In modern conditions the questions of personnel management, including motivation, acquire new meaning. Particularly given the problems relevant to the service sector, where at the beginning of the XXI century employing more than 60% of the workforce in developed countries. These circumstances determine the need for a modern concept of material and immaterial motivation of service industries. Such factors determine the need for the development modern concept of material and immaterial motivation of service industries staff. (...) To obtain indicated objective during research analyzed the existing concepts and paradigm of staff motivation with highlighting their advantages and disadvantages. The results obtained allowed to establish that scientific and expert community does not have the unified approach to the classification and identification of the most effective ones. Special attention is given to modern developments and approaches to the motivation problem. This fact caused the structure of follow studies, including three interlinked vectors: analysis of the essential content of the fundamental concepts in the field of staff motivation; defining features of employee motivation at the enterprises sphere of services; introduction to the key successful international practices which apply by service companies. In general, the results obtained enabled the author’s model of the modern concept of material and non-material motivation at the enterprises the service sector and the corresponding mechanism for the implementation. (shrink)

In a recent remarkable article, Froese (2023) presents his Irruption Theory to explain how motivations can make a behavioral difference in motivated activity. In this opinion article, we review the main tenets of Froese’s theory, and highlight its difficulty in overcoming the randomness challenge it supposedly solves, that is, the issue of how adaptive behavior can arise in the face of material underdetermination. To advance our understanding of motivated behavior in line with Froese’s approach, we recommend that future work (...) should endorse a multilevel pluralistic approach to causation and explanation in which motivations could genuinely play an irreducible role. Additionally, in line with the life-mind continuity thesis, we suggest that the best place to look for the interplay between motivations and nonmotivational physical, biological, and dynamical factors, may be at the level of the continuous feeling of being an embodied, living organism. (shrink)

IntroductionBorderline personality disorder patients are often subjected to inpatient compulsory care due to suicidal behaviour. However, inpatient care is usually advised against as it can have detrimental effects, including increased suicidality.AimTo investigate what motives psychiatrists have for treating borderline personality disorder patients under compulsory care.Materials and MethodsA questionnaire survey was distributed to all psychiatrists and registrars in psychiatry working at mental health emergency units or inpatient wards in Sweden. The questionnaire contained questions with fixed response alternatives, with room for comments, (...) about the respondents’ motives for practising compulsory care of borderline personality disorder patients. The responses were analysed quantitatively with descriptive statistics, and comments were analysed with qualitative descriptive content analysis.ResultsThe psychiatrists’ views were divided on when it was justified to treat borderline personality disorder patients under compulsory care, as were their views on borderline personality disorder patients’ decision competence. When there was an assessed risk of harm, 53% were positive to compulsory care of decision-competent borderline personality disorder patients and another 31% because they considered the patients to be decision incompetent in such situations. Adding the risk of harm caused many respondents to alter their assessment of the patient from decision competent to decision incompetent.ConclusionThe large variations in doctors’ opinions indicate that the care of borderline personality disorder patients is arbitrary. Further, the assessed risk of harm increases the use of compulsory care, even though such care is advised against in clinical guidelines, has questionable legal support, and could lead to an increased suicide risk over time. (shrink)

The article presents the results of a survey of Odessa residents as part of a study of the motivational and value preferences of townsfolk in the field of fitness. It has been established that the determining motives for choosing a place for fitness are the individual trainer's approach to the client, personal comfort and convenient location of the fitness club. It was revealed that respondents have an interest in innovative training, but it has not yet acquired the character of a (...) trend. We also obtained data about the significance of playing sports under the supervision of a personal trainer and sports physician. The collected empirical material served as the basis for revealing the behavioral patterns of townspeople and allowed to identify three groups of city residents who are characterized by different motivational and value preferences in the field of fitness. The first ones are focused on personal achievements, the second – on health, good physical form, good time among like-minded people, the third – on the development of special skills, achievements and opportunities to escape from problems. Based on the survey, it was also revealed that the overall physical development of the child is the leading physical motivation for children to do sports, and despite the fact that children may have certain achievements in sports, parents do not attach much importance to them. (shrink)

BackgroundInformed consent, whose goal is to assure that participants enter research voluntarily after disclosure of potential risks and benefits, may be impossible or impractical in emergency research. In low resource settings, there is limited information on the experiences of the informed consent process for randomized clinical trials in the emergency care context. The objective of this study was to explore the experiences of the informed consent process and factors that motivated participation in two obstetrics and newborn care randomized clinical trials (...) (RCTs).MethodsThis was a qualitative study conducted among former participants of RCTs in the emergency obstetric care context, conducted at Kawempe National Referral Hospital, Uganda. It employed 30 in-depth interviews conducted from June 1, 2019 to August 30, 2019. Issues explored included attitudes about research, the purpose of the research in which they participated, motivations to take part in the study, factors that influenced enrolment decisions, and experiences of the informed consent process.ResultsRespondents felt that research was necessary to investigate the cause, prevention or complications of illness. The decisions to participate were influenced by hope for material or therapeutic benefit, trust in the healthcare system and influence of friends and family members. Many were satisfied with the informed consent process, though they did not understand some aspects of the research.ConclusionRespondents valued participation in RCTs in emergency obstetric and newborn care. Hope for benefit, altruism, desire to further scientific knowledge and trust in the investigators featured prominently in the motivation to participate. Both intrinsic and extrinsic factors were motivators for RCT participation. (shrink)

Among moralists and social critics of several stripes, it is not enough that the right thing be done: they also insist that it be done, and be seen to be done, for the right reasons. They are anxious to know whether we are sending food to starving Africans out of genuinely altruistic concern, or merely to clear domestic commodity markets, for one particularly topical example. Or, for another example, critics of the Brandt Commission’s plea for increased foreign aid more generally (...) say, in stinging rebuke: ‘Many of those who support the proposal... do so out of genuine humanitarian concern about... poverty. But it is doubtful whether this is the main concern of its authors, and it certainly is not their only concern.... They are, instead, primarily concerned with the preservation of the existing world economic order.’What is common to all such cases is an attempt at motive differentiation. Any particular piece of behavior might have sprung from any of a number of different underlying motives; commentators want to know which was the real motive. Here I shall show that this characteristic quest for motive differentiation is misguided. In most of the standard social situations, it makes no material difference to agents’ actions whether they act from one sort of motive or another. And in such circumstances, pressing the motivational issue will usually lead only to mischief, of both a pragmatic and a moral sort. (shrink)

Among moralists and social critics of several stripes, it is not enough that the right thing be done: they also insist that it be done, and be seen to be done, for the right reasons. They are anxious to know whether we are sending food to starving Africans out of genuinely altruistic concern, or merely to clear domestic commodity markets, for one particularly topical example. Or, for another example, critics of the Brandt Commission’s plea for increased foreign aid more generally (...) say, in stinging rebuke: ‘Many of those who support the proposal... do so out of genuine humanitarian concern about... poverty. But it is doubtful whether this is the main concern of its authors, and it certainly is not their only concern.... They are, instead, primarily concerned with the preservation of the existing world economic order.’What is common to all such cases is an attempt at motive differentiation. Any particular piece of behavior might have sprung from any of a number of different underlying motives; commentators want to know which was the real motive. Here I shall show that this characteristic quest for motive differentiation is misguided. In most of the standard social situations, it makes no material difference to agents’ actions whether they act from one sort of motive or another. And in such circumstances, pressing the motivational issue will usually lead only to mischief, of both a pragmatic and a moral sort. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Moral Motivation and the Development of Francis Hutcheson’s PhilosophyJohn D. BishopHutcheson was an able philosopher, but philosophical analysis was not his only purpose in writing about morals. 1 Throughout his life his writings aimed at promoting virtue; his changing philosophical views often had to conform, if he could make them, to that rhetorical end. But a mind which understands philosophical argument cannot always control the conclusions at which (...) it arrives. The result for Hutcheson was often tension in his thought—which in the end produced a farrago when he tried to create a system of moral philosophy.Throughout his writing career, Hutcheson’s views on the problem of moral motivation were a combination of change and development against a background of certain constant views. A close examination of his views on moral motivation throws light on the development of his thought, including his growing Stoicism, and some of the changes he made to the moral sense theory.The phrase “moral motivation” can refer to either of two issues. On the one hand there is the question of what motivates virtuous actions, and the usual answer for Hutcheson is benevolence. Because they are approved by the moral sense, actions motivated by benevolence are morally good or virtuous (terms which I will use interchangeably). Hutcheson in his late writings calls such actions “formally good” to distinguish them from actions which do in fact promote the greatest happiness, or the natural good, of others; these latter actions are “materially good.” 2 On the other hand there is [End Page 277] the question of how our knowledge of the virtuousness of certain actions can motivate and how in particular such knowledge can motivate morally good actions. For Hutcheson we know which actions are morally good because we have a moral sense, but how this knowledge motivates morally good actions is a question Hutcheson made several attempts to answer. This second question, how the moral sense can motivate morally good actions, is the focus of this paper. The development of Hutcheson’s idea of benevolence will be commented on briefly, but first we need to look at some of the unchanging aspects of Hutcheson’s thought and purposes to provide background to the issue of motivation.Virtuous actions are the result of virtuous character. Hutcheson maintained this from his earliest publications (Reflections, par. 5) to his posthumous System. 3 A virtuous character cannot be directly chosen, even if we wanted to, because we cannot choose to have benevolent desires: “[N]either benevolence nor any other affection or desire can be directly raised by volition” (Inquiry, IV, 139; revised from first edition).But virtue can be cultivated:... virtue, itself, or good dispositions of mind, are not directly taught, or produced by instruction; they must be originally planted in our nature by its great Author, and afterwards strengthened and confirmed by our own cultivation.(Inquiry, IV, 271. Changed from I, 253, with reference to cultivation added; cf. also Introduction, 13, 25, 38, 39, 58–59, etc.)We can cultivate virtue in ourselves; and through writing, teaching, conversation, and social interaction, we can cultivate it in others. 4 At the start of his career, when announcing in Reflections the purpose of his writing on [End Page 278] moral theory, Hutcheson regrets that the moral systems common in his day are not conducive to promoting virtue: they are written, he says, by moralists who are “sour and morose in their deportment;... easily put out of humour...; dejected with common calamities, and insolent upon any prosperous change in fortune” (Reflections, par. 4). He promises that his forthcoming Inquiry will not have this fault. In the preface to the Essay he complains about the writings of the ethical egoists because “many [people] have been discouraged from all attempts of cultivating kind generous affections in themselves, by a previous notion that there are no such affections in nature...” (I, v; III, v). Throughout all the rest of his writings on morality Hutcheson advocates both the private and communal cultivation of virtue, and at the same time he contributes to that cultivation.The other constant which dominates the moral motivation issue is Hutcheson’s rejection of egoism. Benevolence is a... (shrink)

Starting from the separation between rational and irrational motivation, Husserl elaborates a formal ethics which justifies the universal validity of its principles on the logical feature of proposition. On the other hand, since the irrationality of motivation represents the associative stream of consciousness constituting the passive background of rational life of subject, the formal aspect of Husserlian ethics seems to be well rooted in the materiality and con-creteness of existen...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.3 (2003) 104-107 [Access article in PDF] Motivating Aesthetics Cynthia C. Rostankowski Humanities Department San Jose State University The territory of philosophical aesthetics remains a conceptual hinterland in the world of academic disciplines. It is not the only hinterland, but in comparison to other disciplines in arts and letters, few scholars engage in the subject professionally, and many people avoid the territory it occupies (...) as a place to visit, let alone to tarry or reside. Why is this? Usually people do not wish to visit places that are uncomfortable in some way. Frozen wastelands, blazing deserts, war zones, and places with nothing to do or see are usually avoided because they are perceived as unpleasant, dangerous, or boring,and the same is very likely true of their conceptual analogs. In what senses might some people perceive aesthetics as analogous to Siberia, Sudan, or central Kansas? I would like to investigate what it is about aesthetics that causes people to shy away from it more often than to flock to it. I have long been fascinated by the responses of students who express amazement or confusion when exposed to the field of aesthetics as a part of an introductory philosophy class, or of arts educators who do not know what to do with aesthetics since it does not seem quite to fit with the rest of what they do, or the responses of some artists or other arts practitioners who are occasionally disdainful of aesthetics. It would be easy to say that aesthetics has merely had bad press or inadequate exposure in the classroom, but I suspect there is more to it than that. I have experienced many of the situations I have just mentioned, and they have usually surprised and sometimes demoralized [End Page 104] me. They have always motivated me to think harder about my beloved field of interest, to try to reveal its attractions to those who do not find it as appealing and engaging as I do, or as you, my reader does. (I am presuming that one who is reading an essay in a journal about aesthetic education has already found his or her comfort zone in the field.) I will also presume to offer some thoughts about motivating an interest in aesthetics among the aesthetically uninterested — why one might want to do it, and what one might do. Please note, I am not speaking of the aesthetically disinterested 1 ; they too have already found their place in the discipline!It is likely that the problem of aesthetics has to do in part with misunderstandings, and those misunderstandings are multi-layered. If one looks up the word "aesthetic" in the Oxford English Dictionary, one finds the following: (F)rom the Greek for perception...and, being pre-occupied;...pertaining to things perceptible by the senses, things material;..."criticism of taste"...the science which treats of the conditions of sensuous perception...of or pertaining to the appreciation or criticism of the beautiful...Recent extravagances in the adoption of a sentimental archaism as the ideal of beauty have still further removed aesthetic and its derivatives from their etymological and purely philosophical meaning. There are varied suggestions about the use of the term, including the mention of its removal in contemporary parlance from its original meanings. If one looks up the keyword "aesthetic" on the Internet, one may find the following sites: skin care, plastic surgery, dentistry, exterior and interior design, tattoos, and some art, art theory, and philosophy among other things. An exemplification in practice of what is suggested in the OED. It is clear that the meaning of the word "aesthetic" has become at best imprecise, at worst confusing in common parlance.So, the first misunderstanding regarding aesthetics is the meaning of the term. What is philosophical aesthetics? It is not what some misconstrue as the imposition of value judgments on society. Unfortunately, some presume that because matters of taste or definitions of beauty are considered in the field, someone must be telling someone what they ought to think is pleasing or beautiful. This is not the focus... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.3 (2003) 104-107 [Access article in PDF] Motivating Aesthetics Cynthia C. Rostankowski Humanities Department San Jose State University The territory of philosophical aesthetics remains a conceptual hinterland in the world of academic disciplines. It is not the only hinterland, but in comparison to other disciplines in arts and letters, few scholars engage in the subject professionally, and many people avoid the territory it occupies (...) as a place to visit, let alone to tarry or reside. Why is this? Usually people do not wish to visit places that are uncomfortable in some way. Frozen wastelands, blazing deserts, war zones, and places with nothing to do or see are usually avoided because they are perceived as unpleasant, dangerous, or boring,and the same is very likely true of their conceptual analogs. In what senses might some people perceive aesthetics as analogous to Siberia, Sudan, or central Kansas? I would like to investigate what it is about aesthetics that causes people to shy away from it more often than to flock to it. I have long been fascinated by the responses of students who express amazement or confusion when exposed to the field of aesthetics as a part of an introductory philosophy class, or of arts educators who do not know what to do with aesthetics since it does not seem quite to fit with the rest of what they do, or the responses of some artists or other arts practitioners who are occasionally disdainful of aesthetics. It would be easy to say that aesthetics has merely had bad press or inadequate exposure in the classroom, but I suspect there is more to it than that. I have experienced many of the situations I have just mentioned, and they have usually surprised and sometimes demoralized [End Page 104] me. They have always motivated me to think harder about my beloved field of interest, to try to reveal its attractions to those who do not find it as appealing and engaging as I do, or as you, my reader does. (I am presuming that one who is reading an essay in a journal about aesthetic education has already found his or her comfort zone in the field.) I will also presume to offer some thoughts about motivating an interest in aesthetics among the aesthetically uninterested — why one might want to do it, and what one might do. Please note, I am not speaking of the aesthetically disinterested 1 ; they too have already found their place in the discipline!It is likely that the problem of aesthetics has to do in part with misunderstandings, and those misunderstandings are multi-layered. If one looks up the word "aesthetic" in the Oxford English Dictionary, one finds the following: (F)rom the Greek for perception...and, being pre-occupied;...pertaining to things perceptible by the senses, things material;..."criticism of taste"...the science which treats of the conditions of sensuous perception...of or pertaining to the appreciation or criticism of the beautiful...Recent extravagances in the adoption of a sentimental archaism as the ideal of beauty have still further removed aesthetic and its derivatives from their etymological and purely philosophical meaning. There are varied suggestions about the use of the term, including the mention of its removal in contemporary parlance from its original meanings. If one looks up the keyword "aesthetic" on the Internet, one may find the following sites: skin care, plastic surgery, dentistry, exterior and interior design, tattoos, and some art, art theory, and philosophy among other things. An exemplification in practice of what is suggested in the OED. It is clear that the meaning of the word "aesthetic" has become at best imprecise, at worst confusing in common parlance.So, the first misunderstanding regarding aesthetics is the meaning of the term. What is philosophical aesthetics? It is not what some misconstrue as the imposition of value judgments on society. Unfortunately, some presume that because matters of taste or definitions of beauty are considered in the field, someone must be telling someone what they ought to think is pleasing or beautiful. This is not the focus... (shrink)

In the introduction to the Normal and the Pathological, Canguilhem’s doctoral dissertation in medicine, defended in 1943, he claimed, “philosophy is a reflection for which all unknown material [matière étrangère] is good.” In this case the “unknown material” was precisely medicine; “a technique or art at the crossroads of several sciences” which was supposed to provide “an introduction to concrete human problems.” Canguilhem had started studying medicine six years before, while he was a high-school professor in Toulouse. At (...) the time he was distancing himself from the philosophical framework that had marked his studies and writings during the previous decade. This framework implied an anti-vitalist, Kantian and Cartesian approach to man, strongly influenced by his mentor Emile Chartier, also known as Alain. In this chapter, I try to provide concrete explanations concerning his decision to study medicine. I will not rely on those proposed by the existent scholarship, which frequently relate his decision to his interest in technology and technique. On the contrary, by examining unpublished material, such as a series of lectures given between 1933 and 1935, I claim that the motivation of his turn has to be related to the readings of works in psychology and ethology undertaken during this period. (shrink)

The creation of guidelines has long been a popular means of conveying normative requirements in scientific and medical research. The recent case of He Jiankui, whose research flouted both widely accepted ethical standards and a set of field-specific guidelines he co-authored, raises the question of whether guidelines are an effective means of preventing misconduct. This paper advances the theory that guidelines can facilitate moral rationalization, a form of motivated reasoning. Moral rationalization in research occurs when individuals justify their actions with (...) plausible reasons that cohere with their moral standards. This allows them to act as they want while believing in their own goodness. If guidelines facilitate moral rationalization, this has implications for research ethics training and for the work of applied ethicists. Research ethics training ought to incorporate reflection on conative features of reasoning, including incentives to commit misconduct, and applied ethicists ought to be circumspect about their use of ethics guidelines. Otherwise, they are feeding the fire of rationalization with the cognitive material practitioners need to accomplish their desired ends. (shrink)

A modus tollens against zero-dimensional material objects is presented from the premises (i) that if there are zero-dimensional material objects then there are bare particulars, and (ii) that there are no bare particulars. The argument for the first premise proceeds by elimination. First, bare particular theory and bundle theory are motivated as the most appealing theories of property exemplification. It is then argued that the bundle theorist’s Ockhamism ought to lead her to reject spatiotemporally located zero-dimensional property instances. (...) Finally, it is argued that since she must accept such instances if she accepts zero-dimensional material object bundles, she ought to avoid the latter. This leaves bare particular theory as the default view of zero-dimensional material objects. The argument for the second premise invokes the thesis that the exemplification of at least one sparse property is a prerequisite for the existence of any particular. It is argued from Humean considerations that bare particulars fail this prerequisite. (shrink)

In metaphysics, the view that material constitution is transitive is ubiquitous, an assumption expressed by both proponents and critics of constitution views. Likewise, it is typically assumed within the philosophy of mind that physical realization is a transitive relation. In both cases, this assumption of transitivity plays a role in discussion of the broader implications of a metaphysics that invokes either relation. Here I provide reasons for questioning this assumption and the uses to which this appeal to transitivity is (...) put. As my title suggests, I shall focus on the case of material constitution, using a brief discussion of realization at the outset to motivate the discussion of the transitivity of material constitution at the core of the paper. (shrink)

Functionally graded materials (FGMs) have been used in many different kinds of applications in recent years and have attracted significant research attention. However, we do not yet have a commonly accepted way of representing the various aspects of FGMs. Lack of standardised vocabulary creates obstacles to the extraction of useful information relating to pertinent aspects of different applications. A standard resource is needed for describing various elements of FGMs, including existing applications, manufacturing techniques, and material characteristics. This motivated the (...) creation of the FGM Ontology (FGMO) in 2016. Here, we present a revised and expanded version of the FGM Ontology, which includes enrichments along four dimensions: (1) documenting recent FGMs applications; (2) reorganising the framework to incorporate an updated representation of types of manufacturing processes; (3) enriching the axioms of the ontology; and (4) importing mid-level ontologies from the Common Core Ontologies (CCO) and Product Life Cycle (PLC) Ontologies. The work is being carried out within the framework of the Industry Ontology Foundry (IOF), and the ontology is conformant to Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). (shrink)

Are the sculpture and the mass of gold which permanently makes it up one object or two? In this article, we argue that the monist, who answers ‘one object’, cannot accommodate the asymmetry of material constitution. To say ‘the mass of gold materially constitutes the sculpture, whereas the sculpture does not materially constitute the mass of gold’, the monist must treat ‘materially constitutes’ as an Abelardian predicate, whose denotation is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it appears. We (...) motivate this approach in terms of modal analyses of material constitution, but argue that ultimately it fails. The monist must instead accept a deflationary, symmetrical use of ‘materially constitutes’. We argue that this is a serious cost for her approach. (shrink)

The impact moral judgments have on our deliberations and actions seems to vary a great deal. Moral judgments play a large part in the lives of some people, who are apt not only to make them, but also to be guided by them in the sense that they tend to pursue what they judge to be of moral value, and shun what they judge to be of moral disvalue. But it seems unrealistic to claim that moral judgments play a pervasive (...) role in the lives of all or even most people. There are considerable variations in how strong a tendency people have to think in moral terms, and in how such thoughts affect their decisions and actions. For every moral hero who single-mindedly pursues moral values, there are thousands of less committed people who only do so when it does not cost them too much in material comfort, personal relations, or social standing. And of course, what counts as too much varies from person to person. On top of such variations, there are those who consistently display moral indifference—people who concede, for example, that certain investment policies have morally problematic consequences, but who can readily and without compunction ignore that in their business decisions. There even seem to be moral subversives, people who intentionally and knowingly pursue what they acknowledge to be morally wrong or bad, and do so for that very reason. (shrink)

This study examined the relationship between L2 motivation and engagement in academic reading skill from the lenses of L2 motivational self-system and transformative experience. More specifically, following the transformative experience framework, we investigated the level of students’ engagement in academic reading skills inside and outside English classes. We also explored what motivational factors act as strong predictors of transformative experience and whether L2 motivation and engagement of students differ across different disciplines. Stratified purposive sampling was followed to recruit (...) 419 undergraduate English for academic purposes students studying in different majors. As such, we developed a questionnaire for measuring TE and utilized a pre-established questionnaire to operationalize L2 motivational self-system. We found that L2 motivation significantly covaried with students’ level of engagement in English academic reading skill. Furthermore, the results of multiple regression analysis revealed that L2 learning experience and ideal L2 self were strong predictors of transformative engagement; ought-to L2 self played a marginal role in the occurrence of TE. Discipline-wise, Life Sciences students were considerably more motivated than those in Arts and Humanities. However, no significant difference was observed in the extent of transformative engagement among students across disciplinary groups. Implications for EAP instructors, educational authorities, and material and curricula developers are discussed. (shrink)

This paper attempts to synthesize the Winchian stress on constitutive rules with the Marxian stress on material relationships by developing the concept of emergently material social relations. Such relationships, it is argued, arise from the constitutive rules that constitute a group's way of life. Although such relationships thus are derivative from the conscious rule-following behavior of actors, nevertheless they have an objective existence independent of actors' specific awareness. It is argued that such material relations are an important (...) mechanism beyond the cultural rules through which our behavior is constrained, enabled, and motivated. Yet the Winchian tradition in general and contemporary structuration theory in particular have tended to peripheralize the notion of material relations, treating them largely as epiphenomenal abstractions. This, it is argued, is a mistake and the source of an important lacuna in structuration theory. In particular, because structuration theory decenters the actor, conflates the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, and peripheralizes social relations, it lacks an adequate explanation of motivation, as symptomized by its inordinate appeal to the unconscious. The concept of emergently material social relations overcomes this problem and offers a reintegration of the Marxian and the Winchian traditions. (shrink)

Spinoza is often conceived as a highly intellectualist philosopher, and it is tempting to read human freedom without attention to its material basis. In this paper, I study Spinoza's claim that the more the body can undergo, the more the mind can know in order to establish Spinoza's view of freedom under the attribute of extension.

The impact moral judgments have on our deliberations and actions seems to vary a great deal. Moral judgments play a large part in the lives of some people, who are apt not only to make them, but also to be guided by them in the sense that they tend to pursue what they judge to be of moral value, and shun what they judge to be of moral disvalue. But it seems unrealistic to claim that moral judgments play a pervasive (...) role in the lives of all or even most people. There are considerable variations in how strong a tendency people have to think in moral terms, and in how such thoughts affect their decisions and actions. For every moral hero who single- mindedly pursues moral values, there are thousands of less com- mitted people who only do so when it does not cost them too much in material comfort, personal relations, or social standing. And of course, what counts as too much varies from person to person. On top of such variations, there are those who consistently display mor- al indifference-people who concede, for example, that certain investment policies have morally problematic consequences, but who can readily and without compunction ignore that in their busi- ness decisions. There even seem to be moral subversives, people who intentionally and knowingly pursue what they acknourledge to be morally u~ong or bad, and do so for that very reason. (shrink)

The so-called paradoxes of material implication have motivated the development of many non-classical logics over the years, such as relevance logics, paraconsistent logics, fuzzy logics and so on. In this note, we investigate some of these paradoxes and classify them, over minimal logic. We provide proofs of equivalence and semantic models separating the paradoxes where appropriate. A number of equivalent groups arise, all of which collapse with unrestricted use of double negation elimination. Interestingly, the principle ex falso quodlibet, and (...) several weaker principles, turn out to be distinguishable, giving perhaps supporting motivation for adopting minimal logic as the ambient logic for reasoning in the possible presence of inconsistency. (shrink)

This article investigates the origin of the lack of motivation for adopting significant pro-environmental behavior . I identify three main barriers to motivation: the feeling that there is a need for broad collective action that has not yet materialized, the lack of practical knowledge about what an individual can do in his/her daily life to address environmental problems, and insufficient feedback and approval mechanisms. Subsequently, I argue that an individual's social context may contribute in addressing all three. The (...) motivation for the adoption of PEB behavior is connected to social interaction, which at times seems to shape individual behavior to a greater degree than other factors such as direct risk perception. (shrink)

This paper discusses the relations between three forms of altruism: behavioural, evolutionary and motivational. Altruism in a behavioural sense is an act that benefits another person. It can range from volunteering to a charity and helping a neighbour, to giving money to a non-profit organisation or donating blood. People often dedicate their material and nonmaterial resources for the benefit of others to gain psychological, social and material benefits for themselves. Thus, their altruistic acts are driven by egoistic (...) class='Hi'>motivation. Also, the final goal of an altruistic act may be the increase in the welfare of a group or adherence to a certain moral principle or a social norm. However, at least sometimes, the welfare of others is the ultimate goal of our actions, when our altruistic acts are performed from altruistic motivation. In evolutionary sense, altruism means the sacrifice of reproductive success for the benefit of other organisms. According to evolutionary theories, behaviour which promotes the reproductive success of the receiver at the cost of the actor is favoured by natural selection, because it is either beneficial for the altruist in the long run, or for his genes, or for the group he belongs to. However, altruism among people emerges as a distinctly human combination of innate and learned behaviours. Not only do we benefit the members of our own group, but we are capable of transcending our tribalistic instincts and putting the benefit of strangers at our own personal expense as our ultimate goal. (shrink)

Mereological nihilism is the view that no objects have proper parts. Despite how counter‐intuitive it is, it is taken quite seriously, largely because it solves a number of puzzles in the metaphysics of material objects – or so its proponents claim. In this article, I show that for every puzzle that mereological nihilism solves, there is a similar puzzle that (a) it doesn’t solve, and (b) every other solution to the original puzzle does solve. Since the solutions to the (...) new puzzles apply just as well to the old puzzles, the old puzzles provide no motivation to be a mereological nihilist. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Questioning the Motives of Habituated Action:Burke and Bourdieu on PracticeDana AndersonThe British official's habit, in the Empire's remotest spots, of dressing for dinner is in effect the transporting of an idol, the vessel of a motive that has its sanctuary in the homeland.—Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives, 44In his recent Kenneth Burke and the Conversation after Philosophy, Timothy Crusius locates Burke in the context of "PostPhilosophical" thought by (...) describing Burke's expansive Dramatistic project as a praxis—as a program encompassing "any act whatsoever, including symbolic action (i.e., expression, whether artistic or discursive), in behalf of a better life." When praxis is conceived broadly as a dialectical perspective on human action—that agents and structures interact in mutually determining ways—the term becomes, in fact, an accurate summary of the entire Burkean corpus: "If we understand it as Burke does," Crusius continues, "all that he wrote is praxis" (1999, 198). This panoramic scope of Burke's dialectical inquiry is certainly one reason it remains rhetorical theory's perhaps most flexible and productive framework for considering human action; the Dramatistic pentad and its ratios for discussing the attribution of motive continue to invite theoretical "ways of placement" as multifaceted as human motives themselves.Speaking of Burke's work in terms of praxis, however, at least in the term's contemporary critical usage,1 raises a question regarding a cognate concept that the idea of praxis entails: in what sense is Burke's pentadic grammar of action equipped to consider the habituated actions characteristic of human practice?Practice, as a conceptual descendant of Marxian praxis, retains a connection with what Marx called "human sensuous activity" (1968, 28-30).2 In its most general sense, practice refers to the regular and repeated activities of agents that, in their quotidian enactment, dialectically [End Page 255] constitute an agent's sense of self and of reality in relation to external conditions of existence. While the activities of agents will tend to reify the dominant external conditions in which agents act, these external conditions are nonetheless open to change inasmuch as the evolving practices of individuals might come to challenge them. This perspective of the determined, yet determining nature of human practice is aptly summarized in The German Ideology, where Marx and Engels famously argue that "circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances" (2000, 189).3 As Michel de Certeau's seminal studies of practice have demonstrated (de Certeau 1984; de Certeau, Giard, and Mayol 1998), the power of this relationship of mutual constitution between individuals and their worlds of external circumstances owes directly to the banality of the actions through which such constitution is accomplished—actions ranging from the way bread is served in a given household, to the way cosmetics are purchased in department stores, to the general "ways of operating" in urban spaces, including simply walking in one's own neighborhood (de Certeau, Giard, and Mayol 1998; Mayol 1998, 7-13). As Judith Butler very poignantly summarizes, it is through precisely such "embodied rituals of everydayness," however "taken-for-granted" they may be, that "a given culture produces and sustains belief in its own 'obviousness' " (1999, 113-14).The constitutive dynamics of such practical actions should surely figure prominently into any conception of Burke's work as praxis. Indeed, this dynamic is already implicit in the fact that, for Burke, it is only through the possibility of mutually transforming both ourselves and our worlds through actions material and symbolic that we might begin to move toward a better life. But while Dramatism and practice rest on similar perspectives of the dialectically constitutive nature of human action, several aspects of the grammar through which Burke investigates motive might appear to limit, or even to preclude, the Dramatistic examination of practice as a kind of motivated action. More specifically, Burke's consistent "anti-Behaviorist" emphasis on the conscious or purposive nature of action questions the extent to which Dramatism can account for the dispositional and habituated actions characteristic of practice, actions for which agents would be least able to articulate conscious purposes. To cast the issue in the context of my epigraph above... (shrink)

Research on Augmented Reality in education has demonstrated that AR applications designed with diverse components boost student motivation in educational settings. However, most of the research conducted to date, does not define exactly what those components are and how these components positively affect student motivation. This study, therefore, attempts to identify some of the components that positively affect student motivation in mobile AR learning experiences to contribute to the design and development of motivational AR learning experiences for (...) the Vocational Education and Training level of education. To identify these components, a research model constructed from the literature was empirically validated with data obtained from two sources: 35 students from four VET institutes interacting with an AR application for learning for a period of 20 days, and a self-report measure obtained from the Instructional Materials Motivation Survey. We found that the following variables: use of scaffolding, real-time feedback, degree of success, time on-task and learning outcomes are positively correlated with the four dimensions of the ARCS model of motivation: Attention, Relevance, Confidence, and Satisfaction. Implications of these results are also described. (shrink)

There is an overlooked similarity between three classic accounts of the conditions of object experience from three distinct disciplines. Sociology: the “inversion” that accompanies discovery in the natural sciences, as local causes of effects are reattributed to an observed object. Psychology: the “externalization” that accompanies mastery of a visual–tactile sensory substitution interface, as tactile sensations of the proximal interface are transformed into vision-like experience of a distal object. Biology: the “projection” that brings forth an animal’s Umwelt, as impressions on its (...) body’s sensory surfaces are reconfigured into perception of an external object. This similarity between the effects of scientific practice and interface-use on the one hand, and of sensorimotor interaction on the other, becomes intelligible once we accept that skillful engagement with instruments and interfaces constitutes a socio-material augmentation of our basic perceptual capacity. This enactive interpretation stands in contrast to anti-realism about science associated with constructivist interpretations of these three phenomena, which are motivated by viewing them as the internal mental construction of the experienced object. Instead, it favors a participatory realism: the sensorimotor basis of perceptual experience loops not only through our body, but also through the external world. This allows us to conceive of object experience in relational terms, i.e., as one or more subjects directly engaging with the world. Consequently, we can appreciate scientific observation in its full complexity: it is a socio-materially augmented process of becoming acquainted with the observed object that—like tool-use and perceiving more generally—is irreducibly self, other-, and world-involving. (shrink)

Are the sculpture and the mass of gold which permanently makes it up one object or two? In this article, we argue that the monist, who answers ‘one object’, cannot accommodate the asymmetry of material constitution. To say ‘the mass of gold materially constitutes the sculpture, whereas the sculpture does not materially constitute the mass of gold’, the monist must treat ‘materially constitutes’ as an Abelardian predicate, whose denotation is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it appears. We (...) motivate this approach in terms of modal analyses of material constitution, but argue that ultimately it fails. The monist must instead accept a deflationary, symmetrical use of ‘materially constitutes’. We argue that this is a serious cost for her approach. (shrink)

Burke approaches man in terms of human actions. His key concepts--elucidated at length in A Grammar of Motives --are act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose. Men are viewed as agents acting in a scene and using some agency for the accomplishment of some purpose. This is a "field" orientation of the sort found in George H. Mead's "philosophy of the act," in Edward C. Tolman's "purposive behaviorism," and in Talcott Parson's concept of "action-system." Burke makes many references to Mead, and (...) his approach to man is very similar to Mead's in its stress upon the act, upon man as a symbol-using agent, and upon the forms of "identification" which role-taking makes possible. The focus of Burke's attention is, however, upon man's literary products as a mirror in which to behold the forms and complexity of human motivation. He is in effect telling us--and showing us--the importance of the study of man's most complex symbolic acts as a way of enriching our understanding of human nature. In the Rhetoric, humanistic material is penetratingly analysed in a way which supplements and broadens the conception of man gained from more narrowly scientific studies. In his discussion of the range and the principles of rhetoric Burke considers Cicero, Aristotle, Augustine, Bacon, Bentham, Marx, Carlyle, Empson, Veblen, Diderot, La Rochefoucauld, De Gourmont, Pascal, Ovid, Machiavelli, and Dante. Of his analyses of literary works the pages on Castiglione, Shakespere, Kafka, and Kierkegaard are very fine. That no student of man should neglect this humanistic material or this mode of linguistic analysis is convincingly attested by Burke's achievements. (shrink)

The article focuses on motivation, proposing the equation in its title and opposing the contrary view, that what moves people to action is the rational calculation of their material interests. The latter view is most familiar in economics, where it was for generations seen as the best (meaning, most ‘scientific’) mode of explanation. It had a great deal of influence on historiography and found a great deal of support among psychologists also. From these three areas of research it (...) is being challenged, however, even to some extent displaced, in recent decades. The importance of emotions or feelings in explaining behavior is increasingly acknowledged, and the validity of conclusions reached about feelings in historical contexts through the operation of empathy. Illustrations of how this works can be easily supplied. (shrink)

Analyses of participation usually assume a dichotomy between 'instrumental' and 'transformative' approaches. However, this study of voluntary biological monitoring experiences and outcomes finds that they cannot be fitted into such a dichotomy. They can enhance the information base for environmental management; change participants through education about scientific practice and ecological change; lead to changes in life direction or group organisation; and influence decision-makers. Personal transformation can take place within a conventionally top-down context. Conversely, grassroots data collection can shore up the (...) status quo and protect local interests. Partnerships between actors can provide distinct but complementary and mutually rewarding outcomes. Power is not located in a data-consuming centre, and data are not meaningless materials that leave the collector unmoved. A more dynamic model of human-nature relations is presented which connects humans and information in the participatory process. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Material Virtue: Ethics and the Body in Early ChinaEdward SlingerlandMaterial Virtue: Ethics and the Body in Early China. By Mark Csikszentmihalyi. Leiden: Brill, 2005. Pp. vi + 402. Hardcover $180.00.Material Virtue: Ethics and the Body in Early China by Mark Csikszentmihalyi is a fascinating and meticulously researched study of early Chinese discussions of virtue and moral education in the period following what we might call the (...) "physiological turn," marked by a growing interest in the body and the embodiment of social ideals that begins sometime in the fourth century B.C.E. In Csikszentmihalyi's usage, the phrase "material virtue" refers "narrowly to descriptions of the virtues in terms of their quasi-material properties. More generally, such descriptions are characteristic of the view that, once cultivated, the virtues manifest themselves through physiological changes in the body that can be observed by others" (p. 5). This early Chinese development of this sort of nondualistic model of the self is a topic of growing interest to scholars of early China, with relevance to many contemporary debates about ethics and the mind-body relationship. This study's focus on a recently discovered archeological find, the text of the Wuxing 五行 (datable to sometime before 300 B.C.E.), also places it at the center of one of the most exciting recent developments in the field: the trove of newly discovered and, in many cases, previously unknown texts that are in the process of enriching and transforming our understanding of early Chinese thought. The two versions of the Wuxing that Csikszentmihalyi discusses come from Guodian (tomb closed ca. 300 B.C.E.) and Mawangdui (tomb closed 168 B.C.E.; this version also includes what seems to be a later commentary), two of the richest finds from the perspective of early Chinese philosophical and religious thought. Two substantial appendixes contain critical annotated editions of both texts, which summarize the state of the field with regard to their textual scholarship—an invaluable resource in itself.As Csikszentmihalyi notes, one important aspect of these finds is how they "have augmented the [received textual] record with different kinds of texts, challenging received notions of school and genre" (p. 1). This is one of the more interesting contributions of Csikszentmihalyi's study, part of a recent trend among scholars of early China to move beyond traditional "school" labels. Csikszentmihalyi presents the Wuxing, which modern scholars attribute to the disciple Zisi 子思,1 as a hitherto unheard voice in "an important conversation about the nature of the virtues in early China from the fourth through the second centuries B.C.E." (p. 2), and by doing so significantly increases the subtlety of our picture of the early Chinese philosophical [End Page 694] landscape. For instance, in place of a more-or-less linear picture of the development of "Confucian" thought, originating with Kongzi and then diverging with the two followers Mengzi and Xunzi, Csikszentmihalyi argues for a view of the ru 儒 tradition that sees it as consisting of many competing disciple lineages, united by a shared technical vocabulary and the acknowledgment of Kongzi as an authority, but much more internally diverse than traditionally thought.Csikszentmihalyi contextualizes his discussion of the Wuxing by placing it firmly in the Mengzi-Zisi lineage that appears as one of Xunzi's targets in his famous "Against Twelve Masters" chapter. He makes a strong case for doing so: besides Xunzi's comment that the misguided followers of Mengzi and Zisi "created a theory, and called it 'Five Kinds of Action' (wuxing)" (p. 60), there are many textual and conceptual parallels between the Wuxing and the Mengzi. Csikszentmihalyi also makes a strong case that both the Mengzi and the Wuxing can be seen as springing from a similar motivation: defending Confucianism from Primitivist charges of moral hypocrisy by arguing for a more internalist conception of virtue, grounded in the physical body and its animating qi. As he notes, "The 'psychologizing' or 'embodiment' of moral self cultivation implies that genuine virtue cannot be simulated because it is an observable physical process" (p. 86). For instance, in his interesting discussion of the Mencian concept of haoranzhiqi 浩然之氣 (usually translated as "flood-like" qi), Csikszentmihalyi follows... (shrink)

While there are numerous differences between the approaches taken by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and James J. Gibson, the basic motivation of the two thinkers, as well as the internal logic of their respective views, is extraordinarily close. Both were guided throughout their lives by an attempt to overcome the dualism of subject and object, and both devoted considerable attention to their "Gestaltist" predecessors. There can be no doubt but that it is largely because of this common cause that the subsequent (...) development of their ideas is so similar. It is not my objective in what follows merely to demonstrate a similarity between two lines of thought. Instead, I will try to show that each approach gains considerably from attention to the other. There are numerous ways to begin such a project, each about as arbitrary as the next. For present purposes, I shall take as of central importance the question of the character of the perceived world, both in relation to the traditionally opposed mental and material "substances", and in relation to its identification and individuation of things vis a vis one another and vis a vis ourselves. This will implicate especially Gibson's "affordances" and Merleau-Ponty's thesis concerning the "materiality of meaning.". (shrink)

In this paper we present the standard Thomistic view concerning substances and their parts. We then note some objections to that view. Afterwards, we present Aquinas’s Christology, then draw an analogy between the relation that holds between the Second Person and the assumed human nature, on the one hand, and the relation that holds between a substance whole and its substance parts, on the other. We then show how the analogy, which St. Thomas himself drew at points, is useful for (...) providing a theory that answers the objections that the standard Thomistic view faces. Finally we answer objections to our approach. We conclude that there is a hylomorphic theory, founded on an analogy from Aquinas’s Christology, that fits well with the empirical data concerning substance parts, on which some complete created material substances have other complete created material substances as parts. (shrink)

SUMMARYThis Study reviews the prevalent concepts of maturation and motivation, and develops the following points :1. Developmental and clinical child Psychology are held apart less because of à differing focus of interests than because of differing concepts of maturation and motivation.2. Maturation is à term applied in biology and Psychology to, the development of the individual by growth processes, as distinguished from development by exercise and learning. It is defined in terms of à sequence or order of phases.3. (...) Sequences can be affected by conditioning. It is suggested that only the groundplan of life, the order of phases from birth through maturity and reproduction to death, is unalterable. Maturation is but one contributing factor, or principle, which co‐determines the more complex process of development.4. The goal‐determining factor in the individuals striving is called motivation. There are two major categories of motivation changes : the basic tendency of life is to establish the individuals equilibrium. From this point of view, all changes of direction are due to environmental influences which call for adaptation to reestablish equilibrium . The second category, the thesis of this Study, is that life is expansion , à process involving the homeostatic mechanism. In the course of the expansive as well as of the adaptive process, the individual changes its direction. Direction changes may be experienced in the act of reproduction when the individual transmits energies to new life; again, in the act of self‐limitation when the productive energies have been exhausted; another change of direction is that from flight movements to experimentation with and mastery of stimuli.5. Three developmental theories have been forwarded. The first, based on the concept of evolution, is à structuralization theory of development. The second, à biogenic theory of development, is related to the growth process and hypothecates à parallel of physical and Psychological development. The third developmental theory describes development as à change of motivation– an adaptation process resulting from the individuals dynamic relationship to his environment.The three theories emphasize three indispensable aspects of the developmental process: organization, content and form, Dynamics and objectives.6. Only the last of these three theories explained the fact of personality immaturity in relationship to the physical maturation, since the adaptive and the physical growth process could be conceived of as relatively independent from each other.7. Objections are raised against this theory of adaptation, to the extent that it claims adaptation to be identical with development.8. Objections are raised against the definition of the discharge principle as the basic tendency of the organism and against the identification of the discharge with the homeostasis principle.9. Since homeostasis is defined as an optimal tension level, and not as its lowest possible level, there must be states of tension which are overly‐low as well as overly‐high. In states of too‐low tension, charging must be à basic tendency of the organism.10. The main properties of life are growth and reproduction– that is, expansion, in which the environment is being exploited, adapted to life, mastered by the living being. Adaptation to the environment is only à partial aspect of life, and may be used as à detour to the opposite goal.11. All living beings have à course of life during which they develop structures that anticipate future needs. Theľ work with reserves. Anľ given need of à living being must be considered as related to the present, past and future of its life. As à consequence, it is impossible to assume that à tendency related only to the moment plays à basic role in the life of the individual. The acute release tendency relates only to acute phases or features of the needs of the immediate present.12. Consequently, deferral occurs not onlt in the course of adaptation, and as an imposed phenomenon; deferral may also occur as unimposed, unlearned behavior whenever the individual is not quite prepared for à desired experience.13. Motivation during growth and during decline is described and analyzed.14. Creativity is defined as constructive activity, à process which has its biological substratum in growth and reproduction. It consists of forming new products which develop, first, from experimentation with materials, and second, from the masterful handling of those materials.15. The probability of the processes of unlearned cooperation is presented.16. Neurosis is found to originate in connection with feelings of guilt and remorse over failing oneself as well as over failing others.17. The aim of life is seen in the contribution of biologically and/or culturally constructive products which can be utilized in the building process of life and of culture. (shrink)

The study investigated the perceived potential of motivational strategies operating in school to impact teacher effectiveness in public secondary schools in Ondo State, Nigeria. One research question was raised and two hypotheses formulated for the study. Descriptive-survey design was adopted. Main population consisted of 304 public secondary schools in the state while teachers in the 304 schools constituted the target population. Ten public secondary schools and 200 teachers were selected through multi-stage, stratified and simple-random sampling techniques and used for the (...) study. Data were gathered using a questionnaire, validated by a professional and tested for reliability using test-retest approach, coefficient of reliability being 0.80. Data were analysed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences, frequency counts while hypotheses were tested using chi-square statistic. It was found that provision of instructional materials, improvement of school environment, assignment of add... (shrink)

From Aristotle we can learn how our understanding of human action may profit from a certain way of reading what he has to say about the inherent teleology of cognition. Much as cognition, as such, aims at judging correctly on the basis of suitable reasons , action, as such, aims at doing the right thing for the right reasons . Moreover, one cannot determine whether “the right thing” is being done in a given situation without first determining whether appropriate patterns (...) of motivation would have prompted it in that situation. (shrink)

From Aristotle we can learn how our understanding of human action may profit from a certain way of reading what he has to say about the inherent teleology of cognition. Much as cognition, as such, aims at judging correctly on the basis of suitable reasons, action, as such, aims at doing the right thing for the right reasons. Moreover, one cannot determine whether “the right thing” is being done in a given situation without first determining whether appropriate patterns of (...) class='Hi'>motivation would have prompted it in that situation. (shrink)

A new understanding of Kant’s theory of a priori knowledge and his natural philosophy emerges from Jeffrey Edwards’s mature and penetrating study. In the Third Analogy of Experience, Kant argues for the existence of a dynamical plenum in space. This argument against empty space demonstrates that the dynamical plenum furnishes an a priori necessary condition for our experience and knowledge of an objective world. Such an a priori existence proof, however, transgresses the limits Kant otherwise places on transcendental arguments in (...) the _Critique of Pure Reason_ because it establishes a _material_ transcendental condition of possible experience. This finding motivates Edwards to examine the broader context of Kant’s views about matter, substance, causal influence, and physical aether in connection with the developmental history of his theory of transcendental idealism. Against the backdrop of early modern metaphysics and contemporaneous physical theory, Edwards explicates the origins of the Third Analogy in Kant’s early work on the metaphysics of nature. The argument against empty space presented in the Third Analogy reveals a central aspect of Kant’s transcendental theory of experience that Edwards explains lucidly. By clarifying the epistemological standpoint at issue in the Third Analogy, he shows that the fundamental revisions to which Kant subjects his theory of knowledge in the _Opus postumum_ not only originate in his precritical metaphysics of nature but are developments of an argument central to the _Critique of Pure Reason_ itself. Edwards’s work is important to scholars working in the history of philosophy and the history and philosophy of science, as well as to Kant specialists. (shrink)

Although the importance of measuring and reporting the social and environmental impact of organisational action is increasingly well recognised by both organisations and society at large, existing approaches to impact measurement are still far from being universally accepted. In this context, the stakeholder dynamics within the nascent field of impact investing demonstrate the complexity of resolving potentially differing perspectives on key impact measurement issues such as materiality. This paper argues, from an organisational perspective, that such arenas of contestation can be (...) conceptualised in terms of social justice. Specifically, we draw upon Sen’s notions of ‘arrangement and realisation’ to explore the dynamics of contestation across a range of stakeholders concerning materiality judgements to suggest that such ‘arrangements’ may lead to suboptimal impact outcomes as ‘realisations.’ Our analysis of the nature of materiality contestations in impact measurement reveals the conflicts, tensions and paradoxes evident in this field of action. Empirically, we examine data drawn from 19 cases and 33 interviews. The analysis suggests three arenas of contestation around the materiality of impact measurement: the power dynamics between economically powerful investors and objectified investees; the conflicts between materiality norms and standards; and the interactions between all stakeholders with differing motivations towards radical or incremental materiality. Building upon this analysis, we then discuss how arenas of contested materiality may be mediated by drawing upon Sen’s notions of transcending the individual interests of the invested parties for the greater good via processes of contextualisation and case-specificity. (shrink)

Since the fall of the former Soviet Union, and following geographical and technological changes in the global economy, theorists in Europe as well as the United States have lamented the confusion and emotional disengagement of many groups formerly identified with the left. This paper addresses the Kantian origins of the idea that 'revolution', however defined (or deferred), is the only plausible image for effective historical engagement capable of motivating spectators to action. Drawing on Foucault's inquiries into conditions for the possibility (...) of 'heroizing' the present, I examine two frameworks for understanding the ontological impact of historical models for 'eventfulness', those offered by Heidegger and Bergson. I then explore their implication for debates between Foucauldian theorists over the technological and bodily bases required to recognize the optimistic moral significance Kant attributed to revolution in practices characterizing the 'new capitalism'. Key Words: Bergson • Foucault • Heidegger • historiography • Kant • revolution. (shrink)

The successful early acquisition of reading literacy represents a crucial learning process determining the further course of academic development (Stanovich, 2009). During this process, interactions between children and their proximal social environment are of utmost importance. Therefore, we introduce a systemic framework for the development of learning potential (e.g., Mudrak et al., 2015, 2019, 2019b; Ziegler & Stoeger, 2017) and explore the interactions between the social and motivational processes associated with reading literacy development in school-age children. We base our analysis (...) on a representative Czech sample of fourth-grade pupils involved in the Progress in International Reading Literacy study (PIRLS, Martin et al., 2016). On the basis of the systemic framework, we hypothesized hierarchical relationships among family socioeconomic status, related developmental resources (including parental support, expectations, and reading resources), children’s reading motivation (including reading engagement and reading confidence), and manifested learning outcomes (including school grades and reading competence). We implemented three structural equation models to test the hypothesized relationships. The first model tested the direct effect of developmental resources on reading competence. The second model included the motivational variables as mediators between resources and competence. The third model included school grades as mediators between resources and motivational variables. Our analyses indicated the good fit of the proposed models. The final model explained 37.8 % of the variance in children’s school grades and 46.5 % of the variance in reading literacy test scores (compared to 34.8 % in the first model). Moreover, parental socioeconomic status was strongly associated with parental expectations, which were associated with reading confidence, partially through the effect of parental expectations on children’s school grades. Reading confidence was the main predictor of reading literacy within the model, followed by the direct effects of parental resources. The results illustrate complex processes through which the family environment affects the development of learning competencies such as reading literacy by providing children with the relevant social and material resources associated with their motivation and school outcomes. We discuss some of the reasons that these relationships may take place and consider their implications for educational practice. (shrink)

Three main motivations can explain compliance with social norms: fear of peer punishment, the desire for others' esteem and the desire to meet others' expectations. Though all play a role, only the desire to meet others' expectations can sustain compliance when neither public nor private monitoring is possible. Theoretical models have shown that such desire can indeed sustain social norms, but empirical evidence is lacking. Moreover it is unclear whether this desire ranges over others' “empirical” or “normative” expectations. We propose (...) a new experimental design to isolate this motivation and to investigate what kind of expectations people are inclined to meet. Results indicate that, when nobody can assign either material or immaterial sanctions, the perceived legitimacy of others' normative expectations can motivate a significant number of people to comply with costly social norms. (shrink)

Writings on drama education are strewn with assertions that the aesthetic must be central to drama education, even where drama is used as a means of teaching nonaesthetic material.1 Indeed, it is impossible to understand what drama is without one definition or another of the aesthetic. If students read dialogues out loud without concern for expression or for the literary qualities of the dialogue, then they are not doing drama. If students are obliged to invent sentences but with no (...) concern for dramatic tension or development, they are not doing drama. Students may be placed in the roles of waiters and customers in a restaurant and only do language practice, not drama. Yet the identity of the aesthetic, so crucial... (shrink)