ABSTRACT While Joseph Hooker was considering his upcoming presentation on the geographical distribution of species, he asked Charles Darwin for help with some references. During the ensuing exchange of correspondence, Darwin seems to have contradicted himself, regarding his being aware of Leopold von Buch’s observation that distributed varieties become species, prior to writing On the Origin of Species. Literalists and conspiracists have interpreted this apparent self-contradiction as a sign of duplicity and fraud. However, when the correspondence and Hooker’s address are (...) analysed in context, there is a more compelling explanation. Simply that, in response to direct questioning by Hooker, Darwin conflated the two names of Von Baer and Von Buch, and made an honest mistake. (shrink)

A historical episode of evolutionary theory, which has lead to the Red Queen theory of the evolutionary maintenance of sex, includes two striking contingencies. These are used to explore alternative what-if scenarios, in order to test some common opinions about such counterfactuals. This sheds new light on the nature of science and its historiography. One counterfactual leads to an unexpected convergence of its result to that of the actual science but, nevertheless, differs in its causal structure. The other diverges towards (...) an incompatible alternative, but this requires further contingent choices that also diverge from actual science. -/- The convergence in the first counterfactual is due to a horizontal transfer of knowledge. Similar transfers of knowledge are typical for innovations of actual science. This suggests that contingent choices can merge as well as fork research traditions both in actual research and counterfactual history. Neither the paths of the actual history of science nor those of its counterfactual alternatives will form a tree of exclusively diverging bifurcations, but a network instead. Convergencies in counterfactuals may, therefore, be due to the web-structure of science as much as to the aims of the historians in question. Furthermore, the difference in causal structure between the actual science and its convergent counterfactual might become diagnostic for external factors rather than internal aims forcing a historian towards convergence. (shrink)

Since intelligent design (ID) advocates claimed the ubiquitous mouse trap as an example of systems that cannot have evolved, mouse trap history is doubly relevant to studying material culture. On the one hand, debunking ID claims about mouse traps and, by implication, also about other irreducibly complex systems has a high educational value. On the other hand, a case study of mouse trap history may contribute insights to the academic discussion about material culture evolution. Michael Behe argued that mouse traps (...) cannot trap mice with any part missing; therefore, they cannot have a precursor with one part less, therefore, cannot have a continuous history, and therefore, cannot have evolved. The patented and seminal precursor of current flat snap traps, however, had one part less, because spring and striker were formed of one wire. Secondly, historical records that reach back into the Bronze Age suggest that its history continued for a very long time. Thirdly, all prerequisites for evolution (variation, transmission, and selection) abound in mouse trap populations. Hence, Behe’s triple-jump conclusion about mouse traps is false each step. There is no, in principle, impossibility for mouse traps to evolve. An evolutionary account of mouse trap history also has academic merits beyond its educational value. Three important conclusions can be drawn: (1) reticulate phylogenies of artifact systems may be resolvable as overlapping, but branching, phylogenies of parts; (2) homologous ideas may be realized by analogous material, that is, phylogenies of information do not necessarily coincide with those of material parts; (3) recombination of parts between different artifact systems increases the cumulative nature of cultural evolution. (shrink)

Discussions of the implications of sexual reproduction have appeared throughout the history of evolutionary biology, from Darwin to Weismann, Fisher, Muller, Maynard Smith, and Williams. The latest of these appearances highlighted an evolutionary paradox that had previously been overlooked. In many animal and plant species reproduction is obligately sexual and also half the offspring are male, yet the males contribute nothing but genes to reproduction. If asexual mutants of such a species were to produce as many asexual offspring on average (...) as sexual females in that species produce daughters and sons, the growth rate of their population would be twice as large. Whereas half the offspring of sexual females are noncontributory males, all the offspring of such an asexual mutant would contribute to growth rate. Nevertheless, sexual reproduction prevails in most species and is not lost evolutionarily. (shrink)

In 1935, A. G. Tansley, who was knighted later, proposed the ecosystem concept. Nevertheless, this concept was not without predecessors. Why did Tansley’s ecosystem prevail and not one of its competitors? The purpose of this article is to pin the distinguishing features of Tansley’s ecosystem down, as far as the published record allows. It is an exercise in finding the difference that made a difference. Besides being a pioneering ecologist, Tansley was an adept of psychoanalysis. His interest even led him (...) to visit Sigmund Freud in Vienna for a while. Psychologists had to regard the mind as an entity in its own right, while knowing that it truly was part of a larger whole (body + mind), because the causal relation between body and mind was unknown. This lead Tansley to conclude that psychologists must not objectify the system under study, have to search for causes within their own field, and must not speculate unless this serves a scientific purpose. In 1925, Tansley defended psychoanalysis in a prolonged controversy against a concerted attack criticizing its speculative content and poor scientific standing. This could have been the reason why Tansley kept his ecosystem free of speculative content and unscientific connotation. The competing ecosystem-like concepts, however, have contained philosophical speculation, non-deterministic properties like vitalism or entelechy, or have been burdened with unscientific connotations. Hence, rigorous restraint distinguished the ecosystem concept and made it ready for use by later researchers. (shrink)

The group selection controversy largely focuses on altruism (e.g., Wilson 1983; Lloyd 2001; Shavit 2004; Okasha 2006, 173ff; Borrello 2010; Leigh 2010; Rosas 2010; Hamilton and Dimond in press). Multilevel selection theory is a resolution of this controversy. Whereas kin selection partitions inclusive fitness into direct and indirect components (via influencing the replication of copies of genes in other individuals), multilevel selection considers within-group and between-group components of fitness (Gardner et al. 2011; Lion et al. 2011). Two scenarios of multilevel (...) selection are often distinguished (Damuth and Heisler 1988; Okasha 2006; Pigliucci 2010): (1) group structure only divides individual fitnesses into within- and between-group components (MLS1); and, (2) groups get their own component of fitness and also, in most definitions, a group-level adaptation (MLS2). (shrink)

This study sheds a light on economic roots of optimal foraging/mating theory. Two examples show graphical optimisation models of behavioural ecology that are identical to much older ones of economics. The knowledge transfer has been conscious and explicit in some cases, but also less visible in others. This does no imply plagiarism or misconduct but merely shows how knowledge can diffuse along obscure, sometimes unconscious, routes of non-public and private communication.

Chemical ideas about the diversity of matter in terms of elements and compound substances and their transformations have been pivotal to any scientific or pre-scientific approach ever since. From ancient natural philosophy and alchemy to modern 19th-century chemistry, these ideas were made both the basis of philosophical systems and the target of critical reflection. After temporary interruption, when modern philosophy of science materialized as a discourse on mathematical physics, philosophy of chemistry emerged anew in the 1980s and is now a (...) flourishing field in which philosophers, chemists, and historians of chemistry are engaged. While many of the old philosophical issues have been rediscovered and discussed, new issues have appeared due to shifts of general philosophical foci, alliances with historians and sociologists of science, and the changes of chemistry and its role in society. (shrink)

Unlike other branches of science, the scientific products of synthetic chemistry are not only ideas but also new substances that change our material world, for the benefit or harm of living beings. This paper provides for the first time a systematical analysis of moral issues arising from chemical synthesis, based on concepts of responsibility and general morality. Topics include the questioning of moral neutrality of chemical synthesis as an end in itself, chemical weapons research, moral objections against improving material conditions (...) of life by chemical means, and freedom of research. The paper aims at providing both a sound basis for moral judgements of chemistry in a public discourse and a framework for chemists to reflect on the moral relevance of their activity. (shrink)

The birth of a new discipline, called 'physical chemistry', is sometimes related to the names OSTWALD, ARRHENIUS and VAN'T HOFF and dated back to the year 1887, when OSTWALD founded the Zeitschrift für physikalische Chemie.[1] But as many historians have pointed out, the phrase 'physical chemistry' was widely used before that and the topics under investigation partially go back to Robert BOYLE's attempts to connect chemistry with concepts of mechanical philosophy.[2] The idea of a sudden birth of physical chemistry in (...) 1887 seems to be a founder myth.[3] But there is no doubt that in the late nineteenth-century there was a rapid growth of research in fields now understood as physical chemistry: chemical thermodynamics, electrochemistry, photochemistry, spectroscopy, chemical kinetics etc. (shrink)

Eine philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit der Chemie ist so neu,1 daß die meisten Philosophen gegenwärtig Schwierigkeiten haben dürften, überhaupt eine thematische Verbindung zwischen beiden Fächern herstellen zu können, was auf ähnliche Weise übrigens auch auf Chemiker zutrifft. Daß dies nicht immer so war, wird sofort einsichtig, wenn man bedenkt, daß die chemische Frage nach der substantiellen Verschiedenartigkeit von Stoffen und ihren gegenseitigen Umwandlungsmöglichkeiten bereits zu den Grundfragen aller antiken Naturphilosophen gehörte. Es dürfte insbesondere dem theoretischen Ungenügen des Konzepts stofflicher Qualitäten nach (...) über 2000 Jahren zuzuschreiben sein, daß sich die neuzeitliche mechanische (Natur-)Philosophie gegen Ende des 17. Jahrhundert in nahezu konkurrenzloser Weise durchzusetzen vermochte, so daß jeder, der sich aufs moderne Philosophieren verstehen wollte, der Doktrin der primären (mechanischen) Qualitäten einschließlich der Reduktion jeder Veränderung auf Ortsveränderung anhängen mußte.2 Dieser Ansatz versprach auf einer theoretischen Ebene, mit einem Schlage alle Möglichkeiten stofflich substantieller Verschiedenheit und Veränderung in einen überschaubaren quantitativen Rahmen einzufangen. Diese Abwendung der Philosophie von den ursprünglichen chemischen Fragen beinhaltet drei für den vorliegenden Zusammenhang wichtige Kategorienverschiebungen. (1) Die Kategorie der substantiellen Verschiedenheit verliert ihre Bedeutung in bezug auf Stoffe.. (shrink)

This chapter combines rhetorical with conceptual analysis to argue that the concept of convergence of technologies is a teleological concept that does not describe or predict any recent past, present, or future development. Instead it always expresses or attributes political goals of how future technology should be developed. The concept was already fully developed as a flexible rhetorical tool by US science administrators to create nanotechnology (as nano-convergence), before it was broadened to invent the convergence of nano-, bio-, info-, and (...) cogno-research (NBIC-convergence). Analyzing the use of “convergence” in various US reports, such as in convergence did, does, can, will likely, will necessarily, should, and ought to happen, sheds new light on how science policy avoids public debates about goals and values in deliberating the future, which poses new challenges to STS. (shrink)

Nanotechnology has from its very beginning been surrounded with an aura of novelty. For instance, on the 28 introductory pages of the report that prepared the US National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), Nanotechnology Research Directions (NSTC/IWGN 1999), we read 73 times the term “new”, 15 times “novel”, 7 times “innovation”, and 21 times “revolution”. The authors concede that one should distinguish between different nanotechnologies, because “Many existing technologies do already depend on nanoscale processes. Photography and catalysis are two examples of ‘old’ (...) nanotechnologies” (ibid, p. xxvi). One might conclude here that, if all the existing nanotechnologies are “old” nanotechnologies, “new” nanotechnologies do not yet exists but are only promises of the future. However, without further explanation and distinction between presence and future, they suggest that most nanotechnologies are or will be new. Furthermore, they claim that nanotechnology (in singular) is a generator of further new technologies, since “Nanotechnology will give birth to new fields that at present are only visions of leading researchers” (ibid., p. xviii). Whenever science managers speak of nanotechnology (in singular), sophisticated distinctions seem to give way to plain claims about the present and future novelty of nanotechnology. As the NNI director Mihail Roco wrote in a 2001 report, “A revolution is occurring in science and technology […] Nanotechnology will fundamentally transform science, technology, and society. In 10 to 20 years, a significant proportion of industrial production, healthcare practice, and environmental management will be changed by the new technology.” (Roco & Bainbridge, pp. 1, 19) When they put on their hats as science managers, scientists rarely reject but mostly support such novelty claim, as did for instance the chemists George Whitesides and Paul Alivisatos in the earlier report: “Nanostructures are the entry into a new realm in physical and biological science.” (NSTC/IWGN 1999, p.. (shrink)

The work of the Bohemian chemist Franz Wald seems to be unknown in the history of science. In this paper some of Wald's these concerning the foundation of chemical theory are discussed in connexion with reflexions given in unpublished letters, which Wald wrote to Ernst Mach during the years 1896–1907.

Partly by way of contrast with a conception described by Kleist, Wittgenstein's notions of world?picture and mythology are explained and three types of statement playing a particularly important role with respect to our world?picture or pictures distinguished. Problems concerning sentences which contain normative elements are discussed and a test for what to count as a statement giving information about our world?picture is proposed. A mythology in Wittgenstein's sense is characterized as a structured, systematic set of models permitting analogical development and (...) the gradual change of previous paradigms. (shrink)

L'auteur montre tous les enjeux de la médiation pour une bonne administration de la justice dans le cadre des réformes en cours.

This paper examines the role of community interventions in post-conflict settings. The focus is on peacebuilding through the shaping of collective memories, achieved through the transformation of social ties. By addressing community interventions, this paper opens the black box between interventions by formal institutions (such as peace treaties, trials, or truth commissions) and outcomes. It is based on a study of one specific cross-community initiative in Belfast, Northern Ireland, which – in 2012 – employed a Transitional Justice Grassroots Toolkit. Document (...) analysis is complemented by interviews with participants and organizers to reveal the role of pedagogical practices, mediated by cohort effects, in facilitating cultural transformation through group interactions. This paper suggests how community interventions can change collective memories, cultural trauma, and related identities of the conflict, away from their polarized and polarizing forms, and it explores implications for future peace and social justice. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify certain aspects of the connections between music and (word) language alluded to in various manuscript passages by Wittgenstein. Three points are emphasized: (1) Wittgenstein’s willingness to speak of music as a language; (2) the importance of context; (3) the possibility of distinguishing various ways of explaining our hearing certain sequences of sounds as expressive of gestures or states of mind etc. Several attempts at elucidating the idea of understanding music lead to the realization that, according (...) to Wittgenstein, a prior grasp of his notion of a language-game is required to make headway in this area. (shrink)

Alle Menschen streben nach Glück. Es dürfte schwierig sein, einen Philosophen zu benennen, der diesen Satz jemals ernsthaft bestritten hat. Auf der Basis eines solchen, fast einzigartigen und mehr als zweitausend Jahre haltenden philosophischen Konsenses, so möchte man meinen, konnte eine konstruktive Philosophie des Glücks gedeihen, die sich in der Ausgestaltung der Begriffe des Glücks und des Strebens differenzierte; eine Philosophie, die Antworten gibt auf die Fragen, ob bzw. auf welche Weise wir das jeweils erstrebte Glück erreichen können, und die (...) sich kritisch analysierend zu den wohlfeilen Glücksangeboten verhält, welche uns Werbeagenturen, (Ersatz-) Religionen und selbsternannte Seelenheiler aufdrängen; eine Philosophie, die uns beratend zur Seite stehen kann, wenn wir unsere Bedürfnisse, Lebenshaltungen, -erwartungen und -kontexte aufeinander abstimmen wollen. (shrink)