartes (...)
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  12. John R. Searle (1964). How to Derive "Ought" From "Is". Philosophical Review 73 (1):43-58.
  13. John R. Searle, What is an Institution?
    When I was an undergraduate in Oxford, we were taught economics almost as though it were a natural science. The subject matter of economics might be different from physics, but only in the way that the subject matter of chemistry or biology is different from physics. The actual results were presented to us as if they were scientific theories. So when we learned that savings equals investment, it was taught in the same tone of voice as one teaches that force (...)
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  14. John R. Searle (1990). Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program? Scientific American 262 (1):26-31.
  15. John R. Searle (1997). The Mystery of Consciousness. Granta Books.
     
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  16. John R. Searle (1958). Proper Names. Mind 67 (266):166-173.
  17. John R. Searle (1990). Is the Brain a Digital Computer? Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 64 (November):21-37.
    There are different ways to present a Presidential Address to the APA; the one I have chosen is simply to report on work that I am doing right now, on work in progress. I am going to present some of my further explorations into the computational model of the mind.\**.
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  18. John R. Searle (2000). Consciousness. Intellectica 31:85-110.
  19.  50
    John R. Searle (1991). Intentionalistic Explanations in the Social Sciences. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 21 (3):332-344.
    The dispute between the empiricist and interpretivist conceptions of the social sciences is properly conceived not as a matter of reduction or covering laws. Features specific to the social sciences include the following. Explanations of human behavior make reference to intentional causation; social phenomena are permeated with mental components and are self-referential; social science explanations have not been as successful as those in natural science because of their concern with intentional causation, because their explanations must be identical with the propositional (...)
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  20. John R. Searle (2001). Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology. Philosophy 76 (298):491-514.
    The problem of free will arises because of the conflict between two inconsistent impulses, the experience of freedom and the conviction of determinism. Perhaps we can resolve these by examining neurobiological correlates of the experience of freedom. If free will is not to be an illusion, it must have a corresponding neurobiological reality. An explanation of this issue leads us to an account of rationality and the self, as well as how consciousness can move bodies at all. I explore two (...)
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  21. John R. Searle (1984). Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person. Journal of Philosophy 81 (March):123-146.
  22. John R. Searle (2002). Why I Am Not a Property Dualist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (12):57-64.
    I have argued in a number of writings[1] that the philosophical part (though not the neurobiological part) of the traditional mind-body problem has a fairly simple and obvious solution: All of our mental phenomena are caused by lower level neuronal processes in the brain and are themselves realized in the brain as higher level, or system, features. The form of causation is.
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  23. John R. Searle (1979). The Intentionality of Intention and Action. Inquiry 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
    This article presents a sketch of a theory of action. It does so by locating the relation of intention to action -vithin a general theory of Intentionality. It introduces a distinction between ptiorintentions and intentions in actions; the concept of the experience of acting; and the thesis that both prior intentions and intentions in action are causally self-referential. Each of these is independently motivated, but together they allow suggested solutions to several outstanding problems within action theory (deviant causal chains, the (...)
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  24. John R. Searle (1984). Intentionality and its Place in Nature. Synthese 38 (October):87-100.
    Int. intr nseca i derivada. Condicions de satisfacci . Atribuci literal i metaf rica d'Int. Int. intr nseca-cervell. Ment-cervell. Panorama Filosof a de la Ment. Ryle. Causaci intencional. Teleolog a. Explicaci de les CC. Socials.
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  25. John R. Searle (1978). Literal Meaning. Erkenntnis 13 (1):207 - 224.
  26. John R. Searle (1979). What is an Intentional State? Mind 88 (January):74-92.
  27. John R. Searle (2002). Consciousness and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    One of the most important and influential philosophers of the last 30 years, John Searle has been concerned throughout his career with a single overarching question: how can we have a unified and theoretically satisfactory account of ourselves and of our relations to other people and to the natural world? In other words, how can we reconcile our common-sense conception of ourselves as conscious, free, mindful, rational agents in a world that we believe comprises brute, unconscious, mindless, meaningless, mute physical (...)
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  28.  16
    John R. Searle (1990). Who is Computing with the Brain? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):632-642.
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  29. John R. Searle (1998). Mind, Language and Society Philosophy in the Real World.
  30. John R. Searle (2000). Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10):3-22.
    Commentary on John Searle's Article John Searle presents a philosopher's view of how conscious experience and free action relate to brain function. That view demands an examination by a neuroscientist who has experimentally investigated this issue.
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  31. John R. Searle (1968). Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts. Philosophical Review 77 (4):405-424.
  32.  6
    John R. Searle (1980). Rules and Causation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):37.
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  33. John R. Searle (1994). Animal Minds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):206-219.
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  34. John R. Searle (1991). Consciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality. Philosophical Issues 1 (1):45-66.
  35. John R. Searle (2007). Neuroscience, Intentionality and Free Will: Reply to Habermas. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):69 – 76.
    I agree with much of Habermas's article ?The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will,? but concentrate on disagreements. (i) He is wrong to think the language game of neuroscience is somehow at odds with the language game of rational intentionality. I argue that they give different levels of description of the same system. He also has too narrow a conception of contemporary neurobiological research. (ii) He is mistaken in thinking there is a ?performative contradiction? in (...)
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  36.  8
    John R. Searle (1982). Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. Philosophical Review 91 (3):488-493.
    John Searle's Speech Acts made a highly original contribution to work in the philosophy of language. Expression and Meaning is a direct successor, concerned to develop and refine the account presented in Searle's earlier work, and to extend its application to other modes of discourse such as metaphor, fiction, reference, and indirect speech arts. Searle also presents a rational taxonomy of types of speech acts and explores the relation between the meanings of sentences and the contexts of their utterance. The (...)
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  37. John R. Searle (1994). The Connection Principle and the Ontology of the Unconscious: A Reply to Fodor and Lepore. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):847-55.
  38.  83
    John R. Searle (2009). Language and Social Ontology. In Chrysostomos Mantzavinos (ed.), Theory and Society. Cambridge University Press 443-459.
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  39. John R. Searle (1993). The Problem of Consciousness. Social Research 60 (1):3-16.
    The most important scientific discovery of the present era will come when someone -- or some group -- discovers the answer to the following question: How exactly do neurobiological processes in the brain cause consciousness? This is the most important question facing us in the biological sciences, yet it is frequently evaded, and frequently misunderstood when not evaded. In order to clear the way for an understanding of this problem. I am going to begin to answer four questions: 1. What (...)
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  40. John R. Searle (1958). Russell's Objections to Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference. Analysis 18 (6):137 - 143.
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  41. John R. Searle (1987). Minds and Brains Without Programs. In Colin Blakemore (ed.), Mindwaves. Blackwell
     
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  42.  27
    John R. Searle, Conclusion: We Live in One World, and It All Hangs Together.
    Última sessió del seminari de John R. Searle.
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  43. John R. Searle (1962). Meaning and Speech Acts. Philosophical Review 71 (4):423-432.
  44. John R. Searle (1989). How Performatives Work. Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (5):535 - 558.
  45.  3
    John R. Searle (2016). The Future of Philosophy. Nova et Vetera 14 (2):543-558.
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    John R. Searle (2015). Oxford Philosophy in the 1950s. Philosophy 90 (2):173-193.
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  47. John R. Searle, Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics.
    Throughout the history of the study of man there has been a fundamental opposition between those who believe that progress is to be made by a rigorous observation of man's actual behavior and those who believe that such observations are interesting only in so far as they reveal to us hidden and possibly fairly mysterious underlying laws that only partially and in distorted form reveal themselves to us in behavior. Freud, for example, is in the latter class, most of American (...)
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  48. John R. Searle (1981). Intentionality and Method. Journal of Philosophy 78 (November):720-732.
  49. John R. Searle (1987). Consciousness and the Philosophers. New York Review of Books 44 (4).
  50.  59
    John R. Searle (1997). Responses to Critics of The Construction of Social Reality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):449 - 458.
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