L’article analyse le sens que prend l’architecture dans la philosophie de Schelling vers 1802/05. On montre comment ce dernier subvertit la thèse de l’architecture-art comme imitation de la simple construction, pour finalement définir l’art architectural par sa capacité à présenter, dans l’inorganique, des allégories de l’organique. On illustre pour finir concrètement différents niveaux de compréhension de cette caractérisation, d’une part avec des exemples tirés de Schelling, d’autre part avec des édifices architecturaux récents relevant à divers titres de la bioinspiration.

Connaissant bien le rôle essentiel pris par le symbolisme, comme présence objective de l’Idée, dans les métaphysiques de l’art postkantiennes (Schelling, Hegel), V. Basch en fait cependant la clef de sa propre esthétique sentimentaliste, subjectiviste et anti-métaphysique. Le déplacement de sens du symbolisme, qui s’effectue chez Basch principalement à partir de son étude de Kant, de Fr. Th. Vischer et de la psychologie physiologique allemande (G. Th. Fechner, W. Wundt), est analysé dans l’article comme le passage d’une incarnation qui est (...) présentation de l’Idée dans le phénomène, à une prise de chair de mes propres sentiments et émotions à même l’objet de l’expérience esthétique. (shrink)

À la croisée des recherches sur l’espace humain et du développement récent des études sur les émotions, l’étude philosophique, esthétique, sociologique, ethnographique, architecturale et urbaine des atmosphères décrit et analyse la manière dont se nouent, dans l’expérience vécue, les propriétés des espaces et des objets, le contexte de la perception sensible, et l’état affectif du sujet sur ses deux versants, l’intime et le partagé. Atmosphère (de même que l’anglais atmosphere ou l’allemand A...

Schelling’s philosophy of art between 1801 and 1807 can be defined as metaphysics of art. The object of that metaphysics is to deploy the absolute as the being of art and of the arts. Schelling has been criticized on the basis that this metaphysics of art represses the infinite diversity of existing works of art, while overlooking concrete aesthetic experience. Based on Schelling’s definition of the “philosophical construction” of art as an inseparably speculative and historical construction, the aim of this (...) paper is to challenge such assertions. It will show that “historical construction” has to be understood in a twofold manner: first, as a transcendental history of the absolute’s artistic individuation and second, as a cultural history of both the ancient and modern worlds of art. Working within this twofold setting the paper argues that Schelling’s systematic approach, while exhibiting a unifying force, still remains open to the otherness of the real. (shrink)

L’article examine le sens de la systématisation de la philosophie transcendantale que Schelling présente en 1800 comme accomplie par l’art, « organon et document » de la philosophie. A partir d’une reconstitution du problème et de la dynamique propres au Système de l’idéalisme transcendantal, puis de la fonction systématique de la philosophie de l’art, on soutient que l’achèvement que l’art est censé accomplir prend en fait plutôt – en lien direct avec l’ambiguïté du principe du Système – la figure d’une (...) mise en suspens, d’une indécision fondamentale entre deux voies, ultérieurement empruntées l’une par la philosophie de l’identité, l’autre par la dernière philosophie.This article examines the significance of the systematization of transcendental philosophy which Schelling claims in 1800 to be fulfilled by art, « the organon and document » of philosophy. After reconstructing the problem and the process peculiar to the System of transcendental Idealism, as well as the systematic function of the philosophy of art, we maintain that the supposed completion of philosophy by art is in fact fundamentally unresolved, suspended between two distinct approaches which will later be taken up in the philosophy of identity and in the late philosophy. (shrink)

Big data and artificial intelligence (“AI”) promise to transform virtually all aspects of biomedical research and health care (Matheny et al. 2019), through facilitation of drug development, diagno...

Institutional ethics consultation services for biomedical scientists have begun to proliferate, especially for clinical researchers. We discuss several models of ethics consultation and describe a team-based approach used at Stanford University in the context of these models. As research ethics consultation services expand, there are many unresolved questions that need to be addressed, including what the scope, composition, and purpose of such services should be, whether core competencies for consultants can and should be defined, and how conflicts of interest should (...) be mitigated. We make preliminary recommendations for the structure and process of research ethics consultation, based on our initial experiences in a pilot program. (shrink)

In recent years, English-language scholars have begun to approach the daunting field of Kant's politics by way of its technical core: the deduction of private right. In this interpretive project, t...

Institutional ethics consultation services for biomedical scientists have begun to proliferate, especially for clinical researchers. We discuss several models of ethics consultation and describe a team-based approach used at Stanford University in the context of these models. As research ethics consultation services expand, there are many unresolved questions that need to be addressed, including what the scope, composition, and purpose of such services should be, whether core competencies for consultants can and should be defined, and how conflicts of interest should (...) be mitigated. We make preliminary recommendations for the structure and process of research ethics consultation, based on our initial experiences in a pilot program. (shrink)

In the third volume of the History of England, David Hume considers the political ramifications of the Protestant reformation with a “Digression concerning the ecclesiastical state.” He advocates the establishment of a state church, believing it will dampen religious “enthusiasm” in the polity. Unlike later secularization theorists, Hume assumes an intractable basis for religion in the human passions. Tensions in Hume’s “cooptation” strategy are evident from Adam Smith’s famous attack upon it in section five of The Wealth of Nations, and (...) in Hume’s own treatment of seventeenth century independency in the fifth volume of the History. Smith argues that public competition among sects facilitates political moderation. In History V Hume stresses the positive role of enthusiasm in fostering civil liberty. This article traces Hume’s indecision to his “external” mode of moral and historical analysis, arguing that a secular policy on religion cannot proceed fruitfully without engaging the theological particulars of the religions at issue. (shrink)

: A familiar criticism of bioethics charges it with being more conceptual than practical—having little application to the "real world." In order to answer its critics and keep its feet on the ground, bioethics must utilize the social sciences more effectively. Empirical research can provide the bridge between conceiving a moral vision of a better world, and actually enacting it.

The use of racial categories in biomedicine has had a long history in the United States. However, social hierarchy and discrimination, justified by purported scientific differences, has also plagued the history of racial categories. Because “race” has some correlation with biological and genetic characteristics, there has been a call not to “throw the baby out with the bathwater” by eliminating race as a research or clinical category. I argue that race is too undefined and fluid to be useful as a (...) proxy for biology or genetics. (shrink)

There are deep divides over the use of racial and ethnic categories in biomedical research and its application in both medical and non-medical contexts. On one side of a roughly described dividing line are practitioners who need to use every piece of information at their disposal to solve pressing, realworld problems in real time, such as making clinical diagnoses or identifying perpetrators of crime. On the other side are scientists and policy makers committed to meeting a scientific and social need (...) for accuracy and thus trying to avoid miscategorization.As Jay Cohn describes in this issue, medical practitioners in particular have used racial and ethnic categories to “enhance diagnostic and therapeutic precision.” He argues for retaining this practice. The plea, motivated by genuine concern for patients, is to avoid “throwing the baby out with the bathwater.” However, Cohn and others mischaracterize the nature of the debate. The argument is not about whether differences among populations exist, or even whether differences among “races” exist. (shrink)

The concept of “humanity” is integral to David Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, but barely appears in his earlier Treatise. Many consider the later “humanity” theory superior, permitting a more “extensive” sympathy not limited by proximate associations. This paper argues for Hume's consistency on humanity by surveying The History of England. Hume's History discussions lend support to the associative, and thus limited, Treatise conception. Humanity is opposed to religious enthusiasm; its positive effects are local and particular. Moreover, Hume's (...) historiography involves a hesitation on the content of “humane” judgments, which cannot fulfill the cosmopolitan function envisioned by many present-day interpreters. (shrink)

Human genetic and genomic research can yield information that may be of clinical relevance to the individuals who participate as subjects of the research. It has been common practice among researchers to notify participants during the informed consent process that no individual results will be disclosed, “incidental” or otherwise. However, as genetic information obtained in research becomes orders of magnitude more voluminous, increasingly accessible online, and more informative, this precedent may no longer be appropriate. There is not yet consensus on (...) the responsibilities of researchers to disclose individual research results to research participants. Empirical research suggests that participants want to know individual research results. On the other hand, the increased resolution and power aforded by new genomic analyses may lead to fndings of statistical, but not necessarily clinical, signifcance. This paper addresses the issues to be considered in deciding whether and how to disclose “incidental” fndings or other fndings of clinical signifcance that arise in the course of human genomic and genetic research. What research results should be ofered, and what should not be ofered? For which research should individual results be ofered to research participants, when should they be ofered, how, and to whom? (shrink)

Human genetic and genomic research can yield information that may be of clinical relevance to the individuals who participate as subjects of the research. However, no consensus exists as yet on the responsibilities of researchers to disclose individual research results to participants in human subjects research. “Genetic and genomic research” on humans varies widely, including association studies, examination of allele frequencies, and studies of natural selection, human migration, and genetic variation. For the purposes of this article, it is defined broadly (...) to include analysis of DNA collected from humans that has implications for human health. This paper addresses both research results of individual research participants that may be an intended product of the research, as well as unanticipated, “incidental” findings. (shrink)

Across the world, an authoritarian and exclusionary form of populism is gaining political traction. Historically, some populist movements have been democratic and based on a sense of inclusive justice and the common good. But the populism on the rise at present speaks and acts otherwise. It is challenging constitutional democracies. The polarization seen in authoritarian populism goes beyond the familiar left-right political spectrum and generates disturbing forms of extremism, including the so-called alternative right in the United States and similar ethnic (...) and nationalistic political movements in other countries. The field of bioethics will be profoundly affected if authoritarian populism displaces constitutional democracy. But the field has a significant contribution to make to rebuilding the communal and civic foundations upon which constitutional democracy rests. (shrink)

A familiar criticism of bioethics charges it with being more conceptual than practical—having little application to the “real world.” In order to answer its critics and keep its feet on the ground, bioethics must utilize the social sciences more effectively. Empirical research can provide the bridge between conceiving a moral vision of a better world, and actually enacting it.

In his book Objectivity, William Earle has attempted to give the phenomenologically intentional aspect of awareness its philosophical due. To sharpen the issues, it may be well to review some of the main points of his treatment. Earle combines a realist view of the object of awareness with a partially Hegelian conception of awareness. Awareness, according to Earle, involves three stages, recognizable as thesis, antithesis and synthesis. The thesis is made up of the subject and object intertwined, and not yet (...) distinguished from each other. The antithesis is constituted by a recoil of the subject from the object back upon itself. Earle terms this recoil a primary reflexivity of the subject, which, though ingredient in awareness, is not yet sufficient to constitute awareness. Whereas for Hegel the reflexive recoil of the subject back upon itself constitutes the object for the subject, for Earle this recoil of the subject in no way creates its object. The reflexive withdrawal of the subject from the object simply separates two metaphysically distinct entities. Hegel's separation of subject and object alienates the subject from himself; Earle's separation of subject and object alienates the subject from the world. But for both Earle and Hegel, knowledge of the object does not take place until a redemptive synthesis of subject and object occurs. In the Hegelian scheme the redemptive synthesis unifies the subject with himself. According to Earle, however, the redemptive synthesis achieves only knowledge of the object as other than the subject; that is, it is the object as distant from, therefore intended by, the subject that is known. The final stage in knowledge is thus constituted by a positive approach of the subject to a metaphysically distinct object. Earle must therefore insist, as he does, that immediate self-awareness is, in principle, impossible. He characterizes his own method as retrospectively reflexive, very different from the primary reflexivity involved in the constitution of awareness. To justify the validity and possibility of this retrospective reflexivity, he argues for the metaphysical identity of a subject forever outside of and beyond its own acts, and, of course, inaccessible to knowledge in a way that the world independent of the subject is not. (shrink)

Higher plant shoot meristems are multicellular structures that are the site of postembryonic organogenesis. Analysis of chimeric plants has indicated that cells in different regions of the meristem can interact with each other so that their activities are coordinated during developmental processes. Correlations have not been demonstrated between events at a molecular level and the interactions observed at a phenotypic level in chimeras. Two recent papers(1,2) address this problem by reporting that expression of the floricaula gene in one region of (...) chimeric snapdragon meristems is sufficient to promote the transition from inflorescence to floral development and to induce the expression of the downstream organ identity genes deficiens and plena throughout the meristem. (shrink)

A peculiar feature of Hutcheson’s system is his claim that there exist no original pains in the imagination, and hence no real displeasures concerning form or beauty. This position, when set against a clear emphasis upon the pains of the moral sense in apprehending evil, seems to render tenuous his frequent analogies between the experiences of beauty and goodness. In light of this apparent discrepancy in Hutcheson’s argument, the repeated use of the term “moral beauty” presents interpretive difficulties, particularly on (...) the matter of whether, and in what way, goodness is itself a species of beauty. These problems can be surmounted by way of close attention to Hutcheson’s connection and ordering of the various “senses.” On the present interpretation, Hutcheson denies formal displeasure aspart of a broader theological argument concerning the moral function of the imagination. On this view, “moral beauty” is a special type of imaginative pleasure. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s position on international justice is beset by some troublesome inconsistencies, most notably a conflicted set of views on the status of federations as suitable alternatives to a world state. It is tempting for contemporary readers to interpret Kant’s indecision as a lack of commitment or resoluteness. Closer inspection demonstrates that this problem involves deeper paradoxes, rooted in the concept of sovereignty. On this matter, Kant’s Rechtslehre is the source of the difficulties found in the “popular” essays. Kant’s vacillating (...) position on the proper institutional end for international relations is attributable to the fundamentally “permissive” character of his concept of right. Rechtslehre doctrines entail a form of skepticism, from which a coherent cosmopolitan program cannot possibly be derived. (shrink)

As we write, U.S. cities and states with extensive community transmission of Covid‐19 are in harm's way—not only because of the disease itself but also because of prior and current failures to act. During the 2009 influenza pandemic, public health agencies and hospitals developed but never adequately implemented preparedness plans. Focused on efficiency in a competitive market, health systems had few incentives to maintain stockpiles of essential medical equipment. Just‐in‐time economic models resulted in storage of only those supplies needed then. (...) At the same time, global purchasing in search of lower prices reduced the number of U.S. suppliers, with hospitals dependent on foreign companies. There is still a possibility that the pandemic will be manageably bad rather than unmanageably catastrophic in this country. Immediate, powerful, and sustained federal action could make the difference. (shrink)

The Institute of Medicine has called on health care leaders to transform their health systems into “learning health care systems,” capable of studying and continuously improving their practices. Learning health care systems commit to carrying out numerous kinds of investigations, ranging from clinical effectiveness studies to quality improvement research and implementation science. There has been progress in realizing the IOM's vision, but also many challenges. One of these challenges has been lingering uncertainty about whether the data collection and monitoring central (...) to learning health care systems is actually research and if so, what kind of ethical oversight it should have. This is not a new question. Yet so far, there has been no foundational analysis of the fit between the existing human subjects protection framework in use in the United States and the new kinds of data collection activities that are being, and increasingly will be, undertaken by learning health care systems. Two companion feature articles in this volume, by a team at Johns Hopkins, fill this void. (shrink)

“There's glory for you!”“I don't know what you mean by ‘glory,’ ” Alice said.Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course, you dont—till I tell you. I meant ‘there's a nice knock-down argument.’”“But ‘glory’ doesn't mean a ‘nice knock-down argument,” Alice objected.“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”“The question is,” said (...) Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master, that's all.”When applied bioethics confronts the topic of futility, the question of who is to be master turns out to be central. Indeed, much of the literature on futility has focused on exactly this question: who gets to define the terms of the debate? Who gets to decide that treatment is “futile” and therefore allowably withheld or withdrawn? (shrink)

“There's glory for you!”“I don't know what you mean by ‘glory,’ ” Alice said.Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course, you dont—till I tell you. I meant ‘there's a nice knock-down argument.’”“But ‘glory’ doesn't mean a ‘nice knock-down argument,” Alice objected.“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”“The question is,” said (...) Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master, that's all.”When applied bioethics confronts the topic of futility, the question of who is to be master turns out to be central. Indeed, much of the literature on futility has focused on exactly this question: who gets to define the terms of the debate? Who gets to decide that treatment is “futile” and therefore allowably withheld or withdrawn? (shrink)

Two papers in this issue address the limits of surrogates’ authority when making life-and-death decisions for dying family members or friends. Using palliative sedation as an example, Jeffrey Berger offers a conceptual argument for bounding surrogate authority. Since freedom from pain is an essential interest, when imminently dying, cognitively incapacitated patients are in duress and their symptoms are not manageable in any other way, clinicians should be free to offer palliative sedation without surrogate consent, although assent should be sought and (...) every effort made to work with surrogates as harmoniously as possible. Ellen Robinson and her colleagues report on the implementation of a policy at Massachusetts General Hospital that supports do-not-resuscitate orders when cardiopulmonary resuscitation is likely to be ineffective or harmful, even if surrogates disagree. The “Doing No Harm” policy at MGH allows for what MGH calls a “medically indicated DNR” and what in some other places is called “a unilateral DNR”—the writing of an order not to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation, regardless of surrogate disapproval. These kinds of DNR policies have emerged in some hospitals across the country and for much the same reason that Berger provides in his argument regarding palliative sedation. I support the reasoning and the policies in both the Berger and Robinson papers. However, as the authors would most likely agree, the problems they aim to remedy are not simply about the scope of surrogate and professional authority. They are also symptoms of inattention to professional obligations and system failures. (shrink)