When (if ever) may a professional deceive a client for the client's own good? Under what conditions (if any) is whistle-blowing morally required? These are just some of the questions that scholars as diverse as Michael D. Bayles, Thomas Nagel, Sissela Bok, Jessica Mitford, and Peter A. French confront in this stimulating anthology. Organized around philosophical issues such as the moral foundations of professional ethics, models of the professional-client relationship, deception, informed consent, privacy and confidentiality, professional dissent, and professional virtue, (...) the volume illuminates the complex ethical issues that arise in journalism, law, health care, counselling, education, engineering, business, politics, and social science research. A variety of pedagogical aids--including clear introductions to and study questions for each set of readings, concrete cases designed to focus discussion, and an appendix on preparing cases and position papers--makes the text invaluable for both students and teachers of professional ethics. (shrink)

Feminist philosophy emerged in earnest in the 1970s. With that emergence and the latest surge of the Women's Movement now a quarter of a century old and with the turn of the century approaching quickly, the Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs and the Pacific Society for Women in Philosophy invited a group of feminist philosophers to reflect on feminism and philosophy as we approach the millennium. A roundtable was held at the 1995 meeting of the Pacific Division of the (...) American Philosophical Association, and much of the content of that session is included in this Symposium. The discussants include scholars with research interests across the traditional areas of philosophy (e.g., metaphysics and epistemology, ethics, social and political philosophy, history of philosophy, and philosophy of science), as well as not so traditional areas (e.g., lesbian philosophy). Each participant was asked to take ten minutes to focus on whatever she thought might be useful to discuss in a forum designed for taking stock of feminism and philosophy in the mid‐1990s. The contributors are Louise Antony, Joan Callahan (introduction), Claudia Card, Ruth Ginzberg, Martha Nussbaum, Naomi Scheman, Laurie Schrage, Nancy Tuana, Margaret Walker, and Charlotte Witt. (shrink)

For many of us, entry into motherhood involves an ambiguous visibility and intelligibility, where our acceptance into mainstream spaces as mothers entails a loss of lesbian difference. Mann explores this loss using the work of two philosophers of lesbian difference, Monique Wittig and Judith Butler. She argues that the figure of the lesbian mother is deployed on a broad cultural scale to reinvigorate and renaturaUze the myth of the happy, natural, heterosexual mother.

Book reviewed in this article: Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynecology. By Laurence B. McCullough and Frank A. Chervenak.

This paper addresses the progressive, feminist critique of same-sex marriage as articulated by Claudia Card. Although agreeing with Card that the institution of marriage as we know it is profoundly morally flawed in its origins and effects, Callahan disagrees with Card's suggestion that queer activists in the United States should not be working for the inclusion of same-sex couples in the institution.

The. Metamorphosis. of. Motherhood. Patricia. Smith. Motherhood, as traditionally understood, is obsolete. It is not yet as obsolete as, say, knighthood, but it is moving just as inevitably in the same direction. No one wants to admit that, but it is ...

Multiple gestations, or multifetal pregnancies,raise a number of significant policy questionsconcerning the well being of women and the wellbeing of the children fetuses might become.Important questions for feminists pertain notonly to multifetal pregnancy itself, but alsoto the medical interventions associated withthese pregnancies. In this paper, we addressthe questions of how many embryos should betransferred in assisted reproduction, how manyfetuses should remain in a multiple gestation,who should make these decisions, and the needto protect women from overexposure to exogenoushormones. Although we focus (...) on assistedreproduction in the United States, we believethat our suggestions are applicable to othercountries where the technology is comparable. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to show that current legal criteria for paternalistic involuntary psychiatric confinement of the mentally ill are both too narrow and too broad. I do this by first developing a principle of justified paternalistic interference with adults, which I take to be acceptably protective of individual liberty, but which does not require unnecessary sacrifices of individual welfare. After offering an analysis of current legal criteria for involuntary confinement, 1 argue that an acceptable theory of paternalistic (...) interference reveals that those criteria (1) exclude some cases where confinement would be morally permissible, and (2) allow paternalistic confinement of many whose detention is not morally justifiable. Keywords: paternalism, incompetence, involuntary civil confinement, liberty, beneficence, harm CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Among fundamental, widely shared values, there are two which often come into conflict, creating a serious moral dilemma, viz., the value of individual well-being and the value of individual self-direction. These values issue in two fundamental moral principles, one which prescribes the protection of others from harm, and one which proscribes interfering with a person's right to direct his own life and actions. When an individual is doing or choosing something which subjects him to harm or significant risk of harm, (...) the question of paternalistic interference arises.Since John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, there have been a number of attempts to say when such protective interference with adults is morally acceptable. (shrink)

The Silent Scream, a videotape which includes footage of a real time sonogram of an abortion in progress, has been receiving considerable attention in America as the anti-abortion movement’s latest argument. The tape has been enthusiastically endorsed by President Reagan and has been distributed to every member of Congress and to each of the Supreme Court justices. It is produced and narrated by Bernard N. Nathanson, a practicing obstetrician and gynecologist, and it includes a number of implicit and explicit claims (...) which are highly controversial. Chief among these are: (1) the claim that since we can draw no morally significant line during the stages of fetal development, the fetusmust be recognized as a person from conception onward, (2) the claim that the film is a high tech, state of the art proof that abortion is the brutal murder of an innocent human being, (3) the claim that in abortion the fetus experiences terror and pain, and (4) the claim that as long as abortion is legal, showing this film (or one relevantly similar) must be made part of the informed consent procedure for abortion. My purpose in this paper is to examine these claims to see if The Silent Scream adds anything to the moral case for making abortion illegal. I give particular attention to two claims which are seldom addressed in the abortion debate, viz., that the fetus experiences terror and pain during an abortion, and that women have not had the information they need (but which this film provides) to give an adequately informed consent to abortion. Since there is so much confusion in the abortion debate, and since this film trades on that confusion, my broader purpose is to add some clarificationto the public discussion of this issue, which is daily becoming a more divisive issue of public policy. (shrink)

The Silent Scream, a videotape which includes footage of a real time sonogram of an abortion in progress, has been receiving considerable attention in America as the anti-abortion movement’s latest argument. The tape has been enthusiastically endorsed by President Reagan and has been distributed to every member of Congress and to each of the Supreme Court justices. It is produced and narrated by Bernard N. Nathanson, a practicing obstetrician and gynecologist, and it includes a number of implicit and explicit claims (...) which are highly controversial. Chief among these are: (1) the claim that since we can draw no morally significant line during the stages of fetal development, the fetusmust be recognized as a person from conception onward, (2) the claim that the film is a high tech, state of the art proof that abortion is the brutal murder of an innocent human being, (3) the claim that in abortion the fetus experiences terror and pain, and (4) the claim that as long as abortion is legal, showing this film (or one relevantly similar) must be made part of the informed consent procedure for abortion. My purpose in this paper is to examine these claims to see if The Silent Scream adds anything to the moral case for making abortion illegal. I give particular attention to two claims which are seldom addressed in the abortion debate, viz., that the fetus experiences terror and pain during an abortion, and that women have not had the information they need (but which this film provides) to give an adequately informed consent to abortion. Since there is so much confusion in the abortion debate, and since this film trades on that confusion, my broader purpose is to add some clarificationto the public discussion of this issue, which is daily becoming a more divisive issue of public policy. (shrink)

Review of Joan Callahan, Reproduction, Ethics and the Law: Feminist Perspectives.

Queen Christina of Sweden was unconventional in her time, leading to hypotheses on her gender and possible hermaphroditic nature. If genetic analysis can substantiate the latter claim, could this bring the queen into disrepute 300 years after her death? Joan C. Callahan has argued that if a reputation changes, this constitutes a change only in the group of people changing their views and not in the person whose reputation it is. Is this so? This paper analyses what constitutes (...) change and draws out the implications to the reputation of the dead. It is argued that a reputation is a relational property which can go through changes. The change is “real” for the group changing their views on Queen Christina and of a Cambridge kind for the long dead queen herself. Cambridge changes result in new properties being acquired, some of which can be of significance. (shrink)

Summary: An introduction to this special issue of Hypatia, in which feminist philosophers analyze, critically engage, and extend several predominant ideas in the work of Claudia Card. Authors in this collection include Lisa Tessman, Marilyn Friedman, Hilde Lindemann, Sheryl Tuttle Ross, Joan Callahan, David Concepción, Kathryn Norlock and Jean Rumsey (co-authors), Linda Bell, Samantha Brennan, and Victoria Davion.

For years, mainstream feminist ethics focused criticism on male supremacy. Feminist philosophers in this volume adopt a less male-focused stance to look closely at oppression's impact on women's agency and on women's relations with women. Examining legal, social, and physical relationships, these philosophers confront moral ambiguity, moral compromise, and complicity in perpetuating oppression. Combining personal experience with philosophical inquiry, they vividly portray their daily engagement with oppression as both victims and perpetrators. They explore such issues as how pornography silences women (...) and radical feminist politics' complicity in racism. Among these insightful essays, Sandra Bartky argues that women share guilt for racism when they benefit from it without protest; Susan Brison reflects on uses of narrative in trauma recovery from such experiences as being targeted for rape or murder; Joan Callahan examines fallout of derogatory speech directed at lesbians; Virginia Held proposes carrying care into marketplaces and governments; and, in her introduction, Claudia Card draws on Primo Levi's conception of "gray zones" in exploring dangers of character damage to victims of misogyny. A fitting companion to Card's highly regarded Feminist Ethics, this volume interweaves observations on character, political ethics, violence, and love into an accessible sourcebook for students. It tackles some of feminism's most pressing issues and helps readers to identify and then overcome the real damage caused by oppression. (shrink)

In the long-running debate on the interest of the dead, Joan C. Callahan argues against such interests and although Søren Holm for practical reasons is prepared to consider posthumous interests, he does not see any moral basis to support such interests. He argues that the whole question is irresolvable, yet finds privacy interests where Tutankhamen is concerned. Callahan argues that there can be reasons to hold on to the fiction that there are posthumous interests, namely if it (...) is comforting for the living and instrumental for society. Thus, despite arguing against the position that the dead have any interests or for any moral basis for such interests, these “interests” are still taken into consideration in the end. This shows the unsatisfactory basis of their positions and indicates the tenacity of the moral intuition that the dead can have moral claims on the living. One example of a posthumous interest is the interest in one’s good name. Here we argue that it is an interest of moral significance. This implies that if individuals restrict use of their sample when they are still alive, those restrictions apply after their death. Further, it implies that one should be concerned with the reputation of historic persons. Research that defeats these interests calls for justification. We have suggested two lines of thinking along which such a discussion could go: investigating the truth-value of the good name and the relevance of bringing it into possible disrepute. (shrink)

The HOD Dichotomy Theorem states that if there is an extendible cardinal, δ, then either HOD is “close” to V or HOD is “far” from V. The question is whether the future will lead to the first or the second side of the dichotomy. Is HOD “close” to V, or “far” from V? There is a program aimed at establishing the first alternative—the “close” side of the HOD Dichotomy. This is the program of inner model theory. In recent years the (...) third author has provided evidence that there is an ultimate inner model—Ultimate-L—and he has isolated a natural conjecture associated with the model—the Ultimate-L Conjecture. This conjecture implies that that the first alternative holds—HOD is “close” to V. This is the future in which pattern prevails. In this paper we introduce a very different program, one aimed at establishing the second alternative—the “far” side of the HOD Dichotomy. This is the program of large cardinals beyond choice. Kunen famously showed that if AC holds then there cannot be a Reinhardt cardinal. It has remained open whether Reinhardt cardinals are consistent in ZF alone. It turns out that there is an entire hierarchy of choiceless large cardinals of which Reinhardt cardinals are only the beginning, and, surprisingly, this hierarchy appears to be highly ordered and amenable to systematic investigation, as we shall show in this paper. The point is that if these choiceless large cardinals are consistent then the Ultimate-L Conjecture must fail. This is the future where chaos prevails. (shrink)

We show that Bounded Forcing Axioms (for instance, Martin's Axiom, the Bounded Proper Forcing Axiom, or the Bounded Martin's Maximum) are equivalent to principles of generic absoluteness, that is, they assert that if a $\Sigma_1$ sentence of the language of set theory with parameters of small transitive size is forceable, then it is true. We also show that Bounded Forcing Axioms imply a strong form of generic absoluteness for projective sentences, namely, if a $\Sigma^1_3$ sentence with parameters is forceable, then (...) it is true. Further, if for every real x, $x^{\sharp}$ exists, and the second uniform indiscernible is less than $\omega_2$ , then the same holds for $\Sigma^1_4$ sentences. (shrink)

For each natural number n, let C(n) be the closed and unbounded proper class of ordinals α such that Vα is a Σn elementary substructure of V. We say that κ is a C(n)-cardinal if it is the critical point of an elementary embedding j : V → M, M transitive, with j(κ) in C(n). By analyzing the notion of C(n)-cardinal at various levels of the usual hierarchy of large cardinal principles we show that, starting at the level of superstrong (...) cardinals and up to the level of rank-into-rank embeddings, C(n)-cardinals form a much finer hierarchy. The naturalness of the notion of C(n)-cardinal is exemplified by showing that the existence of C(n)-extendible cardinals is equivalent to simple reflection principles for classes of structures, which generalize the notions of supercompact and extendible cardinals. Moreover, building on results of Bagaria et al. (2010), we give new characterizations of Vopeňka’s Principle in terms of C(n)-extendible cardinals. (shrink)

Gender, ‘race’, poverty, health and discourses of health reform in the context of globalization: a postcolonial feminist perspective in policy researchIn this paper, I draw on extant literature and my empirical work to discuss the impact of globalization and healthcare reform on the lives of women — those from countries of the South as well as of the North. First, I review briefly the economic hardships identified in different sectors of the population that have been attributed to how globalization is (...) now working. Second, I examine what these global processes mean for health, with particular focus on poverty, gender, racialization and health. Third, I reflect on how nurse scientists might develop research agendas in the 21st century that would foster social transformation and social justice for all people. The position taken here is not an indictment of globalization. Rather, I argue that globalization is a fact in all of our lives. There are positive aspects of globalization. There are also negative aspects which we must collectively address, given that the issues identified can have deleterious consequences for the world’s poor, women in particular. I suggest that, to construct knowledge for practice and praxis, research agendas of the future should be inclusive of subaltern voices. I argue that drawing on a postcolonial feminist epistemology might help us to define such agendas, and express the multilayered sociopolitical contexts of health and illness in advocacy with policy‐makers. (shrink)

Superstrong cardinals are never Laver indestructible. Similarly, almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals, superhuge cardinals, rank-into-rank cardinals, extendible cardinals, 1-extendible cardinals, 0-extendible cardinals, weakly superstrong cardinals, uplifting cardinals, pseudo-uplifting cardinals, superstrongly unfoldable cardinals, Σn-reflecting cardinals, Σn-correct cardinals and Σn-extendible cardinals are never Laver indestructible. In fact, all these large cardinal properties are superdestructible: if κ exhibits any of them, with corresponding target θ, then in any forcing extension arising from nontrivial strategically <κ-closed forcing Q∈Vθ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} (...) \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathbb{Q} \in V_\theta}$$\end{document}, the cardinal κ will exhibit none of the large cardinal properties with target θ or larger. (shrink)